Fernanda A. Ferreira, Flávio Ferreira, "Privatization and Government Preference in an International Cournot Triopoly," WSEAS Transactions on Systems, vol. 17, pp. 237-243, 2018, DOI:
Fernanda A. Ferreira, Flávio Ferreira. Privatization and Government Preference in an International Cournot Triopoly.
WSEAS Transactions on Systems. 2018;17:237-243.
WSEAS Transactions on Systems
Print ISSN: 1109-2777, E-ISSN: 2224-2678
Volume 17, 2018
Privatization and Government Preference in an International Cournot Triopoly
Authors: ,
Abstract: This paper presents an analysis of the relationship between the privatization of a state-controlled firm and government preferences for tax revenue, by using a mixed Cournot model with domestic and foreign firms. We assume that the government fixes a tax rate on the domestic production and a tariff for imported goods. The state-controlled firm aims to maximize the sum of consumer and producer surplus; the government’s objective function is a weighted sum between social welfare and tax revenue.
Pages: 237-243 WSEAS Transactions on Systems, ISSN / E-ISSN: 1109-2777 / 2224-2678, Volume 17, 2018, Art. #26 DOI: *As the DOI is a unique identifier, it is already available in the pdf version.
**The DOI link will be activated in the first midst of January 2026.
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