A Novel Smart Home Lightweight Authentication Protocol using IoT
Applications
HANA A.RABABAH1, AHMAD Y. ALHUSENAT2, KHALED A.MAHAFZAH1
1Department of Electrical Engineering, Al-Ahliyya Amman University, Amman, JORDAN
2Department of Network Engineering and Security, Jordan University of Science and Technology,
Irbid, JORDAN
Abstract: - The Internet of Things (IoT) introduces innovative real-time applications that use sensors to collect
data that exchange between things to things and things to humans through the network. In this aspect, security
and privacy is the primary concern for researchers to protect these systems. This paper proposes a real-time
authentication algorithm based on the one-time pad (OTP) principle. The keys are dynamically exchanged, and
the data is encrypted via dynamic encryption, depending on random sensors’ data. The key is generated and
exchanged dynamically using the dynamic encryption technique, thus enhancing the users’ data privacy and
security. Moreover, a lightweight key generation, exchange, and authentication protocol are proposed for data
collecting from smart home sensors. The proposed protocol guarantees security and privacy demand, which are
the user’s primary concern. The proposed protocol is developed for smart home applications with interfacing
requirements, which makes the system real and applicable. The operation principle of the proposed protocol is
illustrated sufficiently if there is any desynchronization or emergency.
Key-Words: - Lightweight algorithm, Internet of Things (IoT), One-time pad (OTP), Privacy, Authentication,
Dynamic key exchange, Real-Time application, Smart Home.
Received: October 16, 2021. Revised: September 18, 2022. Accepted: October 17, 2022. Published: November 24, 2022.
1 Introduction
Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is a new digital
system for securing IoT applications related to
physical, computational, and communications
elements. The IoT real-time applications of CPS are
implemented in many areas that require high
security and privacy in the exchange of data, such as
industry, smart homes, smart grids of power
systems, and medical devices, [1], [2]. IoT
applications exchange vast amounts of secure and
private data within heterogeneous networks, but
they are vulnerable to attack in both the hardware
and the software because due to many cyber and
physical interfaces, Attacks may come from these
interfaces; Indeed, security is the main burden for
cyber-physical systems. Nowadays, energy
management in home appliances has become a
crucial issue. To overcome this issue, a smart home
is presented in, [3]. In this home, the user can
control energy consumption remotely through
smartphone applications in which the Internet of
Things plays an essential role, [4]. Smart homes rely
on different sensors thus home automation devices
need to be decorated due to the rapid development
of numerous new wireless communication
technologies, [5], [6]. As seen in Fig.1, the overall
system comprises a home equipped with different
sensors such as a humidity sensor, temperature
sensor, fire/smoke detector, and light sensor, [7].
Moreover, these sensors are controlled remotely
using a mobile application with different features.
Both sides of this system are connected using an IoT
server. IoT information security concerns are
becoming more complex and vital. In a single
network context, traditional and present security
cannot provide expanded secure data sharing for
IoT, [8]. A user’s identification is verified by an
authentication process using various tools, including
a password, identity certificate, smart cards, or
biometrics, [9]. However, because of inherent
weaknesses or carelessness on the user’s part, many
authentication techniques are vulnerable to
compromise, [10], [11]. Some proposed
conventional authentication methods also call for
administrator setup beforehand, user intervention for
identity clarification, and permission. They are,
therefore, inappropriate for mobile environments.
This problem highlights the necessity for a seamless
authorization solution incorporating context
information to improve static authentication
methods. In the end, this approach would reduce the
need for the user to provide verification information
each time they want to access the necessary service.
Any information describing an entity’s
circumstance, such as a person, location, or object,
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on SYSTEMS and CONTROL
DOI: 10.37394/23203.2022.17.52
Hana A. Rababah, Ahmad Y. Alhusenat,
Khaled A. Mahafzah
E-ISSN: 2224-2856
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is context, [12], [13], [14]. This work proposes a
smart home authentication protocol inspired by the
random nature of IoT real-time applications. The
proposed protocol improves the security and privacy
of the data ultimately. Moreover, the paper presents
a new lightweight algorithm that utilizes the random
nature of real-time data and exchanges the dynamic
encryption keys in order to improve security and
privacy. The proposed algorithm can classify and
manage data dynamically, this feature is significant
for smart home applications depending on the One-
Time Pad (OTP), which is the most robust
lightweight encryption technique; Using
unpredictable random keys, and used only for one
time. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2
discusses the proposed protocol and its dynamic
encryption. Section 3 presents the authentication
algorithm technique. Interfacing requirements as a
mobile application for smart home applications are
presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes
the paper, and future work will be given.
Fig. 1: Smart Home connection with IoT.
2 The proposed Protocol and
Dynamic Encryption
2.1 Security Requirements
This section presents security and privacy
requirements for real-time application systems, and
the proposed authentication and key exchange
algorithm. User privacy and sensitivity are critical
and significant concerns in implementing these IoT
applications in real life (smart home, smart car,
human body, etc.). Using the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) to encrypt real-time applications’
data requires many static keys for each user and
system, which requires huge storage for these keys,
which are under threat. Also, it suffers from the
critical key exchange, [15], and privacy issues result
from using only one key for all systems and
applications. As well as, if RSA (RivestShamir
Adleman) is applied for real-time applications, it
suffers from choosing between private and public
keys regarding privacy issues or multi-private and
public keys regarding storage and keys exchange
issues, [15]. In the presented lightweight real-time
authentication technique, a dynamic key exchange
stage is proposed which changes and updates the
keys between the administrator and server.
Enhancing security and privacy by exchanging
active keys with Hash functions, including unique
identification for the administrator and server (,
and , respectively), permitting the user to
manage and ensure the privacy, integrity, and
authentication of their applications data, the
authentication technique will be discussed in details.
Also, a sequence number is generated within the
server and sent to the administrator to be used in the
following stage message to prevent replay attacks
and synchronization. Moreover, the protocol
provides the ability to manage the family or
emergency response applications to eliminate who,
when, where, and what data is received.
Table 1. Abbreviations and cryptography functions.
Initial vector

Administrator identity

Server identity
data sensor
data group
message

Sequence number

Acknowledgment
Hash
One-way Hash function
Exclusive-OR operation
2.2 Authentication Protocol
The protocol has an administrator side and a server
side within three stages: the initial stage, the normal
stage, and the dynamic stage, as shown in Fig.2,
Fig.3, and Fig.4. Table 1 shows the required
authentication protocol abbreviations and
cryptography functions.
2.2.1 Initial Stage
The initial stage is the first contact between the
administrator and the server. In this stage, the
administrator can generate sensors’ data that they
want to use as key and send to the server
using
. The server will use
to it with and
save, which can be used in dynamic encryption
and decryption, as shown in Fig.2.
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Hana A. Rababah, Ahmad Y. Alhusenat,
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E-ISSN: 2224-2856
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Volume 17, 2022
Fig. 2: Protocol Initial stage.
2.2.2 Normal Stage
The normal stage is the second contact between the
administrator and the server. In this stage, the
administrator generates sensors’ data that they want
to use as a new key and send to the server
using.  is used by the server to be with
and save , which can be used in dynamic
encryption and decryption, as shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: Protocol Normal stage.
2.2.3 Dynamic Stage
At this stage, the administrator can generate new
sensors data that they want to use as a unique key
and send to the server using󰇛󰇜, and then
the server will use 󰇛󰇜 to it with and
save, which can be utilized in dynamic
encryption and decryption, as shown in Fig.4. In this
stage, the two sides will exchange the key
dynamically without the need to save all keys or
stack them in just one key.
Fig. 4: Protocol Dynamic stage.
3 Dynamic Algorithm Solution
3.1 Initial Stage Algorithm
Algorithm 1 represents the administrator side’s
initial stage, it collects the sensors’, and the
combined data from the chosen sensors' group. Then
sends ( = 
), Hash ( ), and cipher
data, which is encrypted by using dynamic
encryption. On the other side, algorithm 2 receives
=
; Hash ( ) and cipher data,
then calculates 󰇛
󰇜 to authenticate the
administrator if the result of the calculated hash
value at algorithm 2 is the same as the received one.
Finally, the server authenticates the administrator
message and generates, and sends it to the
administrator as an acknowledged message and
sends ( ; Hash ( )) as an
acknowledged message and decrypts the cipher data
using and save. The computational
complexity in algorithms 1 and 2 is O(1) because
we have just one message with two lightweight liner
operations, and a hash function. Therefore, we
need low storage to save, ,
, dynamic
updated key , and updated .
Algorithm 1 Initial stage Administrator side
Input: Select group of sensors from 1 to n.
Collect the data Sensor = data combines
from sensors group chosen
Output: Send = //Hash()
1: Calculate= 
2: Calculate Hash()
3: Send the = //Hash()
4: Encrypt data using
5: Send Cipher Data
Algorithm 2 Initial stage Server side
Input: = //Hash() and cipher Data
Output: send (Ak//Hash())
1: Calculate = 
2: Calculate Hash()
3: If the same result hash received then
4: Accepts the authenticated message
5: Set =
6: Generate random 
7: Calculate Ak = 
8: Calculate Hash()
9: Decrypt the cipher data
10: Send (Ak//Hash())
11: Else discard the message
12: End if
3.2 Normal Stage Algorithm
Algorithm 3 at the administrator side normal stage
collects the sensors’, and the combined data from
the chosen sensors group. Then sends =
, Hash (), and cipher data.
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Where data is encrypted by, using dynamic
encryption, after authentication, the server
acknowledges the message by solving ( ;
Hash ()) and calculate the hash value.
On the other side, algorithm 4, at the server side
normal stage, receives = , hash (
) and ciphers data, then calculate 󰇛 =
󰇜and Hash ( ) to authenticate the
administrator if the same resulted hash value is
received. It generates a random and sends
(  Hash ()) as acknowledge
message, decrypts the cipher data using and
saves. If does not authenticate, try
by
and update the key, else discard the message.
The computational complexity in algorithms 3 and 4
is O(1) because we have just one message with two
lightweight liner operations, Xor and Hash function.
We need low storage to save, ,
, dynamic
updated key , and updated Seq2.
Algorithm 3 Normal stage Administrator side
Input: Ak//Hash()
1: Authenticate the server If  True
2: else discard the message
3: collect the sensor data group = data combines
from sensors group chosen
Output: send the M2 = //Hash()
and Cipher Data
1: calculate = 
2: calculate Hash()
3: send the M2
4: Encrypt using Dynamic encryption by
5: send cipher Data
Algorithm 4 Normal stage Server side
Input: = //Hash() and cipher data
Output: send (Ak//Hash())
1: Calculate = 
2: Calculate Hash()
3: If the same result Hash received then
4: Accept the authenticated message
5: Set = ;
6: Generate random 
7: Calculate Ak = 
8: Calculate Hash(IDs)
9: Send (Ak//Hash(IDs))
10: Else
11: Calculate = 
12: Calculate Hash()
13: If the same result Hash received then
14: Accepts the authenticated message
15: Set =
16: Generate random 
17: Calculate Ak = 
18: Calculate Hash()
19: Send (Ak//Hash())
20: Decrypt using dynamic encryption by
21: Else discard the unauthenticated message
22: End if
23: End if
3.3 Dynamic Stage Algorithm
Algorithm 5 is at the administrators’ side dynamic
stage, it collects sensors’, and the combined data
from the chosen sensors group. Then send =
󰇛󰇜, hash (󰇛󰇜), and cipher data.
Where data is encrypted by using dynamic
encryption after authenticating, the server
acknowledges that message by solving (󰇛󰇜)
󰇛󰇜; Hash ( )) and calculate the
hash value. On the other side, algorithm 6 dynamic
stage server side, receives󰇛 󰇛󰇜󰇜,
Hash ( ) and cipher data, then calculate
= 󰇛󰇜and Hash (󰇛󰇜) to
authenticate the administrator if the same resulted
hash value received. It generates a random  and
sends ( ; Hash ( )) as an
acknowledged message, decrypts the cipher data
using and saves. If Mn is not authenticated
by󰇛󰇜, try by
and update the key, else discard
the message. The computational complexity in
algorithms 5 and 6 is O(n) because we have n
message with two lightweight liner operations, Xor
and Hash function. We need low storage to
save,
, dynamic updated key , and
updated 󰇛󰇜.
Algorithm 5 Dynamic stage Administrator side
Input: Ak//Hash( ).
Collect the data group = data combined from
chosen sensors group
Output: ( = 󰇛󰇜//Hash(󰇛󰇜 ))
(Cipher Data)
1: Calculate 󰇛󰇜 = 󰇛󰇜
2: Calculate Hash( 󰇛󰇜
3: Send the
4: Encrypt using dynamic encryption by
5: Send cipher Data
Algorithm 6 Dynamic stage Server side
Input:󰇛󰇜Hash(󰇛󰇜and
(Cipher Data)
Output: Send (Ak//Hash ( ))
1: Calculate = 󰇛󰇜 󰇛󰇜
2: Calculate Hash (󰇛󰇜 )
3: If the same result that received then
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DOI: 10.37394/23203.2022.17.52
Hana A. Rababah, Ahmad Y. Alhusenat,
Khaled A. Mahafzah
E-ISSN: 2224-2856
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Volume 17, 2022
4: Accepts the authenticated message
5: Set =
6: Decrypt using dynamic encryption by
7: Generate random 
8: Calculate Ak = 
9: Calculate Hash( )
10: Send (Ak//Hash( ))
11: Else
12: Calculate = 󰇛󰇜
13: Calculate Hash( )
14: If the same result hash received then
15: Accept the authenticated message
16: Set =
17: Generate random 
18: Calculate Ak = 
19: Send (Ak//Hash( IDs))
20: Decrypt using dynamic encryption by
21: Else discard the message not authenticate
22: End if
23: End if
4 Smart Home Authentication
Multiple sensors are used in IoT real-time
applications for various purposes, such as smart
homes, smart cities, smart cars, smart grids, etc.,
[16], [17], [18]. Their real-time data can be used as
a random key generated by the administrator that
manages the user applications and sends these data
to the server, where the data will process and react
to implement the IoT application.
In a smart home application, the overall system
comprises a home equipped with different sensors
such as a humidity sensor, temperature sensor, fire/
smoke/ gas leakage detector, and light sensors
indicating LDR and motion sensors, [7]. Moreover,
these sensors are controlled remotely using a mobile
application with different features. Both sides of this
system interact using an IoT server. In this case, the
home administrator can manage the user’s data by
giving each user unique identification and initial
vector and sending the data for each authentication
user while the key exchanges dynamically,
preventing any user from knowing any unauthorized
data. The administrator gathers all data from the
sensors, then manages that data by grouping it and
sending each group of sensors’ data as a key to the
server, where their destination authentication user
can see the smart home application information and
interact with the system situation and use these keys
for dynamic encryption.
For example, the smart home provides data for
three accounts, which requires three- different
unique identification () and initial vectors for
each user. The first one is for parents, with full
access and privilege to all smart home features. This
information must be available just for parents and
not available for anybody else; in this case, we will
use a secret initial vector
for this account and
send the sensor data as a key to these users for
authentication and encryption, which enhances
privacy and security for users, that dynamic key is
updated for each user individually. The second
account is for children, where there is limited access
and privilege, children can control and use some
smart home features by using another initial vector
for these users, allowing them to authenticate and
decrypt authorized application data, and the last
account is for emergency cases that can send critical
information to the nearest emergency center and
family members, which uses public initial vector
that allows reserving and decryption that message
it if needed. The administrator manages the data
based on selected and programmed criteria in
advance based on users’ and applications’ demands
and requests. Moreover, the user can manually add
these options to eliminate who, when, where, and
what data is received.
5 Conclusion and Future work
The IoT real-time applications of CPS are
implemented in many areas of industries. For
example, intelligent Cars, Medical Devices, Power
Grid Systems, Home-based Arrangements, and
other similar regions. These applications need high
security and privacy in the data exchange. This
paper proposes a real-time authentication and a
dynamic key exchange protocol that changes and
updates the keys between the administrator and
server every time. This will enhance security and
privacy. This real-time authentication algorithm
technique gives key exchange techniques for
dynamic encryption, which depends on the random
sensor data. The protocol has a low power
consumption feature and limited storage required
with a lightweight complexity algorithm, facilitating
the implementation and distribution of the IoT real-
time applications. In future work, the realization of
the proposed authentication method will be
developed. The smart home model, mobile
application, and programmed GUI will be
established. Then, real-time data will be presented
and discussed thoroughly; the authors will work on
realizing the proposed authentication protocol.
Finally, a smart home with at least three prototype
sensors will be built, and the effectiveness of the
proposed authentication method will be verified.
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on SYSTEMS and CONTROL
DOI: 10.37394/23203.2022.17.52
Hana A. Rababah, Ahmad Y. Alhusenat,
Khaled A. Mahafzah
E-ISSN: 2224-2856
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Volume 17, 2022
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WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on SYSTEMS and CONTROL
DOI: 10.37394/23203.2022.17.52
Hana A. Rababah, Ahmad Y. Alhusenat,
Khaled A. Mahafzah
E-ISSN: 2224-2856
482
Volume 17, 2022