China’s Economic Growth: Threats and Challenges to Chinese Economy
and Energy Security
ASHFAQ AHMED1, USMAN QAIS2, MUHAMMAD DAWOOD KAKAR3, ATTA MUHAMMAD4
1Department of Politics & International Relations (DPIR) University of Sargodha, PAKISTAN
2Department of Political Science & International Relations University of Sialkot, PAKISTAN
3School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR) Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, PAKISTAN
4Department of Agriculture Economics, Baluchistan Agriculture College Quetta, PAKISTAN
Abstract:- Despite global pandemic Chinese economic growth rate was 2.3 percent in 2020. GDP surpassed US $
15 trillion and growth rate raised to 6.5 percent in fourth quarter of 2020 and US $ 17 trillion GDP was recorded in
first quarter of 2021. People Republic China’s (PRC) gigantic military budget and revolution in military affairs
(RMA) creates senese of hegemonic ambitions in its neighbours. Contrarily, United States (US) sights PRC has
ambitions to expand its political influence, gain access to economic markets, change international order by
replacing US. This potential asymmetrical and imbalanced relationship locks America in typical Thucydides trap.
Washington reached conclusion that economic growth and military might are intertwined. However, it is dependent
on China’s energy supplies. PRC’s rise can be slowed down by stopping or interrupting the flow of energy
supplies. Range of threats are posed to PRC oil imports i.e. US aerial strike on PRC oil//gas pipelines, use of
proxies specially ast Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) to disrupt oil supplies, terrorist attacks on oil containers
on land and naval blockade in Persian Gulf. The inference drawn is energy security dependent on Strait of Malacca
is Achilles Heel of China. This paper aims at probing Washington’s capacity to disrupt or stop energy supplies to
PRC in Malacca strait, Persian Gulf, land routes in Pakistan. It discusses various strategies including direct naval
blockade, use of proxies and direct military strikes.
Key Words: China, Economic, Washington, Energy Security, Development
Received: May 16, 2021. Revised: May 12, 2022. Accepted: June 14, 2022. Published: July 4, 2022.
1 Introduction
In post-Cold War era United States (US) emerged as
sole superpower or hegemon. The protracted war in
Afghanistan and prolonged military engagement in
the Middle East consumed enormous economic
resources. Futile protracted lost wars undermined
America’s soft image and created doubts about its
military power abroad. Beijing critically observing
US engagement in out of area operation draw
conclusion mutual cooperation is prerequisite for
economic progress and development. Economic
reforms were introduced, free market reforms were
introduced and direct investment was welcomed by
China. Policy of war avoidance particularly with
Central Asian Republics (CARs), Magnolia, Pakistan
and Russia was adopted to acquire sustained
economic progress. Conversely, benefits of
globalizations were reaped and Chinese influence
expanded globally. Eight hundred million [1]
Chinese were lifted out of extreme poverty. Standard
of living in China improved. It is ranked as second
largest economy in the world [2]. In 2018 World
Bank while commenting on China’s 9.5% economic
growth rate termed it as fastest sustained expansion
in the history. Today, it is world largest
manufacturer. It has world largest foreign exchange
reserves. China is US’s third largest export market
thus has become significant trade partner. Beijing by
holding America’s treasury bonds is helping US to
keep its interest rates low and pay federal debt [3].
Sustainable economic development marked China as
an upper-middle-income state. Despite global
pandemic Chinese economic growth rate was 2.3
percent in 2020. GDP surpassed US $ 15 trillion and
growth rate raised to 6.5 percent in fourth quarter of
2020 [4]. China’s economy is moving at a fast pace
irrespective of trade war with US. The authorities
created 11.86 million jobs and trade surplus with US
reached US $ 316.9 billion. Abovementioned
statistics were confirmed by the record 18.3% growth
rate, 14.1% industrial output and 34.2% retail sales in
the first quarter of 2021 [5]. Economic indicators
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on POWER SYSTEMS
DOI: 10.37394/232016.2022.17.19
Ashfaq Ahmed, Usman Qais,
Muhammad Dawood Kakar, Atta Muhammad
E-ISSN: 2224-350X
187
Volume 17, 2022
were exceptional case because rest of the world was
grappling with economic crisis hit by the global
pandemic. It indicates surprising economic recovery
of world second largest economy. China’s GDP was
recorded US $ 17.7 trillion and growth rate had been
8.1% in the year 2021.
China requires energy supplies for continuous
industrial production, to sustain pace of exports and
generate foreign revenue. Economic progress,
poverty eradication and sustainable economic
development all relies heavily on energy supplies.
Energy security therefore has become top policy
priority for present day China. This unforgettable
lesson was learned in 2003-04 by experiencing
severe energy shortages that severely disrupted
country’s manufacturing output [6] and capacity to
generate foreign revenue. Energy is playing crucial
role in China’s economic growth and development.
It became world third largest oil importer and largest
oil consumer in 2009 [7]. Conversely, demands for
uninterrupted oil supplies have increased steadily.
Today, it is world largest oil-importer and second
largest oil-consumer in the world [8]. Seventy
percent of its oil-consumption comes from oil
imports. This figure will reach eighty percent by
2030. Uninterrupted secure energy supplies are
essential for China’s sustainable economic growth,
development and economy. Territorial disputes in
South China Sea and in South East Asia between
China and its immediate neighbours are highlighted
in news media and academic literature. Territorial
disputes prevent Beijing to solely control or suppress
regional and extra regional conflicts. Contentious
territorial claims can result in crisis, potential conflict
and out-break of war between China and its
neighbours. China fears application of economic
strangulation through energy cut-offs by its
neighbouring rivals in future conflicts. Securing
energy supplies is primary issue for Beijing. Fear of
energy cut-offs stems from various reasons including,
China’s heavy dependence on energy imports
through sea lanes of communications.
Major energy supply lines at sea are controlled or
dominated by US allies or US.
US National Defense Strategy in 2018, identified
China as a principal challenge and long-term
strategic competitor to the United States.
Pentagon maintains heavy military presence near
Chinese mainland. Washington has signed
strategic partnership agreements with China’s
immediate neighbors. Contentious relations over
territorial claims between Beijing and its
neighbors can result in conflict resulting in
China’s naval blockade.
China’s Military Strategy 2015, manifests Sea Lanes
of Communications (SLOCs) is gaining significance
in Chinese strategic discourse. It asserts that “the
security of overseas interests concerning energy and
resources, strategic SLOCs, as well as institutions,
personnel and assets abroad, has become an
imminent issue.” Paper states that “… great
importance has to be attached to managing the seas
and oceans and protecting maritime rights and
interests,” [9]. Document clearly highlights maritime
disputes.
This paper aims at underlining threats and challenges
posed to Chinese energy security in varying degrees
like naval blockade, terrorist attacks, piracy and
territorial dispute. Significant aspect of these
challenges is these challenges lie in international
waters, disputed territories and insurgency hit areas.
2 Achilles Heel of China’s Energy
Security and Economy the Malacca
Dilemma
Malacca strait is jointly controlled by Singapore,
Malaysia and Indonesia. It is 1080 kilometers long
world busiest waterway connecting Pacific Ocean
and the Indian Ocean [10]. This strait alone supports
25 percent of world’s maritime trade [11]. 60 percent
of vessels passing this strait are Chinese energy
supplies from Middle East, Africa and South East
Asia. It is significant trade route or SLOC for
China’s energy security and Chinese economy. If the
strait is blockaded for Chinese oil tankers it will pose
serious threats to China’s energy security. Exports
dependent economy will be seriously affected. This
double edge sword is China’s Malacca Dilemma. In
November, 2003 Hu Jintao addressing the
Conference on Economic Work of the Communist
Party of China asserted Achilles Heel of China’s
energy security and economy lies in Strait of
Malacca [12]. Naval blockade of Chinese imports
and exports at Strait of Malacca was anticipated long
ago. Strait serves as lifeline of China’s energy
imports as well. This vulnerability is discussed in
Chinese strategic circles and abroad. Alternative
routes include Sunda Strait and Lombok and
Makassar Straits. However, these straits have
disadvantages of being shallow or longer routes. The
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on POWER SYSTEMS
DOI: 10.37394/232016.2022.17.19
Ashfaq Ahmed, Usman Qais,
Muhammad Dawood Kakar, Atta Muhammad
E-ISSN: 2224-350X
188
Volume 17, 2022
estimated financial cost was around US $ 220 billion
per year [13].
Profound changes are taking place in Southeast Asia
e.g. US projected its hegemonic presence by
introducing QUAD and promoting power politics.US
rebalancing strategy resulted in increased naval
presence in the region by cementing strategic
alliances with regional states. Southeast Asian states
are buying advance weapons to cement their control
over illegally occupied territories. Strategic changes
have slowly and gradually exacerbated threats to
Beijing’s interests and hampers peaceful
development in the region. Further, US enjoys
strategic advantages vis-a-vis China because of
advance military technology, capabilities to increase
situational awareness, numerical strengths and
operational military base at Diego Garcia. This
military facility was used for reconnaissance in 1973,
Arab-Israel war, to support Gulf War, Afghanistan
and Iraq wars [14]. Washington replied to growing
Sino-US strategic competition with alliance
formations in South East Asia, Pacific Ocean and the
Indian Ocean region to contain China. US alone is
capable of blockading Malacca Strait to disrupt oil
imports and coerce Beijing to back down in case of
conflict. It is application of non-contact warfare
strategy to avoid unnecessary loss of military
equipment, trained personnel, attacks against military
bases in the region and much costly full-scale
warfare inviting direct attacks against US mainland.
Naval blockades to cut energy supplies in the past
have played crucial role in several cases. During
World War II (WWII) US damaged Japanese
economy and military through naval blockade [15].
Policy to slowly bleed enemy through economic
strangulation can be a risky strategy requiring US to
deploy credible combat capabilities. Question arises
has US the capacity to successfully blockade Chinese
oil shipments?
US imposed economic sanctions against
geographically and economically weak and small
nations for instance Iran and North Korea. Critical
assessment of US policy ascertains despite limited
options available to economically and militarily weak
states Washington could not produce desired results.
Chinese economic share/ contribution in global
economy is more than twenty-five percent, its
geographical size and military strength is gigantic.
Washington can neither fracture energy security nor
damage Chinese economy or declare victory against
Beijing. The following section discusses different
scenarios in case naval blockade is imposed. It can
result in following possible scenarios.
2.1 PRC Policy of Open Confrontation
US measures to disrupt energy supplies will certainly
reduce Beijing’s commercial activities within and
outside its borders. Dire energy shortages can
dreadfully affect Chinese exports resulting in
economic crisis, power shortages sub-sequentially
leading to political crisis at home. Peoples Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) presence in Indian Ocean at Sri
Lanka, Gawadar and Djibouti. Huge defence budget
endows People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to carryout
research and development activities in defence
sector. China has evolved powerful armed forces and
Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
Material resources available to PLA and dire
consequences of economic strangulation enable
Beijing to adopt policy of open confrontation. PLA
can inflict formidable damage to US navy. Strategic
planners in Pentagon may perceive to adopt policy of
non-contact by imposing naval blockade similar to
John F. Kennedy’s 1962 Cuban naval blockade [16]
against its contemporary rival. Pentagon’s musing of
non-contact warfare strategy can dangerously result
in crisis leading to conflict escalation and open war
with nuclear overhang.
2.2 Conflict-Prevention Strategy
Chinese authorities in response to US naval blockade
may decide to avoid adopting policy of open
confrontation. Conflict-Prevention strategy can
involve oil-pipelines construction to import oil from
Russia and Kazakhstan. Other options include PLAN
contingents to safeguard oil-shipments. However, US
navy attempt to directly confront PLAN security
contingents safeguarding oil-shipments or missile
strikes against oil-pipelines [17] will result in
crossing Chinese threshold and patience level.
Certainly, PLA’s reputation publicly challenged will
demand counter-strike. Inability to respond will
fracture Beijing’s deterrent capability in the region.
Incapability will encourage regional rivals perhaps
New Delhi to join hands with Washington and settle
territorial disputes through coercive measures
including use of force or threat of use of force.
2.3 Soft-Strategy
Beijing can orchestrate soft power strategy- a state’s
ability to achieve its national interest or persuade
other states through attraction rather than coercion or
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on POWER SYSTEMS
DOI: 10.37394/232016.2022.17.19
Ashfaq Ahmed, Usman Qais,
Muhammad Dawood Kakar, Atta Muhammad
E-ISSN: 2224-350X
189
Volume 17, 2022
threat of use of force- [18] to maintain status-quo by
utilizing energy reserves and importing extensive
energy from Russia, Kazakhstan and utilizing
Gawadar port for oil-imports. Simultaneously,
Beijing will engage diplomatically for conflict
prevention and conflict resolution with Washington.
However, it should not be considered as a sign of
weakness and hamper China’s nuclear deterrent
capabilities.
2.4 US Conventional War-Winning
Strategy
US air, sea and land war fighting doctrines are
considered as war-winning strategies because of
numerical strength and qualitative edges it enjoys
over enemies. Pentagon can orchestrate war fighting
strategy against China because of PLA’s smaller
nuclear force size. In this scenario Beijing requires to
expand nuclear forces and create sense of mutual
vulnerability in strategic circles based in Washington.
Fear of long-range residual nuclear deterrent force
will erode efficacy of US’s sophisticated military
technology and efficiency of deterrent forces.
Certainly, it will preserve strategic stability and
prevent future conflicts.
2.5 US Allies Response to China Specific
Embargo
In prevailing international order states affairs are
interconnected it resulted in complex
interdependence. Therefore, world economy is
interdependent US declaration of economic warfare
against China will harm Western allies’ economies.
Will they tolerate sanctions? Can they sustain cost of
economic war waged against China? The longer the
blockade is continued the longer would be sufferings
of US allies [19]. Efforts to disrupt Beijing’s
sustainable development will certainly disrupt
sustainable development of European Union
signatories. PRC is playing crucial role in global
economy imposing energy embargo has global
implications.
Fig. 1: Peoples Republic of China’s Territorial Dispute with Neighbours
Source: China′s ambitious bid for Southeast Asia hegemony | Asia | An in-depth look at news from across the continent
| DW | 24.12.2019
3 Sino-Indian Hostility
Chinese sustainable economic development enables it
to stretch military mussels and extend its outreach.
PRC’s military capabilities encouraged it to claim
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on POWER SYSTEMS
DOI: 10.37394/232016.2022.17.19
Ashfaq Ahmed, Usman Qais,
Muhammad Dawood Kakar, Atta Muhammad
E-ISSN: 2224-350X
190
Volume 17, 2022
over different geographical areas. It adopted policy to
regain control of disputed territories. Expansionist
policy is considered threatening by China’s
immediate neighbors. Sino-Indian unresolved
protracted border dispute is resulting in horizontal
escalation of hostility from Ladakh to South East
Asia. Beijing viewed as a common threat by its
Eastern and South Eastern neighbors is bringing them
closer with New Delhi. Indian growing presence in
South East Asia is worsening China’s Malacca
Dilemma. Look East Policy enabled it to enhance
cooperation with South East Asian countries e.g.
Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia [20]. It is
evolving military cooperation. New Delhi is
exporting missiles including naval and coastal
defence version of BrahMos supersonic cruise
missile to South East Asian nations. It is aimed at
increasing defence capabilities of allies to counter
Chinese threatening moves and encroachments.
Strong anti-PLAN forces mean to use force or threat
of use of force to disrupt Chinese energy shipments if
required. In addition, Beijing’s coastguard vessels
and maritime militia can also be targeted in their
hostile operations. Indian navy is strengthening
Vietnamese naval forces by providing it five High
Speed Guard Boats in December 2020. Keeping in
view active territorial dispute India is playing a
disruptive role by adding to problems in China’s
backyard.
Besides strengthening allies Indian armed forces
established bases in Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
Major Indian ships, aircraft careers, fighter aircrafts
and submarines extend its combat zone [21] against
China. Substantial war fighting capabilities and
geographical advantages enable New Delhi to disrupt
Chinese energy supplies in Strait of Hormuz, Arabian
Sea and the Strait of Malacca.
From above paragraphs inference can be drawn that
Chinese Sea Lines of Communications are vulnerable
to hostile navies. Energy imports to China can be
disrupted in case war breaks out. US and India enjoy
clear strategic, numerical and geographical edge over
energy-hungry nation.
4 Threats to China’s Energy Security
in the Persian Gulf
China’s oil imports reached 536.3 million tons in
2018 [22]. It is dependent on Middle Eastern oil-
exporters for its mega oil-consumptions.
International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that its
energy requirements will reach seventy-six percent in
2024 and eighty-two percent in 2042 [23]. Since, 4.5
Million Barrels per day being imported from the
Middle East through the Persian Gulf and Gulf of
Oman it can be interrupted. Disruption in energy
imports will pose serious threats to China’s economy
and economic lifeline. Navy’s fifth fleet represents
US immense military power in Persian and Arabian
Gulf. Seventh fleet is largest forward deployed fleets
with sixty thousand navy and Marine Corps, 350
fighter aircrafts, sixty battle ships it is operating in
South Pacific, Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf [24].
Fifth and seventh fleets can blockade Chinese oil
containers at distant places. However, it is not
prescribed owing to fear of conflict escalation.
Waging economic proxy can be considered
appropriate step e.g. energy importers can offer
higher price to PRC’s oil-exporter disrupting oil
exports. Political and diplomatic efforts can be
launched to execute it. However, implementing this
disruptive strategy will demand intense economic
resources requiring diversion of economic resources
from other important sectors for instance to purchase
additional stocks of energy. Dangers of being
bankrupt and diverse energy resources are making
this task challenging. Consequentially, Washington
can impose strict economic sanctions against Iran,
key energy exporter to threaten energy security.
According to estimates serious disturbance in energy
exports will lower China’s economy by six percent.
To deal with energy scarcity dilemma PRC maintains
Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SRP). However, PRC
has maintained opacity over amount of SPR, its
ability to stock SPR and demands to meet its daily
requirements. It frustrates experts to estimate PRC
actual usage and quantity it stocks as reserves.
Second available option is to enter strategic
agreements with allies paving the way for supply of
energy from their SPRs to meet China’s energy
requirements.
5 Vulnerability of Oil and Gas Supply
China is making economic gains because of
industrial production heavily relying on energy
supplies. Sustainable economic development enabled
it to raise, sustain and modernize its armed forces and
expand political influence abroad. US is locked in
typical Thucydides trap- emerging power is
perceived threatening by the ruling power/ hegemon
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on POWER SYSTEMS
DOI: 10.37394/232016.2022.17.19
Ashfaq Ahmed, Usman Qais,
Muhammad Dawood Kakar, Atta Muhammad
E-ISSN: 2224-350X
191
Volume 17, 2022
it results in war [25]. Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) Director Christopher Wray in July, 2020
clearly termed China “the greatest long-term threat”
to US [26]. China is considered as a threat by US top
ranking officials. US annual intelligence report
released on April 13, 2021by the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence further exacerbated
this threat. The report compiled by intelligence
community based on declassified documents regards
China as a major threat [27]. US intelligence
community believes Beijing can pose challenges to
US in different domains including military,
technological and economic. Yet, it does not foresee
direct war between the peer competitors. Mere
presence of nuclear weapons stabilized strategic
stability. It suggests war avoidance to avoid perilous
future. Fear of mutual annihilation prevents direct
confrontation. The ideal strategy for US security
establishment and intelligence community is use of
proxies including mercenaries, propaganda
campaigns, insurgents, pirates and terrorists to
disrupt energy flows en-route to china.
6 East Turkistan Islamic Movement
(ETIM)
The group has presence in Afghanistan. It comprises
of Uyghurs from Xinjian Western China. ETIM is
Afghanistan based terrorist group. United Nations
released a report in July, 2017 highlighting ETIM’s
presence in Syria and several Afghan provinces
including Badakhshan, Faryab, Helmand and
Nuristan. Group members have long pursued
independence for Xinjian province. Linkages with Al
Qaeda, Jamaat Ansarullah and Katiba al-Tawhid wal-
Jihad [28] empower it to expand its reach and
carryout operations in areas beyond its reach.
Peculiar features make it perilous and an ideal
candidate towage proxy and target PRC’s energy
supplies and development operations in South Asia.
Proxy war enables US to avoid being unnecessarily
exposed to charges of its involvement and direct
confrontation. US intelligence officials can provide
ETIM substantial clandestine financial assistance to
slow the pace of peer competitor’s economic growth.
In 2018, Beijing conveyed Islamabad that ETIM
linked with Baloch insurgents [29] can carry-out
potential terrorist attacks against Chinese workers
and projects in Gilgit-Baltistan, Khyber Pakhton-
Khwa and Balochistan. Later, crackdown was carried
out against ETIM [30]. Cao Wei expert on security
studies at Lanzhou University presumed that ETIM
was involved in July, 2021 bus attack. Nine Chinese
workers working on Dasu hydropower project [31]
were killed in the ETIM attack.
7 Chinese Countermeasures to
Overcome Energy Security
Problems and Potential Challenges
Washington can employ energy blockade against
PRC the abovementioned scenarios manifests it will
certainly result in war. This section endeavors to
briefly discuss strategies and available options for
China to overcome energy shortages.
7.1 Utilizing Strategic Petroleum Reserves
One of the answers to energy shortages or potential
naval blockade to energy shipments can be to release
crude oil from SPRs. Nonetheless, it is one of the
risky options because this decision will shrink PRC’s
SPRs at a fast face. In case of open confrontation
PLA and PLAN or its air force will succumb to oil
shortages. It will restrict Chinese armed forces
movement and operational capabilities against
overwhelming enemy power becoming paralyzed.
7.2 Constructing Foreign Naval Bases
China’s state owned Cosco Shipping Company was
working on construction of container terminal for
military purposes in collaboration with Abu Dhabi
government. US lobbied with United Arab Emirates
(UAE) to halt construction [32]. China’s sixty
percent of oil is imported through sea vulnerable to
hostile navies. It does not appreciate Washington’s
firm hands on its economic throat. Probably, naval
support base was under construction keeping in view
potential threats posed by US and India to Beijing’s
energy imports particularly in Strait of Hormuz.
Natural competitors can easily cut-off energy imports
to China’s Eastern ports. Inference can be drawn it
was aimed at neutralizing hostile naval blockades in
future conflicts. PLAN can secretly establish naval
bases to support military operation away from
mainland to prevent economic strangulation.
Observers including Fickling believe China is
constructing overseas ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania and Mayanmar to expand its naval
operational capabilities and convert them into
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on POWER SYSTEMS
DOI: 10.37394/232016.2022.17.19
Ashfaq Ahmed, Usman Qais,
Muhammad Dawood Kakar, Atta Muhammad
E-ISSN: 2224-350X
192
Volume 17, 2022
military bases in future to counterbalance US in the
region.
7.3 Policy of Oil Mercantilism
China applied policy of oil mercantilism in pursuit to
secure energy supplies at affordable price. Oil
mercantilist theory advocates (Chinese) government
intervention in oil imports to ensure sustainable oil
supplies at affordable price and ensure energy
security. PRC will thus be able to generate wealth,
strengthen national economy and benefit domestic
audience. The reliable energy strategy devised by oil
mercantilists is state owned oil companies at home
and abroad. It will ensure independent, secure,
reliable and affordable oil/ energy supplies through
state owned production within and outside state
borders. Success of this policy depends upon robust
diplomacy to develop strategic alliance, buy oil fields
and shares in oil industries. Oil mercantilism is seen
as viable strategy to price increase and military
threats to its economy and energy security.
7.4 Construction of Thailand Energy Pipeline
One of the available potential options is to build a
canal through Thailand’s Kra Isthmus Canal.
Construction of this particular route will decrease
China’s reliance on Malacca Strait. Unfortunately,
strategic pundits have considered it impossible as
once operational this route would require Beijing to
take control of Thailand. Therefore, Thailand would
not allow construction of Kra isthmus Canal.
8 Conclusion
This academic research endeavored to highlight
China’s economic growth rate. Significant aspect of
this study is to highlight potential threats, challenges
and obstacles posed to world second largest economy
i.e. 18.3% growth rate, 14.1% industrial output and
34.2% retail sales in the first quarter of 2021. Beijing
though helps US to pay its federal debt and interest
rates low ironically Washington considers it as a
formidable threat. Contrary to adopting neo-liberalist
policy of cooperation both Sino-US are heading
towards confrontation. This study highlights three
potential threats posed to PRC’s economy and
sustainable economic development. First, threat to
China emanates from US owing to Thucydides trap
[33]. Second, wide ranging threats to Chinese energy
supplies [34] are posed at land, on sea and from air.
China is widening its options to increase security of
oil shipments. It took PLAN twenty years to evolve
blue water navy and operate away from Chinese
coastal areas. Hopefully within next decade PRC
naval force will be in a position to secure sea lanes of
communications. Decision makers are also
considering options to import oil from Russia and
Kazakhistan to address security problems posed to
Chinese energy imports and reduce its reliance on
Malacca strait. Oil shipments from Gawadar to
Xinjiang province require restoration of peace in
insurgency hit Balochistan. This volatile region can
be used by PRC’s potential enemies to target China
bound oil tankers. ETIM [35] and Baloch insurgents
can be used as proxy for this purpose. Third type of
threat is the Middle Income Trap (MIT). MIT occurs
when a particular state reaches given economic level
but failed to adopt new sources of development and
innovation. A state failure to address MIT and
transform itself to new economic conditions result in
pivotal declined economic growth rate known as
middle income trap.
This study draws general inference that emerging
power will pose psychological threats to hegemon in
international system. Consequentially, hegemon will
be faced with Thucydides trap resulting in crisis.
Mismanagement of crisis will result in outbreak of
violence.
References:
[1] The World Bank in China. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/o
verview#1.
[2] Jiacheng, L. (2017). Developing China’s
Indian Ocean Strategy: Rationale and
Prospects. China Quarterly of International
Strategic Studies, 3(4), 482.
[3] Chaudhury, D. R. (2021, November 23). View:
The highs and lows of China's economy.
Retrieved from
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/int
ernational/world-news/view-the-highs-and-
lows-of-chinas-
economy/articleshow/88003456.cms?from=md
r.
[4] Shih, G. (2021, January 18). China’s Economy
is Growing Faster Now than Before the
Coronavirus Pandemic. Retrieved from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_p
acific/china-economy-growth-
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on POWER SYSTEMS
DOI: 10.37394/232016.2022.17.19
Ashfaq Ahmed, Usman Qais,
Muhammad Dawood Kakar, Atta Muhammad
E-ISSN: 2224-350X
193
Volume 17, 2022
coronavirus/2021/01/17/2138ef2c-5935-11eb-
a849-6f9423a75ffd_story.html.
[5] China's Economy Grows 18.3% in Post-Covid
Comeback. (2021, April 16). Retrieved from
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-
56768663.
[6] Lam, P.-L. (2005). Energy in China:
Development and Prospects. China
Perspectives , 59, 1.
[7] BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015.
(2015). Retrieved from
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/.
[8] Brandstäter, L. (2020, September 3). Malacca
Strait: China’s strategic chokepoint. Retrieved
from
https://blog.fleetmon.com/2020/09/03/malacca-
strait-chinas-strategic-chokepoint/.
[9] China’s Military Strategy (full text). (2015,
May 27). Retrieved from
https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_pap
er/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm.
[10] Freeman, D. B. (2003). Straits of Malacca:
Gateway Or Gauntlet? . Montreal & Kingston.
London. Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 4.
[11] Maritime Security Partnerships. (2008).
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies
Press, 160.
[12] Lanteigne, M. (2008). China’s Maritime
Security and the `Malacca Dilemma. Asian
Studies , 4 (2), 144.
[13] Mudunuri, N. (2020, July 7). The Malacca
Dilemma and Chinese Ambitions: Two Sides of
a Coin. Retrieved from
https://diplomatist.com/2020/07/07/the-
malacca-dilemma-and-chinese-ambitions-two-
sides-of-a-coin/.
[14] Bose, S. (2012, March 15). Chagos: The Heart
of An American Empire? Retrieved from
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2012/3/15/
chagos-the-heart-of-an-american-empire/.
[15] Farley, R. (2018, May 14). Could the US Navy
Blockade China in Wartime? Retrieved from
The Diplomat:
https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/could-the-us-
navy-blockade-china-in-wartime/.
[16] Glass, A. (2009, October 22). Kennedy
Imposes Naval Blockade of Cuba , Oct. 22,
1962. Retrieved from
https://www.politico.com/story/2009/10/kenne
dy-imposes-naval-blockade-of-cuba-oct-22-
1962-028584.
[17] Zhang, X. (2014, November 25). A U.S.-China
War in Asia: Could America Win by Blockade?
Retrieved from
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/us-
china-war-asia-could-america-win-by-
blockade-11733.
[18] Kalimuddin, M., & Anderson, D. A. (2018).
Soft Power in China's Security Strategy.
Strategic Studies Quarterly , 116.
[19] Collins, G. (2018). A Maritime Oil Blockade
Against China: Tactically Tempting but
Strategically Flawed. Naval War College
Review , 71 (2), 52.
[20] BrahMos Missile Can be Exported to SE Asian,
LatAm Nations. (2014, August 14). Retrieved
from
https://www.brahmos.com/pressRelease.php?id
=12.
[21] Ping, H. (2015). An Analysis of the
Development of India’s Naval Combat
Capabilities]. Modern Military (2), 96.
[22] National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s
Republic of China. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C0
1.
[23] Lelyveld, M. (2019, July 2). China’s Risks Rise
With Threats To Gulf Oil – Analysis. Retrieved
from Eurasia Review:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/02072019-
chinas-risks-rise-with-threats-to-gulf-oil-
analysis/.
[24] US Navy Fleets. (n.d.). Retrieved January 23,
2022, from Navysite:
https://www.navysite.de/navy/fleet.htm.
[25] Allison, G. (2017). Destined for War: Can
America and China Escape Thucydides’s
Trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
[26] China Poses Biggest Threat to U.S. National
Security. (2020, July 24). Retrieved from
https://editorials.voa.gov/a/china-poses-
biggest-threat-to-u-s-national-
security/5516031.html.
[27] (2021). Annual Threat Assessment of the US
Intelligence Community. Office of the Director
of National Intelligence.
[28] Jain, J. (2021, July 27). Uyghur Separatist
Group East Turkestan Islamic Movement now
Active in Afghanistan: UNSC Report.
Retrieved from
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on POWER SYSTEMS
DOI: 10.37394/232016.2022.17.19
Ashfaq Ahmed, Usman Qais,
Muhammad Dawood Kakar, Atta Muhammad
E-ISSN: 2224-350X
194
Volume 17, 2022
https://www.opindia.com/2021/07/uyghur-
separatist-group-east-turkestan-islamic-
movement-now-active-in-afghanistan-unsc-
report/.
[29] Gates, S., & Roy, K. (2014). Unconventional
Warfare in South Asia: Shadow Warriors and
Counterinsurgency. Famham & Burlington:
Ashgate, 120.
Gishkori, Z. (2018, April 3). Pakistan Mounts Secret
Raids in Hunt for Chinese Militants. The News.
[31] Xin, L., & Han, Z. (2021, July 16). China,
Pakistan Confirm Terrorist Attack; Who is the
Most Likely Perpetrator? Retrieved from
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202107/1228
870.shtml.
[32] Fickling, D. (2021, November 25). China and
the U.S. Can’t Break Their Oil Market
Codependency. Retrieved from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ene
rgy/china-and-the-us-cant-break-their-oil-
market-codependency/2021/11/24/736fd7c2-
4d83-11ec-a7b8-9ed28bf23929_story.html.
[33] Tanner, T., & Wang, D. (2020). Avoiding the
'Thucydides Trap': U. S. -China Relations in
Strategic Domains. New York, Taylor &
Francis Group.
[34] Kelanic, R. A. (2020). Black Gold and
Blackmail: Oil and Great Power Politics. New
York: Cornell University Press, 177.
[35] Reed, J. T., & Raschke, D. (2010). The ETIM:
China's Islamic Militants and the Global
Terrorist Threat. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 77.
Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0
(Attribution 4.0 International, CC BY 4.0)
This article is published under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en_
US
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on POWER SYSTEMS
DOI: 10.37394/232016.2022.17.19
Ashfaq Ahmed, Usman Qais,
Muhammad Dawood Kakar, Atta Muhammad
E-ISSN: 2224-350X
195
Volume 17, 2022
