

The Impact of Externally Instigated Separatism on the Political Stability and Territorial Integrity of Countries (Phenomenon of Externally Instigated Separatism)

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Abstract: - The relevance of the study is confirmed by the fact that Russia's aggression against Ukraine was made possible by artificial incitement to and support of specific separatist movements in Ukraine by the Russian Federation. The study aims to define the essence of externally instigated separatism to find mechanisms for preventing it and counteracting its negative consequences. The research methodology is based on structural, logical and systemic analysis methods. The global system of law and order enshrines peoples' right to self-determination, guaranteed by states and the international community. The phenomenon of externally instigated separatism is a technology of direct aggression by a state interested in annexing new territories; it's a stage of hybrid warfare, a full-fledged concept of the exogenous influence of actors fully supported by one state operating on another state's territory. The greatest threat of externally instigated separatism is seen in the level of integration of such actors into the socio-political environment of the state. This means increased opportunities for these actors to subvert the security environment of the state through direct incitement to separatist movements. That is why timely identification of manifestations of externally instigated separatism is critical to stabilising the situation inside the country and preserving its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The article proves the need to develop a state strategy for counteracting externally instigated separatism. Future research may be aimed at finding a system of indicators for early detection of its emergence and spread.

Key-Words: - externally instigated separatism, hybrid warfare, exogenous influence, threat matrix, separatist movements.

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1 Introduction

Having emerged recently, the phenomenon of externally instigated separatism has already become one of the most destructive and destabilising factors for the security environment of a sovereign state. Its spread, mainly in the post-Soviet geopolitical space, is explained by the imperial aspirations of the Russian Federation and the attempts of its political leadership to extend its influence to the countries that gained independence after the collapse of the

USSR in this way. Although speaking about Ukraine, it is advisable to focus on such manifestations of separatism supported from the outside, which took place in the Transcarpathian region (external influence of the far-right forces of Hungary) and Chernivtsi and partially Odesa region (external influence of specific political institutions of Romania). Although these manifestations are not systematic, they carry potential risks for aggravating the situation in these regions due to Russia's more active support of such trends. However, it was

Russia that began to actively use externally instigated separatism as one of the stages of hybrid wars that in one form or another were or are being waged by it against some sovereign states of the post-Soviet space: Moldova, Sakartvelo and, of course, Ukraine. With Ukraine, Russia's externally instigated separatism (from now on – EIS) has acquired those independent features and characteristics that allowed the scientific community to distinguish this phenomenon as a separate type of separatism. EIS is not an independent movement but a conceptualisation of various forms of external influence of one country on another or part of it. Such types of separatism as religious, ethnic, ethno-political, etc. – except for the EIS – are primarily the result of processes that occur according to the historical logic within one state. The nature of such separatism is enshrined in the concept of the right of peoples to self-determination and reflected in the relevant international legal acts, in particular, in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, [1]; Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States following the Charter of the United Nations, [2]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, [3]; UN Charter, [4]. In their overwhelming majority, the most common manifestations of separatism – ethno-political and ethnic – are often resolved in the political sphere by the methods defined in national legislation. It is essential to understand that EIS uses the country's national legislation. The destructive nature of violent separatism makes political dialogue impossible, as its manifestation aims always to achieve the geopolitical goals of those actors who instigate it in other countries.

For Ukraine, the problem of EIS has become particularly acute after Russia's direct aggression and large-scale invasion of Ukraine. It should be emphasised that separatism and its development became one of the essential elements of justification for the process of pursuing the alleged “legitimate interests” of Russia in Ukraine. This artificiality of creation, high level of instigation and penetration of separatism into the political environment and social processes make it one of the most significant and most challenging threats to the state's security sector. That is why, in formulating the aim of this study, we should proceed from the primary need to define the essence of the phenomenon of EIS and to find mechanisms for its effective prevention and counteraction. We believe that the most effective way to achieve this goal is through the following tasks:

- to define the essence and content of the EIS phenomenon;
- to reveal the peculiarities of EIS manifestations;
- to establish the main ways of counteracting EIS, its identification at the early stages and the methodology of combating it at the stage of more active manifestation.

It is crucial to prevent the emergence and development of externally instigated separatism in the modern world, and combating it should become one of the most urgent and prompt areas of democratic countries' response to hybrid attacks by authoritarian regimes.

2 Literature review

The phenomenon of EIS is new in the current geopolitical environment. Therefore, for a long time, the scientific community has focused only on its systemic elements, [5], [6], [7], in particular on the means of implementing Russia's aggressive policy against its neighbours. For example, researcher in [5], point out that Russia seeks to gain domestic political benefits through external escapades abroad. Russia is testing its coercive instruments against other countries that are not limited to the rule of law and pose a direct threat to global security. However, they are mainly regional, [5], [6], analyses the transformation of the post-Soviet security perspective of Sakartvelo and Ukraine in the context of post-Soviet Russia's foreign policy in the neighbouring countries. The researcher concludes that Russia is trying to legitimise its influence on the territory of these countries artificially, using separatist movements, [6]. According to [7], studying Russia's aggression against Ukraine, conclude that Russia's policy towards its neighbours has global negative consequences. The scientists emphasise the artificial nature of Russia's tools to spread its influence, including artificial referendums, [7]. In turn, the researchers in [8], consider the problem of the impact of Russian propaganda on some areas of Ukraine, further instigating more destructive processes. According to [9], examines some elements of separatist propaganda more profoundly, trying to combine them into a single concept. However, the researcher draws the wrong conclusion that Russia's actions in Ukraine manifest “realpolitik” aimed at forcing changes in the European territorial order, especially in the neighbouring countries. In his opinion, Russia uses “colour revolutions” to influence various states in

the broader international system as a policy tool rather than a stage of hybrid warfare, [9].

Much more thorough are the studies by [10] and [11], on the technology of separatism. Investigating the political processes in Ukraine related to regional separatism, the scientists conclude that their primary source, which led to the loss of control by Ukraine over the territories of Luhansk and Donetsk regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in 2014, is outside the country, [10]. This allows to determine that external political forces instigate separatism in Ukraine, and its source should be sought in the decision-making centres of the countries concerned, [11]. Indeed, the political and legal nature of EIS differs significantly from the classical term that describes the phenomenon of separatism as such. Thus, author in [12], defines separatism as “the defence of cultural, ethnic, tribal, religious, racial, governmental or gender separation from a larger group”. According to [13], argues that separatism is the policy and practice of secession, separating a part of a state’s territory (secession) to create a new sovereign state. Author in [14], assumes that separatism is a state disintegration that arises due to dissatisfaction of a particular part of society with the general political course of the country. According to [15], analysing the processes in Ukraine in 2014-2017, demonstrates the diversity of Russia’s approaches to the activation of artificial separatist sentiments, which the aggressor country is trying to present as a quasi-historical concept of the development of “Novorossia” as a potential state formation. The researchers in [16], carefully studied separatist movements on the example of Gagauzia as an autonomous territorial entity in the Republic of Moldova. The desire of the Gagauz (a Turkic ethnic group) for political self-determination stems from the fear of extinction, as the Gagauz have never had their statehood, [16]. These processes found support from Russia’s political leadership. Still, after the Moldovan government declared a course towards European integration, the leaders of Gagauzia refused any external support, realising that it was more economically advantageous to exist as part of a future EU country. In this context, externally instigated separatism has not been successful. In turn, authors in [17], studying EIS, rely on the historical experience of the South Caucasus. The researchers have developed a theory of ethnic negotiations that makes it possible to assess the risks of separatism based on the relations between ethnic groups, the centre and patron states, as well as the impact of ethnic negotiation instruments on exogenous factors of influence, [17].

According to [18], study the different kinds of separatism in the modern world, not distinguishing EIS as its separate type. The ethno-national aspect of the spread of separatist sentiments in Ukraine is considered in the works of [19], [20], [21]. However, in their studies, scholars focus on identifying ways to resolve ethnic, religious and other social conflicts in society, considering this a means of overcoming separatist movements. The international experience of combating separatism is the subject of research in the works by [22].

Author in [23], concludes that any separatism threatens the state’s national security and, therefore, needs to be addressed through domestic political means. According to [24], claims that manifestations of separatism in the post-Soviet space are probably a means for the authoritarian leadership of the Russian Federation to spread its influence on neighbouring countries. However, scientists are very cautious with conclusions about the extent of the negative impact of the Russian Federation on the intensification of separatist movements and Russia’s further destructive direct aggression against sovereign states, [24].

Similar careful conclusions without conceptualising EIS are drawn by authors in [25] and [26]. Moreover, researchers study Russia’s current experience using separatist movements as political technologies to expand its influence on neighbouring states. According to [27], on the contrary, tries to define more clearly the aggressiveness of Russia’s foreign policy towards the post-Soviet countries. He thinks that the ethnic element is artificially replaced by a social one, which is asserted in the propaganda of the so-called concept of the “Russian world” and the unification under this phenomenon of those who consider themselves involved in such a socio-political and ethno-religious phenomenon, [27].

An interesting view on the problem of separatist movements inspired by the Russian Federation in Donbas is provided by [28], who points to the historical background of “interstate movements” in Donbas, artificially created by Russia in the last years of the USSR, whose population opposed the withdrawal of Soviet Ukraine from the USSR, demanded preservation of the latter in a reformed form, and the granting of autonomy to Donbas, [28]. This thesis was also investigated in the works of [29], when studying the mechanisms of transformation of the “Donetsk bridgehead” by Russia’s political leadership during the Orange Revolution into a testing ground for the strategy of anti-Ukrainian discourse. Instead, author in [30], concluded that it is the separatist movements in

Donbas, supported (the researcher deliberately avoids the term instigated”) by Russia, that is an element of Russia's geopolitical struggle with the EU for spheres of influence. According to [31], studied the phenomenon of separatism in the example of the events in Ukraine in 2014-2015. They came to a clear conclusion that it is an element of modern hybrid warfare waged against democratic countries by authoritarian regimes. According to [32], points out that separatism is often manifested through political support from an external actor. Such support creates preconditions not for the full-fledged independent existence of the newly created state but for its further mandatory integration into the state actor that instigates separatist movements.

Author in [33] directly concludes that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 was partly encouraged by historical references and claims that it was a “logical” (from Russia’s point of view) step in defence of separatist states, artificially created on the territory of Ukraine.

However, none of those mentioned above researchers speaks about separatism as a technology used by Russia against Ukraine. The most fundamental in this context is the conclusion drawn by [10], that the consequences of armed separatist conflicts were the emergence of geopolitical entities independent of their home countries, i.e. quasi-states that manifest their own goals and interests. Their further support by Russia, in particular, reveals the corresponding technology of EIS, which has been implemented over the years and is a stage of hybrid warfare that precedes direct armed aggression, [10].

3 Methods and materials

The research methodology was built so that it would be possible to reveal the mechanisms of the negative impact of separatist foreign policy on the socio-economic and socio-political situation in the country. In addition, it is essential to understand the essence of such influence of exogenous factors supporting separatist movements and to find opportunities to counteract them at the level of political, ethnocultural or other instruments within the state.

The sample in this study includes examples of EIS in the post-Soviet countries Moldova, Sakartvelo, and Ukraine.

Due to the peculiarities of its subject matter, the study of the problem of separatism is systematic, as this phenomenon encompasses the features of all types of separatist movements. The study also considers separatism as a technology, a means of aggression by one state against another through the influence of supported actors. This means that the logic of the study is top-down:

1. The first step is to identify the ultimate actor interested in separatist manifestations.
2. The second stage is to study the mechanisms, methods, and tools of an actor's influence on separatist movements.
3. The third stage is to identify potential opportunities for countering and preventing manifestations of separatism.

It is important to note that, after its actual manifestation in the form of quasi-state formations, EIS goes beyond the regulatory influence of national legislation. This means that the state has the right to use legal coercion to overcome or suppress separatist movements. This will be the basis for analysing the practices of Russia's influence on separatist movements in the post-Soviet space (Table 1).

Table 1. Modern manifestations of externally instigated separatism in the post-Soviet space

Country	Separatist formations	The mechanism of external instigation	An actor interested in manifestations of separatism
Moldova	Transnistrian Moldavian Republic	ideological, military, financial and logistical support for a quasi-independent state	russia (the desire to restore the colonial heritage of the ussr)
	Administrative-territorial unit of Gagauzia	Iran's ideological, financial and logistical support to the government of the autonomy in exile	russia, through the activities of the “Gagauz Halk Birlisi”
Sakartvelo	Abkhazia	ideological, military, financial and logistical support after the collapse of the USSR	russia (the desire to restore the colonial heritage of the ussr)
	South Ossetia		
Ukraine	Luhansk People's Republic	“Rossotrudnichestvo”, “Donbass Rus”, “Donetsk Republic”, “Union of the Revolutionary Born”	russia seeks to annex the territory of Ukraine
	Donetsk People's Republic	“Rossotrudnichestvo”, “Vigilant Movement”, “Young Guard”	
	Odesa People's Republic	“Rossotrudnichestvo”, Russian centres, the Party of Regions, regional elites	

	Bessarabian People's Republic	"Rossotrudnichestvo", "The National Council of Bessarabia", regional elites	
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Unlike in Moldova and Sakartvelo, EIS in Ukraine was spread through agents of influence integrated by Russia into the socio-political space of Ukraine, who conducted explicit anti-Ukrainian activities. Therefore, the study of EIS in Ukraine is of particular importance in the context of Russia's anti-Ukrainian policy, which is revealed through the activities of the relevant actors. This activity instigates separatist movements, searching for the "necessary" and most acceptable justification in terms of further prospects of international recognition (ethnic facts, cultural diversity, religious confrontation, etc.).

4 Results

The phenomenon of EIS has long been developing and finally formalised into an independent technology, a separate stage of hybrid warfare aimed at annexing the territory of a sovereign state.

In the post-Soviet space, Russia has used separatist movements to spread its geopolitical influence since the collapse of the USSR. Separate manifestations of separatism inspired and supported by Russia occurred in Moldova, Sakartvelo and Ukraine. For example, in 1990, the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic was artificially created based on an artificial separatist movement that had no ethnic, cultural, religious or other classical factors except for direct influence on the territory of Transnistria by the Russian Federation. Later, through the "Gagauz Halk Birlii" activities, Russia tried to repeat the separatist scenario, but in another part of Moldova, based on the ethnic difference of the Gaguz.

Russia has made incredible progress in implementing the EIS technology in Sakartvelo territory. Although during the war on Abkhazia in 1992-1993, Russia, participating on the side of Abkhazia, did not pay enough attention to the political justification of its interests, in 2008, during the Russian-Georgian war, the technology of EIS became more complete.

However, it was in the example of Ukraine that the EIS technology reached its completion and the integrity that unfortunately demonstrated its effectiveness in achieving the tactical goals of occupying the territory of another state.

It should be noted here that the primary goal of separatism is to conceal the real goals of the country that instigates such manifestations on the territory of third states. The implementation of separatist

processes through the action of an external factor of influence, with an intermediate goal of political destabilisation in the country and the ultimate goal of annexation of a part of the territory.

In the case of Ukraine, such processes instigated by Russia took place from 1991-1992 in specific territories of the Odesa, Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi regions.

Later, EIS intensified during the political crisis of 2004. However, at that time it had the character of ethnopolitical separatism. The political crisis itself was supported by external actors acting in the interests of the Russian Federation. For example, during the campaign, the Party of Regions used propaganda products of Russian political technologists, which aimed to form the idea of oppression of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, violation of their rights, etc. This resulted in a Russian-supported congress of deputies of all levels focused on the Russian-speaking electorate and Russia as a foreign policy partner, which took place in November 2008 in Sievierodonetsk, Luhansk region.

However, its results were cancelled by the political resolution of the crisis, resulting in the third round of the presidential election. But one way or another, the idea of the so-called "Russian world" as an ethnocultural and socio-political basis for further manifestations of EIS began to take shape at that stage. Already in 2013, Russia again began intensifying the political crisis in Ukraine with the movements. Ultimately, this led to the formation of the so-called "LPR" and "DPR" and Russia's invasion of Ukraine to support them and hold referendums, including in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Taking advantage of the political destabilisation and military escalation, in 2015, Russia started actively implementing new separatist projects in Ukraine: "Odesa People's Republic" (OPR) and "Bessarabian People's Republic" (BPR). Their implementation technology was identical to that of the creation of the LPR and DPR. Still, society and the political leadership reacted in advance to the risks of new artificial quasi-state formations on Ukraine's territory.

It should be emphasised that the emergence of the so-called "LPR" and "DPR" and attempts to create the "OPR" and "BPR" were preceded by activities instigated by the political leadership of Russia and integrated into the socio-political space of Ukraine. Thus, there are several stages in the

implementation of the technology of EIS by the Russian Federation:

Firstly, the Russian Federation supported and funded some civil society organisations, including “Donbass Rus”, “Donetsk Republic”, “Union of the Revolutionary Born”, “We Are the Russian Community”, “We Are the Russian Community”, “Vigilant Movement”, “Young Guard”, etc. Their activities were aimed at forming ethnic, cultural and religious ideologies that were opposed to the values of the Ukrainian state.

Secondly, since 2007, the so-called “Russian centres” have been spreading on the territory of Ukraine, which were executive partners of the Russian state fund “Russian World”. Their activities aimed to coordinate projects supported by the Russian Federation, which involved the general population of Ukraine and created an extensive agent network.

Thirdly, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots, Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (“Rossotrudnichestvo”) has been active in Ukraine. In reality, it is a structure through which the Russian special services spread their influence on the political leadership of Ukraine and among regional elites who supported Russia. The purpose of this influence was to diversify sources of support for future separatist movements in Ukraine.

Thus, Russia, through its structures and agents of influence who instigated separatist movements, indirectly participated in almost every separatist process in the post-Soviet space. However, while, for example, in Moldova and Sakartvelo, Russia limited itself to the creation of quasi-state entities, in the case of Ukraine, EIS gained its integrity, which led to the direct annexation of part of its territory through the Russian invasion, which was positioned as the protection of “fraternal republics”.

Moreover, the fact that the centre of decision-making and influence on separatist movements in Ukraine is located outside Ukraine did not create significant obstacles to their effective implementation. This raises the question of the effectiveness of the state model of countering EIS as a stage of hybrid warfare. But the answer to this question is quite simple since the technology of EIS was developed on the example of Russia's influence in Ukraine. This phenomenon is an absolute novelty as a destabilising factor in the state's security environment and a technology of hybrid aggression that must be countered at early detection and levelling stages.

The analysis of EIS in the post-Soviet space has demonstrated specific trends and peculiarities of its emergence and course:

Firstly, the concept of EIS as a technology of expansion was developed in Russia, namely in the “GRU” (The Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) and the fifth Directorate of the FSB (The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation), since the 2000s. Gradually, this technology was “tested” by the military and political leadership of Russia in some countries, in particular in Sakartvelo and Moldova, but it was most widely used and improved in Ukraine;

Secondly, EIS is always aimed at destabilising the political situation in the country and laying the groundwork for further aggression and seizure of either part of the territory or the entire state;

Thirdly, the political basis of EIS in the early stages of its formation is always made up of organisations, movements and forces oriented towards another state's social dimension, its social values and historical common past. At the same time, such movements do not openly proclaim separation from one state and accession to another. However, they advocate creating a single cultural, ethnic or religious environment. Later, the development of EIS led to the idea of restoring “historical justice”, which is the final manifestation of one state's actions against another to seize its territories. The most striking examples here are Ukraine (Donbas) and Sakartvelo (Abkhazia and South Ossetia);

Fourthly, EIS is a stage of hybrid warfare, as this technology involves forming a system of “legal” or “historical” preconditions for the protection of separatist movements up to their military support and invasion of the territory of an independent state. The mechanism of such action is represented in the following formula: “spreading influence on internal political processes in the state by orientating a part of its population towards artificial ideas of separatism → forming the idea of separatist movements → implementing this idea through quasi-legal procedures of plebiscite, referendum → declaring independence of a part of the territory → sending a request for assistance to the country whose actors implemented the technology of EIS → armed support or direct aggression and annexation of a part of the territory”. This formula was implemented in Ukraine most clearly and in its whole dimension;

Fifthly, the EIS includes some aspects of ethno-political, religious, ethno-cultural and other types of separatism. Still, it is activated and supported by the

exogenous influence of actors acting in the interests of a particular state. At the same time, ethnic, cultural, religious, political, linguistic and other determinants act as factors of strengthening or channelling separatist movements with the constant creation of artificial dissatisfaction on the part of separatist entities with the policy of the central government of the state. In other words, the further the technology of EIS is implemented, the fewer tools the political leadership of the state has to peacefully overcome the consequences of this phenomenon, which means that more severe force scenarios have to be used;

Sixthly, EIS is constantly inspired by actors embedded in the state's socio-political processes on whose territory this technology is implemented. Such actors can act either in the form of civil society institutions or through direct diplomatic missions of the state in whose interests the technology of EIS is implemented, or through programmes and projects of interstate cultural, scientific, and economic exchange, or even through religious organisations. Without the legitimate status of such actors and centres of influence, separatist activities immediately become illegal, which allows security agencies to implement measures to stop them quickly. On the other hand, even the visibility of the legitimacy of the processes of the relevant actors' activities significantly complicates the response of law enforcement and state security agencies to the relevant manifestations of separatist violent extremism.

Thus, EIS is a form of realisation by one country of its regional geopolitical ambitions through artificially creating destabilising movements on the territory of other states, which are presented by propaganda and information support as a separatist movement to exercise the right to self-determination.

5 Discussion

The right of people to self-determination is enshrined in international law and is a critical element of the system of civil rights. This right is exercised mainly through secession, i.e., through the active expression of political ideas and the activity of separatist movements, individual peoples, ethnic and cultural groups, etc., declaring independence. Instead, EIS is a stage of hybrid warfare activated by one country and has a destructive impact on another. Counteracting the EIS is a priority task for the state's political leadership to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, the main problem, both at the theoretical and practical

levels, is that in [34], recently discovered the phenomenon of EIS in his research on activating separatist movements in the post-Soviet space.

The vast majority of American and European researchers analysing the events in Ukraine since 2014 only indirectly mention the artificial nature of separatist movements, although they do not exclude their support from Russia, [8], [20], [21], [23], [25], [26], [35]. Some scholars consider only the ethno-political aspect of the separatist manifestations in Ukraine in 2014-2023, [12], [31], [32], [36]. For example, author in [9], notes that Russia's support for separatist movements within the concept of the "Russian world" is an instrument of geopolitical struggle, and the movements themselves have an ethnic component. Some researchers see only the political aspect of the separatist movements in Donbas in 2014-2015, justifying this by the creation of quasi-state entities, [5], [24], [27], [30], [37]. Interestingly, some American and European scholars are bold in identifying separatist movements in Ukraine as an element of hybrid warfare, [38], [39].

Western researchers pay much attention to the study of Russian support for separatist movements not only in Ukraine but also in Moldova and Sakartvelo. However, the vast majority of them agree that such support is merely a means for Russia to pursue its geopolitical interests, [6], [16], [40], [41], [42], [43]. In other words, the phenomenon of separatism in Western studies is not considered.

Most Ukrainian researchers do not consolidate the entire set of factors of exogenous influence from Russia on separatist movements in Ukraine into a single, complete concept of EIS.

For example, [15], focuses on studying the historical preconditions of Russia's increased influence on some areas of Ukraine and the effectiveness of such influence. However, such effectiveness is due to the destructive permanent influence of external actors, groups and agents of influence of the Russian Federation, which are integrated into the socio-political space of Ukraine. That is, the processes of separatism in Ukraine instigated by Russia were created and spread through external influence to destabilise the political situation in Ukraine and further establish Russia's political control in the regions of Ukraine. The result of such processes, as evidenced by historical realities, is annexing a part of Ukraine's territory.

Ukrainian researchers in [13], [19], [29], [44], also investigated the ethno-political nature of separatist movements in Ukraine. For example, researcher in [14], focuses on the ideological component of separatism. However, the scholar

concludes that the ideological background is artificial, being formed not based on historical processes, but as a reaction of representatives of separatist movements to the policy of the central government towards the territory and residents of Donbas.

On the other hand, researchers in [18], [33], [45], [46], do conclude that influence on the intensification of separatist movements in Donbas in 2014-201 was external, but this conclusion is limited to direct forms of interference by Russia at the stage of the formation of quasi-state entities. However, the fact that each type of separatism - political, economic, legal, religious, ethnic, national, or religious - can be subject to an external factor that changes the nature of the development of separatism and becomes the first cause of separatism in a particular region of a specific country remains unaddressed by the scientific community. Instead, author in [10], comes to a clear conclusion about the external nature of separatist movements in Ukraine instigated by Russia. Thus, the scientist substantiates the phenomenon of separatism as a technology of undermining the territorial integrity of a sovereign state and, in particular, as a stage of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine to annex the latter's territories.

Such a conclusion requires the political leadership of Ukraine to develop a model for countering such manifestations and combatting their negative consequences, as well as to develop a set of state policies to respond to separatist violent extremism. For example, in [47], speaks of the need not only for political decisions but also for consolidation of Ukrainian society in the context of Russian aggression, formation of means of countering the EIS and specific cases of influence of actors acting in favour of Russia. Unfortunately, the issue of countering EIS is still at the research stage, as the recent identification of this phenomenon as a technology of aggression by the Russian Federation requires further investigation.

6 Conclusions

The relevance of the problem of EIS for Ukraine has acquired civilisational significance. This phenomenon has become a driving and destructive component of modern processes in Ukraine. The intensification of separatist movements instigated by Russia, further escalation of Russia's aggression against Ukraine up to the direct invasion and temporary occupation of Ukrainian territories by Russian troops – all this became possible due to the active use of the EIS by the enemy. Although

similar manifestations took place in the post-Soviet space on the part of the Russian Federation in such countries as Moldova (TMR and Gagauzia); Sakartvelo (Abkhazia, South Ossetia), it is in Ukraine that the separatism has reached a level of conceptualisation that has turned it into one of the stages of the hybrid war on the part of the Russian Federation. As a modern socio-political phenomenon, the EIS is of exogenous origin, supported and stimulated by third states (actors), characterised by regional manifestations and aimed at political destabilisation of the state in which it is implemented. EIS is deprived of any historical basis and the idea of civilisational development. It is often regional, as its manifestations are realised in certain state territories, which often have artificially created ties (ethnic, social, religious) with the country that inspires separatism. Thus, the political basis of the EIS is the idea of ethnic and social unity of social groups with the corresponding space of the aggressor state. Separatism is a stage of hybrid warfare, and therefore, its spread requires an appropriate international response by recognising such actions by the country that inspires it with aggression.

The scientific value of the results obtained is that the problem of EIS requires developing a transparent system of indicators for preventing and predicting the risks of its occurrence and developing a model for overcoming its consequences. To this end, the article presents several approaches to identifying and counteracting the manifestations of EIS, both at the emergence stage and its transition to the next phase or stage of hybrid warfare. This is the most destructive effect of EIS on the country, as seen in the case of Ukraine. It has been active since the so-called congress in Severodonetsk, which took place in 2004 when the first determinants of Russia's influence on internal political, ethnic, religious and social processes in Ukraine were outlined. During this period, the boundaries of the territories of EIS spreading in Ukraine were outlined, which was later implemented in 2013-2014 through artificial regional referendums. It should be emphasised that all manifestations and forms of the EIS violent ideology go beyond the state's legal framework and, therefore, require an appropriate response from both the political leadership and law enforcement agencies. The weakness of the system of counteracting the EIS and the innovation of this stage of hybrid warfare together has become a significant challenge for the Ukrainian political leadership, which has allowed the enemy to more actively implement this concept with the subsequent occupation of Ukrainian territories. That is, a new

type of separatism – the EIS – is acquiring signs of a powerful technology of Russia's influence on Ukraine, which is spreading through artificially created conflicts directly accompanied by Russian agents of influence and political actors to annex Ukrainian territories.

Thus, the practical value of the results obtained is that the separation and conceptualisation of the technology of EIS allows us to analyse its negative impact and develop a system for identifying indexes of the development of such a technology.

It is advisable to focus further research on developing a system of indicators that would allow the risks of externally inspired separatism in the country to be identified and an effective state strategy to counter the foreign policy of EIS to be developed.

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