wseas-12318-20261111063920-a6da99 20261111063920524 wseas/wseas wseas.group@gmail.com WSEAS Financial Engineering 2945-1140 01 20 2026 01 20 2026 4 Andi Irfan Department of Accountancy Diploma III, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences Universitas Islam Negeri Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau, INDONESIA Salma Naura Ismail Undergraduates Student on Department of Accountancy, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences Universitas Islam Negeri Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau, INDONESIA Desvi Emti Department of Management, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences Universitas Islam Negeri Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau, INDONESIA This study examines the effects of reward and punishment schemes on performance and investigates whether risk preference moderates these relationships. The study used a 3 × 2 between-subjects factorial design involving undergraduate accounting students with an auditing concentration at Universitas Islam Negeri Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau. The three compensation conditions were reward, neutral, and punishment, while risk preference was classified as risk taker or risk averse. 74 students participated initially, and 52 observations remained after the manipulation check. The hypotheses were examined using analysis of variance (ANOVA). The reported results indicate a significant main effect of the reward condition on performance (F = 5.443, p = .025) and a significant main effect of risk preference (F = 8.313, p = .006). The punishment condition was not statistically significant (F = 1.565, p = .221), and neither the reward x risk-preference interaction (F = 0.452, p = .506) nor the punishment x risk-preference interaction (F = 1.130, p = .297) was statistically significant. The findings therefore provide evidence of differences associated with reward framing and risk preference in the reported sample, but not for the two interaction effects. 11 11 2026 11 11 2026 183 16 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 10.37394/232032.2026.4.16 https://wseas.com/journals/articles.php?id=12318 B. K. Church, T. Libby, and P. Zhang, “Contracting frame and individual behavior: Experimental evidence,” J. Manag. Account. Res., vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 153–168, 2008. A. G. Brink and F. W. Rankin, “The effects of risk preference and loss aversion on individual behavior under bonus, penalty, and combined contract frames,” Behav. Res. Account., vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 145–170, 2013. R. L. Hannan, V. B. Hoffman, and D. V. Moser, “Bonus versus penalty: does contract frame affect employee effort?,” in Experimental Business Research: Economic and Managerial Perspectives VOLUME II, Springer, 2005, pp. 151–169. T. Zaleskiewicz, “Beyond risk seeking and risk aversion: Personality and the dual nature of economic risk taking,” Eur. J. Pers., vol. 15, no. S1, pp. S105–S122, 2001. C. A. Holt and S. K. Laury, “Risk aversion and incentive effects,” Am. Econ. Rev., vol. 92, no. 5, pp. 1644–1655, 2002. G. D. Koencoro, “Pengaruh Reward dan Punishment Terhadap Kinerja (Survei Pada Karyawan PT. INKA (Persero) Madiun).” Brawijaya University, 2013. R. Apriyanti, K. Bahrun, and M. Finthariasari, “Pengaruh Kepemimpinan, Reward Dan Punishment Terhadap Kinerja Karyawan (Studi Kasus Pada PT. K3/SIL Ketahun Begkulu Utara),” Entrep. Dan Manaj. Sains, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 189–194, 2020. Gunanto and Ikatrinasar, “Pengaruh reward dan punishment terhadap kinerja welder studi kasus di proyek pipeline spread 4 labuan maringgai-tanjung karang,” J. Inkofar, vol. 1, no. 1, 2018, [Online]. Available: ojs.politeknikmeta.ac.id. E. S. Dymastara, “Pengaruh Reward Dan Punishment Terhadap Kinerja Karyawan Pada PT. Sandabi Indah Lestari Bengkulu Utara,” J. Enterp. Dan Manaj. Sains, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 160–167, 2020. I. A. Purnama, “Pengaruh Skema Kompensasi Denda Terhadap Kinerja Dengan Risk Preference Sebagai Variabel Moderating (Studi Eksperimen pada Mahasiswa S1 Fakultas Ekonomi UNY dan Mahasiswa S2 Fakultas Ekonomika dan Bisnis UGM),” Nominal Barom. Ris. Akunt. dan Manaj., vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 129–145, 2015. E. Nahartyo, “Desain and implementasi riset eksperimen,” ed UPP STIM YKPN, 2013. C. W. Chow, J. C. Cooper, and W. S. Waller, “Participative budgeting: Effects of a truth-inducing pay scheme and information asymmetry on slack and performance,” Account. Rev., pp. 111–122, 1988. E. PRABOWO, “PENGARUH PERSEPSI MAHASISWA AKUNTANSI MENGENAI KOMPENSASI REWARD DAN PUNISHMENT TERHADAP KECURANGAN PELAPORAN KEUANGAN DENGAN MOTIVASI.” P. W. Wibisono, “Pengaruh Reward and Punishment dan Job Rotation terhadap Fraud,” Skripsi. Univ. Negeri Yogyakarta, 2015. Y. Xu and D. E. Ziegenfuss, “Reward systems, moral reasoning, and internal auditors’ reporting wrongdoing,” J. Bus. Psychol., vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 323–331, 2008. A. Wirawan and I. N. Afani, “Pengaruh Reward dan punishment terhadap kinerja dan motivasi karyawan pada Cv Media Kreasi Bangsa,” J. Appl. Bus. Adm., vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 242–257, 2018.