Generic Model for Safety Management of Critical

Infrastructure Elements

DANA PROCHAZKOVA

Department of Energy

Czech Technical University in Prague

Technicka 4, 166 00 Praha 6

CZECH REPUBLIC

Abstract: - The article summarizes the results of a detailed study of selected elements of critical infrastructure.

Based on the interconnection of risk management and safety for technical installations and their selected criti-

cal elements and, above all, the lessons learned from the study of their accidents and failures, a generic model

for managing their safety during the operation is compiled. Its main parts are and described, e.g. a process of

risk management towards safety; structure of safety management over time, the division of responsibilities for

risk management and the way of safety management process documentation.

Key-Words: - Critical infrastructure; critical element; risk; safety; security; the basic parts of the generic model.

Received: June 19, 2021. Revised: October 27, 2021. Accepted: December 27, 2021. Published: January 31, 2022.

1 Introduction

Critical infrastructure is the result of the human

intellect, which allows humans to develop and sur-

vive the pitfalls of nature. It was, is and will be a

public asset because it provides for the daily needs

of citizens, i.e. energy, water, food, information, etc.

It consists of hierarchically interconnected systems

of systems, and at the territorial level it is managed

by different sectors. Each sectoral infrastructure

consists of elements and their interconnections,

which are either in the nature of links of different

kinds or flows of different kinds. Some of these

elements are highly important to the functions of

infrastructures, and therefore, are referred to as

critical. From the point of view of the needs of hu-

man society, the goal is the safe critical elements

operation. Safety in this sense means the highest

quality, i.e. the critical element reliably performs the

functions for which it was created, while not endan-

gering itself or its surroundings even under critical

conditions [1]. In a dynamically variable world, this

ambitious goal is possible only realized by targeted

safety management, i.e. high-quality risk manage-

ment considering the risk sources of all kinds [1,2].

Critical elements are complex systems of the sys-

tem of systems (SoS) type, i.e. they are open inter-

connected systems, the nature of which is socio-

cyber-physical (technical) [1]. In Europe, we use for

their supervision the Total Quality Management

(TQM) method [3], which is the basis of ISO stand-

ards of class 9000, 14000 and others. TQM's ap-

proach is that all employees, from ordinary employ-

ees to top managers, must be involved in the quality

improvement process. This process is based on an

impulse according to the needs of the customer /

citizen. Since the highest quality for humans is their

security and development, it is actually about the

safety. TQM assumes that the lasting quality of

products and services cannot be ensured by orders,

control, sub-programs, organizational or economic

measures, but by targeted search, measurement and

evaluation of the reasons, why productivity and

quality do not increase [3]. It is a way in which at-

tention is focused on the processes taking place in

the institution. When implementing the TQM for

the management of critical elements, the specifics of

critical elements are considered, because for the

sake of efficiency, the measures must correspond to

their structure.

2 Safety and Risk

Integral safety respects the systemic understanding

the monitored element and changes in time and

space [1]. It is based on a systemic, proactive and

strategically targeted approach. It is understood as

an emergent property of an element, on which the

existence of an element depends; i.e. it is the most

hierarchically determining property of an element. It

is a set of measures and activities that, considering

the nature of the critical element understood as a

system of systems and all possible risks and threats,

aim to ensure the functioning the elements, links

and flows of critical infrastructure, so that under no

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circumstances do they fail to endanger themselves

or their surroundings.

Risk is the degree of probable losses and dam-

ages to the monitored assets in the event of a harm-

ful phenomenon, which in terms of comparability, is

normed per unit of time and unit of space [2]. It

represents the degree of safety disruption of the

monitored element in the event of a possible harm-

ful phenomenon. Since the research of technical

installations 1,4 showed that incidents, accidents,

as well as failures of technical installations occur in

about 80% when combining the harmful phenome-

na, it is necessary to monitor not only partial risks

but also the integral risk. Therefore, the integral

safety is associated with the management not only

of large partial risks posed by beyond design natural

disasters, but above all with the management of

integral risk.

The quantities of risk and safety are not com-

plementary quantities, since the safety of each entity

can be increased through organizational measures,

e.g. by introducing the warning systems and backup

solutions, without reducing the risk size; an addi-

tional concept to safety is criticality 1,2.

Safety is understood as a system-level property

that is shaped by a human's measures and actions

and can only be ensured by high-quality anthropo-

genic management 1,2. The integral safety is not

limited to unilateral solutions to problems such as

repression, but it deals with situations affecting a

certain level of safety through the so-called safety

chain, which consists of the following parts: proac-

tivity (elimination of structural causes of uncertain-

ties that undermine safety, i.e. threaten security and

sustainable development); prevention (elimination

of direct causes, if possible, of an uncertain situation

violating the existing safety); preparedness (to deal

with a situation in which safety is disrupted); re-

sponse (to bring off safety disruption and stabilize

the situation); and recovery (to ensure conditions for

the restoration and growth of safety); Figure 1. On

the basis of economy, it is necessary, above all, to

reduce risks at the most critical points in the context

of prevention, as well as to prepare a response and

recovery to risks that are not dealt with either due to

omissions or ignorance in the design and construc-

tion process, or preventive measures are very costly.

This is a very costly activity, and therefore, it is

necessary mutual communication among owners

and operators of technical installations works, pub-

lic administrations, the public and the media [1].

Fig. 1: Activities to ensure the safety of the critical

element.

3 Summary of Knowledge on Working

with the Technical Installations´

Risks

Risk is a quantity that is a measure of losses, dam-

ages and harms to protected assets (in the case of

public assets under review, as well as assets of a

technical installation). Its size depends on the spe-

cific disaster that is the source of the risk and on the

vulnerabilities of the local monitored assets. In stra-

tegic management, the following variables are de-

fined: hazard as the probable size of a disaster that

occurs once per defined time interval (so-called

design disaster) 2; and risk as the probable size of

losses, damages and harms to the monitored assets

at a design disaster divided into a unit of time (most

often 1 year) and a unit of territory 2. The risk is,

therefore, site and temporally specific because it

depends on the amount and vulnerabilities of assets

in a given territory and at a given time.

Due to the dynamic development of the world,

the aging and wear and tear of parts of technical

installations, and limited human knowledge, re-

sources and possibilities, the technical installations´

management and the public administration must be

prepared for the future occurrence of risks. This

means to have the tools to reduce the realization of

known sources of risks and mitigate new risks. The

present knowledge promotes risk management in

favour of safety. With regard to current knowledge,

it is necessary to link existing norms and standards,

because they contain previous knowledge and with-

out their application there would be a repetition of

past mistakes from the past and the results of risk

management, as recommended now by a number of

standards, e.g., ISO 31000, ISO 31010, ISO 9000,

etc.; the method of linking is shown in the work 5.

Figure 1 shows the process of working with

risks, the aim of which is to ensure technical instal-

lations safety, i.e. they perform the functions for

which they were created in a high-quality and relia-

ble manner, while not endangering themselves and

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the environment. Therefore, in accordance with

current knowledge and experience, humans must

firstly identify the sources of risks (i.e. disasters –

harmful phenomena of all kinds), appreciate their

harmful potential (i.e. identify the hazards posed by

phenomena and the distribution of their impacts) in

individual locations, and determine the size of pos-

sible losses and damages depending on the distribu-

tion of public assets (i.e. determine the risk).

Depending on the specific possibilities of a given

human society, then to divide the risks into accepta-

ble, conditionally acceptable and unacceptable

[2,4,6-19]; the basis for the division is:

- high risk is intolerable and cannot be justified

even in extraordinary circumstances,

- ALARP risk is tolerable only if risk reduction is

impracticable or if its cost is grossly in dispro-

portion to the improved gained, i.e. if cost of re-

duction would exceed the improvements gained,

- acceptable risk – only check in time that risk

maintains at this level.

Fig. 2: Process model of working with risks. Criteria

= conditions that determine when a risk is accepta-

ble, conditionally acceptable or unacceptable. Aims

indicate required conditions. The numbers 1,2,3,4

indicate the feedbacks that are used when monitor-

ing shows that the specified safety requirements are

not met [2].

In the case of risks that are: unacceptable, it is

necessary to ensure the application of effective pre-

ventive measures against their sources; conditional-

ly acceptable, mitigation, reactive and restorative

measures should be prepared for the assets under

review; and, for acceptable ones, to monitor whether

there is an increase in the harmful potential of their

causes over time. In this way, we carry out what we

call "risk management".

3.1 Categories of Sources of Risks Monitored

at the Critical Elements Risk

Management

Based on the results of the research described in the

works [2,4,20-25], the following selections of risk

sources in conjunction with a specified entity (tech-

nical equipment, component, interconnection of

components, etc.) are currently used in connection

with critical elements:

1. Sources of risk determined either by legislation

or by the experience of the worker, who solves

the task in question.

2. Only the technical sources of risk in the given

critical element. Most of them are sources of risk

associated with: material (meeting the necessary

parameters, supplier relationships – replacement

material, etc.); the construction and interconnec-

tion of components and equipment (no estab-

lished procedures, labile hazardous substances

are present, etc.); manufacturing processes, e.g.

in alloy production, welding, specific machining,

etc.; and conditions that are necessary for a

quality product, e.g. a certain pressure, a certain

temperature or a certain humidity of the sur-

rounding environment, etc.

3. Technical sources of risks and human factor.

These are the sources listed in point 2 and the

human´ poor execution of technical tasks in the

operation of the critical element.

4. Technical sources of risks and human factor in

the broadest concept. These are the sources listed

in points 2 and 3 and the sources of organiza-

tional accidents in the operation of the critical el-

ement (i.e. manager´ wrong decisions, use of in-

correct procedures, etc.).

5. The sources of risks referred to in points 2 to 4,

complemented by sources of risk related to OSH

and the working environment.

6. The risk sources referred to in points 2 to 5, sup-

plemented by risk sources from the surroundings

of the critical element, i.e. external sources of

risk.

7. The risk sources referred to in points 2 to 6,

complemented by risk sources associated with

interconnections between sub-installations, com-

ponents and systems (these are sources of risks

that are related to technical integrity, automation,

education and good skills, asset protection, data

and information protection, protection of specific

knowledge, protection of know-how, protection

of good will, finances, competitiveness, continui-

ty of operations under critical and extreme condi-

tions, etc.).

It follows that in cases 1 to 6, many sources of

risk for critical elements are neglected. This is due

to the fact that in the listed cases:

- when determining risks, not all public assets and

all assets of a critical element are considered (i.e.

the All-Hazard Approach [2], which is very data-

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intensive, methods, knowledge, experience and

execution time, is not respected),

- the systemic nature of the critical element is ne-

glected,

- the dynamic impacts of the external environment

on the critical element are not considered, which

in turn affect the competitiveness of the critical

element and the provision of serviceability of the

territory over a longer period of time (e.g. poor

public administration practices are a source of

risks for critical elements).

From the point of view of needs and economic

use of resources, however, it is true that in a number

of practical tasks it is sufficient to consider only

some sources of risk, because the goal is a safe par-

tial technical device, and not the entire critical ele-

ment and its surroundings. Therefore, for each task

involved in working with risks, the identification of

the target is important (Figure 2).

Since some technical devices (safety valves,

drain valves, etc.) or some components of a critical

element (pressure equipment, air conditioning, con-

trol systems, etc.) are of fundamental importance for

the safety of the critical element, it is not enough to

work with risks only from the point of view of this

entity itself, but it is necessary to work with risks

that are also important from the point of view of the

safety of the entire critical element. These are criti-

cal equipment, critical connections, critical compo-

nents and critical systems of monitored critical ele-

ment that require special work with risks in the sit-

ting, manufacturing and operation [1,25].

3.2 Summary of the General Principles for

Working with Risks

Based on a comprehensive analysis and critical as-

sessment of several thousand professional works

and results from practice, the results of which are in

the works [1,2,4,6-25], it is necessary to use a sys-

temic approach (i.e. focus on integral risk) when

solving the problems of safety of critical objects and

firstly to choose the right concept of working with

risks (i.e. the context in which we monitor risks) and

then respect the logical model of working with risks.

The key concepts of safety-focused engineering are:

1. Risk-based approaches - the intensity of work

and documentation is proportionate to the level

of risk.

2. The professional approach is only based on

considering the critical quality attributes and the

critical process parameters.

3. Problem solving is focused on critical items –

critical aspects of technical systems are moni-

tored and managed to ensure the consistency of

system operations.

4. Proven quality parameters must already appear

in the critical element design.

5. Emphasis on high-quality engineering proce-

dures – the correctness of the chosen procedures

in the given conditions must be proven.

6. Focus on increasing the safety - continuous

improvement of processes using the root cause

analysis of accidents and failures.

Reducing any risk is associated with increasing

the costs, lack of knowledge, technical means, etc.,

and therefore, in practice it is possible to reduce the

risk so that the costs incurred are still reasonable.

This level of risk (some optimization) is mostly the

subject of top management and the result of political

decision-making, in which it is necessary to use

current scientific and technical knowledge and to

consider economic, social and other conditions in

order to ensure development.

Risks have been, are and will be, and new ones

will continue to emerge. Managing and bringing

over control the risks that cause harmful phenomena

(disasters) requires a dimension and measurement of

risks that considers not only physical damage, vic-

tims and the equivalent of economic losses, but also

social, organizational and institutional factors. Most

risk-determination techniques do not represent a

holistic approach and do not respect that risk is di-

vided into local, regional and national levels [2].

Therefore, a strategic management requires to use

technique, which is correct for followed aim [26].

When working with risks, it is necessary to un-

derstand that the task of risk management is to find

the optimal way to reduce the evaluated risks to the

socially acceptable level, or to maintain them at this

level. The basic principles when working with risks

are: to be proactive; to imagine possible conse-

quences; correctly to identify priorities of public

interest; to think about coping with problems; to

consider synergies; and to be vigilant.

According to the International Organization for

Standardization (ISO), qualified risk management of

a technical installation must: be part of the man-

agement system of the technical installation being

pursued; be part of each decision-making process of

the monitored technical installation; explicitly con-

sider uncertainties and uncertainties in the processes

and conditions of the monitored technical installa-

tion and its surroundings; be systematic and struc-

tured; be based on the best available information; be

dynamic and respond appropriately to various

changes; be adapted to local conditions and legisla-

tive requirements; respect the influence of man

(human factor) on the technical installation; and

have the ability to continuously improve.

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3.3 Categories of Risk Handling Tools

Broken Down by Critical Infrastructure

Element Aim Pursued

When choosing tools for working with the risks of

critical elements of infrastructure aimed at safety,

according to the arguments summarized in the work

[2], two factors are decisive:

1. The first factor is the recognition that risk is a

quantity that is locally specific, i.e. it depends on

both, the cause of damage to an asset or set of as-

sets (i.e. on the nature and size of the harmful

phenomenon / disaster) and the properties of the

asset or set of assets (vulnerability) at the mo-

ment of occurrence of the disaster. For example,

an unmaintained safety valve in the event of a

boundary pressure surge usually fails to fulfil its

function [4]. Since there are variables over time,

both, the conditions of assets or the sets of assets,

as well as the sizes of harmful phenomena or

disasters, there are three categories of situations

from the point of view of managing the impacts

of the realized risks, namely situations: normal;

emergency; and critical. With the growing the

category, the professional, financial, organiza-

tional and personnel requirements for managing

and settling the risks associated with these situa-

tions are growing. Therefore, the legislation that

imposes requirements on owners and operators

of critical elements and public administration re-

quirements for safety supervision in the public

interest plays a big role here [2].

2. The second factor is the selection of the type of

risk to be monitored in the task under considera-

tion, which depends on the determination: the

number of assets and their enumeration, i.e. the

consideration of which public assets and which

specific assets of the critical element in the task

are important; e.g., whether they include perfor-

mance, competitiveness, profit, etc.; and whether

the links and flows between the listed assets play

a role in the given task, i.e. a mechanical concept

is not enough, but a systemic concept must be

considered.

To ensure the safety of a critical element in the

short term (e.g. the safe condition of a simple tech-

nical device), it is sufficient to monitor the asset

condition, i.e. the partial risk associated with the

critical element. With regard to the humans´ securi-

ty, the legislation in developed countries also re-

quires monitoring the human safety in the work-

place (OSH), i.e. it is already a matter of monitoring

two assets (lives and health of humans in the work-

place, quality of the working environment), using

the integrated risk (i.e. the machine-human link is

neglected). Since, the technical equipment, persons

in the workplace and the working environment are

interconnected, the links and flows among these

subsystems, i.e. integral risk, should be monitored in

order to ensure safety in the medium and long term.

Therefore, when choosing the tools for working

with risks (identification, analysis, evaluation, as-

sessment, management and settlement) aimed at the

safety of the selected entity, it is necessary to distin-

guish the following tasks in the technical field in the

case of critical elements: the selection of tools for

working with the risk associated with the technical

equipment condition (goal – safe technical equip-

ment); the selection of tools for working with the

risk associated with the technical component condi-

tion (goal – safe technical component); the selection

of tools for working with the risk associated with

the production process or operation (objective – safe

production process or operation); the selection of

tools for working with the risk associated with the

set of processes condition in the entity (target – a

safe set of processes in the entity); selection of tools

for working with the risk associated with the entire

critical element (target – safe critical element); and

selection of tools for working with the risk associat-

ed with the critical element and its surroundings

(target – safe critical element and its safe surround-

ings).

On the basis of the works [1,2,4,5-25], it is not

enough to focus on technical installations and their

equipment in order to ensure the humans´ safety,

because the choice of tools for working with risks

depends on: the nature of the entity being monitored

(i.e. the selected technical equipment or higher sys-

tems of the technical installation, i.e. the critical

element); the nature of the environment in which the

monitored entity (i.e. the selected technical equip-

ment or higher system of the technical installation)

operates; the mode in which the monitored entity

(i.e. the selected technical equipment or a higher

system of the technical installation, i.e. the critical

element) operates; requirements for the operation of

the entity (i.e. selected technical equipment or high-

er systems of the technical installation); it also de-

pends on whether short-, medium-term or strategic,

i.e. long-term, solutions are required.

Instructions for choosing the right tool for each

task are given in the works 4,26. It is a fact that the

higher the type of tool used, the higher the cost

(knowledge, finance, time) of its use. It follows

from the above that in order to ensure the safety of

the monitored critical elements of the transport in-

frastructure, it is necessary to use decision support

systems for risk decision-making.

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3.4 Decision Support System (DSS) to

Manage the Risks of Critical Elements

during Operation

In general, when setting up a decision support sys-

tem for critical elements (both composite and com-

plex, SoS), based on an assessment of the level of

work with risks of all kinds in favour of the safety

of the critical element in operation, it is necessary to

consider that the competencies and responsibilities

that release the necessary resources for measures

and activities to manage and settle risks in favour of

security depend on the level of the organizational

structure [4.

The organizational structure of critical elements

in operation is a mechanism that serves to coordi-

nate and control the operation of critical elements.

According to [27, it represents a hierarchical ar-

rangement of relations of superiority and subordina-

tion and resolves mutual powers (competences), ties

and responsibilities. Of course, the release of large

funds and other resources for the management and

settlement of risks is only at the highest hierarchical

level. According to practical experience [28, at

creating the DSS, it is useful to consider the organi-

zational structure of the critical element as follows:

top management; senior management – responsible

for projects (e.g. the result of a set of several pro-

cesses); middle management – responsible for indi-

vidual processes; technical management – responsi-

ble for the operation of individual technical facili-

ties; and personnel (critical and supporting) – re-

sponsible for technical activities.

When compiling the DSS, the aspects they as-

sess are taken into account: how risks and their

sources are considered; the level of safety achieved

in the given execution of the technical installation;

the technical level of the measures introduced; ma-

terial and energy performance; speed of implemen-

tation of measures; staff requirements; information

requirements; demands on finances; liability claims;

as well as the demands on the management of all

involved (i.e. both, the management of the technical

installation and the management of the territory).

3.5 Example of Processing the DSS Results

for Critical Elements of Transport

Infrastructure

Based on the requirements for working with the

risks of technical installations, DSS has been com-

piled for critical elements of transport infrastructure

during the operation to assess the risks associated

with traffic with a philosophy, the higher the risk,

the lower the safety of the critical element of the

transport infrastructure during the operation, which

also means a lower degree of coexistence of the

technical installation with the surroundings. For

application in practice, a scale was assigned to eval-

uate the entire checklist based on the principle that

was introduced into the ČSN standards in the 80s of

the last centuries [28].

Examples of DSS and risk assessment scales are

for: bridges at work [20]; tunnels at work [21]; air-

port at work [22]; railway station at work [23];

transport control systems at work [24]; and roads at

work [19]. These DSSs have more than 250 items,

and therefore, they are not given here. Further, the

way of integral risk determination and the way of

integral risk acceptability judgement for critical

element itself and for public are shown.

First of all, it is necessary to determine how and

according to what it is necessary to evaluate the

contributions of individual sources of risk to the

integral (total) risk. In practice, according to [4], it

has proven to be successful to use the classification

scale (0-5) and the concept "the higher the value, the

higher the risk [29], i.e. the lower the coexistence of

the critical element at operation with the surround-

ings". The value scale for determining the level of

risk that an accident or failure of a critical element

entails for its surroundings, processed according to

data at work [4], is in Table 1.

Table 1. A value scale to determine the level of risk

that the operated critical element poses to its sur-

roundings; proposed by analogy with the scales

given and described in the work 4; p – annual in-

surance, ABT – annual budget of the territory.

Domain

Risk

rate

Classification criterion

Social

By accident or failure of critical element, it is affect-

ed:

less than 50 humans

50 - 500 humans

500 - 5000 humans

5 000 – 50 000 humans

50 000 – 500 000 humans

more than 500 000 humans

Technical and

Economic

Accident or failure of critical element causes damag-

es:

less than 0.05 p

equal to p

between p and 0.05 ABT

between 0.05 ABT and 0.075 ABT

between 0.75 ABT and 0.1 ABT.

higher than 0.1 ABT.

Environ-

ment

Accident or failure of critical element causes:

very low damages of environment

damages of environment with which the

nature cope during the acceptable time

moderate damages of unrenewable resources

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of nature and natural reservations.

medium damages of unrenewable resources

of nature and natural reservations

unreturnable damages of unrenewable re-

sources of nature and natural reservations

devastation of landscape, unrenewable re-

sources of nature and natural reservations

The evaluation of a specific case, i.e. the evalua-

tion of a set of expected variants of operation of a

critical element according to the relevant DSS, must

be carried out independently by a team of specialists

from different departments; in practice, the team

[4,19-25], which is composed of an employee: pub-

lic administration officer responsible for the territo-

ry safety; the public administration officer responsi-

ble for supervising the operation of the critical ele-

ment; the critical element manager responsible for

risk management; officer of professional institutions

for the safety assessment of a critical element – e.g.

from a technical inspection; and the Integrated Res-

cue System responsible for responding to accidents

and failures of critical elements of transport infra-

structure.

The resulting value for each DSS criterion is the

median, and in the event of a large variance of val-

ues for any criterion, the public administration of-

ficer responsible for territorial safety needs to pro-

vide further investigations, at which each evaluator

communicates the justification for his assessment in

the case in question and the resulting evaluation is

determined on the basis of a panel discussion or

4,30.

Based on the modern approach [4,31-34], we

consider in the given context the tolerable risk ex-

pressed by the ALARP principle (as low as reasona-

ble possible) [2], i.e. the case where the critical ele-

ment under investigation has benefits and at the

same time there are impacts associated with it (loss-

es, damages and harms to protected assets) that the

organizations managing the critical element and its

surroundings can handle through continuous risk

management aimed at safety. The tolerance limit

(i.e. the interface between tolerable and unaccepta-

ble risk) is defined as a quantitative property [35]

used e.g. by the UN and Swiss Re, namely the limit

of unacceptability is a tenth of the use value of the

critical element.

Based on the above requirement in accordance

with the works [36-43] using an integrated approach

and other assumptions listed above, we get the con-

dition for the highest possible annual losses of the

critical element caused by the implementation of

RZTD risks in the form of

   





 , (1)

where HTD is the utility value of the critical ele-

ment, ki are the resulting risk sources assessments in

the DSS, n is the number of risk sources in the DSS,

and T is the lifetime of the critical element. If the

condition given by equation (1) is not met, then the

risk is not tolerable, i.e. coexistence is not ensured

and the operation of the critical element should be

changed, i.e. either a new option or additional risk

reduction measures should be requested, followed

by a further design assessment. If the requirement

given by equation (1) is met, the evaluation can be

continued.

When deciding on the critical element operation

from the point of view of the requirement to ensure

its coexistence with surroundings, it is necessary

that the operation of the critical element is not loss-

making for the territory. Therefore, another condi-

tion for assessing the degree of coexistence is given

when evaluating the benefits of a critical element of

transport infrastructure according to the table taken

from 4, Table 2 and with the help of Tables 3 and

Table 2. Checklist for assessing the contribution of a

critical element to the surroundings. A - result of

assessment (YES or NOT).

Critical element

Criterion

Note

It increases education of the

population in the territory

It increases the possibility of

employment of the population in

the territory

It increases the level of services

in the territory

It increases welfare in territory

It contributes to the development

of basic infrastructure in the

territory.

It raises the prestige of the terri-

tory

It contributes to the cultural de-

velopment of the territory

It improves the situation in the

social sphere in the territory –

Table 3

It improves situation in technical

and economic spheres in territo-

ry - Table 3

It improves the situation in envi-

ronment protection and welfares

in territory - Table 3

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Table 3. A value scale to determine the degree of

benefit that a critical element makes to its surround-

ings; proposed by analogy with the scales given in

the work 4; ABT – annual budget of the territory.

Domain

Benefit rate

classification

Criterion

Rate

Critical element benefits:

Social

less than 50 humans

50 - 500 humans

500 - 5000 humans

5 000 – 50 000 humans

50 000 – 500 000 humans

more than 500 000 humans

Rate

Critical element gives to territory budget:

Technical and

economic

less than 0.005 ABT

0.005-0.01 ABT

0.01-0.025 ABT

0.026-0.05 ABT

0.05-0.075 ABT

higher than 0.075 ABT

Environment

Rate

Critical element contributes to environment

protection and welfare increase per year by

sum of money:

less than 50 EUR

50 – 500 EUR

500 – 5 000 EUR

5 000 – 50 000 EUR

50 000 – 500 000 EUR

more than 500 000 EUR

Table 4. Value scale to determine the degree of con-

tribution of the proposed critical element to its sur-

roundings; N is a number equal to five times the

number of criteria in Table 2, i.e. N = 50.

Level of critical

element benefits for

territory

Values in % N

Extremely high – 5

More than 95 %

Very high – 4

70 - 95 %

High – 3

45 - 70 %

Medium – 2

25 – 45 %

Low – 1

5 – 25 %

Negligible – 0

Less than 5 %

Based on practical experience and the

knowledge of examples at work [44], using an inte-

grated approach and assuming that all benefits listed

in Table 2 have the same probability of occurrence,

we get a relationship to determine the expected an-

nual yield of a critical element of the PRZTD

transport infrastructure in the form of

    





  (2)

in which CPTD is the total lifetime useful yield of a

critical element, ki are the individual ratings in Ta-

ble 2, n is the number of benefit sources in Table 2

(i.e. n = 10 in this case) and T is the lifetime of the

critical element. The expected annual net yield of

the critical element RPTD for the territory is deter-

mined by the relation

      , (3)

where A is the annuity and the RPNTD is the ex-

pected operating cost of the critical element. The

basis for the decision is the result of the difference R

between the permissible maximum annual losses of

the critical element caused by realization, risks and

expected net annual returns, i.e. the result of the

difference R.

     (4)

The assessment uses the thresholds of accepta-

bility or unacceptability of risk, such as those used

by the UN and Swiss Re, namely the amount of the

annual premium for protected assets in the territory

(PRTD) and a tenth of the annual budget of the ter-

ritory (ABT) that ensures development in the territo-

ry. According to this rule, in practice we compare

three variables: the difference between the annual

losses of the critical element caused by the realiza-

tion of risks and the expected annual net return from

the operation of the critical element (R), the annual

premium for the critical element (PRTD) and the

annual budget of the territory (ABT). On the basis of

the results of the scoring, the category to which the

risk associated with the critical element belongs in a

given case shall be determined according to the

methodology described in [4] as follows:

R ˂ PRTD, thus, the risk of a critical element is

acceptable for the territory,

PRTD ˂ R ˂ 0.1 ABT, thus, the risk of the critical

element is conditionally acceptable (tolerable) for

the territory,

R ˃ 0.1 ABT, thus, the risk of a critical element is

unacceptable for the territory.

In the first case (revenues are greater than loss-

es), the advantages associated with the critical ele-

ment outweighed the disadvantages, i.e. expected

losses, and the critical element can be operated con-

sidering the coexistence of the critical element and

its surroundings.

In the latter case, additional preventive

measures in the management of the critical element

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leading to risk reduction and mitigation, reactive

and restorative measures shall be ensured [4] as part

of continuous targeted risk management aimed at

ensuring the safe critical element and its coexistence

with its surroundings.

In the last case, i.e. in the case of an unaccepta-

ble risk, a thorough reflection on the conclusion is

necessary – either risk avoidance, i.e. stopping the

operation of the critical element, or requiring further

preventive and mitigating measures to increase the

safety of the critical element (application of: higher

knowledge; better technical equipment; higher costs

of protective systems; ensuring the higher readiness

of human resources, etc. is necessary 4, and then

conduct a new assessment of coexistence.

4 Generic Model of Safety

Management of Critical Elements

Based on the above findings, the safety management

structure, management actors, procedures, strategies

and responsibilities are given.

4.1 Safety Management System

From the point of view of ensuring the critical ele-

ments safety and their coexistence with their sur-

roundings throughout their lifetime, it is a matter of

determining the size of the relevant risks and sorting

them into categories: acceptable risk; a conditionally

acceptable risk for which the necessary preventive,

mitigating, reactive and restorative measures are

proposed; and an unacceptable risk for which it is

proposed either to avoid the activity, if possible, or

to take other crisis management measures requiring

the higher knowledge, higher technical equipment,

higher costs, higher readiness of human resources

[2]. Therefore, the risk of failure of a critical ele-

ment of infrastructure must firstly be identified with

the right tools.

In order to ensure the technical installations

safety, we solve the problem of system safety [1,4],

because a set of interconnected safe systems is not

necessarily a safe system, since the safety of the

system of systems also depends on the nature of the

interconnections between the systems. The conse-

quence of interdependencies is that a defect in one

part of a technical installation causes the failure of

other parts of the technical installation and a cascade

of other impacts. This means that if we want to en-

sure the safety of the system of systems, in addition

to the safety of the individual parts of the technical

facility, we also have to pay special attention to the

set of systems as a whole. We need to find out:

types of system failures of systems; the system of

systems operating conditions; internal links and

their manifestations; and the characteristics of criti-

cal system of systems conditions.

Currently, several types of risk management are

used in practice; their goals differ. The oldest type

the management of technical installation reliability

[1]. Continuity management is aimed at the safety of

the technical installation and its surroundings under

all possible conditions [4]. Flexible resilience man-

agement is a precursor to safety management and

continuity management; it seeks to increase the

toughness of the system and its surroundings in

order to gain time to form an effective response [4].

Asset management prioritizes risk management in

favour of production over the safety of the humans

and surroundings of the technical installation [4].

Components of all types of management are specific

types, which are emergency management and crisis

management.

A comparison of types shows that: all types use

the same methods and tools for working with risks,

which, due to the different objectives of the proce-

dures in question, do not give the same results in

specific cases 1; all types have the same objective,

which is risk management and asset protection (but

there is a difference in which risks and which assets

consider); and are a superstructure of reliability

management, which for many years was the royal

discipline in the management of technical works 1.

Despite the different names of the types of man-

agement, their methodology is the same, namely to

obtain: awareness of risk; understanding of risk and

its relationship to assets and their safety; and apply

relevant knowledge of what to do to achieve the

goal. Risk management in favour of safety (i.e. safe-

ty management) is essential for the strategic devel-

opment of human society and technical installations.

In order to manage the risks of the technical installa-

tions in favour of safety, five key activities need to

be carried out well [2], namely:

1. Definition of the objective and focus of safety

management. It means: to identify the context; to

identify priority objectives; and to identify areas

and critical tasks. Selections are based on an

evaluation of assets and targets. This will deter-

mine which risks have priorities in a given case.

2. Description. It means to give an objective under-

standing the probability of occurrence and size of

impacts (in qualitative or better quantitative

terms) of possible disasters and failures of the

technical installation. It is a highly professional

activity requiring the deep knowledge and quali-

ty data.

3. Decision. It means to evaluate the quality of the

forecast of the development of the technical in-

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stallation, if possible as an optimum when con-

sidering the benefits and losses in the operation

of the technical installation in a dynamically var-

iable surrounding; i.e. to do the decision-making,

how to mitigate and manage risks and how to

implement measures represents a key step in risk

management.

4. Communication. It means a discussion of a set of

measures and activities with the key actors in the

process of operation of the technical installation

and with other stakeholders. Legislation requires

communication with the public, consultation,

conflict resolution and the establishment of part-

nerships on important issues.

5. Monitoring and instruction. It means a monitor-

ing of the specified quantities and their values

that characterize the consequences of decisions

and actions on the technical installation, and in

case of detection of significant deviations that

may interfere with the achievement of the goal,

to apply corrections.

Risk management in the event that the risk is

not acceptable consists, according to [1,2,4,5] in

choosing one of the following alternatives: risk

avoidance, i.e. not initiating or continuing the activi-

ties that are a source of risk when possible (human

society can exists without a technical installation);

eliminating the risk sources, i.e. preventing the dis-

asters from occurring when possible (choosing an

alternative to a technical installation that has fewer

sources of risk or less risk); reducing the likelihood

of risk occurring, i.e. the occurrence of major disas-

ters when possible (application of the principles of

safety culture); reducing the severity of the impacts

of the risk, i.e. preparing the mitigation measures

such as warning, response and recovery systems;

risk sharing, i.e. risk allocation between the parties

and the insurance undertakings; and risk retention.

Risk negotiation is based on the current possi-

bilities of human society and consists, according to

[1,2], in the division of risks into categories in

which part of the risk is: reduced, i.e. preventive

measures avert the realisation of risk; mitigated, i.e.

through preventive measures and preparedness

(warning systems and other emergency and crisis

management measures) to reduce or avert unac-

ceptable impacts; insured; ensured response and

recovery measures for which reserves of all kinds

shall be prepared; and for the part that is unmanage-

able or too expensive or infrequent, a contingency

plan is prepared.

This is also accompanied by a distribution of

risk management among all concerned. The break-

down in good management [27] is carried out by

taking as a view to ensuring that all stakeholders

(from politicians to administrative staff, technical

management to technicians and citizens) are respon-

sible for risk management and that the management

of a particular risk is assigned to the entity best pre-

pared for it; Figure 3.

When selecting the risk management measures

and activities, it should be ensured that the cost of

managing the risks, does not exceed the potential

damage caused by the realisation of the risk. The

safety management system (SMS) of the critical

element shall include the tasks listed in Figure 4

[1,4].

According to current knowledge in connection

with the safety of a technical equipment or technical

installation, i.e. also a critical element of infrastruc-

ture, it is necessary to respect the following proce-

dure when drawing up its concept, its sitting, design,

construction and operation, which links standards

and risk management results for the benefit of safe-

ty, i.e. using the risk-based design, the risk-based

operation tools; the risk-based inspections, the risk-

based maintenance, etc. [4,5], which link standards

and risk management results. The actual methodo-

logical process of risk management in favour of

safety (safety management) is shown in Figure 5.

Fig. 3: The safety features of critical transport ele-

ment; SMS is a safety management system.

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Fig. 4: Tasks specified in the safety management

system (SMS) of the critical element.

Fig. 5: Safety management of a critical entity.

4.2 Strategies for Increasing the Critical

Elements Safety

The safety and security of critical elements is essen-

tial for the protection and development of humans

and each State, so each State must have a strategy to

maintain and possibly increase safety in integral

concept. As the world evolves dynamically, condi-

tions may arise for which critical element limits are

not prepared, and therefore, the safety management

systems (including the security management sys-

tems) must always be equipped with measures to

minimize damages in the event that security

measures and safety systems fail or an unidentified

hazard occurs. Minimizing the damage can take the

form of warning and warning signals, training, in-

structions and procedures for behaviour in danger-

ous situations, or isolation of hazardous facilities

from populated centres etc. Measures prior to acci-

dents, including the emergency planning, shall be

drawn up before the equipment is put into operation,

because in the event of an accident, there might not

be enough time for this [4].

The safety management system has its roots in

industrial safety engineering, which has been devel-

oping step by step since the 19th century. The rela-

tively new discipline dealing with the safety man-

agement system is a response to the conditions that

arose after the 2nd World War when its "parent"

disciplines developed, namely systems ´ engineering

and systems´ analysis, which developed to solve

new and complex engineering problems. The scien-

tific basis of all these new currents of engineering

lies in the theory of systems, the development of

which began in the thirties of the last century; at

present, it is about the management of the safety of

the whole and its surroundings (integral safety).

Critical elements are complex socio-cyber-

physical systems with a high number of many dif-

ferent interconnections. According to the design, all

elements, components and interconnections have

their limits, which are set to certain conditions so

that together they meet the specified goal (interop-

erability) [1,4]. As conditions change as a result of

the dynamic development of the world, so also

change the conditions for interoperability. There-

fore, the critical elements safety varies depending

on the conditions.

In accordance with OECD requirements [45]

and results for technical installations [4,19-24], each

critical element manager shall have a critical ele-

ment safety management programme that is based

on qualified risk management, from design to con-

struction up to operation. Due to the present im-

portance of the role of cyber infrastructure associat-

ed with an automated management system, the SMS

must also ensure the cybersecurity; Figure 6 [11].

Fig. 6: Model of safety management of a critical

element with automated control in time according to

[11]. Processes: 1- conception and management; 2 -

administrative procedures; 3 - technical matters; 4 -

external cooperation; 5 - emergency preparedness; 6

- documentation and investigation of accidents; 7-

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cyber security. Feedback: numbers 1-4 in a yellow

circle.

The main goal of critical element security in au-

tomatic control is that the instructions for critical

element control systems are clear and precise, i.e.

not affected by phenomena that distort them.

4.3 Responsibility for the Safety of Critical

Elements

Safety management is based on process manage-

ment, which is based on the consistent use of

knowledge about the problem in the system and its

surroundings, which is why it is also called

"knowledge management". The bearers of

knowledge are humans, knowledge cannot be taken

away from anyone, but can be expanded and multi-

plied indefinitely. In a knowledge society, it is pre-

cisely intellectual capital that dominates and has a

completely different position than before. All this

requires a different view of the management of de-

partments and units. Process management based on

the control of management and implementation

processes differs from the operational approach,

which is commonly used in the decision-making

process of classical management. It is based on

knowledge management and it does not focus on

results, but on causes.

In each entity, we distinguish the basic levels of

management that need to be aligned, namely: politi-

cal, strategic, tactical, operational/functional and

technical, Figure 7. The political level is often influ-

enced by the ideas and power goals of the ruling

political representations, and thus is sometimes far

removed from the goals of knowledge-based process

management. However, it is important because it is

through it that the other levels are realized. It is

greatly influenced by phenomena such as: corrup-

tion, power relations, abuse of power and lobbying.

In knowledge-based process management, the

strategic level determines the basic directions of

development, from which it follows which process-

es need to be modified or created, what organiza-

tional changes will need to be made, where to get

know-how, financial resources, etc. The tactical

level of process management helps to organize the

activities necessary for the implementation of long-

term goals. Answers to the questions of how to set

up processes, in what condition to maintain them

and how these processes must cooperate with each

other are sought. Operational management decides

on the specific distribution of resources in the pro-

cess (human, technological, financial) and also on

the performance of individual activities within the

set processes (how to perform a specific operation).

The aim is to ensure the of knowledge and skills

among workers. At the technical level, specific

problems are solved. It should be remembered that

the most challenging negotiations with risks take

place at this level; the resistance and resilience of

elements, equipment, components and entire sys-

tems increases, and according to data from practice,

the success rate of technical measures is between 40

and 80%. A significant effect and competitive ad-

vantage are achieved by the entity (territory, organi-

zation) only by harmonizing all levels of manage-

ment. The aim is to achieve a condition where pro-

cesses are defined and managed on the basis of

strategy, operational management is not just extin-

guishing emergencies. The processes are improved

on the basis of knowledge transferred from the op-

eration. New knowledge stemming from process

control is then quickly reflected back into the strate-

gy and provokes another fundamental change or

changes in the development of the subject.

Fig. 7: Entity process management levels.

According to the TQM scientific theory [3] and

according to the author's experience to date, in con-

nection with problem solving, it is necessary to con-

sider the possibilities that exist at each level of man-

agement when determining the division of tasks and

responsibilities in ensuring safety. The possibilities

are determined by both, the powers and the availa-

bility and amount of available resources, forces and

means that are needed to solve:

- at the operational management level of a tech-

nical installation, well-structured problems can

be successfully solved,

- at the middle management level of a technical

installation, both, the structured problems and

the poorly structured problems that are not asso-

ciated with great risks to the technical installa-

tion can be successfully solved,

- at the top management level of a technical in-

stallation, complex and unstructured problems

that have risks that can be controlled using the

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tools that only the top management of the tech-

nical installation has at its disposal,

- only through mutual cooperation of public ad-

ministration and top management of technical in-

stallation can complex and unstructured prob-

lems of large scale with great risks be solved.

In the case of technical installations of transnational

scope, international cooperation is necessary. The

highest responsibility is at the political level, where

concepts are set and finances are decided.

5 Conclusion

The study of accidents and failures of technical

equipment and technical installations [4,19-24,28]

(generally entities) shows that these non-required

phenomena occurred in a number of cases due to

insufficient documentation of the processes shown

in Figures 2, 5 and 6, and insufficiently determined

responsibilities. Therefore, a number of suprana-

tional institutions (EU, IAEA, IATA, ICAO, OECD,

etc.) require the preparation of documentation in the

form of a safety report, which means that it is a doc-

ument supporting the safety of the monitored entity.

The document in question is intended for the man-

agement activities of the entity operator and for the

needs of the relevant public administration bodies

(state supervision) as well as for informing the pub-

lic. In real case, this document describes the adapta-

tion of generic model of safety management to real

entity.

In general, a safety report is a set of documents

that contain information about the monitored entity,

its location and activities, the organization and con-

trol system with respect to the prevention of acci-

dents and failures, a description of the entity's sur-

roundings and the environment, a description of the

equipment and an inventory of hazardous substances

present in the entity, the identification and analysis

of the risks of accidents and failures, their evalua-

tion and preventive measures, measures related to

preparedness for dealing with accidents and failures,

and limiting their impacts, as well as map documen-

tation. It monitors the processes shown in Figure 1

and is the basis of the integral safety management

system of the monitored entity.

The safety report is processed already in the

concept phase (preliminary), refined in the design

and construction phase, and systematically updated

during the operation of the entity. It provides a set

of policies and rules for maintaining the safety and

improving it. In practice, it is implemented by trans-

position into internal regulations, which are manda-

tory. It is the basic tool of the safety management

system (SMS) in the entity; a detailed description is

at work 4. In terms of responsibilities, it is created

hierarchically at different levels of details, and since

the highest competencies are in top management

27, so the division of responsibilities is done from

top to bottom.

An important document of the safety report for

critical entities that are vital to ensuring the basic

functions of the State is the continuity plan 4,

which is the strategic plan for the management of

safety and development of the entity anchored in the

SMS. The plan is based on the way of integral safe-

ty management and it contains not only data im-

portant for the operation of the entity, but also a way

of solving the problems that can seriously disrupt

the operation and competitiveness of the entity. In

accordance with 4, the entity continuity plan has

higher goals than the risk management plan and it

includes:

- how to deal with risks that have a source outside

the entity and seriously affect the entity, with the

appropriate responsibilities and procedures for re-

solving the conflicts between the public interest

and the entity interests,

- procedures to ensure a safe entity for the planned

lifetime so that the entity delivers quality products

or services, it is competitive and does not endan-

ger itself and its surroundings,

- due to the dynamic development of the entity and

its surroundings, which are not necessarily syner-

gistic, the response to the change of conditions,

including the emergency and crisis management

measures, which are elaborated in detail and en-

sured in all aspects for all levels of management

of the entity, i.e. it is attached a crisis prepared-

ness plan that contains measures and their provi-

sion for the State support.

To ensure the correctness and expertise of the

safety report, it must be approved by the State au-

thority, i.e. the State must have a safety oversight

authority, which is codified by law. Due to reality

that risk is site-specific, the generic model present-

ed above must be adapted to site conditions.

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