

The Determinant of Sustainability Report Disclosure (SRD) in companies listed on the LQ45 Index on the Indonesia Stock Exchange

MAYLIA PRAMONO SARI¹, MOCHAMMAD TAUFIQ GYMNASTIAR¹,
RICHATUL JANNAH¹, RISANDA ALIRASTIRA BUDIANTORO²,
FAUZUL ADZIM³, NOOR ISMAWATI JAAFAR⁴

¹Accounting Department,
Universitas Negeri Semarang,
Sekaran, Gunungpati, Semarang, Central Java 50229,
INDONESIA

²Islamic Economics and Finance,
Universitas Negeri Semarang,
Sekaran, Gunungpati, Semarang, Central Java 50229,
INDONESIA

³Development Economic Department,
Universitas Negeri Semarang,
Sekaran, Gunungpati, Semarang, Central Java 50229,
INDONESIA

⁴Decision Science Department,
Universitas Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur 50603,
MALAYSIA

Abstract: - The purpose of this study is to objectively investigate the impact of independent commissioners, gender representation on the Board of Directors (BoD), media exposure, and Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) on Sustainability Report Disclosure (SRD). This study's population consists of companies listed in the LQ45 index on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) between 2021 and 2023, for a total of 135 units of analysis, with 89 final units. The research sample was selected using a purposive sampling method. This study used panel data regression analysis with EViews 12 Student Lite and the Random Effects Model (REM). The study's findings indicate that independent commissioners have no effect on SRD. Gender representation on the Board of Directors has a considerable detrimental impact on SRD. Media exposure has a considerable favourable impact on SRD. Meanwhile, ESG has a strong favourable impact on SRD. This study examines the effects of independent commissioners, gender representation on the board of directors, media exposure, and ESG on SRD. The use of ESG as a variable is deemed new, given it is rarely used in SRD studies. This analysis has drawbacks, as the independent commissioner variable had no significant influence, implying that different proxies could be utilized. To increase the adjusted R-squared, future research should include variables such as audit committee, foreign ownership, and family ownership.

Key-Words: - Sustainability Report Disclosure (SRD), Independent Commissioners, Gender Representation, Media Exposure, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG).

Received: February 11, 2026. Revised: April 15, 2026. Accepted: August 5, 2026. Published: September 18, 2026.

1 Introduction

The company's founding goal is to maximize profit, which is believed to improve the company's operations and the well-being of its stakeholders. The structural tension between short-term profit

maximization and long-term social value remains a critical discussion point, particularly within agency frameworks. Operational friction arises when managers must decide whether to deploy immediate profits toward internal operational improvements or

external corporate social responsibility (CSR) goals [1]. Companies seek a competitive advantage by strengthening their environmental image [2]. Corporate success must be granted by balancing the performance of the economic, environmental, and social dimensions (the "3Ps": Profit, Planet, and People). It highlights that corporate strategies treating these three dimensions equally stimulate long-term economic development and create strong corporate competitive advantages. [3]. In an organizational context, sustainability entails striking a balance between profitability, social responsibility, and environmental management through a variety of strategies such as waste reduction, resource conservation, workforce diversity and inclusion, and ethical business behaviour [4]. A broad overview of how TBL integrates ethical accountability with economic, social, and environmental goals, mapping out structured approaches that guide modern sustainable business practices and global policy development. [5]. John Elkington proposed the TBL in 1994, and it is made up of three dimensions: EES (or profit), people, and the earth. The firms prioritize not only earnings, but also the balance of social and environmental repercussions [6]. As a result, the company's operations must be socially and environmentally responsible.

The company's operations do not always take into account social and environmental concerns. PT Aneka Tambang Tbk of North Konawe has mined 157 hectares of forest without permission. PT Aneka Tambang only manages 22 hectares; nevertheless, an additional 157 hectares are available, the majority of which are forest areas unlawfully mined. This topic underscores the continued obstacles to corporate sustainability in the Indonesian mining sector [7]. Furthermore, the same problem occurred at numerous prominent corporations, including Indofood, Unilever, and Mayora Indah, which were shown to have contaminated 11 coastline locations in Indonesia, with single-use plastic packaging trash accounting for 79.7% of the finds during brand audits.

Corporate practices that are not socially and environmentally responsible cause worry among stakeholders. Stakeholders are becoming increasingly concerned about the social and environmental consequences of company operations, particularly those of multinational corporations [8]. Stakeholders require transparency into the company's actual activity. The Sustainability Report Disclosure (SRD) is an important criterion for stakeholders evaluating a company's commitment [9]. Companies can utilize Sustainability Reports (SR) to increase openness with their stakeholders [10]. Companies

use social responsibility (SR) to increase transparency regarding the economic, environmental, and social implications, both good and negative, of achieving the SDGs.

The Financial Services Authority (OJK) has regulated the implementation of SR in Indonesia with POJK Number 51/POJK.03/2017, Implementation of Sustainable Finance for Financial Services Institutions, Issuers, and Public Companies. Article 10 paragraph (1) of OJK Regulation Number 51/POJK.03/2017 says that Financial Services Institutions, Issuers, and Public Companies must produce SR. SRD is the communication of information regarding material elements, namely those with economic, social, and environmental implications for stakeholder decision-making. The SRD not only certifies the report's existence but also determines how effectively the corporation communicates key information to stakeholders. As a result, this amount of disclosure is significant since it can impact stakeholder decision-making. For the information to be compared over time and among firms, the SRD must adhere to applicable standards. This standard offers companies clear and consistent guidance for revealing the EES implications of their actions. The creation of SR must adhere to internationally recognized measuring standards issued by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Using the GRI framework allows you to examine the relevant social impact of sustainability reporting. Furthermore, stakeholders will benefit from increased relevance and transparency of financial and non-financial data. Using a systematic literature review approach on Scopus and Google Scholar indexed material, this study explores how integrating GRI-based non-financial information (economic, environmental, social) into the corporate strategy addresses public demands for transparency, building greater stakeholder trust [11].

The research, titled "Sustainability Counts II, State of SR in Asia Pacific," was published by Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC) in partnership with the National University of Singapore (NUS) and provides an examination of SR in the region. According to the findings, GRI standards continue to dominate the Asia Pacific region's SR condition. Up to 81% of the companies under inspection use the GRI SR standard. According to the Sustainability Counts II study, 80% of Indonesian enterprises applied the GRI standard in their SRDs in 2022. However, the 80% number means that in 2022, 20% of Indonesian enterprises will still not use GRI standards. As a result of the dominating GRI standard, global investors are unable to compare the performance and transparency of Indonesian

companies with those of other Asia Pacific enterprises.

The LQ45 Index evaluates the price performance of 45 equities with high liquidity, huge market capitalization, and excellent company fundamentals. The LQ45 Index is made up of 45 equities chosen every six months based on their high liquidity and market capitalization. Angga Septianus, IPOT's Community Lead, highlighted that investors choose stocks in the LQ45 Index because they are thought to have strong growth potential due to company development. Furthermore, Cheril Tanuwijaya, a Jasa Utama Analyst at Capital Sekuritas, stated that firms in the LQ45 Index have high potential for 2022. This potential is high since the LQ45 Index continues to be a favourite among foreign investors who are shifting cash from conflict-ridden Russia and Ukraine to developing countries like Indonesia. As a result, companies in the LQ45 Index attract a diverse variety of local and overseas investors. As a result, transparency and comparability of information via SR adopting international standards become important. Because investors can utilize information on SR's economic success to inform their investment decisions. Non-financial disclosures and modern accounting systems act as transparency mechanisms that bridges the gap between internal corporate operations and external market participants. By minimizing information gaps, sustainability disclosures strengthen investor confidence and ensure that capital is directed toward economically viable, resilient organizations [12]. Furthermore, the firms in this index are the best in each sector on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), serving as role models for other companies in the same industry.

Foreign investors invest in companies that are listed on the LQ45 Index. Net foreign buying demonstrates investment, with foreign investors buying more than selling. On March 13, 2024, net foreign acquisitions were made at PT Chandra Asri Pacific Tbk (IDR 145.6 billion), PT Telkom Indonesia Tbk (IDR 84.0 billion), and PT Vale Indonesia Tbk (IDR 32.9 billion). Furthermore, foreign investors own a larger portion of the company's shares in the LQ45 Index than local investors. For example, in April 2022, 198 foreign business entities held shares with the code GOTO, accounting for 81.43 percent of the total outstanding shares. As of July 31, 2023, several corporations with the code BBKA have 84.99% foreign ownership, 77.48% TLKM, 72.03% ASII, and 66.87% ICBP.

However, some organizations have not applied GRI requirements in their SRD. In 2021 and 2022, 40 enterprises adopted GRI standards, while the

remaining five did not. In 2023, 43 companies implemented the GRI Standard in their SRD. Some elements that may influence this include the fact that, in 2021, the corporation saw economic recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic; therefore, it prioritized economic recovery above SRD. It occurs because revealing material in compliance with SR compilation criteria necessitates significant resources, including time, money, and expertise. Furthermore, Indonesian public companies are required to issue SR in accordance with OJK Circular Letter No. 16/SEOJK.04/2021 General Provisions Number 5, which states that the Circular Letter from the Financial Services Authority serves as a reference for Issuers or Public Companies in preparing Annual Reports and SR that must be complied with.

In 2021 and 2022, 5 enterprises did not utilize the GRI Standard in the SRD, which climbed to 43 in 202. The five corporations for 2021 and 2022, as well as two for 2023, used OJK Regulation No. 51/POJK.03/2017 in their SRDs. Although the OJK legislation is a necessary national legislation, OJK Regulation Standard Number 51 of 2017 has not adequately addressed foreign investors' information demands. Companies in the LQ45 Index have a diverse set of local and global investors. As a result, the implementation of international standards, such as the GRI standards, is critical to ensuring that the information given is transparent and comparable across firms. It should be emphasized that the state of SR in the Asia Pacific region is still dominated by the GRI level of 81%, which is the standard for SR. Furthermore, the LQ45 index includes the finest stocks from each sector on the IDX, which serve as role models for other companies in the same industry.

2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

2.1 Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Governance

Stakeholders are individuals or groups who have the capacity to influence the achievement of organizational goals or who are impacted by organizational activities in achieving those goals. According to stakeholder theory, firms are accountable for giving benefits to stakeholders in addition to their own interests. The sustainability of the company's operations is dependent on stakeholder support, hence the company must take measures to obtain it [13]. To function sustainably,

companies must have the trust and support of their stakeholders. As a result, in order to gain the necessary support for its operations, the corporation must establish strong relationships and meet the expectations of its stakeholders [14]. Furthermore, integrated corporate governance is critical in balancing these interests and promoting long-term performance since it ensures that all organizational levels are aligned with shared value generation [15].

2.2 The Independent Commissioners' Impact on SRD

From a theoretical standpoint, a firm is not only responsible for its own interests, but also for giving advantages to stakeholders. In this situation, independent commissioners might be viewed as stakeholder representatives, assisting in ensuring that the corporation conducts responsible business and meets their needs. The corporation addresses stakeholder interests in a variety of ways, including complying with government sustainability standards, fulfilling social and environmental duties to the surrounding community, and guaranteeing gender equality for employees. If the corporation ignores these stakeholders' interests, it may face operational risks such as community conflicts, government punishments, and diminishing performance. As a result, the presence of independent commissioners is critical for the proper performance of the supervisory duty. Independent commissioners can use this monitoring to direct the Board of Directors (BoD) and ensure that its policies are aligned with the interests of stakeholders [16].

The greater the number of independent commissioners in a corporation, the more they contribute to increasing SRD. The existence of independent commissioners in the company can increase control over the Board of Directors, allowing it to guide company policies in accordance with shareholder interests. These policies are disclosed in the SR, which increases the SRD. Independent commissioners have a strong positive impact on SRD. A comprehensive study examining property companies highlights that corporate leverage, profitability, and particularly the proportion of independent board members act as significant drivers for transparent reporting [17].

H1: Independent commissioners have a positive effect on the SRD.

2.3 The Gender Representation Influence on SRD

The participation of women on the Board of Directors helps improve decision-making. It is possible because the inclusion of women on the Board of Directors provides a diverse variety of ideas and experiences, resulting in increased creativity and innovation in decision-making and a favourable impact on corporate performance. The presence of women on the Board of Directors can boost the diversity of decision-making perspectives, allowing them to consider a broader range of variables, including environmental and social concerns. It occurs because women are more sensitive to social problems and are more willing to provide social aid [18].

Women on the Board of Directors bring value because they have a strong social conscience, which can motivate businesses to prioritize stakeholder interests. The participation of women on the Board of Directors can help the company focus on corporate social responsibility, employee well-being, consumer protection, and environmental conservation. Women directors are more likely to prioritize stakeholder interests and support social responsibility programs that promote decision-making that improves SRD. Gender diversity in the Board of Directors improves the SRD. The corporate governance landscape highlights an accelerating recent research cluster specifically proving that higher female board representation mitigates greenwashing and improves the depth of ethical corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure. [19].

H2: Gender representation on the Board of Directors has a beneficial effect on SRD.

2.4 Impact of Media Exposure on SRD

High media exposure causes corporations to be more cautious in their decision-making because numerous parties may easily obtain information about corporate performance and policies. Furthermore, extensive media coverage raises awareness and allows stakeholders to monitor company activity. According to stakeholder theory, media exposure can be interpreted as a type of oversight and pressure from corporate stakeholders. Examines the interplay between internal corporate prioritization and external governance. The empirical findings validate stakeholder assumptions, demonstrating that media exposure serves as an effective external supervisory channel that actively penalizes deceptive reporting and enforces disclosure compliance. [20]. Media exposure puts pressure on firms to avoid public scrutiny; thus, they must unavoidably modify their

policies and actions to accord with stakeholder interests.

The policy has the potential to address significant environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues such as diversity and equity, employee occupational safety and health, anti-corruption, and investor transparency in business ethics. The more intense the media coverage, the more external pressure the corporation feels. As a result, corporations become more cautious, paying closer attention to stakeholder interests in their policies and operations. These policies and operational activities are in reaction to stakeholder pressure and are consistent with the company's objective to establish a favorable image, as indicated in the sustainability report, raising the company's disclosure level. Previous studies have found that media exposure has a considerable favourable influence on SRD. Drawing from a cross-country analysis, the authors demonstrate that extensive media coverage serves as an informal governance tool. The public visibility directly correlates with higher transparency indexes in sustainability reporting frameworks. [21], [22], [23]. H3: Media exposure improves SRD.

2.5 The Impact of ESG on SRD

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) is a non-financial indicator that assesses a company's environmental, social responsibility, and corporate governance standards. ESG provides a framework for firms to identify and manage non-financial risks. When firms recognize significant ESG issues, they can develop policies and take actions to address them. The sustainability report discloses the company's sustainable policies and initiatives in order to engage with stakeholders, meet expectations, and seek assistance. The level of commitment and strong performance in ESG motivates organizations to design a more comprehensive plan [24]. With a strong ESG commitment, the company exhibits actual sustainability initiatives integrated into its business plan, such as green innovations, which are subsequently disclosed in the SR to increase stakeholder trust. Companies with strong ESG commitments and performance foster innovation in green technology, which contributes to greater SRD. The green innovation not only mitigates the negative impact of operational activities, but it also highlights the company's responsibility. As a result, the more effectively the organization applies ESG, the higher the SRD linked with its policies and actions. Research indicates that ESG has a considerable positive impact on SR [25]. H4: ESG positively affects the SRD

With reference to the theories and frameworks of thought that have been described, the research model is structured as follows in Figure 1. Independent Commissioners, Gender of BOD, Media Exposure and ESG as independent variables; Sustainability Reporting Disclosure (SRD) as a dependent variable; Leverage and Size as control variables that shows in research model in Figure 1.




Fig. 1: Research Model
Source: created by the authors

3 Methodology

The population of this study includes 59 companies listed on the IDX LQ45 Index between 2021 and 2023. This study employs imbalanced panel data, which is a blend of cross-sectional and time-series information. The companies in the LQ45 index were chosen as research subjects because both local and global investors choose the LQ45 index since the companies follow international standards. The purposive sampling approach is used for sample selection, which is a strategy based on specified criteria that are relevant to the research objectives. 89 units of analysis were acquired between 2021 and 2023. The sample selection criteria for this investigation are shown in Table 1.

The study's dependent variable is the SRD. Furthermore, the independent factors include independent commissioners, gender representation on the Board of Directors, media exposure, and ESG. The ESG score in this study is based on variables from the Refinitiv Eikon platform, which gives a thorough assessment of a company's sustainability performance. There is a paper examines how disaggregated components of financial risk (market, liquidity, and credit risks) interact with a firm's comprehensive ESG rating. [26] this study's control variables include company size. Table 2 (Appendix) provides operational definitions and measurements for each research variable.

Table 1. Research Sampling Criteria

NO	CRITERIA	2021	2022	2023	TOTAL
1.	Companies included in the LQ45 Index on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX)	45	45	45	135
2.	Companies in the LQ45 Index that use the GRI standard in SR or integrated reports.	40	40	43	123
3.	Companies in the LQ45 Index that include the GRI content index in their SR or integrated reports	39	40	42	121
4.	Companies in the LQ45 Index that use the GRI standard according to the year in force	28	38	42	108
5.	Available data related to the ESG Score on the Refinitiv Eikon platform	22	31	36	89
Total		22	31	36	89

Source: Processed secondary data, 2025.

This study uses a panel data regression model analysis method, which is carried out to observe the influence of independent variables and control variables on dependent variables. Three methods are used to determine regression model estimation for panel data, which are the Common Effect Model (CEM), the Fixed Effect Model (FEM), and the Random Effect Model (REM). There are three types of tests that can be used to assist in selecting a panel data regression model: the F-test (Chow Test), the Hausman Test, and the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test.

Classical assumption tests are necessary to assess the feasibility of a research model to ensure that it meets the requirements and passes the classical assumptions. To obtain a good regression model in research, classical assumption tests must be conducted before entering the hypothesis testing stage. Classical assumption tests include tests for normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation.

The following is the panel data regression model in this study:

$$\text{SRD}_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{KOMIN}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{GENDER}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{ME}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{ESG}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{LEV}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{SIZE}_{it} + \text{eit} \quad (1)$$

Note:

SRD = Sustainability Report Disclosure

α = Constant

$\beta_1 - \beta_6$ = Regression Coefficient

KOMIN = Independent Commissioner

GENDER = Gender Representation of the Board of Directors

ME = Media Exposure

ESG = ESG score

LEV = Leverage

SIZE = Company Size

i = Number of Companies in the LQ45 Index (Cross Section)

t = Research Period, 2021-2023 (Time Series)

e = Standard Error

4 Results

Table 3 (Appendix) shows the descriptive statistics for the variables SRD, independent commissioners (KOMIN), gender representation on the board of directors (GENDER), media exposure (ME), ESG, and firm size. The descriptive statistical analysis reveals that the standard deviations of the SRD, KOMIN, GENDER, ME, ESG, and SIZE variables are less than their respective means, implying that the data are homogeneous and that the variances are not too big. The variables show a good distribution of means.

Three methods for determining the model estimates, namely the Common Effect Model (CEM), Fixed Effect Model (FEM), and Random Effect Model (REM), are used to determine which regression model is most suitable for use in hypothesis testing.

a. The Common Effect Model (CEM) is an estimation method in panel data regression that combines cross-section data with time series data into a single unit (data pool), which is then estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. This method is known as common effects estimation. The CEM approach does not consider inter-individual or inter-temporal variables. The CEM approach assumes that each unit of analysis (firm) is uniform over time, so individual and temporal variation cannot be observed in the model (Table 4).

b. The Fixed Effect Model (FEM) assumes that the intercept (constant) and slope (coefficient in a linear equation) are the same across time and across individuals as well as between firms. However, this assumption is considered unrealistic because it does not reflect real conditions. This model is also known as the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) technique (Table 5).

Table 4. Estimate Common Effect Model (CEM)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	2,288077	0,463612	4,935325	0,0000
KOMIN	-0,283892	0,157003	-1,808189	0,0742
GENDER	-0,307743	0,113465	-2,712234	0,0081
ME	0,040175	0,022394	1,793951	0,0765
ESG	0,006304	0,001051	5,997169	0,0000
LEV	0,010484	0,008222	1,275159	0,2059
SIZE	-0,063480	0,015716	-4,039238	0,0001
R-squared	0,368904	Mean dependent var		0,653363
Adjusted R-squared	0,322726	S.D. dependent var		0,166779
S.E. of regression	0,137253	Akaike info criterion		-
Sum squared resid	1,544752	Schwarz criterion		-
Log likelihood	54,10738	Hannan-Quinn criterion.		-
F-statistic	7,988775	Durbin-Watson stat		0,614928
Prob(F-statistic)	0,000001			

Source: EViews 12 Student Lite output, 2025

Table 5. Estimate Fixed Effect Model (FEM)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-1,987002	2,341863	-0,848471	0,4010
KOMIN	-0,008199	0,247164	-0,033173	0,9737
GENDER	-0,197704	0,251499	-0,786102	0,4362
ME	0,041084	0,026077	1,575452	0,1227
ESG	0,003817	0,002982	1,280011	0,2076
LEV	-0,054789	0,048522	-1,129171	0,2652
SIZE	0,073322	0,075686	0,968758	0,3382
R-squared	0,897740	Mean dependent var		0,653363
Adjusted R-squared	0,785741	S.D. dependent var		0,166779
S.E. of regression	0,077199	Akaike info criterion		-
Sum squared resid	0,250304	Schwarz criterion		-
Log likelihood	135,0948	Hannan-Quinn criterion.		-
F-statistic	8,015618	Durbin-Watson stat		3,219729
Prob(F-statistic)	0,000000			

Source: EViews 12 Student Lite output, 2025

c. The Random Effect Model (REM) assumes that inter-individual and/or temporal variation is accommodated by errors. The REM model also considers that errors may be correlated across both

the cross-section and the time series. There are advantages to using this model, namely, it can eliminate heteroscedasticity, and this model is also known as the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) technique (Table 6).

Table 6. Estimate Random Effect Model (REM)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	1,659683	0,634273	2,616670	0,0106
KOMIN	-0,150310	0,169454	-	0,3777
GENDER	-0,290824	0,128460	-	0,0262
ME	0,041812	0,019605	2,132708	0,0359
ESG	0,005713	0,001295	4,411407	0,0000
LEV	0,001032	0,010761	0,095865	0,9239
SIZE	-0,044553	0,021026	-	0,0371
Effects Specification				2,118942
			S.D.	Rho
Cross-section random			0,120056	0,7075
Idiosyncratic random			0,077199	0,2925
Weighted Statistics				
R-squared	0,263271	Mean dependent var		0,254835
Adjusted R-squared	0,209364	S.D. dependent var		0,092857
S.E. of regression	0,078384	Sum squared resid		0,503814
F-statistic	4,883799	Durbin-Watson stat		1,773513
Prob(F-statistic)	0,000259			
Unweighted Statistics				
R-squared	0,348865	Mean dependent var		0,653363
Sum squared resid	1,593801	Durbin-Watson stat		0,560622

Source: EViews 12 Student Lite output, 2025

Three tests are performed to select the best panel-data regression model. These tests are the Chow test, the Hausman test, and the Lagrange Multiplier test. The Chow test distinguishes between the Fixed-Effects Model (FEM) and the Common-Effects Model (CEM). The results of the panel data regression model testing are as follows:

a. F-test (Chow Test) is used to determine the best model between the Fixed Effect Model (FEM) and the Common Effect Model (CEM). The decision is made based on the cross-section probability value $F > 0.05$, which means H_0 is accepted. If the cross-section probability value $F < 0.05$, H_0 is rejected. H_0 represents the Common Effect Model (CEM), while H_1 represents the Fixed Effect Model (FEM). The results of the Chow test are shown below.

Table 7. Chow Test

Effects Test	Statistic	D.F.	Prob.
Cross-section F	5.430071	(40,42)	0.0000
Cross-section Chi-square	161.974775	40	0.0000

Source: EViews 12 Student Lite Output, 2025.

Table 7 reveals that the cross-section F-probability value for this study is 0.0000, which is less than 0.05. This finding denies the null hypothesis, prompting the choice of the FEM. Following the selection of the FEM, the Hausman test is used to find the best model from the REM and the FEM. The decision is based on the cross-section's random probability value. If the value is larger than 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted in favour of the REM. If it is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the FEM. The results of the Hausman test are shown below

b. The Hausman test is used to determine the best model between the Random Effects Model (REM) and the Fixed Effects Model (REM). The decision is made based on the cross-section probability value $F > 0.05$, which means H_0 is accepted. If the cross-section probability value < 0.05 , H_0 is rejected. H_0 represents the Random Effect Model (REM), while H_1 represents the Fixed Effect Model (FEM).

Table 8. Hausman Test

Test Summary	Chi-Sq. Statistic	Chi-Sq. D.F.	Prob.
Cross-section random	6.522799	6	0.3672

Source: EViews 12 Student Lite Output, 2025.

This study's cross-section random probability is 0.3672, greater than 0.05, as shown in Table 8. The REM was chosen since this outcome supports the null hypothesis. After that, the Lagrange Multiplier test determines whether REM or CEM better matches the data. The judgment uses Breusch Pagan cross section probability. If the value exceeds 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted, selecting the CEM. When less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the REM is accepted. The Lagrange Multiplier test results follow.

c. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test is used to determine the best model between the Random Effects Model (REM) and the Common Effects Model (CEM). The decision is made based on the Breusch-Pagan cross-section probability value > 0.05 , then H_0 is accepted. If the Breusch-Pagan cross-section probability value < 0.05 , then H_0 is rejected. H_0 represents the Common Effects Model (CEM), while H_1 represents the Random Effects Model (REM).

Table 9. Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test

	Test Hypothesis		
	Cross-section	Time	Both
Breusch-Pagan	20.06943 (0.0000)	0.490429 (0.4837)	20.55986 (0.0000)

Source: EViews 12 Student Lite Output, 2025.

Table 9 shows that the Breusch-Pagan cross-section probability value in this investigation is 0.0000, which is less than 0.05. It rejects the null hypothesis and confirms the choice of the REM. The REM is selected as the most appropriate model based on the results of the Chow, Hausman, and Lagrange Multiplier tests. The summary table regarding the panel data model testing in this study is as follows in Table 10.

Table 10. Summary of Model Test Results

Testing	Criteria	Result	Model Selected
<i>Chow Test</i>	Prob Value. $< 0,05 = \text{FEM}$ Prob Value. $> 0,05 = \text{CEM}$	Prob Value. = 0,0000	FEM
<i>Hausmant Test</i>	Prob Value. $< 0,05 = \text{FEM}$ Prob Value. $> 0,05 = \text{REM}$	Prob Value. = 0,3672	REM
<i>Langrangge Multiplier Test</i>	Prob Value. $< 0,05 = \text{REM}$ Prob Value. $> 0,05 = \text{CEM}$	Prob Value. = 0,0000	REM

Source: EViews 12 Student Lite Output, 2025.

Following model selection, classical assumption tests are performed, notably those for multicollinearity and normality. The multicollinearity test is required for any panel data regression model. The normality test is not absolutely required to meet the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator criterion in panel data regression, but it is used in this study to assure analytical robustness. The normality test determines if the residuals from a linear regression model follow a normal distribution. If the Jarque-Bera probability value exceeds the 0.05 significance threshold, the residuals are deemed normally distributed. The normality test graph is presented below.




Fig. 2: Normality Test Graph

Source: Output EViews 12 Student Lite, 2025

Figure 2 displays a bar chart illustrating a symmetrical distribution of data. The Jarque Bera probability value is 0.707734, which is greater than 0.05, indicating that the data are normally distributed. Multicollinearity is a potential issue in regression analysis that occurs when two or more independent variables are highly correlated. Detecting multicollinearity involves examining the correlation matrix to assess the relationships among independent variables. The independent variables are considered uncorrelated if the correlation value in the matrix is less than 0.9. The results of the multicollinearity test are provided below.

Table 11. Multicollinearity Test Results

	KOMI N	GENDE R	ME	ESG	SIZE
KOMIN	1.0000 00	0.38798 7	0.3822 43	0.3731 67	0.2441 53
GENDE R	0.3879 87	1.00000 0	0.0525 55	0.1709 77	- 0.2013 92
ME	0.3822 43	0.05255 5	1.0000 00	0.3997 70	0.5222 54
ESG	0.3731 67	0.17097 7	0.2997 70	1.0000 00	0.3923 51
SIZE	0.2441 53	- 0.20139 2	0.5222 54	0.3923 51	1.0000 00

Source: EViews 12 Student Lite Output, 2025.

Table 11 shows that no correlation value in the matrix exceeds 0.9, indicating that this study is free of multicollinearity. The highest value in the correlation matrix is 0.583979, which is well below the 0.9 threshold. After satisfying the classical assumptions, the regression analysis proceeds using the REM. The results are presented in Table 12.

According to Table 12, the REM results indicate a constant intercept of 1.659683. It means that if the independent variables rise by one unit on average, the dependent variable will grow by 1.659683. The regression coefficient for the independent commissioner variable is negative, measuring -0.150310. It suggests that increasing the independent commissioner variable reduces the SRD variable by 0.150310, provided the other independent variables remain constant. The regression coefficient for the BoD gender representation variable is negative (-0.290824), meaning that increasing this variable will reduce SRD by 0.290824 while keeping other independent variables constant. The regression coefficient for the media exposure variable is 0.041812, showing that increasing media exposure will increase SRD, as long as the other independent variables remain constant. The regression coefficient for the ESG variable is positive at 0.005713, indicating that increasing the ESG variable will raise

SRD by 0.005713, provided all other independent variables remain constant. Table 9 summarizes the significance tests for each independent variable.

Table 12. Data Panel REM

Variable	Coefficien t	Std Error	T- Statistic	Prob
C	1.659683	0.63427 3	2.616670	0.0106
KOMIN	-0.150310	0.16945 4	- 0.887927	0.3777
GENDE R	-0.290824	0.12846 0	- 2.263917	0.0262
ME	0.041812	0.01960 5	2.132708	0.0359
ESG	0.005713	0.00129 5	4.411407	0.0000
SIZE	-0.044553	0.02102 6	- 2.118942	0.0371

Effects Specification

	S.D.	Rho
Criss-section random	0.120056	0.7075
Idiosyncratic random	0.077199	0.2925

Weighted Statistics

R-Squared	0.26327 1	Mean dependen t var	0.25483 5
Adjusted R-squared	0.20936 4	S.D dependen t var	0.09285 7
S.E. or regression	0.07838 4	Sum squared resid	0.50381 4
F-statistic	4.88379 9	Durbin- Watson stat	1.77351 3
Prob (F-statistic)	0.00025 9		

Unweighted Statistics

R-squared	0.34886 5	Mean dependen t var	0.65336 3
Sum squared resid	1.59380 1	Durbin- Watson stat	0.56062 2

Source: EViews 12 Student Lite Output, 2025.

Based on Table 12, the panel data regression equation is as follows:

$$\text{SRDit} = 1.659683 + -0.150310\text{KOMIN} + -0.290824\text{GENDER} + 0.041812\text{ME} + 0.005713\text{ESG} + 0.001032\text{LEV} + -0.044553\text{SIZE} + \text{eit} \quad (2)$$

Explanation of the panel data regression equation results:

1. A positive regression coefficient indicates a positive or unidirectional relationship, where an increase in the independent variable causes an

increase in the dependent variable. A decrease in the independent variable causes a decrease in the dependent variable. Conversely, a negative regression coefficient indicates an inverse relationship, where an increase in the independent variable causes a decrease in the dependent variable.

2. A positive coefficient value of 1.659683 indicates that all independent variables are constant, or 0, and therefore the value of the sustainability report disclosure variable is 1.659683.

3. The regression coefficient value for the independent commissioner (KOMIN) variable is -0.150310, indicating a negative or inverse relationship between the independent commissioner variable and sustainability report disclosure. An increase in the independent commissioner variable leads to a decrease in sustainability report disclosure, and conversely, a decrease in the independent commissioner variable leads to an increase in sustainability report disclosure. Therefore, a 1% increase in the number of independent commissioners leads to a decrease in the sustainability report disclosure variable, decreasing by -0.150310, with other variables assumed to remain constant.

4. The regression coefficient for the board of directors' gender representation (GENDER) variable, at -0.290824, indicates a negative, or inverse, effect between the board of directors' gender representation and sustainability report disclosure. An increase in the board of directors' gender representation leads to a decrease in sustainability report disclosure, and conversely, a decrease in the board of directors' gender representation leads to an increase in sustainability report disclosure. Therefore, a 1% increase in the board of directors' gender representation leads to a decrease in the sustainability report disclosure variable, decreasing by -0.290824, with other variables assumed to remain constant.

5. The regression coefficient for the media exposure (ME) variable, at 0.041812, indicates a positive, or inverse, effect between the media exposure variable and sustainability report disclosure. An increase in media exposure leads to an increase in sustainability report disclosure. Conversely, a decrease in media exposure leads to a decrease in sustainability report disclosure. Therefore, a 1% increase in media exposure leads to an increase in the sustainability report disclosure variable. This increase is 0.041812, with other variables assumed to remain constant.

6. The regression coefficient for the ESG variable, 0.005713, indicates a positive or unidirectional effect between the ESG variable and

sustainability report disclosure. An increase in the ESG variable leads to an increase in the sustainability report disclosure variable. Conversely, a decrease in the ESG variable leads to a decrease in the sustainability report disclosure variable. Therefore, a 1% increase in the ESG variable leads to an increase in the sustainability report disclosure variable, also by 0.005713, with other variables assumed to remain constant.

A summary of the hypothesis can be seen in Table 13. This study's first hypothesis states that independent commissioners have a positive effect on sustainability report disclosure. Table 12 shows that the independent commissioner variable has a significance value of 0.3777, exceeding the significance level set in this study of 5%. Therefore, H1 is rejected, concluding that the independent commissioner variable has no effect on sustainability report disclosure.

This study's second hypothesis states that gender representation of the board of directors has a positive effect on sustainability report disclosure. Table 12 shows that the gender representation of the board of directors has a significance value of 0.0262, less than the significance level set in this study of 5%. Furthermore, the coefficient value of the gender representation of the board of directors variable is -0.290824, indicating a negative effect. Therefore, H2 is rejected, concluding that the gender representation of the board of directors variable has a significant negative effect on sustainability report disclosure. An increase in the gender representation variable on the board of directors leads to a decrease in sustainability report disclosure. Conversely, a decrease in gender representation on the board of directors leads to an increase in sustainability report disclosure. Therefore, a 1% increase in the gender representation variable on the board of directors leads to a decrease in the sustainability report disclosure variable, decreasing by -0.290824, with other variables assumed to remain constant.

This study's third hypothesis states that media exposure has a positive effect on sustainability report disclosure. Table 12 shows that the media exposure variable has a significance value of 0.0359, less than the 5% significance level set in this study. Furthermore, the coefficient value of the media exposure variable is 0.041812, indicating a positive effect. Therefore, H3 is accepted, concluding that media exposure has a significant positive effect on sustainability report disclosure. An increase in the media exposure variable leads to an increase in sustainability report disclosure. Conversely, a decrease in media exposure leads to a decrease in sustainability report disclosure. Therefore, a 1%

increase in the media exposure variable will also lead to an increase in the sustainability report disclosure variable by 0.041812, assuming the other variables remain constant.

This study's fourth hypothesis states that ESG has a positive effect on sustainability report disclosure. Table 12 shows that the ESG variable has a significance value of 0.0000, less than the 5% significance level set in this study. Furthermore, the coefficient value of the ESG variable is 0.005713, indicating a positive effect. Therefore, H4 is accepted, concluding that the ESG variable has a significant positive effect on sustainability report disclosure. An increase in the ESG variable leads to an increase in sustainability report disclosure, while a decrease in ESG leads to a decrease in sustainability report disclosure. Therefore, a 1% increase in the ESG variable leads to an increase in the sustainability report disclosure variable by 0.005713. A summary of the results of the hypothesis testing in this study is shown in Table 13.

Table 13. Summary of Hypothesis Test Results

No.	Hypothesis	Output Yield Direction	β	Sig.	Results
1	H1 The Independent - Commissioner influences the SRD	-	0.1503	0.3777	Rejected
2	H2 Gender - representation of the board of directors has a positive effect on SRD	-	0.2908	0.0262	Rejected
3	H3 Media exposure + has a positive effect on SRD	+	0.0418	0.0359	Accepted
4	H4 ESG has a positive impact on SRD	+	0.0057	0.0000	Accepted

Source: Data processed by researchers, 2025.

5 Discussion

5.1 Independent Commissioners

The first hypothesis is rejected, leading to the conclusion that independent commissioners have no effect on the SRD. This study does not prove it, according to stakeholder theory. The research findings become more significant when seen through the lens of agency theory. Agency theory defines the principal-agent relationship in which the owner delegates authority to management to run the organization. Agency conflicts will arise if investors and management have different functions. Agency

conflicts arise when management fails to act in the best interests of investors. As a result, supervision is required, including the participation of independent commissioners, to reduce agency conflicts. However, the supervision provided by independent commissioners is not always successful [27]. Even when firms have independent commissioners, their effectiveness is limited if they do not have enough time owing to other obligations outside of the company. Furthermore, choices made by the Board of Directors, including the decision to disclose SR, are influenced not only by the role of independent commissioners who perform supervisory tasks, but also by the caliber of all Board members [13]. These characteristics can include knowledge, experience, concern for social and environmental issues, and a desire to promote transparency and corporate responsibility. As a result, the SRD can be modified by the collaboration and competency of all commissioners.

It is suggested that while corporations have independent commissioners, their efficiency is hampered if they do not have the time to carry out supervisory tasks due to other obligations outside the company [28]. In certain circumstances, independent commissioners hold roles in multiple companies, limiting their attention to each. For example, in 2022, the independent commissioner of PT Unilever Indonesia also served as an independent commissioner for another hospital group [29]. This circumstance is consistent with agency theory, which holds that inadequate supervision is caused by ineffective management monitoring. Management will be able to make its own decisions without proper monitoring from parties representing the principal's interests, potentially leading to severe agency conflicts. Thus, agency theory emphasizes the efficiency of monitoring in ensuring that the principal's and agent's interests are aligned. This study's findings are consistent with earlier research demonstrating that independent commissioners have no effect on the SRD [30]. However, this contradicts previous data, which demonstrate that independent commissioners have a large positive impact on SRD [11]. On the other hand, other research suggests that independent commissioners have a major detrimental impact on the SRD [16].

5.2 Gender Representation of the BOD

The second hypothesis is rejected, indicating that gender representation on the BoD has a considerable negative impact on the SRD. This study does not prove it, according to stakeholder theory. The research findings become more significant when seen

through the lens of agency theory. The agency relationship is defined by the separation of functions between investor ownership and management control. The separation of these tasks leads to a conflict of interest because management may not always operate in the owner's best interests. It occurs as a result of personal interests or a poor comprehension. In addition, management knows more about the company's potential and operations than the owners, resulting in information asymmetry. Information asymmetry can increase the likelihood of agency conflicts. As a result, reporting can help owners and management align their interests. The report includes the SRD.

A larger proportion of female directors on the BoD is associated with a lower level of SRD [19]. There are various reasons why this occurs. It is owing to a lack of educational credentials and knowledge among women on boards of directors in developing countries, which may contribute to a misunderstanding of the significance of voluntary disclosure of information. Contrary to observations in Western economies, the study finds an unexpected significant adverse relationship between simple board gender diversity metrics and the extent of voluntary disclosure items. This supports the argument that in certain developing environments, structural barriers to female executive pipelines and a lack of specific governance-related credentials can weaken direct monitoring capabilities regarding complex voluntary strategies. [31]. Furthermore, some female directors may be chosen for the Board of Directors because of family links; therefore, they tend to prioritize defending family interests over sustainability concerns. Previous research has shown that the presence of women on the Board of Directors has a detrimental impact on several disclosure areas, implying that female board members are passive participants in board meetings [5]. According to agency theory, this scenario suggests a potential conflict of interest in which management is not fulfilling its job to encourage information disclosure in accordance with the interests of the company owner. The existence of potential conflicts of interest will have a negative impact on information disclosure. The principal may suffer losses because the information provided by the agent does not adequately disclose the company's performance in social and environmental issues. Low SRD might limit information transparency and investor trust. It may have a long-term impact on the company's reputation and viability. Investors can use economic performance data in SR to inform their investing decisions [32]. In addition to annual reports, the

disclosure of economic performance data in SR can boost investor trust and improve the company's image. As a result, if the directors lack an open attitude toward knowledge and social responsibility, the Board of Directors' position in supporting the owner's interests is suboptimal. It demonstrates the existence of agency conflicts caused by a lack of transparency and a focus on family interests. The findings of this study are consistent with earlier research, which has shown that gender diversity has a considerable detrimental impact on the SRD. In environments with high institutional pressures or stringent mandatory compliance frameworks, increasing gender diversity can initially trigger an over-caution paradox. Because female directors are often socialized to be more risk-averse and sensitive to regulatory penalties, they may favor restricting voluntary or narrative disclosure items to avoid litigation or "greenwashing" claims, causing a measurable negative impact on optional sustainability reporting volume. [33]. These findings are consistent with the observation that the presence of women on the BoD had a strong detrimental impact on SRD [34]. This contradicts previous research, which found that gender diversity on the Board of Directors has a significant beneficial effect on sustainability reporting [9]. Meanwhile, some research shows that the gender diversity of the Board of Directors, including the representation of female directors, had no effect on the SRD [14].

5.3 Media Exposure

The third hypothesis is accepted, indicating that media exposure has a strong favorable effect on SRD. According to stakeholder theory, media exposure serves as a kind of stakeholder monitoring and pressure on the corporation. There is a paper evaluates multiple external stakeholder dimensions under stakeholder theory. It explicitly identifies media exposure as one of the most potent external stakeholder pressures, showing that companies under heavy media scrutiny are driven to produce substantially higher-quality sustainability disclosures to satisfy external monitors. [35]. Media exposure produces pressure that prevents corporations from escaping public scrutiny, forcing them to change their policies and operational actions to meet stakeholder interests. These policies can address important ESG concerns such as diversity and equality, employee safety and health, anti-corruption, and transparency in corporate ethics for investors. In addition, environmental considerations include water conservation, effluent management, energy optimization, and post-mining rehabilitation. Implementing policies that align with the interests of

stakeholders in everyday operational activities will increase the company's public value. When the media recognizes that the company cares about ESG concerns and is open about its operations, the company's image will improve. The media exposure that initially put the company under pressure now serves as an opportunity to strengthen its reputation. It will boost stakeholder trust and support, all of which are critical to the company's long-term operations.

Companies with extensive media coverage utilize it as a tactic to obtain stakeholder support. The corporation has responded positively to the public scrutiny by taking tangible steps on important ESG problems. Real activities are taken, such as using renewable energy, managing waste, and empowering communities. The more authentic acts the company conducts, the more likely the media will cover them. High media coverage of the company's sustainability initiatives will help to build a positive image among stakeholders. As a result, media exposure is no longer a requirement, but rather a company strategy for developing an image and support that affects operational sustainability. The findings of this study are consistent with earlier research, which has shown that media exposure has a considerable favorable influence on SRD. The public scrutiny via media exposure forces companies (especially in sensitive industries) to expand their ESG and sustainability reporting to bridge the information gap and maintain corporate legitimacy, [36], [37] However, this contradicts the result that media exposure had no substantial effect on SRD.

5.4 Environmental, Social, and Governance

The fourth hypothesis was accepted, as ESG has a considerable favorable impact on SRDs. ESG measures a company's commitment to sustainability and responsibility. By identifying ESG concerns, businesses can develop policies and procedures that fulfil stakeholder expectations. It is consistent with stakeholder theory, which emphasizes the importance of sustainability and demands organizations to be accountable to the local community and the environment. Thus, implementing ESG principles is a company strategy for gaining stakeholder support through responsible and sustainable behaviors. Companies with a strong ESG commitment demonstrate real measures in sustainable aspects integrated into their company plan, such as green innovation, which are revealed in the SR to create stakeholder trust. Companies with strong ESG pledges and performance promote green innovation, which boosts SRD. Green innovation not only decreases the negative impact of operational

activities but also exhibits corporate social responsibility. This innovation exhibits dedication not only via policies but also through specific acts. Companies are more comfortable providing information on sustainability practices to the public since they have physical evidence of their initiatives. When tangible activities connected to ESG standards are successfully implemented, businesses have confidence that the information they transmit to stakeholders is accurate and responsible. Transparent disclosure is not just a form of responsibility, but it also helps organizations create stakeholder trust. This finding aligns with previous research, which found that ESG has a significant positive influence on a company's SR [4]. ESG is a relatively new issue in research; hence, our finding adds significantly to the existing literature.

6 Conclusions

Independent commissioner monitoring in firms is not often successful due to time restrictions generated by dual responsibilities and the quality of the board of commissioners, rather than just having independent commissioners. Low SRD is caused by conflicts of interest, in which female directors fail to fulfill their tasks owing to a lack of competence, familial relationships, or inactivity, reducing the transparency of company information. Companies with high media exposure employ public pressure to achieve stakeholder support through concrete SRD measures. Companies with strong ESG performance are more comfortable publishing their sustainability data because they have real evidence of measures taken and accountability to stakeholders. This study's findings show that the independent commissioner variable has little effect on SRD; hence, future research should utilize different proxies. Furthermore, the adjusted R-squared coefficient of determination was 20.94 percent. It suggests that independent commissioners, female representation on the Board of Directors, media exposure, and ESG account for only 20.94% of SRD. The remaining variation, 79.06%, is explained by factors not included in the regression model. As a result, additional studies will include characteristics like the Board of Directors, audit committee, foreign ownership, family ownership, and liquidity. Following the test results and discussion, numerous recommendations are made. The government should consider adopting two standards for preparing SRs, namely the worldwide GRI standard and the national POJK standard. Implementing both standards aims to improve the quality and comparability of SRs. Companies in the LQ45 Index are required to follow

applicable rules, such as Article 20 of POJK Number 33 of 2014, because the number of independent commissioners remains below the regulatory requirement of around 2% of total analysis units. Companies are encouraged to promote gender diversity on their boards, as current representation is often inadequate or non-existent. Furthermore, using two standards in SRD will greatly simplify comparisons. If a company has implemented more than one standard, it is expected to keep abreast of the latest developments to avoid using outdated versions. Companies that have proactively adopted new standards, even if they are voluntary, should continue this constructive approach.

Acknowledgment:

The authors are grateful to Universitas Negeri Semarang for their support of this article.

References:

- [1] Yang, Y. (2024). Sustainability agency theory: A new agency framework for social enterprises. *Sustainability*, 17(11), 4778. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su17114778>.
- [2] Balcarová, T., Mráčková, A., Prokop, M., Kvasničková Stanislavská, L., Pilařová, L., & Pilař, L. (2025). Disentangling greenwashing discourse: A topic and sentiment analysis of public engagement on Twitter, *Challenges in Sustainability*, Vol 13(2), 295–315. <https://doi.org/10.56578/cis130210>.
- [3] Nogueira, E., Gomes, S., & Lopes, J. M. (2023). Triple Bottom Line, Sustainability, and Economic Development: What Binds Them Together? A Bibliometric Approach. *Sustainability*, 15(8), 6706. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su15086706>.
- [4] Awamleh, F. T., Alarabiat, Y. A., & Bustami, A. N. (2024). Enhancing Sustainable Development Through International Performance Indicators: The Role of Business Intelligence Techniques. *Challenges in Sustainability*, 12(3), 203-218. <https://doi.org/10.56578/cis120304>.
- [5] Nica, I., Chiriță, N., & Georgescu, I. (2025). Triple Bottom Line in Sustainable Development: A Comprehensive Bibliometric Analysis. *Sustainability*, 17(5), 1932. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su17051932>.
- [6] Ribhan, R., Rusdi, Z. M., & Erlina, R. R. (2024). Analysis of CEO characteristics on sustainability development in mining companies in Indonesia. *WSEAS Transactions on Business and Economics*, 21, 1362–1369. <https://doi.org/10.37394/23207.2024.21.111>.
- [7] Ngu, S. B., & Amran, A. (2021). Materiality disclosure in sustainability reporting: Evidence from Malaysia. *Asian Journal of Business and Accounting*, 14(1), 225–252. <https://doi.org/10.22452/ajba.vol14no1.9>.
- [8] Sari, M. P., Prabowo, G. P. W. P., Ardina, A. M. Y., & Raharja, S. (2025). Determinants of sustainability report with company size as moderation. *Journal of Applied Accounting and Taxation*, 10(1), 62–71. <https://doi.org/10.30871/jaat.v10i1.8954>.
- [9] Sari, M. P., Yulianto, A., Larasati, P. D., Raharja, S., & Jaafar, N. I. (2024). Sustainability reporting in higher education institution (HEIs) between Indonesia and Malaysia: Bibliometric analysis. *Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research*, 505–517. https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-522-5_40.
- [10] Fitriani, A., & Sari, M. P. (2025). Sustainability reporting and sustainability performance in higher education institutions in Indonesia. *Jurnal Akademi Akuntansi*, 8(4), 608–623. <https://doi.org/10.22219/jaa.v8i4.40341>.
- [11] Apriyani, N. W., Maharani, N. P. A. Y., Astini, N. K., & Partiwi, N. M. A. (2025). The impact of sustainability reporting on company financial performance: a literature study. *Journal of Information Systems, Digitization and Business*, 3(3), 1–9.
- [12] Fernandez Salazar, J. K., & Chafloque Gonzales, R. (2025). Measuring and reporting ESG: A systematic review of frameworks for financial sustainability. *Journal of Risk and Financial Management*, 18(5), 309. <https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18050309>.
- [13] M. P. Sari, A. Hajawiyah, S. Raharja, I. D. Pamungkas, The report of university sustainability in Indonesia, *International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change*, Vol. 11, No.8, 2020, pp. 110-124.
- [14] Rusgowanto, F. H., Murwaningsari, E., Augustine, Y., & San, O. T. T. (2026). The influence of integrated governance, and creating shared value on sustainability performance, with organizational culture as moderation. *WSEAS Transactions on Business and Economics*, 23.
- [15] Le, N., Lam, P. H., Tuyet, C. H., & Hoa, N. T. L. (2024). Impact of emotional perceptions and social influences on green consumption

- practices in Vietnam. *Challenges in Sustainability*, 12(1), 34–51. <https://doi.org/10.56578/cis120103>.
- [16] Handayani, B. D., Widyaningsih, A., Supriyono, E., & Pamungkas, I. D. (2024). Types of industries, financial performance and corporate governance on the sustainability report: Insight from Indonesia. *Montenegrin Journal of Economics*, 20(1), 27–36. <https://doi.org/10.14254/1800-5845/2024.20-1.3>.
- [17] Ho, V., Kampo, K., & Tangke, P. (2023). The influence of leverage, independent commissioners, company activities and profitability on sustainability report disclosures. *Contemporary Journal on Business and Accounting*, 3(2), 96–117. <https://doi.org/10.58792/cjba.v3i02.39>.
- [18] Githaiga, P. N., & Kosgei, J. K. (2023). Board characteristics and sustainability reporting: a case of listed firms in East Africa. *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, 23(1), 3–17. <https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-12-2021-0449>.
- [19] Board gender diversity and corporate social responsibility: A bibliometric analysis. *Heliyon*, 9(1), e12734. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2022.e12734>.
- [20] Lu, X. (2024). Corporate environmental attention and corporate greenwashing behavior: Firm-level evidence from China. *Sustainability*, 16(4), 2059. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su16042059>.
- [21] Le, A.-T., & Doan, A.-T. (2024). Examining the influence of corporate social responsibility performance on earnings management: A global perspective in the context of sustainable development. *Business Strategy & Development*, 7(2), Article e372. <https://doi.org/10.1002/bsd2.372>.
- [22] Herdiawan, I. P. B., & Dewi, I. G. A. A. P. (2023). The effect of media exposure, type of companies, and environmental performance on carbon emission disclosure of Indonesia companies. *Review of Management, Accounting, and Business Studies*, 4(1), 94–102. <https://doi.org/10.38043/revenue.v1i1.2670>.
- [23] Siregar, I. F., Ismail, T., Taqi, M., & Soleha, N. (2024). Influence of ESG on Sustainability Reporting: Mediation Rule of Green Innovation and Investor Sentiment. *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, 14(1), 452–463. <https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeeep.14988>.
- [24] Dib, O. A., Daba, J., & Semaan, N. (2025). Assessing sustainability performance in leading retail giants: A comparative analysis. *WSEAS Transactions on Environment and Development*, 21.
- [25] Parsons, M., Nalau, J., & Fisher, K. (2017). Alternative perspectives on sustainability: Indigenous knowledge and methodologies. *Challenges in Sustainability*, 5(1), 7–14. <https://doi.org/10.12924/cis2017.05010007>.
- [26] Faqera, A. F., Jadi, D. M., & Abdul Aziz, N. A. (2025). Disaggregated financial risk and ESG performance: Firm-level evidence from Malaysia. *Cogent Business & Management*, 13(1), Article 2597709. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2025.2597709>.
- [27] Muttakin, M. B., Khan, A., & Subramaniam, N. (2015). Firm characteristics, board diversity, and corporate social responsibility. *Pacific Accounting Review*, 27(3), 353–372. <https://doi.org/10.1108/PAR-01-2013-0007>.
- [28] Fahad, P., & Rahman, P. M. (2020). Impact of corporate governance on CSR disclosure. *International Journal of Disclosure and Governance*, 17(2), 155–167. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41310-020-00082-1>.
- [29] Wahyuningrum, I. F. S., Oktavilia, S., & Utami, S. (2022). The Effect of Company Characteristics and Gender Diversity on Disclosures Related to Sustainable Development Goals. *Sustainability*, 14(20), 13301. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su142013301>.
- [30] Jasmi, Z. S., & Hassan, N. (2024). Challenges in attaining sustainable development goals between income groups: A systematic comparative analysis. *Challenges in Sustainability*, 12(2), 136–151. <https://doi.org/10.56578/cis120204>.
- [31] Zhao, M., & Abeysekera, I. (2023). Board diversity and intellectual capital disclosure of Chinese-listed firms with Belt and Road Initiative projects. *Journal of Intellectual Capital*, 24(7), 1–30. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JIC-10-2022-0209>.
- [32] Darsono, D., Ratmono, D., Lee, S., Cahyonowati, N., & Lianawati, L. (2024). ESG and Environmental Performance: Multiple Mediation Models of Green Accounting and CSR Disclosure. *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, 14(5), 365–371. <https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeeep.16682>.
- [33] Ozordi, E., Eluyela, F. D., Uwuigbe, U., Uwuigbe, O. R., & Nwaze, C. E. (2020).

Gender diversity and sustainability responsiveness: Evidence from Nigerian fixed money deposit banks. *Problems and Perspectives in Management*, 18(1), 119–129. [https://doi.org/10.21511/ppm.18\(1\).2020.11](https://doi.org/10.21511/ppm.18(1).2020.11).

- [34] M. P. Sari, S. R. K. Dewi, S. Raharja, A. Dinanti, F. W. Rizkyana, Good Corporate Governance as Moderation on Sustainability Report Disclosure, *Journal of Governance and Regulation*, Vol. 12, No.3, 2023, pp. 16-24.
- [35] Sriningsih, S., & Wahyuningrum, I. F. S. (2022). Pengaruh Comprehensive Stakeholder Pressure dan Good Corporate Governance terhadap Kualitas Sustainability Report. *Owner: Riset & Jurnal Akuntansi*, 6(1), 813-827.
- [36] Tan, W., Liu, Y., Shen, M., Xu, C., & Sun, Y. (2025). ESG reputation risk and corporate investment and financing maturity mismatch: Evidence from ESG news sentiment. *Journal of Accounting Literature*, 47(2), 166–188. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JAL-07-2024-0166>.
- [37] Ilmi, M., & Wijaksana, T. I. (2024). The impact of green investment and media exposure on carbon and sustainability disclosure: A structural equation modeling approach. *Heliyon*, 10(2), Article e24110. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e24110>.

Contribution of Individual Authors to the Creation of a Scientific Article (Ghostwriting Policy)

MPS: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Methodology, Resources, Visualization, Writing-original draft, Funding acquisition

MTG: Formal analysis, Methodology, Writing-original draft, Funding acquisition

RJ: Data curation, Software, Resources, Methodology, Visualization, Project Administration

RAB: Data curation, Software, Resources, Methodology, Visualization, Project Administration

FA: Formal analysis, Data curation, Software, Resources, Writing – review & editing

NIJ: Investigation, Validation, Writing – review & editing, supervision

Sources of Funding for Research Presented in a Scientific Article or Scientific Article Itself

No funding was received for conducting this study.

Conflict of Interest

The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare that are relevant to the content of this article.

Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 (Attribution 4.0 International, CC BY 4.0)

This article is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en_US

APPENDIX

Table 2. Variable Operational Definition

No	Variable	Definition	Measurement
1.	Sustainability report (SRD) disclosure	Delivery of information on material aspects, namely, aspects that show economic, social, and environmental impacts that affect stakeholder decision-making	The number of items disclosed by the company divided by the total disclosure items based on the GRI Standard
2.	Independent Commissioner (KOMIN)	Members of the board of commissioners who do not have any connection or relationship with the company	The number of independent commissioners divided by the total number of members of the board of commissioners (Idawati & Hanifah, 2022)
3.	Gender representation of the board of directors (GENDER)	The presence of female board members highlights differences in roles and character between men and women in the company's management.	The number of female directors is divided by the total number of board members
4.	Media exposure (ME)	Media exposure is a form of information and company activities that receive coverage and dissemination through various media channels (Purnomo, 2021)	The natural logarithm of the number of company-related news on Google's search engine in the reporting year (Sriningsih & Wahyuningrum, 2022)
5.	ESG	Non-financial indicators that measure how companies are handling issues related to the environment, social responsibility, and corporate governance practices	ESG score refers to the ESG score available on Refinitiv Eikon.
6.	Company size (SIZE)	A measuring tool to assess the size of a company (Indrianingsih & Agustina, 2020)	The natural logarithm of the total assets owned by the company

Source: Processed secondary data, 2025.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistical Analysis Results

	SRD	KOMIN	GENDER	ME	ESG	SIZE
Mean	0.6533	0.4677	0.1768	4.6439	61.8888	32.2199
Median	0.6525	0.4444	0.1666	4.7095	64.1108	31.9294
Max	0.9915	0.8333	0.5454	5.7037	88.8126	35.3154
Min	0.3220	0.2857	0.0000	2.5649	22.5607	29.6010
Std. Dev.	0.1667	0.1250	0.1502	0.8214	16.3897	1.3962
Skewness	0.1766	0.9250	0.7593	-0.3057	-0.4727	0.6876
Kurtosis	2.4044	3.6913	2.9310	1.9506	2.5052	2.7519
Jarque-Bera	1.7782	14.4653	8.5713	5.4702	4.2233	7.2415
Prob	0.4110	0.0007	0.0137	0.0648	0.1210	0.0267
Sum	58.1493	41.62825	15.73932	413.3156	5508.109	2867.57
Sum Sq. Dev.	2.44772	1.376428	1.987449	59.37711	23638.95	171.557
Observation	89	89	89	89	89	89

Source: Eviews 12 Student Lite Output, 2025.