National Action Plan to Prevent and Combat Extremism (RAN-PE):
Youth Perception and Trust in Public Policy
MUHAMMAD ADNAN1, BUDI SETIYONO1, ANITA AMALIYAH2, TURTIANTORO1
1Faculty of Social and Political Science,
Universitas Diponegoro,
Semarang,
INDONESIA
2Faculty of Social and Political Science,
Universitas Tidar,
Magelang,
INDONESIA
Abstract: - Theories and practices related to preventing radicalism, extremism that leads to terrorism offer
different intangible measures to combat such acts. The National Action Plan to Prevent and Combat Extremism
(RAN-PE) as part of achieving national goals; of protecting the homeland of Indonesia’s, and participating in
the achievement of world order. The purpose of this study is to determine public views on violent extremism
(VE) as well as public perception and public trust toward the RAN-PE policy. In addition, this study also
identifies the empirical relationship between the public perception of the VE variable and public trust under the
RAN-PE policy. We conducted a survey to examine the influence of perception on the level of trust toward the
government in relation to the RAN-PE policy and used Spearman’s rho in the non-parametric analysis to
determine the correlation between variables. The findings showed that public perception can predict the level of
trust toward the government’s implementation of policies to combat extremism, radicalism, and terrorism.
Key-Words: Extremism, PT, Public Perception, Counter Violent Extremism.
Received: August 29, 2022. Revised: January 7, 2023. Accepted: February 9, 2023. Published: March 7, 2023.
1 Introduction
Indonesia relies solely on Anti-Terrorism Act No.
15 of 2003 to deal with radicalism, VE, and
terrorism. On January 6 2021, President Joko
Widodo issued Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2021,
which became the Act on the National Action Plan
to Prevent and Combat Extremism (RAN-PE). This
change elicited a variety of responses from various
sectors, including individual and organizational
settings or groups, such as non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). Some of the arguments
relevant to the criticism mostly indicate that a) it can
lead to conflict and fresh acts of violence, even
though the regulations were introduced to combat
violence leading to terrorism; b) it can create fragile
conditions as they threaten national security and
stability rights; and c) it tends to be are
discriminatory, as the new rules could legitimize
discrimination against citizens of religions and
beliefs deemed different from the majority. This
critical attitude arises because the new regulations
give the public (civilians) the opportunity to conduct
police investigations into allegations that lead to
terrorism; which is supported by community
policing training that promotes such activities. The
RAN-PE policy includes prevention measures and
appropriate response to violent extremism (VE)
leading to terrorism which are divided into the three
pillars of its main strategy and plan: (1) the
prevention pillar, including preparedness,
deradicalization and deradicalization and law
enforcement; (2) the pillars of witness and victim
protection, as well as strengthening of national legal
frameworks; and (3) the pillar of international
partnership and cooperation.
However, the emergence of these regulations in
the context of the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted
in less public focus on national issues than those
related to general pandemic issues.
One of the reasons for this provision is to
address the growing threat of VE that leads to
terrorism. In addition, the content of the regulation
also stipulates that, “The prevention and fight
against VE based on violence leading to terrorism
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requires a comprehensive strategy and systematic,
planned and comprehensive measures involving the
active role of all parties”. Presidential Decree No. 7
of 2021 is the basis for the establishment of a new
agency called the Joint Secretariat of RAN PE,
which consists of several government agencies such
as the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and
Security Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the BNPT
(National Counter Terrorism Agency).
Acts of Terrorism in Indonesia are not all based
on a particular religious ideology, but also on
separatist acts from those who are oppressed by the
ruling regime. In The Oppressed Society, Paulo
Freire pointed out that oppression is a feeling
possessed by the oppressed, not a label assigned by
the oppressor. The oppressor is systematically a
hegemonic power that exercises a system of power
over the oppressed. People who perceive that they
are being oppressed have strong feelings of
alienation, humiliation, servitude, contempt,
degrading treatment, arrogance, humiliation, shame,
shame, inferiority, and many more adjectives that
remind of their oppression. VE stems from
situations wherein hegemonic regimes are seen as
extremely bad for society. Interactions among
individuals in violent forms of extremism cannot be
described as dynamically as ordinary human
interactions in groups; instead, they comprise a
complex phenomenon because VE is a product of
hatred and terrorism.
To date, the meaning or definition of VE is
often confused with radicalism or terrorism.
However, the commonly used definition in various
studies refers to VE as an ideology that is contrary
to societal values and principles, wherein the use of
violence to achieve certain goals or impose certain
beliefs , such as those pertaining to race, religion,
and politics, is justified, [1]. In general, VE
supports the advocacy and use of violence by
accepting individuals for their ideological purposes.
In addition, there are five types of extremism: (1)
nationalist or separatist, (2) far right, (3) far left, (4)
personal/issue-oriented, and (5) religiously
motivated, [2]. The United Nations Ad Hoc
Committee on Terrorism defines terrorism as:
Any person who commits an offense within the
meaning of this Convention if that person, by any
means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
(a) death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
(b) serious damage to public or private property,
including a place of public use, a state or
government facility, a public transportation system,
an infrastructure facility or the environment; or (c)
damage to property, places, facilities, or systems
referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article,
resulting or likely to result in major economic loss,
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do
or abstain from doing any act.
With the existence of RAN-PE, the Indonesian
government is currently focusing not only on
terrorism but also on VE. In order to define VE, it is
necessary to correctly define the term “extremism”.
According to [3]:
Since extremism is a relational concept, to answer
the question: “what is extreme?”, one needs a
benchmark, something that is (more) “ordinary”,
“centrist”, “mainstream” or “normal” when
compared with the (extreme) political fringe.
Humans have a tendency to think that others should
also think like they do and therefore tend to assume
that their own position is shared by the majority of
other “reasonable” individuals. Therefore, it can
happen that even those whom we may consider
extremists call others “extremist”.
Referring to the explanation above,
“extremism can be defined as a conceptual order
that is semantically an ideology in itself. Extremism
is certainly considered political extremism in RAN-
PE and in the current study, as is the definition of
VE. The difference between extremism and VE is
the use of force violence. However, the study in [3]
pointed out that extremism has two concepts, one
action-based and value-based. Furthermore, there
are at least three kinds of extremists: a) extreme in
method but not extreme in intent, (b) extreme in
purpose and method used, and c) extreme in purpose
but not coherent.
During the period 2002-2012, a total of 27
bombings occurred in Indonesia, [4]. Looking at the
2019 events before the pandemic, there was one
bomb attack and four attacks on government
facilities (i.e., police), [5]. This shows the
fluctuations of terrorist movements in Indonesia,
which could be due to the effects of global or
interstate events. Numerous studies have shown that
terrorist attacks are a form or end result of the
radicalization process. In Indonesia itself, activism
is more associated with a specific ideology.
Historically, in the early days of the Republic of
Indonesia, radicalism in favor of certain religions
was turbulent owing to the desire of some Muslims
to make Indonesia an Islamic state, [6]. The Darul
Islamic Movement/Islamic Army of Indonesia made
this claim from 1940 to mid-1960. The emergence
of the seeds of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia
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stemmed from calls by some Muslims to replace
Pancasila with Islamic ideology. Although these
movements can be suppressed, the Indonesian
government and people still face threats from
certain terrorist groups or organizations such as
Jamaah Ansharut Daulah and Jamaah Ansharut
Tauhid, which are still actively conducting
dangerous operations.
However, it can be said that Indonesia is
relatively late in dealing with VE and terrorism.
This is because in 2015 as many as 70 countries and
representatives from each country participated in the
CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) Summit at
the White House in the United States, [7]. This
comes after the entire world has been affected by
terror and VE, spawning widespread societal
perceptions against VE, IS, Boko Haram in Nigeria
and Al-Shabaab in Kenya. The concept of
countering VE already exists in Europe through the
European Union, the study in [8] following a series
of attacks by homegrown Islamic terrorist groups in
Madrid and London in 2004-2005. Hence, according
to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon in 2016,
“Missiles may kill terrorists. But I am convinced
that good governance is what kills terrorism”.
Measures to combat VE and terrorism are based
on the premise that combating VE involves not only
knowledge, rules, and military measures, but also
various socio-cultural aspects that need to be
excluded, such as tolerance, ethnic attitudes,
economics, [7], [9]. The youth as the next
generation of Indonesian nation must be involved in
combating VE inevitably.
Historically, the youth were major participants
in the struggle for Indonesian independence. The
youth movement in the pre-independence period
was initiated by two very popular, unique, and
monumental student movements, the 1908 student
movement or Force 08 led by Boedi Oetomo, and
the famous 1928 student movement called the “28th
Generation Student Movement,” which was led by
the Student Association of Indonesia (PPPI) and
young students from universities in the Netherlands
East Indies, such as Jong Ambon, Jong Batak, Jong
Celebes, Jong Java, Jong Sumatra Bond, Pemuda
Betawi, etc. The student youth movement is
inseparable from the elements of primitivism; race,
regionalism and religion, but still based on the spirit
of nationality (nation) and state (state)
independence, so it has a very strong nationalist
color.
Preventing radicalization and extremism that
lead to terrorism should be addressed as early as
possible among the youth, because they are the
usual targets being used by radical and extremist
elements. This topic is of critical importance, as we
witness violent acts of terror being perpetuated by
young fanatics in the name of religion, social
exclusion, ethnicity, and economic depravity.
Furthermore, groups of lower socioeconomic status
may be more vulnerable to extremist ideals taught
by Saudi Arabia-funded religious schools and
hardline Islamic groups that blame societal
inequality on Indonesia's denigration of Islamic
principles, [10]. Studies conducted in Malaysia,
Mindanao and greater South Asia have shown
positive relation between terrorism and youth
extremism, [11], [12], [13].
Furthermore, the issue of radicalism, VE, and
terrorism is a multilateral one, and the nature of
such movements or ideologies is not limited to any
particular region or country. With the approval of
the Indonesian version of the CVE RAN-PE, the
government is also working with other countries and
the international community to combat VE and
terrorism. With the release of RAN-PE, the
Indonesian government has constitutionally declared
national efforts to overcome activities or those that
threaten national security and stability. The
existence of these provisions also demonstrates the
indispensable role of the community as a collective
in overcoming problems resulting from VE and
terrorism.
However, the main means of assessing whether
a government agency has voter support or vice versa
is to look at the political trust (PT) and public
perception (PP) aspect of its population. On the one
hand, PT involves citizens evaluating the
performance of political authorities and institutions
against normative expectations of society or the
public. On the other hand, PT is crucial to the
legitimacy of the institutions to ensure a stable and
effective democracy. Furthermore, it is based on
citizens’ assessments of government performance
relative to their expectations. In the current study,
PT refers to trust in government institutions and
measures a person’s direct trust in parliament or a
particular system of government. Parliaments are
used to gain trust in government agencies and their
representatives, [14]
According to [15], PT consists of three
dimensions: perceived competence (PC), perceived
benevolence (PB) and perceived integrity (PI). PC
is defined as the degree to which citizens perceive
the government to be capable, effective, competent
and professional in its work, [15]. PB is defined as
the degree to which citizens believe that the
government cares about the public good and is
motivated to act to achieve its goal, [15]. Finally, PI
is defined as the degree to which citizens perceive
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the government to be sincere, honest, and able to
keep its promises, [15]. These three indicators are
known as the Citizen’s Trust in Governmental
Organizations Scale (CTGO-S scale), which has
been used to measure politically related PT in a
government.
Meanwhile, PP is defined as the process by
which individuals use their senses to organize and
interpret themselves to give meaning to their
surroundings. Essentially, perception is the
cognitive process that occurs when an individual
understands information presented from the
environment. The process of perception formation
begins with receiving stimuli from various sources
through the five senses of being and then providing
responses that correspond to the general meanings
or specific meanings in particular interpretations.
The factors affecting perception include (1) the
individual perception, (2) the goal of perception,
and 3) the situation and context, [16]. In the context
of the current research, PP of knowledge,
acceptance, and barriers to RAN-PE policies, as
well as VE issues in general, can be seen.
Dealing with extremist groups is an urgent task
given the growing intolerance and terror in societal
and religious spheres. A series of bombing attacks
since the Bali bombings that led to Medan sparked a
movement of thousands of students in Indonesia,
who declared that they wanted to change the basic
concept of the state to the Islamic State, [17]. The
threat of VE and terrorism is real; thus, the
implementation of RAN-PE focuses not only on a
security-based approach to counterterrorism, but
also on systemic preventive measures that can
directly address the drivers (enablers).
2 Problem Formulation
The existence of RAN-PE as a comprehensive
package of government countermeasures against VE
and terrorism; while respecting and protecting
human rights, the very essence of the security
concept itself (human security) - must also be
considered. Based on the above background
description, the research questions of this study are
as follows: (1) How does the public perceive VE
and (2) How high is the Indonesian PT in the RAN-
PE policy against CVE?
In an attempt to identify the empirical
relationship between the variables of the PP of VE
and PT in the RAN-PE policy, we conducted
quantitative research by relying on two types of
scales. In order to measure PT toward RAN-PE
policy, we used an instrument developed by [15],
which consists of eight items (See Table 1).
Modifications in all items were made by adding
contextual information related to the policy so that
the participants were aware that the policy was the
main trust object. In order to measure PP, the
authors constructed a tool based on social cognitive
theory consisting of 10 items (See Table 2), [18].
All items were constructed through a statement and
attitudinal scale. For the analysis phase, Spearman’s
Rho correlations method was used to examine the
correlation between two variables. The authors
hypothesize that there is no significant association
between the PP of VE and the public’s trust in the
government’s RAN-PE policy (null hypothesis, H0)
and that there is a significant correlation between PP
of VE and the level of PT in the government’s
RAN-PE policy (alternative hypothesis, H1).
2.1 Method Participant and Procedures
As for the data collection, this research has applied
probability sampling, because the population
elements were already known. Multistage random
sampling (stratified random sampling technique)
was used to group the sample into several
categories, [19]. A stratified random sample was
conducted to first determine the primary sampling
unit (PSU), namely, Diponegoro University. Then,
the sample was clustered again based on the name
of the faculty, and the name of the department. Four
faculties were chosen randomly to represent the
focus of the study. Thus, a total of 650 participants
were included, of whom 66.6% were females,
representing the majority of the respondents. The
respondents’ origins were dominated by Central
Java (57.5%) and the rest came from greater Jakarta,
East Java, and outside Java.
The participants received a link to access the
scale and a consent form on this study’s home page.
A participant’s decision to participate in the study
was signified by clicking on the “continue” button,
to continue the session. The tools were distributed to
the participants through digital applications, such as
WhatsApp messages and Instagram. Upon the
completion of the data collection, a variety of test
methods were used for analysis, including validity
test and descriptive statistics to measure the
classification of the sub variable level of each
variable; and the significance of the lower variable
respectively.
Trust in the government’s public policy (i.e.,
RAN-PE) is the independent variable, while the PP
of VE is the dependent variable. The questionnaire
for the independent variable asked the respondents
about their confidence, belief in the capabilities of
government institutions, such as the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches. Thus, the
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questionnaires examined trust in institutions rather
than trust in individual leaders. The dependent
variable in this study included all three aspects in PP
that include ideological perspective to action, [20].
3 Problem Solution and Discussion
In the context of a democracy, public trust is one of
the indicators that determines the legitimacy of an
existing government. The government in a
democratic environment is the top administrator,
who serves society through a variety of policies and
regulations. Therefore, the level of public trust, as a
basic indicator, should be used in government
dashboards to assess the effectiveness of national or
regional measures, especially in crisis situations
where countering VE and terrorism is a critical
challenge for all Indonesians.
Drawing from the hypothesis, this research
examines the relationship in greater depth, and
concludes that both public trust and PP toward VE
support the RAN-PE. The correlation between the
two variables results in a positive relationship with a
significance of 0.671. The significance of this score
lies in the variable strength of the relationship
between PP of VE and the varying levels of public
PT in government’s policy. Therefore, if public
awareness of VE is high, the public's PT in the
government’s RAN-PE policy will also increase.
Furthermore, there is a strong and significant
correlation between the variables of PP of VE and
level of PT in the government.
Previous studies have proposed at least 20
indicators that can be used to identify individuals
who have broad extremist ideology in a liberal-
democratic perspective, which can not only be used
as indicators of religious extremism, [3], [21], [22].
Individuals who have extremist tendencies are likely
to:
(1) Place themselves outside of the general public
around them and reject the existence of a
social or political system or order;
(2) Overthrow the existing sociocultural and
political order and want the provisions they
imagine in the aspects of race, social class,
belief, ethnicity and culture;
(3) Harbor obsession with certain ideological
goals and also plan certain activities aimed at
taking over the social order;
(4) Reject the liberal-democratic system and also
law enforcement when they power;
(5) Reject the concept of human rights and show
low empathy for the rights of people outside
of their group;
(6) Tend to reject the principles of democracy
based on people’s sovereignty;
(7) Reject equal rights especially for women and
minorities;
(8) Reject pluralism;
(9) Justify certain philosophies or beliefs as long
as it fits their goals or ideals;
(10) Actively demonstrate the glorification of the
use of force to those they deem “evil” or
enemies;
(11) Commit mass violence;
(12) Become single minded or closed minded;
(13) Eliminate individual freedom, in favor of the
collective goal;
(14) Refuse to compromise;
(15) Show intolerance toward all views except the
dogma they believe in and create;
(16) Blind fanaticism;
(17) Show a dictatorial, tyrannical, or totalitarian
attitude;
(18) Be against criticism and show an intimidating
attitude;
(19) Demand obedience in accordance with their
requests and commands and do not allow the
subjectivity of other views;
(20) Believe that there is only one truth and
voluntarily want to sacrifice themselves for
the collective goals of their group and what
they believe in.
These are in line with our results on
respondents’ perceptions that extremist groups that
commit acts of to violence and terrorism do not
have a sense of nationalism. In particular, the
majority of respondents stated that they strongly
agree (36%) and agree (26%) with the statement.
The majority of the respondents were in the middle
category, accounting for 71.2% of the 650
respondents in terms of cognitive dimension. In
terms of emotion or affective dimension, the
majority comprised the middle category, accounting
for 68.6% of all respondents and 63.4% for
cognitive dimension. Regarding perceptions of VE,
several things must be highlighted. First, the
majority of respondents agree that extremist groups
that incite violence and terrorism do not believe in
and practice Pancasila’s Values. Second, the
majority of respondents indicated that extremist
groups do not belong to any particular religion, thus
making it impossible to associate religion with the
characteristics of groups in Indonesia.
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Table 1. Measuring public perceptions of the VE
variable
Dimensions
Items
Coefficient
Correlations
Cognitive
Extremist
groups that
commit acts
of violence
and terrorism
only adhere
to a certain
religion,
namely,
Islam.
0.688
Extremist
groups that
commit acts
of violence
and terrorism
do not believe
in Pancasila
and do not
practice
Pancasila’s
values.
0.761
Those who
support
extremist
groups that
lead to
violence and
terrorism
pose no
danger to
Indonesia.
0.552
I do not think
extremist
groups that
commit acts
of violence
and terrorism
have a sense
of
nationalism.
0.712
Affective
Extremist
groups that
commit acts
of violence
and terrorism
believe in and
support the
caliphate.
0.815
A society that
supports
extremist
groups that
commit acts
of violence
and terrorism
is bad and
0.771
inappropriate.
Fighting for
personal
beliefs in the
name of
religion, even
with elements
of coercion
and violence
is natural and
acceptable.
0.701
Conative
People with
beards and
veils are
supporters of
extremist
groups.
0.758
Intolerance,
hatred, and
sense of
injustice in
the country
and society
are among the
factors that
allow a
person to join
an extremist
group.
0.765
People who
join extremist
groups that
fuel violence
and terrorism
can change
and deserve
better
opportunities
0.753
Regarding the affective side of VE perceptions,
a few points should also be emphasized. Despite the
use of elements of coercion and violence, most
respondents agree that fighting for personal beliefs
in the name of religion is normal (53%). Still, at
least 10% said it was common and natural to use
elements of coercion and violence in personal
struggles in the name of religion. The results
highlight the idea that hatred and a sense of injustice
in the state and society are among the factors that
encourage individuals to join extremist groups (26%
completely agree, 26% agree). From this statement,
we can conclude that when intolerance is high, the
sense of injustice and hatred in the community also
increases, which in turn, motivates people to join
extremist groups.
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Table 2. Measuring public trust towards RAN-PE
Policy
Dimensions
Items
Coefficient
Correlations
Scale
PC
In general, the
government
issued RAN-PE
policy as the
right step in the
fight against
violent
extremism and
terrorism in
Indonesia.
0.615
Interval
Counter-
terrorism
programmes are
effectively
implemented
0.803
The RAN-PE
policy is the
result of the
hard work of
state officials
who have
competence and
expertise in the
study of
extremism and
terrorism
0.759
The government
has executed the
counter-
terrorism plan
well and
professionally
0.829
PB
Presidential
Decree on the
National Action
Plan to Prevent
and Combat
Violent
Extremism That
Leads to
Terrorism
(RAN-PE) is
part of Ensuring
Justice and
Keeping
Communities
Safe
0.827
Plan to Prevent
and Combat VE
That Leads to
Terrorism
(RAN-PE)
serves the
political
interest, not the
0.893
public interest.
PI
The Presidential
Decree on the
National Action
Plan for
Preventing and
VE That Leads
to Terrorism
(RAN PE) is the
Government’s
Commitment
and Integrity in
combating
terrorism
0.839
Violent
extremist and
terrorist groups
and their
supporters are
still emerging
and growing in
Indonesia,
which are the
result of the
government’s
lack of
seriousness and
dishonesty in
overcoming the
Pancasila threat
and the nation’s
ideological
problems.
0.877
The results of the study highlight the RAN-PE
policy’s aim to address and combat the drivers of
VE that lead to terrorism and enable the structural
conditions and radicalization. Structural conditions
include economic inequality, marginalization and
discrimination, poor governance, human rights
violations, poor law enforcement, ongoing conflict,
and radicalization in prisons. Meanwhile, the
process of radicalization can be broken down into
multiple factors, including personal background and
motivation, self-description as a victim
(victimization), collective disillusionment, and
distortion of certain understandings, which may be
rooted in beliefs, political ideologies, racial and
cultural differences, social networks, and leadership.
Nevertheless, the majority of respondents believe
that people who subscribe to extremism can still
have the opportunity to change and deserve a second
chance in society (56%).
Regarding perceptions of PT in the
government’s RAN-PE policy in terms of
perception competence, the majority (97.4%) of the
633 respondents were in the high category, followed
by 16 respondents in the medium category, and 1
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(0.1%) in the lowest category. Consequently, PT in
the government’s capability to implement the RAN-
PE policy is high. However, it must be emphasized
that counterterrorism programs are being
implemented effectively, with the majority of
respondents expressing slight skepticism (agree
24%) and tend to agree (36%). Thus, it can be
concluded that the majority of respondents do not
believe in the effectiveness of the government’s
counterterrorism programs. What needs to be
highlighted in the PB category as part of PT is that
the majority of respondents believe that the RAN-
PE policy is part of the government’s efforts to
provide legal certainty and guarantee public security
from terrorism and VE groups. This is reflected in
the need to have confidence and certainty in
overcoming terrorism and mainstream extremist
violence in society, which continue to threaten
diversity, security, and public justice. Furthermore,
in the PI dimension of PP regarding PT in the
government’s RAN-PE policy, the result show that
out of a total of 650 respondents, as many as 394
(60.6%) are in the middle category, followed by the
high category with 132 (20.3%) respondents, and
the low category with 123 (19.1%) respondents. It
needs to be emphasized that, in this category, the
government is still seen as being dishonest in its
handling of the remaining problems of VE and
terrorism in Indonesia, which pose a threat to
Pancasila’s state and ideology. In addition, some
respondents in this category also expressed doubts
about the government’s commitment and integrity in
preventing and overcoming acts of extreme violence
and terrorism.
This study confirms that PP can predict the level
of PT toward government in the area of combating
extremism, radicalism and terrorism policy.
However, in the internet age, which has become an
important source of information related to
extremism and terrorism, especially among the
youth, this prevention policy must be addressed
comprehensively. In particular, the government
must pay more attention to social changes that can
shape the public's optimistic view of the seriousness
of its handling of extremism and terrorism cases and
their causes, especially because the drivers are
intangible. More efforts must be exerted regarding
issues of concern, including (1) the likelihood of
communal conflict in the context of primitive and
religious sentiment, (21) economic disparities, (3)
differences in political opinion, (4) unfair treatment;
and (5) religious life of intolerance.
4 Conclusion
These findings of this study provide scientific
evidence regarding the relationship between PT in
government public policy and PP in the field of
countering and preventing radicalization, extremism
and terrorism. The results suggest that governments
must demonstrate the seriousness of policies and
measures to combat radicalization, extremism and
terrorism, which should account for the involvement
of all relevant actors. The findings also indicate that
greater trust in government agencies correlates with
increased understanding of VE, activism, and
terrorism itself. Therefore, the government must
highlight the public’s (youth) perception that this
policy strengthens the right to protect citizens from
VE along with national security and stability in
accordance with Pancasila and the 1945
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
However, the findings of this study also reveal
the notion that high levels of intolerance also lead to
feelings of injustice and hatred in the community,
which are thought to trigger people to join extremist
groups. In fact, the pillars of the rule of law and
cooperation will not have a significant impact if
there is omission from the government regarding the
lack of synergy among major stakeholders in the
society, such as government institutions, NGOs,
community institutions, and religious organizations
as a whole. Taking trust into account allows the
government and its institutions to hone their
discretion to establish forums that enhance citizen’s
participation in a given set of circumstances.
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Contribution of Individual Authors to the
Creation of a Scientific Article (Ghostwriting
Policy)
Muhammad Adnan, Anita Amaliyah carried out the
conceptual idea and research problem.
Anita Amaliyah, Budi Setiyono and Turtiantoro
organized the research conduct.
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on ENVIRONMENT and DEVELOPMENT
DOI: 10.37394/232015.2023.19.15
Muhammad Adnan,
Budi Setiyono, Anita Amaliyah, Turtiantoro
E-ISSN: 2224-3496
182
Volume 19, 2023
Sources of Funding for Research Presented in a
Scientific Article or Scientific Article Itself
No funding was received for conducting this study.
Conflict of Interest
The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare
that are relevant to the content of this article.
Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0
(Attribution 4.0 International, CC BY 4.0)
This article is published under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en
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