# National Action Plan to Prevent and Combat Extremism (RAN-PE): Youth Perception and Trust in Public Policy

MUHAMMAD ADNAN[1], BUDI SETIYONO[1], ANITA AMALIYAH[2], TURTIANTORO[1]

[1]Faculty of Social and Political Science,
Universitas Diponegoro,
Semarang,
INDONESIA

[2]Faculty of Social and Political Science,
Universitas Tidar,
Magelang,
INDONESIA

*Abstract: -* Theories and practices related to preventing radicalism, extremism that leads to terrorism offer different intangible measures to combat such acts. The National Action Plan to Prevent and Combat Extremism (RAN-PE) as part of achieving national goals; of protecting the homeland of Indonesia's, and participating in the achievement of world order. The purpose of this study is to determine public views on violent extremism (VE) as well as public perception and public trust toward the RAN-PE policy. In addition, this study also identifies the empirical relationship between the public perception of the VE variable and public trust under the RAN-PE policy. We conducted a survey to examine the influence of perception on the level of trust toward the government in relation to the RAN-PE policy and used Spearman's rho in the non-parametric analysis to determine the correlation between variables. The findings showed that public perception can predict the level of trust toward the government's implementation of policies to combat extremism, radicalism, and terrorism.

*Key-Words:* Extremism, PT, Public Perception, Counter Violent Extremism.

## 1 Introduction

Indonesia relies solely on Anti-Terrorism Act No. 15 of 2003 to deal with radicalism, VE, and terrorism. On January 6 2021, President Joko Widodo issued Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2021, which became the Act on the National Action Plan to Prevent and Combat Extremism (RAN-PE). This change elicited a variety of responses from various sectors, including individual and organizational settings or groups, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Some of the arguments relevant to the criticism mostly indicate that a) it can lead to conflict and fresh acts of violence, even though the regulations were introduced to combat violence leading to terrorism; b) it can create fragile conditions as they threaten national security and stability rights; and c) it tends to be are discriminatory, as the new rules could legitimize discrimination against citizens of religions and beliefs deemed different from the majority. This critical attitude arises because the new regulations give the public (civilians) the opportunity to conduct

police investigations into allegations that lead to terrorism; which is supported by community policing training that promotes such activities. The RAN-PE policy includes prevention measures and appropriate response to violent extremism (VE) leading to terrorism which are divided into the three pillars of its main strategy and plan: (1) the prevention pillar, including preparedness, deradicalization and deradicalization and law enforcement; (2) the pillars of witness and victim protection, as well as strengthening of national legal frameworks; and (3) the pillar of international partnership and cooperation.

However, the emergence of these regulations in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in less public focus on national issues than those related to general pandemic issues.

One of the reasons for this provision is to address the growing threat of VE that leads to terrorism. In addition, the content of the regulation also stipulates that, "The prevention and fight against VE based on violence leading to terrorism

requires a comprehensive strategy and systematic, planned and comprehensive measures involving the active role of all parties". Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2021 is the basis for the establishment of a new agency called the Joint Secretariat of RAN PE, which consists of several government agencies such as the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the BNPT (National Counter Terrorism Agency).

Acts of Terrorism in Indonesia are not all based on a particular religious ideology, but also on separatist acts from those who are oppressed by the ruling regime. In The Oppressed Society, Paulo Freire pointed out that oppression is a feeling possessed by the oppressed, not a label assigned by the oppressor. The oppressor is systematically a hegemonic power that exercises a system of power over the oppressed. People who perceive that they are being oppressed have strong feelings of alienation, humiliation, servitude, contempt, degrading treatment, arrogance, humiliation, shame, shame, inferiority, and many more adjectives that remind of their oppression. VE stems from situations wherein hegemonic regimes are seen as extremely bad for society. Interactions among individuals in violent forms of extremism cannot be described as dynamically as ordinary human interactions in groups; instead, they comprise a complex phenomenon because VE is a product of hatred and terrorism.

To date, the meaning or definition of VE is often confused with radicalism or terrorism. However, the commonly used definition in various studies refers to VE as an ideology that is contrary to societal values and principles, wherein the use of violence to achieve certain goals or impose certain beliefs , such as those pertaining to race, religion, and politics,  is justified, [1]. In general, VE supports the advocacy and use of violence by accepting individuals for their ideological purposes. In addition, there are five types of extremism: (1) nationalist or separatist, (2) far right, (3) far left, (4) personal/issue-oriented, and (5) religiously motivated, [2]. The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism defines terrorism as:

*Any person who commits an offense within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:*
*(a) death or serious bodily injury to any person; or*
*(b) serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or (c) damage to property, places, facilities, or systems*

*referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.*

With the existence of RAN-PE, the Indonesian government is currently focusing not only on terrorism but also on VE. In order to define VE, it is necessary to correctly define the term "extremism". According to [3]:
*Since extremism is a relational concept, to answer the question: "what is extreme?", one needs a benchmark, something that is (more) "ordinary", "centrist", "mainstream" or "normal" when compared with the (extreme) political fringe. Humans have a tendency to think that others should also think like they do and therefore tend to assume that their own position is shared by the majority of other "reasonable" individuals. Therefore, it can happen that even those whom we may consider extremists call others "extremist".*

Referring to the explanation above, "extremism" can be defined as a conceptual order that is semantically an ideology in itself. Extremism is certainly considered political extremism in RAN-PE and in the current study, as is the definition of VE. The difference between extremism and VE is the use of force violence. However, the study in [3] pointed out that extremism has two concepts, one action-based and value-based. Furthermore, there are at least three kinds of extremists: a) extreme in method but not extreme in intent, (b) extreme in purpose and method used, and c) extreme in purpose but not coherent.

During the period 2002-2012, a total of 27 bombings occurred in Indonesia, [4]. Looking at the 2019 events before the pandemic, there was one bomb attack and four attacks on government facilities (i.e., police), [5]. This shows the fluctuations of terrorist movements in Indonesia, which could be due to the effects of global or interstate events. Numerous studies have shown that terrorist attacks are a form or end result of the radicalization process. In Indonesia itself, activism is more associated with a specific ideology. Historically, in the early days of the Republic of Indonesia, radicalism in favor of certain religions was turbulent owing to the desire of some Muslims to make Indonesia an Islamic state, [6]. The Darul Islamic Movement/Islamic Army of Indonesia made this claim from 1940 to mid-1960. The emergence of the seeds of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia

stemmed from calls by some Muslims to replace Pancasila with Islamic ideology. Although these movements can be suppressed, the Indonesian government and people still face threats from certain terrorist groups or organizations such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, which are still actively conducting dangerous operations.

However, it can be said that Indonesia is relatively late in dealing with VE and terrorism. This is because in 2015 as many as 70 countries and representatives from each country participated in the CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) Summit at the White House in the United States, [7]. This comes after the entire world has been affected by terror and VE, spawning widespread societal perceptions against VE, IS, Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Kenya. The concept of countering VE already exists in Europe through the European Union, the study in [8] following a series of attacks by homegrown Islamic terrorist groups in Madrid and London in 2004-2005. Hence, according to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon in 2016, "Missiles may kill terrorists. But I am convinced that good governance is what kills terrorism".

Measures to combat VE and terrorism are based on the premise that combating VE involves not only knowledge, rules, and military measures, but also various socio-cultural aspects that need to be excluded, such as tolerance, ethnic attitudes, economics, [7], [9]. The youth as the next generation of Indonesian nation must be involved in combating VE inevitably.

Historically, the youth were major participants in the struggle for Indonesian independence. The youth movement in the pre-independence period was initiated by two very popular, unique, and monumental student movements, the 1908 student movement or Force 08 led by Boedi Oetomo, and the famous 1928 student movement called the "28th Generation Student Movement," which was led by the Student Association of Indonesia (PPPI) and young students from universities in the Netherlands East Indies, such as Jong Ambon, Jong Batak, Jong Celebes, Jong Java, Jong Sumatra Bond, Pemuda Betawi, etc. The student youth movement is inseparable from the elements of primitivism; race, regionalism and religion, but still based on the spirit of nationality (nation) and state (state) independence, so it has a very strong nationalist color.

Preventing radicalization and extremism that lead to terrorism should be addressed as early as possible among the youth, because they are the usual targets being used by radical and extremist elements. This topic is of critical importance, as we witness violent acts of terror being perpetuated by young fanatics in the name of religion, social exclusion, ethnicity, and economic depravity. Furthermore, groups of lower socioeconomic status may be more vulnerable to extremist ideals taught by Saudi Arabia-funded religious schools and hardline Islamic groups that blame societal inequality on Indonesia's denigration of Islamic principles, [10]. Studies conducted in Malaysia, Mindanao and greater South Asia have shown positive relation between terrorism and youth extremism, [11], [12], [13].

Furthermore, the issue of radicalism, VE, and terrorism is a multilateral one, and the nature of such movements or ideologies is not limited to any particular region or country. With the approval of the Indonesian version of the CVE RAN-PE, the government is also working with other countries and the international community to combat VE and terrorism. With the release of RAN-PE, the Indonesian government has constitutionally declared national efforts to overcome activities or those that threaten national security and stability. The existence of these provisions also demonstrates the indispensable role of the community as a collective in overcoming problems resulting from VE and terrorism.

However, the main means of assessing whether a government agency has voter support or vice versa is to look at the political trust (PT) and public perception (PP) aspect of its population. On the one hand, PT involves citizens evaluating the performance of political authorities and institutions against normative expectations of society or the public. On the other hand, PT is crucial to the legitimacy of the institutions to ensure a stable and effective democracy. Furthermore, it is based on citizens' assessments of government performance relative to their expectations. In the current study, PT refers to trust in government institutions and measures a person's direct trust in parliament or a particular system of government. Parliaments are used to gain trust in government agencies and their representatives, [14]

According to [15], PT consists of three dimensions: perceived competence (PC), perceived benevolence (PB) and perceived integrity (PI). PC is defined as the degree to which citizens perceive the government to be capable, effective, competent and professional in its work, [15]. PB is defined as the degree to which citizens believe that the government cares about the public good and is motivated to act to achieve its goal, [15]. Finally, PI is defined as the degree to which citizens perceive

the government to be sincere, honest, and able to keep its promises, [15]. These three indicators are known as the Citizen's Trust in Governmental Organizations Scale (CTGO-S scale), which has been used to measure politically related PT in a government.

Meanwhile, PP is defined as the process by which individuals use their senses to organize and interpret themselves to give meaning to their surroundings. Essentially, perception is the cognitive process that occurs when an individual understands information presented from the environment. The process of perception formation begins with receiving stimuli from various sources through the five senses of being and then providing responses that correspond to the general meanings or specific meanings in particular interpretations. The factors affecting perception include (1) the individual perception, (2) the goal of perception, and 3) the situation and context, [16]. In the context of the current research, PP of knowledge, acceptance, and barriers to RAN-PE policies, as well as VE issues in general, can be seen.

Dealing with extremist groups is an urgent task given the growing intolerance and terror in societal and religious spheres. A series of bombing attacks since the Bali bombings that led to Medan sparked a movement of thousands of students in Indonesia, who declared that they wanted to change the basic concept of the state to the Islamic State, [17]. The threat of VE and terrorism is real; thus, the implementation of RAN-PE focuses not only on a security-based approach to counterterrorism, but also on systemic preventive measures that can directly address the drivers (enablers).

# 2 Problem Formulation

The existence of RAN-PE as a comprehensive package of government countermeasures against VE and terrorism; while respecting and protecting human rights, the very essence of the security concept itself (human security) - must also be considered. Based on the above background description, the research questions of this study are as follows: (1) How does the public perceive VE and (2) How high is the Indonesian PT in the RAN-PE policy against CVE?

In an attempt to identify the empirical relationship between the variables of the PP of VE and PT in the RAN-PE policy, we conducted quantitative research by relying on two types of scales. In order to measure PT toward RAN-PE policy, we used an instrument developed by [15], which consists of eight items (See Table 1).

Modifications in all items were made by adding contextual information related to the policy so that the participants were aware that the policy was the main trust object. In order to measure PP, the authors constructed a tool based on social cognitive theory consisting of 10 items (See Table 2), [18]. All items were constructed through a statement and attitudinal scale. For the analysis phase, Spearman's Rho correlations method was used to examine the correlation between two variables. The authors hypothesize that there is no significant association between the PP of VE and the public's trust in the government's RAN-PE policy (null hypothesis, H0) and that there is a significant correlation between PP of VE and the level of PT in the government's RAN-PE policy (alternative hypothesis, H1).

## 2.1 Method Participant and Procedures

As for the data collection, this research has applied probability sampling, because the population elements were already known. Multistage random sampling (stratified random sampling technique) was used to group the sample into several categories, [19]. A stratified random sample was conducted to first determine the primary sampling unit (PSU), namely, Diponegoro University. Then, the sample was clustered again based on the name of the faculty, and the name of the department. Four faculties were chosen randomly to represent the focus of the study. Thus, a total of 650 participants were included, of whom 66.6% were females, representing the majority of the respondents. The respondents' origins were dominated by Central Java (57.5%) and the rest came from greater Jakarta, East Java, and outside Java.

The participants received a link to access the scale and a consent form on this study's home page. A participant's decision to participate in the study was signified by clicking on the "continue" button, to continue the session. The tools were distributed to the participants through digital applications, such as WhatsApp messages and Instagram. Upon the completion of the data collection, a variety of test methods were used for analysis, including validity test and descriptive statistics to measure the classification of the sub variable level of each variable; and the significance of the lower variable respectively.

Trust in the government's public policy (i.e., RAN-PE) is the independent variable, while the PP of VE is the dependent variable. The questionnaire for the independent variable asked the respondents about their confidence, belief in the capabilities of government institutions, such as the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Thus, the

questionnaires examined trust in institutions rather than trust in individual leaders. The dependent variable in this study included all three aspects in PP that include ideological perspective to action, [20].

# 3 Problem Solution and Discussion

In the context of a democracy, public trust is one of the indicators that determines the legitimacy of an existing government. The government in a democratic environment is the top administrator, who serves society through a variety of policies and regulations. Therefore, the level of public trust, as a basic indicator, should be used in government dashboards to assess the effectiveness of national or regional measures, especially in crisis situations where countering VE and terrorism is a critical challenge for all Indonesians.

Drawing from the hypothesis, this research examines the relationship in greater depth, and concludes that both public trust and PP toward VE support the RAN-PE. The correlation between the two variables results in a positive relationship with a significance of 0.671. The significance of this score lies in the variable strength of the relationship between PP of VE and the varying levels of public PT in government's policy. Therefore, if public awareness of VE is high, the public's PT in the government's RAN-PE policy will also increase. Furthermore, there is a strong and significant correlation between the variables of PP of VE and level of PT in the government.

Previous studies have proposed at least 20 indicators that can be used to identify individuals who have broad extremist ideology in a liberal-democratic perspective, which can not only be used as indicators of religious extremism, [3], [21], [22]. Individuals who have extremist tendencies are likely to:

(1) Place themselves outside of the general public around them and reject the existence of a social or political system or order;
(2) Overthrow the existing sociocultural and political order and want the provisions they imagine in the aspects of race, social class, belief, ethnicity and culture;
(3) Harbor obsession with certain ideological goals and also plan certain activities aimed at taking over the social order;
(4) Reject the liberal-democratic system and also law enforcement when they power;
(5) Reject the concept of human rights and show low empathy for the rights of people outside of their group;
(6) Tend to reject the principles of democracy based on people's sovereignty;
(7) Reject equal rights especially for women and minorities;
(8) Reject pluralism;
(9) Justify certain philosophies or beliefs as long as it fits their goals or ideals;
(10) Actively demonstrate the glorification of the use of force to those they deem "evil" or enemies;
(11) Commit mass violence;
(12) Become single minded or closed minded;
(13) Eliminate individual freedom, in favor of the collective goal;
(14) Refuse to compromise;
(15) Show intolerance toward all views except the dogma they believe in and create;
(16) Blind fanaticism;
(17) Show a dictatorial, tyrannical, or totalitarian attitude;
(18) Be against criticism and show an intimidating attitude;
(19) Demand obedience in accordance with their requests and commands and do not allow the subjectivity of other views;
(20) Believe that there is only one truth and voluntarily want to sacrifice themselves for the collective goals of their group and what they believe in.

These are in line with our results on respondents' perceptions that extremist groups that commit acts of to violence and terrorism do not have a sense of nationalism. In particular, the majority of respondents stated that they strongly agree (36%) and agree (26%) with the statement. The majority of the respondents were in the middle category, accounting for 71.2% of the 650 respondents in terms of cognitive dimension. In terms of emotion or affective dimension, the majority comprised the middle category, accounting for 68.6% of all respondents and 63.4% for cognitive dimension. Regarding perceptions of VE, several things must be highlighted. First, the majority of respondents agree that extremist groups that incite violence and terrorism do not believe in and practice Pancasila's Values. Second, the majority of respondents indicated that extremist groups do not belong to any particular religion, thus making it impossible to associate religion with the characteristics of groups in Indonesia.

Table 1. Measuring public perceptions of the VE variable

| Dimensions | Items | Coefficient Correlations | Scale |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cognitive | Extremist groups that commit acts of violence and terrorism only adhere to a certain religion, namely, Islam. | 0.688 | Interval |
| | Extremist groups that commit acts of violence and terrorism do not believe in Pancasila and do not practice Pancasila's values. | 0.761 | |
| | Those who support extremist groups that lead to violence and terrorism pose no danger to Indonesia. | 0.552 | |
| | I do not think extremist groups that commit acts of violence and terrorism have a sense of nationalism. | 0.712 | |
| Affective | Extremist groups that commit acts of violence and terrorism believe in and support the caliphate. | 0.815 | |
| | A society that supports extremist groups that commit acts of violence and terrorism is bad and inappropriate. | 0.771 | |
| | Fighting for personal beliefs in the name of religion, even with elements of coercion and violence is natural and acceptable. | 0.701 | |
| Conative | People with beards and veils are supporters of extremist groups. | 0.758 | |
| | Intolerance, hatred, and sense of injustice in the country and society are among the factors that allow a person to join an extremist group. | 0.765 | |
| | People who join extremist groups that fuel violence and terrorism can change and deserve better opportunities | 0.753 | |

Regarding the affective side of VE perceptions, a few points should also be emphasized. Despite the use of elements of coercion and violence, most respondents agree that fighting for personal beliefs in the name of religion is normal (53%). Still, at least 10% said it was common and natural to use elements of coercion and violence in personal struggles in the name of religion. The results highlight the idea that hatred and a sense of injustice in the state and society are among the factors that encourage individuals to join extremist groups (26% completely agree, 26% agree). From this statement, we can conclude that when intolerance is high, the sense of injustice and hatred in the community also increases, which in turn, motivates people to join extremist groups.

Table 2. Measuring public trust towards RAN-PE Policy

| Dimensions | Items | Coefficient Correlations | Scale |
|---|---|---|---|
| PC | In general, the government issued RAN-PE policy as the right step in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism in Indonesia. | 0.615 | Interval |
| | Counter-terrorism programmes are effectively implemented | 0.803 | |
| | The RAN-PE policy is the result of the hard work of state officials who have competence and expertise in the study of extremism and terrorism | 0.759 | |
| | The government has executed the counter-terrorism plan well and professionally | 0.829 | |
| PB | Presidential Decree on the National Action Plan to Prevent and Combat Violent Extremism That Leads to Terrorism (RAN-PE) is part of Ensuring Justice and Keeping Communities Safe | 0.827 | |
| | Plan to Prevent and Combat VE That Leads to Terrorism (RAN-PE) serves the political interest, not the public interest. | 0.893 | |
| PI | The Presidential Decree on the National Action Plan for Preventing and VE That Leads to Terrorism (RAN PE) is the Government's Commitment and Integrity in combating terrorism | 0.839 | |
| | Violent extremist and terrorist groups and their supporters are still emerging and growing in Indonesia, which are the result of the government's lack of seriousness and dishonesty in overcoming the Pancasila threat and the nation's ideological problems. | 0.877 | |

The results of the study highlight the RAN-PE policy's aim to address and combat the drivers of VE that lead to terrorism and enable the structural conditions and radicalization. Structural conditions include economic inequality, marginalization and discrimination, poor governance, human rights violations, poor law enforcement, ongoing conflict, and radicalization in prisons. Meanwhile, the process of radicalization can be broken down into multiple factors, including personal background and motivation, self-description as a victim (victimization), collective disillusionment, and distortion of certain understandings, which may be rooted in beliefs, political ideologies, racial and cultural differences, social networks, and leadership. Nevertheless, the majority of respondents believe that people who subscribe to extremism can still have the opportunity to change and deserve a second chance in society (56%).

Regarding perceptions of PT in the government's RAN-PE policy in terms of perception competence, the majority (97.4%) of the 633 respondents were in the high category, followed by 16 respondents in the medium category, and 1

(0.1%) in the lowest category. Consequently, PT in the government's capability to implement the RAN-PE policy is high. However, it must be emphasized that counterterrorism programs are being implemented effectively, with the majority of respondents expressing slight skepticism (agree 24%) and tend to agree (36%). Thus, it can be concluded that the majority of respondents do not believe in the effectiveness of the government's counterterrorism programs. What needs to be highlighted in the PB category as part of PT is that the majority of respondents believe that the RAN-PE policy is part of the government's efforts to provide legal certainty and guarantee public security from terrorism and VE groups. This is reflected in the need to have confidence and certainty in overcoming terrorism and mainstream extremist violence in society, which continue to threaten diversity, security, and public justice. Furthermore, in the PI dimension of PP regarding PT in the government's RAN-PE policy, the result show that out of a total of 650 respondents, as many as 394 (60.6%) are in the middle category, followed by the high category with 132 (20.3%) respondents, and the low category with 123 (19.1%) respondents. It needs to be emphasized that, in this category, the government is still seen as being dishonest in its handling of the remaining problems of VE and terrorism in Indonesia, which pose a threat to Pancasila's state and ideology. In addition, some respondents in this category also expressed doubts about the government's commitment and integrity in preventing and overcoming acts of extreme violence and terrorism.

This study confirms that PP can predict the level of PT toward government in the area of combating extremism, radicalism and terrorism policy. However, in the internet age, which has become an important source of information related to extremism and terrorism, especially among the youth, this prevention policy must be addressed comprehensively. In particular, the government must pay more attention to social changes that can shape the public's optimistic view of the seriousness of its handling of extremism and terrorism cases and their causes, especially because the drivers are intangible. More efforts must be exerted regarding issues of concern, including (1) the likelihood of communal conflict in the context of primitive and religious sentiment, (21) economic disparities, (3) differences in political opinion, (4) unfair treatment; and (5) religious life of intolerance.

## 4 Conclusion

These findings of this study provide scientific evidence regarding the relationship between PT in government public policy and PP in the field of countering and preventing radicalization, extremism and terrorism. The results suggest that governments must demonstrate the seriousness of policies and measures to combat radicalization, extremism and terrorism, which should account for the involvement of all relevant actors. The findings also indicate that greater trust in government agencies correlates with increased understanding of VE, activism, and terrorism itself. Therefore, the government must highlight the public's (youth) perception that this policy strengthens the right to protect citizens from VE along with national security and stability in accordance with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

However, the findings of this study also reveal the notion that high levels of intolerance also lead to feelings of injustice and hatred in the community, which are thought to trigger people to join extremist groups. In fact, the pillars of the rule of law and cooperation will not have a significant impact if there is omission from the government regarding the lack of synergy among major stakeholders in the society, such as government institutions, NGOs, community institutions, and religious organizations as a whole. Taking trust into account allows the government and its institutions to hone their discretion to establish forums that enhance citizen's participation in a given set of circumstances.

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