Factors Affecting Enforced Tax Compliance of Businesses in Vietnam
NGUYEN THI PHUONG HONG
School of Accounting, University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City,
VIETNAM
Abstract: The objective of this study is to test 11 factors including Social Norms, Tax Education, Coercive Power
of Tax Authority, Legitimate Power of Tax Authority, Tax Information, Tax Penalty, Tax Audit, Tax Rate, Tax
Compliance Costs, Service Quality of Tax Authority, Public Governance Quality affecting the enforced tax
compliance of businesses in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. The study uses a data collection tool which is a
questionnaire with survey subjects who are accountants, chief accountants, and financial directors of businesses in
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. The author uses Structural equation modeling to test the hypotheses in the research
model. The research results found that there are 5 factors that have a significant influence on the enforced tax
compliance of businesses in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. They are Legitimate Power of Tax Authority, Service
Quality of Tax Authority, Tax Information, Coercive Power of Tax Authority, and Tax Education, and the
remaining 6 factors do not affect the enforced tax compliance of the businesses industry in Ho Chi Minh City,
Vietnam. Policymakers, tax authorities, and other stakeholders based on this research can come up with more
appropriate solutions to enhance the enforced tax compliance behavior of businesses.
Keywords: Tax compliance, Enforced tax compliance, Tax non-compliance, Tax authorities, Tax compliance costs.
Received: December 13, 2021. Revised: September 8, 2022. Accepted: October 12, 2022. Published: November 1, 2022.
1 Introduction
Tax is one of the most important sources of revenue in
the total state budget revenues, and is used to serve
public services such as education, health care,
security, transportation, etc. Therefore, taxes play a
very important role in the development of a country in
the world, [1]. Therefore, ensuring and improving
compliance with tax regulations of relevant subjects is
a matter of great concern and urgency.
With such great importance, the issue of tax
compliance has been studied. There are many
classifications of tax compliance according to
different approaches. However, the most common and
widely recognized classification is based on
implementation. In this way, tax compliance is
divided into two categories: enforced tax compliance
and voluntary tax compliance, [2], [3].
In this study, the author focuses on enforced tax
compliance in the context of the current status of
enforced compliance with tax laws of Vietnamese
businesses, more specifically, businesses located in
Ho Chi Minh City- the biggest city in Vietnam, are
not really good. Through tax inspection results, many
businesses located in the city have not yet fully
complied with tax laws. In addition, many businesses
are not selected for tax inspection and examination,
and it is possible that they also have acts of non-
compliance with tax laws, hence causing tax loss for
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.
Thus, the question that needs to be asked is how
the status of enforced tax compliance of businesses
located in the city. What factors have influenced this
level of enforced tax compliance in Ho Chi Minh
City? What solutions should be taken to increase the
tax revenues for the city? Facing such a situation, in
Vietnam, there have been a number of researchers
interested in and conducting research related to this
topic. However, with the overview analysis of
previous studies, the number of studies is quite small,
and some studies only stop at the implementation of
descriptive statistics, [4]. Some studies have been
carried out in the city; however, the results of these
studies are only based on the survey results for 1
object which is businesses and focus on corporate
income tax. Another recent study carried out in Ho
Chi Minh City is from [5], but this study only
analyzed the factors of internal enterprise
characteristics affecting the high and low-level
compliance with corporate income tax, but not yet
included in the research model to analyze other factors
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as important as those outside the business, etc. Thus, it
can be said that a study on the analysis of factors
affecting the required level of tax compliance, with
more factors both inside and outside the business, and
data collected from surveys of many subjects with
many different angles to have a solid scientific basis
on which to base. It is really necessary to come up
with more appropriate solutions to strengthen the
enforced tax compliance behavior of businesses,
increase revenue for the budget and contribute to the
development of the country.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Conceptual Theories
2.1.1 Slippery Slope Theory
The authors in [2] and [6] proposed a theoretical
concept that integrates economic factors of tax
compliance as well as psychological and social
factors, arguing that tax compliance depends on the
power of the tax authorities as well as the trust in the
tax authorities. The slippery slope theory starts from
the assumption that the interaction environment
between government and taxpayers at two different
extremes can be antagonistic, or cooperative.
According to this theory, to achieve cooperation
in a society, there can be two different paths. The first
path emphasizes the authority's right to regulate the
behavior of citizens. Tax compliance is enhanced by
external measures, primarily through inspections and
fines. The second path emphasizes how taxpayers
interact with the government, mutual trust, and
commitment to the society in which they live. Trust is
viewed as a relational variable that provides the basis
for voluntary cooperation. If trust is high, taxpayers
are aware of their obligation to meet social needs.
Both approaches promise high tax contributions,
either by exercising power or by strengthening trust.
The resulting taxpayer behavior may be the same in
both cases, they pay their share; however, the
implementation of tax compliance is different. In the
first case, compliance is enforced; in the second case
is voluntary.
In this study, according to the explanation of this
theory, the author expects that enforced tax
compliance will depend on the level of trust of
taxpayers and the power of the competent authorities.
In the case where the confidence of the taxpayer is not
high but the authority of the authority is high, the
main motivation for paying taxes will be a
compulsion. And conversely, in another study, the
author will consider that the main motivation for
paying taxes is voluntary in case the taxpayer's
confidence is high enough. This shows that there is a
correlation between power and trust, power can
promote trust, but on the other hand, it can also
decrease trust.
2.1.2 The Theory of Planned Behavior
The theory of planned behavior or the theory of
intended behavior was initiated by [7]. This theory
states that an individual's behavior in society is
influenced by certain factors, derived from for certain
reasons, and occurs in a planned manner, [8]. A
person does something when she sees it as a positive
behavior (attitude towards the behavior), has
encouragement from those seen as important
(subjective norm), and has beliefs to do it (control
cognitive behavior). The interaction of these three
factors determines the consistency of a person's
intentions with his or her behavior.
There have been many studies using the Theory of
Planned Behavior to test tax compliance, [8], [9], [10],
[11].
In this study, according to the explanation of this
theory, the author expects that enforced tax
compliance will depend on three main factors of the
theory, which are behavioral beliefs, common
normative beliefs, and common-sense beliefs. On
autonomy, specifically, tax education, tax
information, and social norms will affect taxpayers'
tax compliance intentions.
2.1.3 Economic Deterrence Model
Economically, deterrence has historically been seen as
a popular strategy for enforcing tax compliance, [12].
Deterrence theory was founded by [13] based on the
simple idea that the threat of legal penalties will deter
criminal acts, [14]. The implication of the theory is
that each taxpayer must maximize the expected
benefit in deciding whether or not to evade taxes,
weighing the benefits of successful tax evasion with
tax audits and penalties. Apparently, this theory is
based on the fact that taxpayers fear detection and
punishment when they evade taxes, [15], [16], [17].
The study of [18] was the first to apply the
deterrent theory based on the crime model of [13] to
shape the theory of tax non-compliance. Deterrence
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theory assumes that threats of fines and tax checks are
the primary mechanisms for improving tax
compliance. Tax audits are defined as the probability
that the tax authority discovers taxpayers' non-
compliance with tax laws through tax audit and
inspection programs, [19], while punishment is a form
of penalty and fines for taxpayers who do not comply
with taxes, [20].
Based on this theory, the author expects the
authorities have an effective way to check Based on
this theory, the author expects that the authorities have
an effective way to check and detect businesses’ non-
tax compliance behaviors, and the form of tax penalty
is specified, clear, and enough deterrent in case
taxpayers engage in tax non-compliance, either
enforced or voluntary.
2.1.4 Social Norms Theory
The authors in [21] defined social norms as a
psychosocial construct composed of rules and
standards understood by members of a group, and
norms. This norm will serve to guide and/or limit
social behavior in which no law exists. The study also
identified four different social norm constructs:
doctrinal norm, descriptive norm, subjective norm,
and personal norm. Specifically, doctrinal norms
specify what should be done and that is the group's
code of ethics. Descriptive standards are standards
that develop from observing how other people
actually behave in specific situations. Subjective
norms relate specifically to the expectations of
significant others (e.g. family, friends, co-workers,
etc.). Finally, personal norms are the individual's own
expectations for behavior which can arise from
internalizing doctrinal norms.
In this study, according to the explanation of this
theory, the author expects that enforced tax
compliance will depend on social norms. In particular,
the expectations of important taxpayers will impact
enforced tax compliance. When family, friends, and
colleagues consider tax evasion and violation of tax
regulations to be wrong, taxpayers are likely to
comply with tax in an enforced state.
2.1.5 Contingency Theory
According to contingency theory, it is not possible to
build a universal model that fits all possible scenarios
because the nature of a model depends on the
condition and state of the contingency factors which
are really diverse. Instead, the theory suggests that the
specific nature of the model should be left to change,
depending on the state of the various contingency
variables. At the same time, the theory has also shown
that researchers are encouraged to conduct tax
compliance research by focusing on specific groups of
taxpayers rather than the entire taxpayer population,
[22].
The potential relevance of contingency theory to
tax compliance in this area has only recently been
recognized. Several researchers since 1985 have
suggested that a universal theory of tax compliance is
not possible, [23], [24]. The authors in [25] tested the
relevance of the contingency theory to research tax
compliance through surveys and their results showed
that this theory was relevant for tax compliance
research player in the future. Two contingency
variables were examined by the authors, including the
use of the tax preparer and the taxpayer's return goal.
These were found to affect the importance of other
checked compliance variables. Several other studies
have indirectly examined the relevance of contingency
theory to the tax compliance field. These studies have
found variables such as ethics, [26], [27], and
education, [28], as prophylactic variables, affecting
compliance.
Thus, according to the explanation of this theory
and the results of some conducted studies, the author
expects the tax education factor to have an influence
on enforced tax compliance.
2.1.6 Fiscal Exchange Theory
The authors in [29] state that the fiscal exchange
theory is shaped by economic deterrence and
psychosocial theories. The content of this theory
suggests that the level of service of the tax authorities
to taxpayers will improve the motivation in
implementing voluntary tax compliance. This means
that tax authorities and governments can enhance tax
compliance through delivering the desired level of
quality of service and infrastructure projects and
programs to the public in effective ways, [30]. This
form of relationship is considered to be a contractual
relationship between the tax authority, the
government, and the taxpayer, [30].
The author in [31] recognizes that this theory is
based on the social, and psychological contract and
relationship between tax authorities/government and
taxpayers. The theory assumes that the behavior of
individual taxpayers in paying taxes is often
motivated by tax authorities and government efforts
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on the service quality, and the rational use of tax
revenues on goods and public service. Compliance
levels decrease when taxpayers feel dissatisfied with
the service quality level of the tax authorities and the
use of tax revenues by the government, [32].
Voluntariness and willingness to pay taxes will be
enhanced when the tax qualifies the services provided
by the tax authorities along with the good projects and
programs implemented by the government from the
tax revenue generated, [33].
In this study, according to the explanation of this
theory, the author expects that the better the service
quality of the tax authorities is, the higher the tax
compliance level of taxpayers becomes.
2.2 Factors Affecting Enforced Tax
Compliance
2.2.1 Social Norms
As discussed above on the content of social norms
theory, there have been many previous researchers in
[34], [35], [36], [37], [38] examining the influence of
social norms on tax compliance behavior and found
that many open questions remain regarding their
influence. Almost all previous tax studies that include
social or individual normative structures have
identified a significant effect on tax compliance from
these constructs.
Recently, the authors in [39] examined the
influence of social factors on the tax compliance
intention of individuals. The survey results of 217 US
taxpayers show support for the influence of social
factors on tax compliance. This study concluded that
social norms indirectly influenced compliance
intentions through internalization as personal norms.
Specifically, as the strength of social norms in favor
of tax compliance increased, so did individual
standards of tax compliance, which in turn led to an
increase in compliance intentions thereafter.
Previously the authors in [9] conducted research to
explore more closely and in more detail the role of
social norms in tax compliance. They examined the
direct and indirect effects of social norms using a
hypothetical compliance scenario with 174
experienced taxpayers. The results showed that social
norms had an important direct and indirect influence
on tax compliance behavior.
It is such strong evidence that it is the basis for the
author to propose the first hypothesis as follows
H1: Social norms positively affects enforced tax
compliance.
2.2.2 Tax Education
Taxpayer education was presented along with
deterrence and tax morale as three factors affecting
tax compliance, [40]. Research has mentioned that
taxpayer education is seen as the sharing of
knowledge about the tax system with taxpayers. When
it comes to taxes, it is impossible not to mention
relevant regulations and laws, and taxpayers'
ignorance of this knowledge is a barrier to tax
compliance. As a result, some studies have suggested
that educating taxpayers can help reduce taxpayers’
ignorance, and once the law is understood, it is more
likely that taxpayers will be more compliant.
The author in [41] was conducted with the aim of
assessing the perceptions of individual taxpayers in
Portugal and Switzerland on different aspects of their
relationship with the tax authorities, and the
corresponding impact on tax evasion. Research results
show that trust represents the largest amount of
significant disparity, considering the control variables
for gender, age, country, tax return filing, tax
education, marital relationship, the current sense of
belonging to a religion, and income level.
Based on the results of the previous studies above,
and based on the explanation of the contingency
theory, the author proposes the next hypothesis as
follows
H2: Tax education positively affect enforced tax
compliance.
2.2.3 Coercive Power of Tax Authority and
Legitimate Power of Tax Authority
The result of [42] points out that power is often
defined as the ability of a person to accomplish goals
through others. The authors in [43] state two possible
reasons why people conform to those in power. First,
they may want to avoid the punishment that those in
power might inflict on them, [44]. Second, there may
be a division of roles between power holders and
subordinates acceptable to both sides. In the second
scenario, people consider the authority of the
government to be legitimate. In contrast, coercive
power is the power on the part of the tax authorities to
compel taxpayers to pay taxes not because they
believe that taxes help finance common public goods,
but out of fear of tax checks and penalties caused by
tax evasion, [6], [45], [46], [47], [50]. In other words,
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coercive power is the power to direct individuals
against their will, [6]. The result of [43] also shows
that this form of power is needed to enforce tax laws
in a hostile tax environment where there is no mutual
understanding between tax authorities and taxpayers.
In their study of the impact of agency power and
people's trust in the relationship between slippery
slope theory and tax compliance in Italy, the authors
in [47] proposed an investigation on examination of
the nature of power (coercive versus legal) within the
framework of tax compliance theory to clarify
ambiguous results as well as to clarify the complex
relationship between power and belief. The study uses
a linear structural model to test the hypotheses of the
slippery slope theory by examining coercive and legal
power on a sample of N = 389 Italian taxpayers and
self-employed entrepreneurs. They find evidence that
trust is positively related to voluntary tax compliance.
Trust is found to be negatively related to coercive
power and positively related to legitimate power. Both
coercive power and legal power are correlated with
enforcement compliance. However, the effectiveness
of compliance is enforced resulting in increased tax
evasion.
The author in [41] also showed that voluntary tax
compliance, trust, and legal power, are statistically
significant and negatively correlated with tax evasion.
In addition, the obtained results also indicate that
there is a positive and statistically significant
correlation between tax evasion and enforcement
aspects of tax compliance and coercive power.
The theory of the slippery slope together with
previous studies serves as the basis for the author to
put forward the next hypothesis about the coercive
power and legal power affecting obligatory tax
compliance.
H3: Coercive power of the tax authorities positively
affects enforced tax compliance.
H4: Legitimate power of the tax authorities positively
affects enforced tax compliance.
2.2.4 Tax Information
The authors in [48] applied the theory of planned
behavior (TPB) to investigate the tax compliance
intentions of citizens residing in Phnom Penh,
Cambodia. TPB asserts that there are three
components of behavior: attitudes, subjective norms,
and perceived behavioral control. Based on the
components, seven determinants were developed to
study tax compliance intent including tax information.
Planned behavior theory is the basis for the
author's argument that if taxpayers receive sufficient
tax information which is understandable, timely, and
accurate, they will comply with the enforced tax
compliance. The next hypothesis is given as follows
H5: Tax information positively affects enforced tax
compliance.
2.2.5 Tax Penalties and Tax Audit
According to [49], factors affecting tax non-
compliance are divided into 4 groups: Demographic
variables (Age, gender and education), Chances of
non-compliance (Income level), source of income,
occupation), Tax system/structure (Tax Complexity,
Tax Inspector, Tax penalties, Tax rates) and attitudes
and perspectives (Spirit, Tax fairness, colleagues’
influence).
The economic deterrence theory analyzed above
has also shown the role of two factors preventing
taxpayers from intending to comply with tax, which
means that the authorities conduct inspection
procedures to detect wrongdoings and deal with them
with penalties. A tax audit is a method used by tax
authorities to detect tax irregularities, [50]. Tax audit
presents an effective mechanism to enforce tax
structure in tax policy, [51]. Research by the author in
[52] with the aim of examining the role of tax audits
in the tax non-compliance of Palestinian taxpayers by
Majed when investigating found that the results of
previous studies evaluating the relationship between
tax audit and tax non-compliance are very
inconsistent. At the same time, the study is also based
on an economic model to argue that the taxpayer is
supposed to try to maximize the decision to comply
by comparing the benefits of successful non-
compliance at the risk of being discovered and the
punishment to be incurred. Thus, the value of tax non-
compliance depends on audit probabilities and tax
penalties.
Tax non-compliance is considered an economic
crime, with fines being the most common and
important form of punishment for this behavior, [53].
The goal of preventing non-compliance is often to
create fear, increase fines, and increase tax audits,
[54].
Another useful study is [55] conducted to expand
Fischer's model built on the integration of both
economic and social theory in the context of sales tax
compliance as well as considering the regulatory role
of public governance and patriotism as a new
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construct for better understanding on sales tax
compliance determinants. This study hypothesized
eight factors influencing sales tax compliance, as well
as eight hypotheses about the regulatory impact of
public governance on such relationships. Using a
quantitative approach, this study conducted a self-
administered questionnaire survey of 660 owners-
managers of SMEs listed in the Jordan Chamber of
Industry, among which there were 212 answers that
can be used for analysis purposes. Partial least squares
(PLS) results show a positive effect of tax audits, tax
penalties, tax ethics, tax fairness, and patriotism on
sales tax compliance and a negative effect of tax
complexity for respective sales tax compliance.
Meanwhile, peer influence and tax rate did not show
any significant effect on sales tax compliance. The
findings also identify a significant regulatory effect of
public governance on the links between tax audits, tax
penalties, and peer influence on sales tax compliance.
In addition to expanding the body of knowledge by
providing a comprehensive model to explain how a
number of interrelated factors affect sales tax
compliance, the results provide insights into the
determinants of sales tax compliance among SMEs.
From the above analysis, the author proposes the
next two hypotheses as follows
H6: Tax penalty positively affects enforced tax
compliance.
H7: Tax audit positively affects enforced tax
compliance.
2.2.6 Tax Rate
For the nature of the tax system, economic deterrence
theory also supports the argument that adopting an
appropriate tax rate will encourage taxpayers to
comply although the exact impact is still unknown and
controversial, [2]. An increase in the marginal tax rate
might increase the incentive for taxpayers to evade
more taxes, [56], [57], but it is unlikely that lowering
the tax rate will increase tax compliance, [2], [56],
[57]. Even so, the authors in [6] still argue that when
trust is low, taxpayers think that a high tax rate is
unfair; and when the level of trust is high, taxpayers
can consider the tax rate to be equivalent to
contributing to the community.
Of great interest is the study by the authors in [58]
conducted in Malaysia, the purpose of which is to
analyze the effects of penalty factors, marginal tax
rates, current solvency ratios, foreign ownership rates,
company size, and industry category to the level of tax
non-compliance and tax inspections as measured
based on the results of tax inspections by small and
medium-sized enterprises in Malaysia. The study used
secondary data collected from these companies in
2011 with a sample of 375 small and medium-sized
businesses. The results of the study show that
marginal tax rates, company size, and industry type
have a significant influence on the level of tax
noncompliance and that companies in the service and
construction industries are major non-compliant
industries. In addition, according to this study, the
results of tax inspections also show that non-
compliance with tax laws in Malaysia is widespread
and the amount of tax loss is quite high.
There have been many previous studies paying
attention to tax rates or marginal tax rates when
learning about factors that impact taxpayer tax
compliance, [59], [60], [61], [62], [63]. Based on the
above analysis, the author proposes the H8 hypothesis
as follows
H8: Tax rate negatively affects enforced tax
compliance.
2.2.7 Tax Compliance Costs
The author in [64] defined compliance costs as costs
incurred by a taxpayer, higher and greater than the tax
liability, in fulfilling his or her tax obligations. This is
the total cost of compliance and includes three main
components: monetary cost, time cost, and
psychological cost. Monetary costs include expenses
incurred to hire tax agents/advisors, purchase books,
tax guides, and other tax-related documents. Time
spent keeping records, completing tax returns, and
dealing with tax authorities is a time cost, while
psychological costs are costs incurred related to the
stresses encountered in managing complex tax issues,
[65], [66], have classified compliance costs into 2
groups: (1) internal costs related to the time of the
management/staff in preparing tax returns and tax-
related activities, and (2) external costs primarily
related to the involvement of external tax advisors.
Agreeing with this point of view, the authors in
[67] stated: “Previous studies have defined
compliance costs as costs related to the costs of
complying with enforced requirements of the tax
regime regarding the timely preparation and
submission of tax returns in accordance with the
relevant tax laws in a country. Therefore, compliance
costs are costs associated with the hours spent
preparing tax returns, administrative costs, and any
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money spent procuring the services of tax
professionals. These costs can be classified into
internal and external costs.
In [68], an empirical assessment of some factors
determines the tax evasion behavior of companies.
The analysis includes standard determinants including
compliance costs.
Thus, the H9 hypothesis in this study is:
H9: Tax compliance costs negatively affect enforced
tax compliance.
2.2.8 Service Quality of Tax Authority
The authors in [69] defined tax service quality as the
global perceptions or attitudes of taxpayers regarding
the superiority of tax services provided by tax
authorities. In [70], the authors identified the factors
that are components of tax service quality as
responsiveness, reliability, and information provision.
The study also used these factors as a measure of tax
service quality.
In studying the relationship between the quality of
tax services and tax compliance behavior, the authors
in [71] have suggested that in the tax sector, there are
very few studies measuring the direct impact of tax
service quality on taxpayer compliance behavior.
However, the result from [72] shows that taxpayer
satisfaction with how they are treated by tax
authorities affects their compliance behavior in the
future. Agreeing with the view of the authors in [71]
view, the authors in [73] also argue that there is not
much research that addresses this relationship, while
in fact, the decline in the quality of tax services
provided by tax authorities leads to the loss of taxes.
The authors in [74] conducted a study to examine
the tax service quality and income tax non-compliance
of SMEs in Yemen. The results from the study show
that the quality of tax services is assessed as low,
which makes the managers of small and medium-
sized business owners dissatisfied with the service
quality of the tax authorities. Prior to that, the purpose
of [75] is examining the influence of tax awareness,
knowledge, tax penalties, and services on tax
compliance. The results of the study show that tax
awareness, penalties, and service quality by tax
authorities have a significant positive effect on
taxpayer compliance, while tax knowledge has a
negative impact on tax compliance. significant impact
on taxpayer compliance.
A recent study was conducted to determine the
influence of tax knowledge, service quality, tax audit,
and technology on local taxpayer compliance, [76].
This study used primary data based on respondents'
responses to a questionnaire distributed to 90
taxpayers registered at the Badung Regency Revenue
Authority. The technique of identifying samples by
purposeful sampling. Based on the information that
hotel, restaurant, and entertainment taxpayers used the
online monitoring system, 904 taxpayers and based on
the criteria, the study determined a sample size of 90
taxpayers. Data analysis techniques are performed
using a variety of linear regression analysis
techniques. The analysis shows that all four factors:
tax knowledge, service quality, tax inspection, and
technology have a positive influence on the
compliance of local taxpayers.
Along with the argument from the fiscal exchange
theory, the author proposes the next hypothesis as
follows
H10: Service quality of tax authority positively affects
enforced tax compliance.
2.2.9 Public Governance Quality
World Bank considers the quality of public
governance to be the process by which competent
leaders are selected, monitored, and replaced along
with the capacity of a country's government to
implement policies, and manage that country's
resources effectively, [77]. Citizens support the
government in its responsibility by providing finance
for the maintenance of government in the form of
paying taxes, [71], [78], argues that if taxpayers
perceive that the conversion rate from taxes to
political goods is low then taxpayers will feel that the
government has failed to comply with its obligations
under the contract; thus, tax compliance will
deteriorate. The result of [31] argues that when the
quality of public governance declines, the tax
compliance of taxpayers may be affected because
individuals believe that the government does not
respect their honesty.
Research by the authors in [71] with the main aim
to examine the relationship between taxpayers'
perception of the quality of public governance and
their compliance behavior as well as to determine
whether the relationship adjusted for financial
conditions, proposed to expand Fischer's tax
compliance model to incorporate perceived tax service
quality, public governance quality, ethnic diversity as
well as effective regulation of taxpayers' financial
condition and risk preference. This study included a
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survey on individual taxpayers' views, perceptions,
and behaviors on the quality of public governance as
well as tax compliance. The main finding of this study
is that the quality of public governance has a
significantly positive relationship with tax compliance
behavior.
From these arguments and previous research
evidence, the author proposes the following final
hypothesis.
H11: Public governance quality positively affects
enforced tax compliance.
3 Research Model
Based on the theoretical framework and relevant
literature reviews, I propose a research model as in
Figure 1. The main purpose of this study is to analyze
the effects of 11 factors including Social Norms, Tax
Education, Coercive Power of Tax Authority,
Legitimate Power of Tax Authority, Tax information,
Tax Penalty, Tax Audit, Tax Rate, Tax Compliance
Costs, Service Quality of Tax Authority, Public
Governance Quality to Enforced Tax Compliance, and
thus Enforced Tax Compliance will take the role of
the dependent variable while 11 factors will be the
independent variables that I am interested in.
Fig. 1: Proposed research model
Source: Researcher proposed
4 Methodology
In this study, questionnaires are used to collect
research data. The questionnaire consists of 2 parts
consisting of 57 questions. The first section includes
an introduction to the business and participants
answering the questionnaire. Part 2 includes content
related to enforced tax compliance and factors
affecting enforced tax compliance. Respondents
include accountants, chief accountants, or chief
financial officers of businesses in Ho Chi Minh City,
Vietnam. There were 501 businesses surveyed in this
study.
This study examined the influence of 11 factors on
the enforced tax compliance behavior of businesses,
and the study model consisted of 1 dependent variable
and 11 independent variables. These variables are
Social Norms
Public Governance Quality
Tax Education
Coercive Power of Tax Authority
Legitimate Power of Tax Authority
Service Quality of Tax Authority
Tax Compliance Costs
Tax Information
Tax Penalty
Tax Audit
Tax Rate
Enforced
Tax
Compliance
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measured with items which are adapted from several
studies, such as, [47], [48], [55], [79], [80], [81], [82],
[83]. The items of each measurement are tested using
a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 = strongly disagree; 2
= disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = agree; and, 5 = strongly
agree.
The analysis of the model includes the following
stages: (1) Cronbach’s test for reliability of the scale,
(2) Exploratory factor analysis (EFA), (3)
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and (4)
Structural equation modeling (SEM).
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Sample Descriptive
The survey for research purposes obtained 501 valid
responses from the survey subjects. According to [84],
if the model has a number of factors greater than 7
and some factors have fewer than 3 observed
variables, the minimum sample size is 500. This study
has 11 factors, of which there are 2 factors with 3
observed variables, after testing Cronbach Alpha,
there are 2 factors left with 2 observed variables, so
the sample size of this study is 501, greater than 500,
hence is appropriate. Table 1 below describes some
characteristics, numbers, and percentages of surveyed
businesses such as Legal form of business, Main
business sector, Company age; Company size, Audit
of financial accounting, and some characteristics of
business representatives participating in the survey
such as Gender, Age, the Highest level of education,
Respondent designation, Working time in the field of
finance and accounting.
Table 1. Respondents profile
N
o
Freque
ncy
(N=501)
Percentage
(Total =
100%)
1
Legal form of business
20
4.0
43
8.6
317
63.3
120
24.0
1
.2
2
Main business sector
101
20.2
160
31.9
Services
193
38.5
Others
47
9.4
3
Business age
Under 2 years
32
6.4
2 – under 5 years
124
24.8
Over 5 years
345
68.9
4
Business size
(Total Asset)
Under 20 billion
295
58.9
20 - under 50
billion
66
13.2
50 - under 100
billion
31
6.2
Over 100 billion
109
21.8
5
Audit of financial accounting
Big 4 (KPMG,
Deloitte, EY,
PwC)
62
12.4
Non-Big 4
140
27.9
Non - Audited
financial
statements
299
59.7
6
Gender
Male
143
28.5
Female
358
71.5
7
Age
Under 22 years
13
2.6
22 – under 30
years
245
48.9
30 – under 45
years
204
40.7
More than 45
years
39
7.8
8
Highest level of education
Junior college
92
18.4
Bachelor degree
326
65.1
Masters
73
14.6
PhD
6
1.2
Others
4
.8
9
Respondent designation
Accountant
332
66.3
Chief accountant
130
25.9
CFO
39
7.8
10
Working time in the field of financial and
accounting
Under 5 years
235
46.9
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139
27.7
104
20.8
23
4.6
Source: The researcher’ collecting data, SPSS 26
5.2 Assessment of Measurement Model
Reliability and validity are the main standards to be
met in the measurement model. The main standards
used to evaluate measurement models are indicator
reliability testing, internal consistency testing,
convergence validity testing, and discriminant validity
testing.
This study consisted of 12 scales for 1 dependent
variable and 11 independent variables, for a total of 57
observed variables. The scales are inherited from
previous studies and are resulting scales, so
Cronbach's Alpha test is used to test scale reliability.
The test results show that all scales meet the reliability
requirements, except for the observed variables: EC3
of the Required Tax Compliance variable; TA1 of
variable Tax Inspector; TR4 of Variable Tax Rates;
CC4 of variable Current tax costs; PG1 of the Public
Governance Quality variable with a total variable
correlation coefficient equal to: 0.142; 0,042; 0,169;
0.105 and 0.126 - less than 0.3, so they were excluded
from the scale. At the same time, the test also showed
that for the TR1 observation variable of the Tax Rate
variable, if this observation variable is removed,
Cronbach's Alpha coefficient increases from 0.69 to
0.857, so the TR1 observation variable is also
excluded. The final result consisted of 51 measured
observational variables for 1 dependent variable and
11 independent variables included in the discovery
factor analysis. Table 2 below shows the minimum
value, maximum value, mean, and standard deviation
of 51 observed variables and the reliability results of
the variables’ scales.
Table 2. Test results of the validity and reliability of the scale
No
Symbol
Descriptive statistics (N =
501)
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min
Max
Alpha
A
Dependent Variable
1
EC
Enforced tax compliance
.857
1.1
EC1
When I pay my taxes as
required by the regulations,
I do so because I feel forced
to pay my taxes
3.5768
.76458
1.00
5.00
1.2
EC2
When I pay my taxes as
required by the regulations,
I do so because a great
many tax audits are carried
out
3.5788
.74315
1.00
5.00
1.3
EC4
When I pay my taxes as
required by the regulations,
I do so because the tax
office often carries out
audits
3.6208
.74019
1.00
5.00
1.4
EC5
When I pay my taxes as
required by the regulations,
I do so because I know that
I will be audited
3.6008
.76179
1.00
5.00
1.5
EC6
When I pay my taxes as
required by the regulations,
I do so because the
punishments for tax evasion
are very severe
3.6687
.70852
1.00
5.00
1.6
EC7
When I pay my taxes as
3.5389
.85614
1.00
5.00
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required by the regulations,
I do so because I do not
know exactly how to evade
taxes without attracting
attention
1.7
EC8
When I pay my taxes as
required by the regulations,
I do so after putting a lot of
thought into how I could
legally save taxes
3.5589
.79939
1.00
5.00
1.8
EC3
When I pay my taxes as
required by the regulations,
I do so although I would
really prefer not to pay any
taxes
Excluded
B
Independent Variable
1
SN
Social Norms
.910
1.1
SN1
My spouse or significant
other would think it is
wrong to evade use taxes.
3.8503
.79470
1.00
5.00
1.2
SN2
My tax return preparer
would think it is wrong to
evade use taxes.
3.8762
.72983
2.00
5.00
1.3
SN3
My family would think it is
wrong to evade use taxes.
3.8703
.79570
1.00
5.00
1.4
SN4
My friends would think it is
wrong to evade use taxes.
3.7924
.78283
1.00
5.00
1.5
SN5
My peers would think it is
wrong to evade use taxes.
3.8184
.76743
1.00
5.00
2
TE
Tax Education
.861
2.1
TE1
I encounter significant
confusion whilst filling tax
forms
3.7086
.80679
2.00
5.00
2.2
TE2
I need to consult tax
professionals in completing
my tax forms
3.7545
.76786
2.00
5.00
2.3
TE3
When I am not really sure
whether or not an expense is
allowable, it makes sense to
claim the deduction
anyway.
3.7485
.76722
1.00
5.00
2.4
TE4
There is shortage of
experienced and highly
motivated personnel for tax
assessment and tax
collection
3.7665
.78189
1.00
5.00
3
CP
Coercive Power of Tax Authority
.815
3.1
CP1
Tax authorities primarily
aim to punish
3.3972
.85785
1.00
5.00
3.2
CP2
Tax authorities investigate
3.4052
.86342
1.00
5.00
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as long as they find
something
3.3
CP3
Tax authorities'
interventions are too severe
3.4651
.87022
1.00
5.00
3.4
CP4
Tax authorities nurture
hostile feelings toward
taxpayers
3.4032
.92580
1.00
5.00
3.5
CP5
Tax authorities interpret tax
laws in order to punish the
highest number of taxpayers
3.6607
.91904
1.00
5.00
4
LP
Legitimate Power of Tax Authority
.898
4.1
LP1
Tax Evasion is detected in a
high percentage of the cases
3.7605
.74197
1.00
5.00
4.2
LP2
Tax authorities combat tax
crimes in an efficient way
3.7405
.72425
1.00
5.00
4.3
LP3
Tax evasion is likely to be
detected
3.8084
.66874
1.00
5.00
4.4
LP4
Tax authorities control
frequently and profoundly
3.8323
.69558
1.00
5.00
4.5
LP5
Due to their knowledge and
competence, tax authorities
are able to detect every act
of tax evasion
3.8343
.70604
1.00
5.00
5
TI
Tax information
.874
5.1
TI1
I could receive accurate
information about tax issues
from my sources of
information (i.e., television,
email, newspaper, radio,
Facebook)
3.5030
.81884
1.00
5.00
5.2
TI2
The tax information that I
receive is clear and
understandable
3.3713
.82091
1.00
5.00
5.3
TI3
Tax officials provide clear
explanations or responses to
my queries
3.4052
.85410
1.00
5.00
5.3
TI4
I generally receive
sufficient information about
my tax issues
3.4251
.86307
1.00
5.00
5.5
TI5
I am always given up-to-
date and relevant
information on tax issues
3.4251
.84433
1.00
5.00
6
TP
Tax Penalty
.818
6.1
TP1
The tax authority’s ability to
detect and punish tax fraud
and fraud is high
3.5848
.80703
1.00
5.00
6.2
TP2
The sanctions for tax non-
compliance, tax fraud, or
3.7285
.80384
1.00
5.00
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tax evasion are very strict
6.3
TP3
The fines for tax non-
compliance are high
3.7445
.78141
1.00
5.00
7
TA
Tax Audit
7.1
TA1
Businesses pay the correct
amount of tax when there
are greater
enforcement and monitoring
Excluded
7.2
TA2
The likelihood of audits
encourages me to comply
with the tax law
4.4311
.67657
2.00
5.00
.850
7.3
TA3
Businesses registered for
tax are often subject to tax
authority audits and
inspections
4.3413
.71921
2.00
5.00
8
TR
Tax rate
.857
8.1
TR2
If tax rates are reduced, I
believe that more people
would be encouraged to pay
their taxes
3.8363
.78814
1.00
5.00
8.2
TR3
I would be motivated to pay
taxes if tax rates are
reduced
3.8683
.81646
1.00
5.00
8.3
TR1
I think the current tax rate is
considered fair for every
taxpayer
Excluded
8.4
TR4
The income tax rate does
not affect my decision on
tax
non-compliance
Excluded
9
CC
Tax compliance costs
.885
9.1
CC1
The complexity of the tax
system results in taxpayers
incurring tax compliance
cost
3.9401
.80772
1.00
5.00
9.2
CC2
The taxpayers are spent
high tax compliance costs
and time to tax comply
3.8263
.87166
1.00
5.00
9.3
CC3
The complexity of tax
administration (e.g.,
multiple taxes, the
requirement for multiple
filing per year, etc.)
increases tax compliance
costs
3.9341
.84950
1.00
5.00
9.4
CC5
I feel high tax compliance
costs discourage the
taxpayer’s compliance
3.8563
.90515
1.00
5.00
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Source: The researcher’ collecting data, SPSS 26
9.5
CC4
The burden of compliance
costs of the large business
taxpayer in terms of staff
time, professional, fees, and
to external assistance are
affect tax compliance
Excluded
10
AQ
Service quality of tax authority
.914
10.1
AQ1
The tax authority provides
adequate and timely service
for taxpayers to encourage
tax compliance
3.5349
.76503
1.00
5.00
10.2
AQ2
I feel the tax collection
system by the authority is
operating quickly and
properly to encourage
compliance
3.5090
.79399
1.00
5.00
10.3
AQ3
The tax authority well
organized by ethical skilled
man power and
technological development
to inspire compliance
3.5768
.77497
1.00
5.00
10.4
AQ4
I feel the tax author
provides reliable service to
assure voluntary compliance
3.5329
.75459
1.00
5.00
10.5
AQ5
The tax authority provides
consulting assistance
services to encourage and
help accomplish voluntary
compliance
3.5669
.77073
1.00
5.00
11
PG
Public governance quality
.772
11.1
PG2
I think government wastes a
lot of money
3.7545
.80598
2.00
5.00
11.2
PG3
I do not feel like paying
taxes as long as the
government cannot be
trusted
3.5948
.82553
1.00
5.00
11.3
PG4
It is not so wrong to declare
less on taxable income
since the government
spends too much on
extravagant projects
3.7784
.74351
2.00
5.00
11.4
PG5
I think people are not
enlightened on how tax
revenues are being utilized
the by government
3.7325
.74049
2.00
5.00
11.5
PG1
I think corruption in Viet
Nam is high
Excluded
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Before performing confirmatory factor analysis,
further scales are performed with exploratory factor
analysis. The results of the exploratory factor
analysis showed that the KMO coefficient = 0.929
with the Sig. value = 0.000, the factor load
coefficients were all greater than 0.5, the Eigenvalues
stopping at the 12th factor was 1,198 was greater
than 1, and the total quoted variance was 67.602%
greater than 50%. Therefore, the results of the
exploratory factor analysis were appropriate. Table 3
below shows the rotated factor matrix of the
exploratory factor analysis.
Table 3. The rotated factor matrix of exploratory factor analysis
Items
Factor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
SN4
.867
SN5
.861
SN3
.855
SN2
.775
SN1
.746
LP4
.958
LP5
.922
LP3
.737
LP2
.638
LP1
.601
AQ2
.837
AQ4
.830
AQ1
.815
AQ5
.790
AQ3
.731
EC7
.776
EC2
.742
EC8
.725
EC4
.600
EC1
.559
EC6
.511
EC5
.500
TI5
.804
TI4
.790
TI2
.770
TI1
.657
TI3
.656
CC2
.871
CC3
.863
CC1
.825
CC5
.717
CP3
.791
CP4
.767
CP2
.747
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CP1
.634
CP5
.514
TE2
.790
TE3
.775
TE1
.750
TE4
.717
PG2
.778
PG4
.747
PG5
.645
PG3
.503
TP2
.921
TP3
.737
TP1
.637
TA2
.864
TA3
.858
TR2
.885
TR3
.826
KMO
0.929
Sig.
.000
Variance explanation (%)
67.602%
Source: The researcher’ collecting data, SPSS 26
Table 4 shows the average variance and composite
reliability of the exploratory factor analysis.
Table 4. The average variance and composite reliability of items
Variable
CR
AVE
Variable
CR
AVE
Social Norms
SN
0.906
0.659
Coercive Power of Tax
Authority
CP
0.825
0.496
Legitimate Power of Tax
Authority
LP
0.892
0.623
Tax Education
TE
0.862
0.610
Service quality of tax
authority
AQ
0.911
0.673
Public governance quality
PG
0.778
0.469
Enforced tax compliance
EC
0.861
0.474
Tax Penalty
TP
0.827
0.618
Tax information
TI
0.875
0.584
Tax Audit
TA
0.855
0.747
Tax compliance costs
CC
0.888
0.666
Tax rate
TR
0.858
0.751
Source: The researcher’ collecting data, SPSS 26 and Amos 24
Thus, according to the analysis of the above
results, the measurement model of the present study
is tested the by Cronbach Alpha test, exploratory
factor analysis (EFA), and confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) to test including accuracy reliability
of the indicator, checking for internal consistency,
convergence, and discriminability. The main purpose
for performing all of these tests is to ensure that the
measurement model is valid and reliable before
performing the Structural Equation Model (SEM) to
test the hypotheses. The results of all tests confirm
that the measurement model is consistent and
reliable.
5.3 Assessment of Structural Model
After verifying the suitability and reliability of the
measurement model, I conducted to test of the
structural model by SEM. The results of testing SEM
(Figure 2) show that the model has df = 1158 degrees
of freedom, Chi-Square = 1992,993; TLI = 0.937;
CFI = 0.942 so these indexes are all greater than 0.9;
index RMSEA = 0.038 less than 0.08 and CMIN/df =
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1.721 less than 3; P = 0.000, GFI = 0.865 is also
approximately equal to 0.9, so it is also acceptable.
The results in Table 5, show that, at the 5% level of
statistical significance, there are 5 factors affecting
enforced tax compliance, which are the Legitimate
Power of Tax Authority, Service quality of tax
authority, Tax information, Coercive power of tax
authorities and Tax education at the 5% statistical
significance level, the remaining 6 factors include:
Social norms, Tax compliance cost, Public
governance quality, Tax penalty, Tax audit and Tax
rate, have no effect on the enforced tax compliance
of enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam at
statistical significance level 5%.
Table 5. Result of Hypotheses Testing
Variable
Estimate
Estimate
(standardized)
S.E.
C.R.
P
Result
EC
<---
SN
.030
0.35
.034
.898
.369
Not supported
EC
<---
LP
.253
0.253
.056
4.496
***
Supported
EC
<---
AQ
.126
0.137
.054
2.348
.019
Supported
EC
<---
TI
.207
0.239
.049
4.259
***
Supported
EC
<---
CC
-.018
-0.023
.027
-.656
.512
Not supported
EC
<---
CP
.114
0.136
.035
3.289
.001
Supported
EC
<---
TE
.126
0.133
.046
2.745
.006
Supported
EC
<---
PG
.095
0.093
.051
1.866
.062
Not supported
EC
<---
TP
.056
0.70
.032
1.715
.086
Not supported
EC
<---
TA
-.002
-0.002
.031
-.049
.961
Not supported
EC
<---
TR
.028
0.031
.035
.797
.425
Not supported
Source: The researcher’ collecting data, SPSS 26 and Amos 24
According to table 5, normalized beta
coefficients between relationships show how strong
or weaker the influence is between variables in the
study model. The results of the normalized beta
coefficient estimation showed that the highest
normalized beta coefficient belonged to the
relationship between LP and EC (normalized β =
0.253). This is followed by the normalized beta
coefficient of the relationship between TI and EC
(normalized β = 0.239). Thus, in terms of the
relationship between factors and EC, LP and TI are
the two factors that have the strongest influence on
EC because the normalized beta coefficients are the
highest. This will be followed by 3 factors AQ, TE,
and CP with a decreasing influence on EC with a
normalized beta system of 0.137, 0.126, and 0.114,
respectively
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Fig. 2: Results of Structural Equation Modeling
Source: The researcher’ collecting data, SPSS 26 and Amos 24
According to the results compiled in table 6
below, of the 11 research hypotheses put forward for
testing, there are 5 supported hypotheses and 6
unsupported hypotheses. Supported hypotheses
include H2, H3, H4, H5, and H10. The remaining
unsupported hypotheses include H1, H6, H7, H8, H9,
and H11.
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Table 6. Summary of Hypotheses Testing
NO
HYPOTHESIS
THEORY
EXPECTED
DECISION
H1
Social norms positively affect enforced
tax compliance
Social Norm
Theory
+
0
H2
Tax education positively affects enforced
tax compliance
Contingency
theory
+
+
H3
Coercive power of the tax authorities
positively affects enforced tax
compliance
Slippery Slope
Theory
+
+
H4
Legitimate power of the tax authorities
positively affects enforced tax
compliance
Slippery Slope
Theory
+
+
H5
Tax information positively affects
enforced tax compliance
Theory of Planned
Behavior
+
+
H6
Tax penalty positively affects enforced
tax compliance
Economic
Deterrence
Theory
+
0
H7
Tax audit positively affects enforced tax
compliance
Theory of Planned
Behavior
+
0
H8
Tax rate negatively affects enforced tax
compliance
Economic
Deterrence
Theory
-
0
H9
Tax compliance costs negatively affect
enforced tax compliance
Economic
Deterrence
Theory
-
0
H10
Quality service of tax authority positively
affects enforced tax compliance
Fiscal Exchange
Theory
+
+
H11
Public governance quality positively
affects enforced tax compliance
Fiscal Exchange
Theory
+
0
Source: Compiled by author
6 Conclusions
This study examines 11 factors affecting the enforced
tax compliance of businesses in Ho Chi Minh City,
Vietnam. The results of the study found that there are 5
factors affecting enforced tax compliance, including
the Legitimate power of the tax authorities, Coercive
power of the tax authorities, Tax education, Quality
service of the tax authority, and Tax information.
Furthermore, according to the research results, the
remaining 6 factors do not affect enforced tax
compliance in terms of statistical significance, which
are Social norms, Tax penalty, Tax audit, Tax rate, Tax
compliance costs, and Public governance quality.
Tax education has the same impact as enforced tax
compliance of businesses, so the State needs to
strengthen the education of tax-related knowledge.
Universities need to insert subjects related to tax
knowledge in their training program. In addition, the
Tax Authority also regularly updates tax knowledge for
businesses so that they have a timely grasp of tax
regulations from which they will comply with higher
taxes. Tax service quality is an important factor
affecting enforced tax compliance. Therefore, tax
authorities need to further improve service quality at
tax authorities, and provide full and timely services.
Besides, the tax system works quickly and properly.
Accordingly, an important issue is that tax authorities
require to be organized by a team that is skilled,
ethical, and enthusiastic to support taxpayers, and
apply modern technology so that businesses will
comply with higher taxes.
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Additionally, tax authorities must strengthen their
coercive power and legal power to improve businesses'
enforced tax compliance. Specifically, tax authorities
control businesses more often and closely; and at the
same time, tax authorities further improve their
knowledge and professional capacity to enhance their
ability to develop current tax evasion of businesses.
Finally, it is important that tax authorities provide
complete, timely, accurate, and up-to-date information
to businesses, and at the same time, explain and clearly
respond to taxpayers' questions.
Thus, the study results are a useful resource for
policymakers and tax authorities to understand the
current situation of tax compliance at business and on
that basis adjust and develop tax policies, digitize and
modernize tax administration to enhance tax
compliance behavior, increase revenues for the State in
growing the economy and achieving the set goals.
7 Limitation and Future Research
This study collects primary data through questionnaires
to survey businesses in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
about factors affecting enforced tax compliance. Future
studies should collect secondary data instead of
collecting primary data like this one. Besides, the
sample in this study has only 501 businesses, so future
studies should collect with a larger sample size so that
the results of the study may be better. In addition, this
study has only examined 11 factors affecting enforced
tax compliance, so in the future, researchers can
examine some more factors such as tax knowledge, tax
spirit, the structure of the tax system, etc.
Acknowledgment:
This research is funded by the Ministry of Education
and Training under grant number B2020-KSA-02.
This paper is the result of the ministerial-level research
project “Analysis of factors affecting the level of tax
noncompliance of businesses in Ho Chi Minh City".
This research is funded by the University of Economics
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.
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