The Modern Experience of Lobbying Interests in Europe
OKSANA KOVALOVA
PhD student, Department of the Political Theories, National University Odessa Academy of Law,
UKRAINE
ORCID identifier: 0000-0002-5138-0918
ELLA MAMONTOVA
Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Department of the political theories
National University Odessa Academy of Law Odessa, UKRAINE
ORCID identifier: 0000-0003-2761-8217
ZORIANA BURYK
Doctor of science in Public Administration, Professor, Department of Management and Business
Administration, Institute of Graduate Studies and Preuniversity Education, Vasyl Stefanyk
Precarpathian National University, Lviv, UKRAINE
SERGIY VONSOVYCH
PhD in Political Science (Department of Political Science and Philosophy), Department of Political
Science and Philosophy, Kamianets-Podіlskyi National Ivan Ohiienko University, UKRAINE
ORCID identifier: 0000-0001-9657-0902
TATIANA VOROPAYEVA
PhD in Psychology, Associate Professor, Senior Researcher, Center for Ukrainian Studies, Faculty of
Philosophy, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, UKRAINE
ORCID identifier: 0000-0001-8388-7169
Abstract: The current experience of lobbying interests in Europe requires a detailed study of legislation to
provide open public access to the Transparency Register and to promote the use of lobbying transparency
mechanisms in European countries and EU institutions. These mechanisms ensure the implementation of
relevant regulations and political decisions by political actors with the assistance of interest groups for the
effective implementation of public policy. The purpose of the study is to establish the patterns of implementation
of interest lobbying policy in Europe and assessing the reliability of lobbying activities in European countries
and EU institutions to check the effectiveness of lobbying interests’ modern experience in Europe and
mechanisms in ensuring transparency and its integrity in the EU. Research methods: comparative analysis;
regression analysis; systematization, generalization. Results. Availability has established the relationship
between disclosure by lobbyists and oversight of compliance with the rules of the register and transparency in
lobbying. Lobby transparency has been identified as too weak across Europe, as the implementation of the
Transparency Register, which aims to regulate lobbying, has not protected against its excessive influence. The
largest expenditure on EU lobbying for the period 2017-2018 falls on countries such as Belgium, Germany, and
Italy. The current expenditure of EU member states is 91%, more than €2 billion. It was found that lobbying in
Europe helps to solve current problems by further improving the legislation that will ensure the implementation
of effective EU policy, where the main topics on the agenda are the implementation of the Law on Digital
Services and overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic. It has been established that lobbying in Europe should
address barriers to access to public sector information and public data faced by citizens, and require the
implementation of measures to regulate the further activities of officials between the public sector and lobbying.
Keywords: lobbyists, lobbying, lobbying of interest, lobbying activity, lobbyists' registers, Transparency
Register, EU institutions, EU countries, European Union, integrity mechanisms, technology companies.
Received: March 29, 2022. Revised: March 19, 2023. Accepted: April 25, 2023. Published: May 31, 2023.
DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE
DOI: 10.37394/232022.2023.3.7
Oksana Kovalova, Ella Mamontova,
Zoriana Buryk, Sergiy Vonsovych,
Tatiana Voropayeva
E-ISSN: 2732-9984
75
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1. Introduction
Over the last decade, the number of states
and transnational political institutions, such as the
European Union, that have an interest in regulating
lobbying to reduce political propaganda by interest
groups has increased. The implementation of
relevant legislation will help increase transparency
in the legislative decision-making process. The
creation of open national registers of lobbyists
involved in regulation in the EU is based on the idea
that transparency is a determining factor of
accountability and subcontracting is the ability of
the public to follow the process of lobbying to
influence the European political system (Korkea-
aho, E., 2021).
The participation of outside interests in the
political process corresponds to the legitimacy of
both input and output data. At the same time,
however, lobbying can create problems of unequal
access, bias, and even corruption. Thus, the need to
regulate these activities is now a widely accepted
process, with the result that international bodies
such as the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and, more
recently, the Council of Europe have issued
recommendations and guidelines on lobbying.
Public registers of lobbyists, often supplemented by
codes of conduct, where the most commonly used
tools for such regulatory efforts (Chari et al., 2010;
OECD, 2014), reflect the belief that transparency
provides accountability and ultimately increases
citizens' confidence in the EU political system
(Năstase, A. and Muurmans, C., 2020).
Political organizations such as business
associations, trade unions, civil society
organizations, and social organizations have
aggregate political goals (Beyers et al., 2008),
where one of the main goals of interest lobby groups
is to influence political decisions (Dür, 2008a;
Klüver, 2011). However, understanding lobbying is
problematic for democratic governance because
politics tends to perceive certain interest groups that
can undermine majority power and jeopardize
public interests (Stevens F., De Bruycker I., 2020).
Nevertheless, lobbying has become indispensable
in modern society as it helps companies and NGOs
to put pressure on their interests. Lobbying of
interests wins the favor of politicians by using
strong arguments and without any tangible or
intangible incentives. Interest lobbying is a
discussion between civil society and government
about how processes can be managed better and
more effectively, which problems to ignore and
which to solve. Due to the observance of legal
norms and rules, lobbying will be defined as a basis
of a healthy civil society of the XXI century. Thus,
lobbying in Europe is seen as a very important
factor for the development of European public
policy (Růžičková, K., 2010).
The need to implement public policy is
caused by the idea of harmonization of economic,
political, social, and environmental components,
which become especially relevant, namely in
solving social and state problems, using effective
experience in lobbying.
The importance of the practical use of
research results lies in the further application of
modern experience of lobbying in Europe to
promote the implementation of state policy, which
provides "a way of state development where public
affairs will be managed to take into account the
interests of society" (Brundtland, G., 1987).
The aim of the study - to establish
regularities of realization of policy of lobbying of
interests in Europe and assessing the reliability of
its activities in European countries and EU
institutions to check the effectiveness of modern
experience of lobbying interests in Europe and
mechanisms in ensuring its transparency and
integrity in the EU.
Research objectives of the article:
1. Analyze the distribution of the current
composition of registrants in the Register of
Transparency and the Percentage of these
registrants, according to the location of the head
office within the EU.
2. To analyze the number of lobbying
meetings of registrants and determine in which
areas these meetings were held in the field of
lobbying.
3. Identify lobbying transparency
mechanisms in European countries and EU
institutions and integrity mechanisms designed to
promote ethical lobbying among lobbyists and
decision-makers in European countries and EU
institutions.
4. Analyze the costs of EU countries for
lobbying, as well as the costs of lobbying by large
technology companies in Brussels.
5. Conduct a comparative analysis of the
activities of the Juncker Commission and the von
der Leyen Commission in the field of lobbying.
6. Investigate the relationship between the
results of registration and disclosure by lobbyists
and the supervision of the rules of the register and
transparency of lobbying activities in European
countries and EU institutions.
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Tatiana Voropayeva
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2. Literature review
Lobbying is part of any healthy democracy,
but Transparency International EU (henceforth - TI
EU) makes every effort to ensure the transparency
and ethics of such activities at the EU level.
Brussels is the second capital of the world in terms
of lobbying interests after Washington. At least
48,000 people work in this European capital in
organizations that seek to influence EU institutions
and decisions, with 7,500 of them having an
accredited lobby to the European Parliament. About
12,000 organizations on the EU's current register of
lobbyists say the lobby's total annual budget is 1.8
billion (estimated costs of the annual lobby;
Transparency International EU, 2021).
At the EU level, lobbying is not regulated
comprehensively. For example, the Council does
not have a system of protection against unethical
lobbying. Parliament and the Commission have a
common voluntary register of lobbyists, which
lacks adequate resources to supervise registrars
properly. In the last mandate, the European
Commission proposed to regulate this sector
through a mandatory register common to all three
EU institutions, which is a long-term policy
perspective. Unfortunately, despite many years of
negotiations, the "mandatory EU Transparency
Register" is not yet a reality. The European
Parliament and the European Commission
established the Transparency Register as a joint
scheme in 2011 through an Interinstitutional
Agreement. It is a key tool, which allows these two
institutions to meet their obligations of transparency
in their relations with stakeholders involved in
influencing decision-making and policy
implementation in the EU institutions. All
registrants have signed a common code of conduct
(EUR-Lex, 2014). By disclosing what interests are
being pursued, by whom, and with what level of
resources, the Transparency Register allows for
stronger public scrutiny (European Commission,
2009). This allows citizens, the media, and
stakeholders to monitor the activities and potential
influence of stakeholders on the formulation of EU
legislation (The Joint Transparency Register
Secretariat, 2019).
While researching the issue of lobbying
interests, it is necessary to provide an interpretation
of its concept. "Lobbying is an influence on the
government by certain methods to comprehensively
cover the problems of stakeholders in political
decision-making." (Leif & Speth, 2006). Many
definitions of lobbying include such an aspect as a
particularly desirable influence on policy decisions
(Kleinfeld, Willems & Zimmer, 2007; Michalowitz,
2004; Greenwood, 2007). When it comes to the
details of lobbying, the opinions of experts are even
more contradictory. Kleinfeld et al. (2007) view
lobbying as a legitimate attempt to influence policy
outcomes and recognize criticism of lobbying as
justified only in isolated cases. Leif and Speth (Leif
& Speth, 2006), on the other hand, even critically
call lobbying a "fifth force", where for them those
who try to influence political decisions through
lobbying are not part of the decision-making
process, whereas Redelfs suggests that politicians
may also represent the interests of certain interest
groups (Redelfs, 2006). Busch-Janser S. and
Vondenhoff C. concluded, "Lobbying is a mediator
between society, business and politics. It does not
only enable those who represent themselves to have
a voice in political decisions but also translates the
code of policy" (Busch-Janser, S., Vondenhoff, C.,
2008). They think, like Althaus (Althaus, 2001),
that lobbying is not only a process of influencing
politics but also a mediator between politics,
business, and society, while Leif and Speth (Leif
and Speth, 2006) clearly distinguish between
lobbying and representation of interests. In their
view, lobbying is a diffuse representation of
interests as well as values and ideologies in the
political space (which, from their point of view,
including the public) (Scheske, S., 2011).
Lobbying at the European level, in
particular by corporate interest groups, has led to
claims that lobbying reduces the transparency of
European Union governance and opens the door to
the possibility of writing legislation that is contrary
to or ambiguous about the public interest
(Chambers, A., 2016). Given the different views on
lobbying, it should be seen as a whole as an attempt
to influence policy-making against the background
of a certain public interest (Scheske, S., 2011).
The lobbying activities of interest groups
were seen as destructive to the democratic
functioning of the entire EU. Understanding the
interests of different Member States in EU
institutions such as the European Parliament is
important for the EU, which, despite sharing many
attributes of the political system, is not a state (Hix
and Hoyland, 2011). Due to differences in
regulatory levels and regulatory measures in EU
member states, political negotiations in Brussels
often have to find compromises between different
political parties and national interests (Berkhout et
al., 2015). In such negotiations, interest-bearing
organizations not only act on behalf of specific
political interests but may also represent individual
national approaches to address a particular policy
DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE
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Tatiana Voropayeva
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issue (Brendan J. & Rasmussen A., 2017). With the
right lobbying, this process will play an important
role in shaping and improving public policy, as civil
servants cannot be experts on every issue (Burson
Marsteller, 2013). Nevertheless, for lobbying to
play a constructive role and become legitimate in
society, it must be regulated adequately and
properly enforced (Transparency International EU,
2021).
An in-depth analysis of the issues outlined
in the scientific article allows us to conclude that the
topic of the modern experience of lobbying interests
in Europe, in terms of in-depth integration of
national economies into the structure of world
socio-political, foreign, and Ukrainian scientists
study economic space sufficiently.
Thus, the problem of promoting the
experience of lobbying interests in Europe is widely
reflected in scientific publications in the form of
theoretical research and practical research.
However, the issue of promoting the modern
experience of lobbying in Europe remains relevant
and open for further research, taking into account
the reports of the European Commission, the
European Parliament, and Transparency
International EU on the application of modern
experience of lobbying in Europe.
3. Methods and Materials
The realization of the purpose of this
exploration involves the involvement of such
research methods as:
analysis of countries' spending on
lobbying and current national lobbying registers in
Europe;
system and logical analysis, method of
information synthesis;
systematization, summarization of the
latest scientific publications and statistics published
by governments and accountable organizations on
the specifics of lobbying transparency mechanisms
in European countries and EU institutions, integrity
mechanisms designed to promote ethical lobbying
among lobbyists and decision-makers in European
countries, and EU institutions.
To identify certain features of interest
lobbying, there was used a method of generalizing
the regulatory practice of applying lobbying
transparency mechanisms in European countries
and EU institutions. The use of the comparison
method made it possible to draw a parallel in the
activities of the Juncker Commission and the von
der Leyen Commission, on the implementation of
relevant acts and decision-making in the field of
lobbying.
The statistical analysis method was used to
display statistics on the distribution of the current
composition of registrants in the Register of
Transparency, Percentage of Registrants,
Headquarters within the EU, EU lobbying costs,
lobbying costs of large technology companies in
Brussels. Regression analysis was used to reflect
the relationship between the results of registration
and disclosure by lobbyists and the monitoring of
the rules of the register and transparency of
lobbying activities in European countries and EU
institutions.
4. Results
According to statistics, the Transparency
Register has grown significantly since its inception
and as of April 06, 2021, includes almost 12,475
entities, consisting of 6 sections and 14 subsections.
In 2019, the total number of registrants remained
unchanged at 1,592 new registrations. The
registrants, in which the head office is located
within the EU, make up almost 91% of all
registrations, as in 2018, and the other registrants
are 9% distributed in 87 countries. The largest
number of registered interest representatives, about
51%, is located in the following countries: Belgium,
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. (see
Figure 1) (The Joint Transparency Register
Secretariat, 2019).
Fig. 1. Registrants per location of head
office
Source: Compiled by the authors by official
data of The Joint Transparency Register Secretariat
(2019).
From the beginning of January 2017 to
September 2018, more than €2 billion (€2.3 billion)
were spent on EU lobbying, most of which was
spent by entities within the European Union. The
current share of lobbyists outside the European
Union is not so significant and is only 9% of the
subjects in the Transparency Register, with a total
cost of 11%.
EU law extends to EU member states,
which means that the subjects of these countries
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have a greater interest in lobbying EU political and
legislative issues. The largest expenditure on EU
lobbying for the period 2017-2018 falls on
Belgium, Germany, and Italy, where of the top 30
countries that have spent money on EU lobbying,
five countries that are not part of the EU and namely
the USA, Switzerland, Norway, Japan, and China
(see Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. The 30 biggest lobbying spenders (in
millions of €)
Source: Compiled by the authors by official
data of Transparency Register (2021).
The total cost of lobbying non-EU
companies for lobbying is about 43%. US lobbying
spending is highest in Brussels, and higher than in
Germany, the United Kingdom, and France.
Belgium is the second country in terms of lobbying
power to register hundreds of pan-European
associations that mark the country as the location of
their headquarters (Transparency Register, 2021).
The cost of lobbying by large technology
companies in Brussels has increased over the last
decade. Google ranks first with a declared cost of
€5,750,000 per year, an increase of 360% since
December 2014. Apple's lobbying budget has
quadrupled in the last six yearsfrom €400,000 to
€2,000,000. Only Microsoft's budget has remained
relatively stable, increasing by 17% since 2014.
Microsoft was already one of the leading lobbyists
in Brussels in 2014, thanks to the opening of the
first major technology company to be hit by the
application of dogmatic EU9 antitrust rules (see
Figure 3).
Fig. 3. Increase in in-house lobby budget 2014 -
2020 (in millions of €)
Source: Compiled by the authors by official
data of Transparency International EU, (2021).
Google, Facebook, and Microsoft are
among the organizations that have published the
most lobbying meetings in Juncker's years. The
main topic lobbied by these companies was the
single digital market, which accounted for 15% of
all 540 published meetings, and the next important
topic was data privacy. During the Commission,
von der Leyen, Google, Facebook, and Microsoft
continue to lead the top 10 companies and groups in
terms of meetings in all policy areas, while Apple
and Amazon lag behind these companies, ranking
39th and 68th, respectively. The launch of the von
der Leyen Commission in December 2019 did not
significantly change the priorities in terms of digital
policy. One of the stated main objectives, together
with the European Green Course, is to refine the
rules underlying the digital single market. In 2020,
COVID-19 is considered a topic for 15% of all
meetings held by the Commission, making it,
together with the Digital Services Act, a major topic
for large technology companies. The trend of the
dominance of corporate lobbying continues during
the von der Leyen Commission, where business
interests represent 75% of the 1212 meetings held
by the Commission, which are responsible for
digital policy (see Figure 4).
Fig. 4. Increase in in-house lobby budget 2014 -
2020 (in millions of €)
Source: Compiled by the authors by official
data of Transparency International EU, (2021).
Although Google, Facebook, and Microsoft
are among the top five lobbying organizations, there
is a more even distribution of meetings between
corporate and civic organizations (44% and 39%,
respectively) (Transparency International EU,
2021).
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The EU countries surveyed have access to
information on legislation, except for Cyprus, but
there are significant shortcomings in the EU both in
terms of the quality of laws and in terms of their
implementation. In all but two countries (Slovakia
and the United Kingdom), citizens face barriers to
accessing public sector information and public data.
In most countries, it is not possible to access
information on lobbying, due to requests for
freedom of information, because contacts are not
documented and therefore data do not exist, or
because such information is made private (Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania,
Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom).
Slovenia, Ireland, the European Commission,
Lithuania, and the European Parliament have robust
transparency mechanisms for lobbying (see Table
1).
Table 2. How reliable are the mechanisms of lobbying transparency in European countries and EU
institutions?
Access to
information
Registration
and
disclosure by
lobbyists
Pro-active public sector
transparency mechanisms
including legislative
footprint
Overall
score
Slovenia
67
60
50
58
Ireland
67
64
13
48
European
Commission
67
50
38
48
Lithuania
50
50
38
48
European
Parliament
67
50
25
45
United Kingdom
67
33
13
34
Austria
50
57
13
34
Poland
50
27
25
29
Latvia
50
13
50
28
Netherlands
67
10
25
25
Estonia
50
0
33
24
France
33
30
21
24
Slovakia
83
0
0
21
Czech Republic
75
0
0
19
Council of the EU
67
0
0
17
Bulgaria
50
0
0
13
Germany
50
0
0
13
Portugal
33
0
17
13
Italy
33
10
0
11
Spain
33
7
0
10
Hungary
33
0
0
8
Cyprus
17
0
13
7
Regional average
50
22
17
26
Source: Compiled by the authors by official data of Transparency International, (2016).
Notes: Scale 0-100, where 0 is the weakest
and 100 is the strongest. Overall score based on the
total average score in four subcategories. The
results are presented in descending order, with the
EU country/organization receiving the highest
score first.
Lobbying registers are fast becoming the
most popular transparency tool in the field of
interest lobbying. From the 19 countries surveyed,
10 of them have some form of lobbying register,
ranging from mandatory national registries
(Austria, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, the
United Kingdom) to voluntary registries submitted
to specific institutions (the National Assembly and
the French Senate, the Netherlands, the EU
Transparency Register) or registers targeting
institutions at the subnational level (Tuscany,
Molise and Abruzzo, Italy and Catalonia, Spain).
Table 2 shows the results of regression
modeling, which allows reflecting the relationship
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between the results of registration and disclosure of
information by lobbyists and monitoring
compliance with the rules of the register and
transparency of lobbying activities in European
countries and EU institutions.
The equation of correlation-regression
dependence has the form:
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔
=
(
−2,75
)
+53,99
Registration and disclosure by lobbyists +
+42,04
Oversight of register and transparency rules
The obtained results allow us to conclude
that the reliability of lobbying activities in European
countries and EU institutions depends on the
disclosure of information by lobbyists and
compliance with the rules of the register and
transparency in the field of lobbying. The model
parameters are statistically significant, as indicated
by tStat in the amount of 8.78 and 7.99 and a P-
value of 0,000000018 and 0.00000008.
Table 2. The results of regression modeling
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.80
R Square
0.64
Adjusted R Square
0.62
Standard Error
14.27
Observations
23
ANOVA
df
SS
MS
F
Significance F
Regression
1
7647.75
7647.75
37.57
0.0000044
Residual
21
4274,25
203.54
Total
22
11922
Coeffic
ients
Standard
Error
t
Sta
t
P-value
Lower
95%
Upper
95%
Lower
95.0%
Upper
95.0%
Intercept
-2.75
0.45
-
6.1
3
0.00000
4
-3.68
-1.82
-3.68
-1.82
Registration and disclosure
by lobbyists
53.99
6.15
8.7
8
0,00000
0018
41.20
66.78
41.20
66.78
Oversight of register and
transparency rules
42.04
5.26
7.9
9
0.00000
008
31.09
52.99
31.09
52.99
Source: Compiled by the authors based on official data of Transparency International, (2016).
The value of the coefficient of
determination indicates that the 62% model
explains the relationship between disclosure by
lobbyists and monitoring compliance with the rules
of the register and transparency in lobbying. This
suggests that other factors are influencing the
reliability of lobbying in European countries and
EU institutions, which are not included in the
regression model.
In most countries, there are some forms of
restrictions on the follow-up of officials, where the
scope, coverage, and length of the period for
subsequent employment varies. In 4 of the 19
studied European countries (Austria, Hungary,
Italy, and Latvia) there are no measures to regulate
the further activities of officials between the public
sector and the lobbying world. Where rules exist,
they often do not cover the lobbying goals needed
to realize their potential to reduce risk. The main
gap is that members of parliament are very rarely
subject to restrictions on further employment, even
though they are a high-risk category and can engage
in lobbying activities. In only one of the 19
countries, in Slovenia, MPs have to adhere to
periods for further employment before moving to
positions that may create a conflict of interest and
our research found that this rule was not applied in
practice (see Table 3) (Transparency International,
2016).
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Table 3. How reliable are integrity mechanisms designed to promote ethical lobbying among lobbyists
and decision-makers in European countries and EU institutions?
Post-employment
and pre-
employment
restrictions
Codes of
conduct for
public sector
employees
Code of
conduct for
lobbyists
Self-regulation of
lobbying by
professional
bodies
Overall
score
Slovenia
67
75
60
30
58
United Kingdom
40
40
33
92
51
European
Commission
67
50
30
n/a
49
European
Parliament
50
58
30
n/a
46
Latvia
33
67
20
50
43
Austria
8
67
60
33
42
Lithuania
50
58
50
0
40
Ireland
40
42
13
58
38
Netherlands
8
75
0
67
38
Czech Republic
25
50
20
58
38
Spain
58
58
0
25
35
France
22
42
7
50
30
Council of EU
42
25
20
n/a
29
Estonia
8
67
0
33
27
Italy
8
50
0
50
27
Poland
17
67
20
0
26
Germany
17
42
0
42
25
Bulgaria
33
42
0
25
25
Slovakia
42
42
10
0
23
Cyprus
58
25
0
0
21
Portugal
42
17
0
17
19
Hungary
8
50
0
8
17
Regional average
32
49
16
36
33
Source: Compiled by the authors by official data of Transparency International, (2016).
Thus, further improvement of legislation in
the field of lobbying in Europe will ensure the
implementation of effective EU policy, increase the
efficiency of socio-political and economic systems
of member states and create favorable conditions
for deeper integration of the European economic
environment into the world community.
5. Discussion
A study of the current experience of
lobbying in Europe shows that lobbying serves an
important purpose, namely to provide policy-
makers with information to make more informed
legislative and policy decisions. These results
support the view that the formation of interest
lobbying groups in political activity often combines
the driving forces of the formation of organizations
with the factors underlying lobbying (Baumgartner
& Leech, 2001; Beyers, 2002; Dür & Mateo, 2012;
Klüver, 2012; Leech, etc., 2005; Lohmann, 1998).
A significant number of researchers explain the
dominance of interest groups in the EU by the
problems of collective action faced by these groups
and note that this dominance is likely to contribute
to the formation of effective policy action through
the intervention of lobbyists. Therefore, it is
necessary to pay attention to the obstacles faced by
interest groups during integration into political
affairs, and not just to pay attention to their
organizational creation and implementation of the
strategy. Besides, the study suggests that research
projects should be focused more on the activities of
registrants in the Transparency Register and ensure
their interaction with political actors to implement
interest lobbying, which correlates with the results
of Jordan & Halpin (2012).
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DOI: 10.37394/232022.2023.3.7
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At the same time, the broad distribution of
power in the EU not only contributes to the
formation of various areas in which lobbyists
participate but also ensures certain isolation of
European institutions from interest groups, which
are usually better organized than others.
Agreements between lobby groups and EU
institutions may not be long-term, as the focus of
decision-making shifts to national arenas. As noted
by Greenwood (2002), the European Commission
can sometimes isolate itself from pressure from
interest groups, thereby undermining the
importance of business associations at the European
level compared to other lobbying strategies.
It can be argued that lobbying is likely to
increase in the future, albeit more slowly than in the
last 10-15 years. In this aspect, we can agree with
the opinion of De Fouloy (2001), which identified
some key factors that will continue to promote
lobbying by interest groups: further EU
consolidation and the legitimacy of legislation; a
harsh economic and political climate in which more
interest groups need to be heard to redistribute or
preserve monetary income; accelerating the
implementation of the latest information
technologies; formation of a society where it is
necessary to absorb a huge amount of new
information; an increase of professional
specialization within branch knowledge.
Due to the impact of globalization
processes, lobbyists will have to work in a more
complex political environment, as the integration of
new Member States has a political culture that is
significantly different from the culture of current
EU members. As a result, interest groups will face
new challenges, as the EU institutions and their
decision-making mechanisms are determined by
European law, which will lead to increased
attention to improving legislation in the field of
lobbying. Therefore, the research conducted by
scientists does not provide relevant information on
lobbying interests in Europe.
6. Conclusion
A study of interest lobbying in Europe
revealed that the improvement of European
legislation in the field of lobbying is becoming
increasingly important. In a healthy democracy,
groups and individuals should be free to lobby and
have access to influential legislators. It is important
to uphold this right, but it is equally important to
recognize the rights of others to access decisions
taken at the European level, ensuring the most
transparent contact of outsiders with EU actors and
institutions so that European citizens can influence
effective political and legislative decisions. It has
been established that it is impossible to make
lobbying at any level of European policy
completely transparent due to the impractical
interpretation of the concept of lobbying, acceptable
to all participants, and possible breaches of the
confidentiality of individuals who consult with their
elected representatives. However, by amending
existing legislation and adopting new EU
regulations in the field of lobbying, it can make
significant progress in improving the transparency
of lobbying.
Thus, improving lobbying in Europe can be
the latest paradigm of implementation in all
institutions of the general principle that politicians
(both elected and non-elected) only accept meeting
requests from registered lobbyists, and meetings
must be formally registered. All lobbyist meetings
should be published on a centralized platform in an
open search format. EU institutions and policies
need to take a more proactive approach to ensure a
better balance of lobbying in their meetings with
lobbyists. National registers of lobbyists in the EU
Member States should facilitate the identification of
lobbying activities aimed at influencing EU policy,
and the EU Transparency Register should allow
participants to refer to national registrations. As a
result, the implementation of legislation in the field
of lobbying in Europe is becoming a topic of great
interest both for the actors themselves and for the
public sector as a whole.
The practical significance of the study is
that the theoretical provisions, conclusions, and
recommendations developed by the author and
proposed in the article can be used to improve the
system of lobbying interests in Europe, improve
organizational links and mechanisms for lobbying
transparency in European countries and EU
institutions.
Further research could focus on improving
EU legislation to promote lobbying policies in
Europe, which will stimulate lobbying and improve
the economic performance of actors and the current
standard of living. Capacity building and
widespread use of innovative, policy, research
approach to regulating lobbying policies at the
interstate level can become the basis of a pan-
European strategy for future periods.
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DOI: 10.37394/232022.2023.3.7
Oksana Kovalova, Ella Mamontova,
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Tatiana Voropayeva
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DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE
DOI: 10.37394/232022.2023.3.7
Oksana Kovalova, Ella Mamontova,
Zoriana Buryk, Sergiy Vonsovych,
Tatiana Voropayeva
E-ISSN: 2732-9984
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