Resilience Analysis of Critical Infrastructure
KAZUO FURUTA, RYOICHI KOMIYAMA
Resilience Engineering Research Center, School of Engineering
The University of Tokyo
7-3-1 Hongo Bunkyo-ku, 113-8656
JAPAN
TARO KANNO, HIDEKI FUJII, SHINOBU YOSHIMURA
Department of Systems Innovation, School of Engineering
The University of Tokyo
7-3-1 Hongo Bunkyo-ku, 113-8656
JAPAN
TOMONORI YAMADA
Research into Artifacts, Center for Engineering
The University of Tokyo
5-1-5 Kashiwanoha, Kashiwa, 277-8568
JAPAN
Abstract: - Critical infrastructure is the basis of our modern life, and the resilience of critical infrastructure is a
serious issue for maintaining our safe and secure society. After several remarkable events like terrorists attack
in US in 2001 and the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2012, a shared recognition that more comprehensive
approaches for crisis management is necessary. For resilience enhancement of critical infrastructure, we
have to understand the response of critical infrastructure to a crisis. Computer simulation is a
promising approach for this purpose, but how to model interdependencies that exist among different
sectors of infrastructure is a problem to be solved in resilience analysis of critical infrastructure using
simulation. From this background, a modeling and simulation method of critical infrastructure considering
interdependencies among different sectors were developed. The system consists of detailed models for separate
sectors, and the integrated model including multiple sectors of critical infrastructure. The modeled sectors
include electricity, gas, water supply, roads, and telephone networks in the metropolitan area of Tokyo.
Sensitivity studies were conducted based on the 4R framework of resilience to examine the functionality of the
simulation system. Finally, it has been shown that a human-centered viewpoint is essential for assessing the
resilience of critical infrastructure.
Key-Words: - critical infrastructure, lifeline, resilience, interdependency analysis, service system, socio-
technical systems, computer simulation
1 Introduction
Critical infrastructure, which consists of a multiple
sectors such as power grids, water supply, energy
supply, transportation, telecommunication, and so
on, is the basis of our modern life. Loss of its
function therefore is a crucial threat to the modern
society, and the resilience of critical infrastructure is
a serious issue for every country. After the terrorists
attack in US on September 11
th
, 2001, in particular,
preparedness against all hazards including not only
natural disasters but also intentional incidents have
attracted interests of both practitioners and
researchers. In Japan, the Great East Japan
Earthquake and the Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant Accident in 2012 evoked a shared
recognition that more comprehensive approaches for
crisis management is necessary. Consequently, the
Basic Act for National Resilience was enacted in
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMPUTERS
DOI: 10.37394/23205.2022.21.8
Kazuo Furuta, Ryoichi Komiyama,
Taro Kanno, Hideki Fujii, Shinobu Yoshimura,
Tomonori Yamada
E-ISSN: 2224-2872
58
Volume 21, 2022
2013, and Japanese government is now promoting
the National Resilience Policy for enhancing
national resilience of Japan [1][2].
For resilience enhancement of critical
infrastructure, we have to understand the response
of critical infrastructure to a crisis. Computer
simulation is a promising approach for this purpose,
but how to model interdependencies that exist
among different sectors of infrastructure is a
problem to be solved in resilience analysis of critical
infrastructure using simulation. We are now
developing a method to identify which part is
vulnerable and what risk exists by simulating
complex behaviors of critical infrastructures under
various threat scenarios considering their
interdependencies [3]. We expect the project will
contribute to the crisis management policy of Japan,
presenting options for the risk governance strategy
referring to the outcomes of technological analysis.
This paper, however, will focus on technological
aspects of the project and present the modeling
architecture of simulation as well as preliminary
results.
2 Simulation Model
Our research group is developing a model of the
critical infrastructure including the power grid, gas
supply network, water supply network, road
transportation network, and telecommunication
network in the metropolitan area of Tokyo,
considering interdependencies and developing a
system for simulating its complex behaviors under
various threat scenarios. The system consists of
detailed models for separate sectors, and the
integrated model including all of them.
2.1 Integrated Model
In the conventional approach of interdependency
analysis of critical infrastructure, only the facilities
of infrastructure, lifelines, are modeled. From a
viewpoint of socio-technical context, however, this
approach is insufficient and services that are
provided relying on the critical infrastructure should
be considered. It is because what are worthwhile for
the people are services like commodity supply,
medical service, administration, finance service, and
so on, which are provided relying on these facilities.
Operations of lifelines are also services. Since the
value of these services depends on civic life, the
resilience of service systems is further
interdependent with civic life.
From the above consideration, we have proposed
a socio-technical model shown in Fig. 1 as the
integrated model of critical infrastructure [4]. This
model consists of three subsystems of lifelines,
services, and daily life. Each lifeline system is
represented as a network. Each node represents
some facility and each link represents a conduit or
supply line of resource. The whole model of
lifelines is a multi-layered combination of multiple
networks.
Fig. 1. Integrated model of critical infrastructure
Provision of services, daily life, and recovery of
lifeline systems are modeled by the agent based
modeling architecture. A service agent is the
provider of a service and it is defined by the
company, organization, task, supplier, service type,
and so on. A citizen agent carries out various
activities in civic life like reception of services,
watching and listening of mass media, taking a bath,
dining, shopping, and so on. It is defined by the
attributes representing residence, family, and
member. Different lifestyles are distinguished
between different types of a citizen agent. A
recovery agent repairs damaged lifeline systems. A
recovery team is organized by recovery agents and it
is attributed with the ratio of assembly, the ratio of
resource sufficiency, the capability of field
communication, and so on.
When analyzing the resilience of multiple sectors
of critical infrastructure, it is essential to consider
their interdependencies. If power supply has been
lost, for instance, water supply does not work either
due to pump shutdown, and road transportation will
be confused due to blackout of traffic signals. If
road transportation is confused, repair of the
damaged power grid facility will delay. The
influence of local damage in a single sector will
propagate not only over the same sector but also
over other sectors. It may cause a cascading failure
of the whole critical infrastructure. From this
concern, studies on interdependency analysis of
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMPUTERS
DOI: 10.37394/23205.2022.21.8
Kazuo Furuta, Ryoichi Komiyama,
Taro Kanno, Hideki Fujii, Shinobu Yoshimura,
Tomonori Yamada
E-ISSN: 2224-2872
59
Volume 21, 2022
critical infrastructure have been continued in US
and Europe particularly after the terrorists attack in
2001 [5][6].
If critical infrastructure is modeled including
service and daily life as shown in Fig. 1, it is
necessary to consider interdependencies between
different subsystems of lifelines, services, and daily
life. The interdependencies between these three
subsystems are summarized in Table 1. Thare are
interdipendencies of service on lifeline, for instance,
that lifeline provides resources necessary for service
and transportation for service providers. Lifeline is
dependent on service in a way that damages of
lifeline facilities will be repaired by the recovery
service.
The interdependencies in terms of services can
be classified into two classes, intra- and inter-
organizational ones. The former is represented as a
PCANS model and the latter as an Integrated
Organization (IO) model in this study [7][8]. Fig 2
show an overview of the organization model of
services proposed in this work.
In PCANS model, an organization is described as
a triplet of individual, task, and resource. There are
five relations between these three elements,
PCANS: Precedence, Commitment of resources,
Assignment of individuals to tasks, Networks of
relations among personnel, and Skills linking
individuals to resources. Precedence is a sequential
order between different tasks, that some other tasks
should have been done before starting a particular
task. Commitment of resources describes what
resources are required for execution of a particular
task. Assignment of individuals to tasks show who
are in charge of carrying out a particular task.
Networks of relations among personnel defines the
structure of organization. Finally personal skills will
affect the amount and the class of resources required
for execution of a particular task.
PCANS model
taskindividual
resource outputsfactors
mission
actorsinputs
IO model
intra-
organization
inter-
organization
Fig. 2 Organization model of services
The Integrated Organisation (IO) model describes
the interactions of an organization with the outside
environment, and it is described by the following
items. Outputs are services that the organization
produces, and inputs are the resources that the
organization consumes for the service production.
Actors are agents of verious types: service suppliers,
consummers, collaborators, pompetetors, and so on.
Mission gives the organization the reason for
existing. Factors describe political, economical,
technical, social, or cultural conditions that affect
organizational behaviour.
Table 1
. Multiple interdependencies
Service
Life
Between Lifelines
Ÿ Physical
Ÿ Functional
Ÿ Resource
Ÿ Alternative
Service on Lifeline
Ÿ Functional
Ÿ Resource
Ÿ Transportation
Life on Lifeline
Ÿ Functional
Ÿ Resource
Ÿ Transportation
Service
Lifeline on Service
Ÿ Recovery
Between Services
Ÿ PCANS: Agent-Task-
Resource
Ÿ Alternative
Life on Service
Ÿ Demand and supply
Ÿ Satisfaction
Life
Lifeline on Life
Ÿ Demand and supply
Service on Life
Ÿ Demand and supply
Ÿ Labor supply
Between Lives
Ÿ Resource sharing and
allocation
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMPUTERS
DOI: 10.37394/23205.2022.21.8
Kazuo Furuta, Ryoichi Komiyama,
Taro Kanno, Hideki Fujii, Shinobu Yoshimura,
Tomonori Yamada
E-ISSN: 2224-2872
60
Volume 21, 2022
2.2 Power Grid Model
In addition to the integrated model of critical
infrastructure, we are developing separate models
for each infrastructure sector. A model of the power
grid around the metropolitan area of Tokyo, Kanto,
has been constructed as shown in Fig. 3 considering
the present siting of power plants in the area and
using single point approximation for the power grids
of the surrounding areas.
The risk of the power grid in an emergency such
as an earthquake is evaluated by probabilistic
planning by minimizing the total cost, which is the
sum of the facility cost and the expected variable
cost for various risk scenarios [9]. This method
enables us to obtain the best energy mix in the
metropolitan area of Tokyo considering the
shutdown risk of the power plants concentrated
around Tokyo Bay as well as the damage risk of the
transmission lines.
Fig. 3. Power grid model of Kanto
Referring to the annual probability of earthquake
that directly hits Tokyo area, preliminary
assessment was done for four scenarios of 0%, 1%,
3%, and 5% risk. Fig. 4 show an example of
optimized energy mix in a day after a seismic
disaster.
As a result of the analysis, the following findings
were obtained. As the earthquake probability
increases, (1) new construction sites of combined
natural gas plants shift from Tokyo Bay Area to the
other areas, (2) the capacity of private power
generation newly introduced increases, (3) the
capacity of storage batteries introduced around
Tokyo Bay Area increases. This result suggests that
these decisions are useful for enhancing the
robustness of the power grid in this area from an
economic viewpoint. If the value of earthquake risk
officially published by the government is correct,
half of the expected combined natural gas plants
should be built in the peripheral area of Tokyo
rather than around Tokyo Bay. This example
demonstrates that the developed method provides
useful insights for decision-making in national
security policy.
Fig. 4 Optimum energy mix after seismic disaster
2.3 Road Network Model
A precise road network model of the metropolitan
area of Tokyo was constructed in a format of Multi-
agent-based Traffic Simulator, MATES. MATES is
a multi-agent traffic flow simulator, which can
simulate the motion of each car along the road
network considering various interactions between
cars as well as cars and the traffic environment [10].
The road network model describes the topology of
road network, the number of lanes of each road
segment, the structure of crosses, and so on, which
are required to perform traffic simulation at a
microscopic level.
In order to apply MATES simulation to the road
network model of a realistic scale, speeding-up of
simulation was attempted. Keeping the preliminary
data on road structure that are referred to frequently
during simulation reduced the computation time less
than one third. Since the path search algorithm was
the bottle neck for fast simulation, a hierarchical
path search technique has been adopted, where
travel paths are searched for using a simplified road
network model and then using a precise one. This
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMPUTERS
DOI: 10.37394/23205.2022.21.8
Kazuo Furuta, Ryoichi Komiyama,
Taro Kanno, Hideki Fujii, Shinobu Yoshimura,
Tomonori Yamada
E-ISSN: 2224-2872
61
Volume 21, 2022
improvement contributed to cutting 98% of the
computing time for travel search.
The parallel computing technique that we
developed with virtual road network models was
applied to the realistic model of Tokyo and the
efficiency of parallel computing was evaluated. Fig.
5 shows an example of the evaluation. Model1, 2,
and 3 are virtual models and the model size is in the
order of Model2 < Model1 < Model3. As the model
size increases, the efficiency of parallel computing
increases, but this performance does not hold for the
model of Tokyo. Close investigation of this
performance revealed that a large difference in the
road density between different segmentation zones
resulted in failure in balancing computational loads
among many processors and then it caused the poor
performance in parallel computation. Now we are
implementing a new scheme of zone segmentation
that reflects difference in road density.
Speed-up Factor
Number of Processors
Model1
Model2
Model3
Tokyo
Fig. 5. Efficiency of parallel computing
2.4 Water Supply Network Model
Since water supply tubes are installed along the
primary roads, the water supply network of the
metropolitan area of Tokyo was constructed from
the road network model for MATES. In addition,
the parts of network where seismic reinforcement
work has already been completed were presumed.
The locations of 2,659 critical facilities such as
police offices, fire stations, large hospitals, and so
on were identified referring to the open database of
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and
Tourism. It is assumed then that the region between
each critical facility and the nearest water supply
point is seismically resistant. Fig. 6 shows the water
supply network model of Tokyo with the locations
of critical facilities.
The damage of this network expected after a
great earthquake that directly hits Tokyo was
estimated by the square grid of 500m using the
formula for damage estimation already proposed.
The maximum seismic acceleration of 80 cm/sec
and the liquefaction factors estimated and opened by
Tokyo Metropolitan Government were used for this
estimation. It is revealed consequently that the
damage is greater in the east area than the west area
of Tokyo, because it is almost determined by the
liquefaction factor except the regions where seismic
reinforcement has been completed.
Fig. 6. Water supply network model of Tokyo
2.4 Telecommunication Network Model
A telecommunication network model was developed
using the data opened from NTT East Company.
The logical topology of the telecommunication
network has a three-layered hierarchy that consists
of regional, local, and customer relay stations from
the top to the bottom, and it contains one regional,
three local, and 102 customer relay stations within
the target area of modeling. A regional or local relay
station shares the same building with some customer
relay station. It is assumed for simplicity that all
these relay stations are connected physically in a
single optical communication ring.
Based on the traffic theory, a simulation system
was developed for evaluating the call loss
probability using the following algorithm.
(1) Initialize the number of lines between nodes.
(2) Generate a call.
(3) Determine the holding time of the call.
(4) Determine the routing of communication.
(5) Determine success or failure of the call.
(6) Terminate the calls that end immediately.
(7) Evaluate the call loss probability.
(8) Repeat from (2) till the end of simulation.
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMPUTERS
DOI: 10.37394/23205.2022.21.8
Kazuo Furuta, Ryoichi Komiyama,
Taro Kanno, Hideki Fujii, Shinobu Yoshimura,
Tomonori Yamada
E-ISSN: 2224-2872
62
Volume 21, 2022
The call loss probability evaluated by this
simulation under an overloading condition of
communication demands agreed well with the value
evaluated theoretically by Erlang-B formula as
shown in Fig. 7. In the next stage, each connection
in the physical ring was destroyed and the call loss
probability was evaluated for a surge of ten times
communication demands after crisis. Fig. 8 shows
the result of this simulation as a hazard map. It is
shown here that the links located around the cover
area boundary of different local relay stations are
relatively resistant against damage.
Fig. 7 Call dends and call loss probability
80% =< R
75% =< R < 80%
70% =< R < 75%
R < 70%
Fig. 8. Call loss probability with damaged link
3 Assessment of Resilience
The resilience of critical infrastructure that was
damaged by some event like natural disaster
depends on the recovery plan of lifelines. In the past
disasters, the lifeline operators in each sector made
their best efforts to recover their own facilities as
soon as possible, but they made no attempt to
optimize the recovery plan considering
interdependencies between different lifelines.
Interdependency analysis is a key to mitigate this
drawback, but the studies of interdependency
analysis so far have ignored services and civic life.
We try to globally optimize the recovery plan
considering these important factors.
We adopted Genetic Algorithm (GA) in this
research to optimize the recovery plan, while
studying more decentralized and opportunistic
planning method. A recovery plan, which recovery
team covers which damaged part of the lifeline
systems in what order, is coded as a genome and a
population of genomes evolves by genetic
operations of natural selection, cross over, and
mutation under some fitness function. The recovery
plan is optimized by this process.
The next fitness function was adopted.
F =
a
Rr +
b
Sa +
g
Cs
d
Rc (1)
Rr, Sa, Cs, and Rc are the recovery ratio of
infrastructure facilities, the relative achievement
level of services, the satisfaction level of the citizens,
and the recovery cost. Parameter
a
,
b
,
g
, and
d
are
importance weight of each contribution. The
recovery cost is a combination of the total migration
length, the total work hours, and the total migration
cost over the all recovery teams.
The effectiveness of the approach was
demonstrated using a virtual lifeline model of 6x6
square grid shown in Fig. 9 and test scenarios.
Lifelines of 12 types and 550 agents were
considered in this test simulation. The sum of Sa
and Cs in Equation (1) was used as the measure of
system performance.
Fig. 10 compares two recovery curves obtained
considering just the recovery ratio and all the four
factors in Equation (1). In terms of service
achievement and citizens satisfaction, the fitness
function including all of the four factors gave a
better result than the conventional approach. It
shows that the comprehensive infrastructure model
of this study, which consider not only lifeline
facilities but also services and civic life, is useful for
evaluating the resilience of critical infrastructure
from a human-centered viewpoint.
It is impossible to validate simulation models of
this type based on empirical data. We performed
therefore sensitivity analysis to check behavior of
the simulation model. Some model or scenario
parameters were changed that correspond to the R4
framework of resilience: robustness, redundancy,
resourcefulness, and rapidity [11]. Fig. 11 shows an
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMPUTERS
DOI: 10.37394/23205.2022.21.8
Kazuo Furuta, Ryoichi Komiyama,
Taro Kanno, Hideki Fujii, Shinobu Yoshimura,
Tomonori Yamada
E-ISSN: 2224-2872
63
Volume 21, 2022
example of the results, which shows the area of
resilience triangle for various scale of damage. The
area of resilience triangle [11], which is the area
between the performance curve degraded after a
crisis and the normal level of performance, is often
used as a metric of systems resilience. It shows the
sensitivity of the resilience to the robustness of the
system; when the robustness gets low, the resilience
degrades. Such a reasonable response indicates
qualitatively that the model is functional for
evaluating the resilience of this system.
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
50
100
150
200
250
Time (day)
Performance
fittness function
recovery ratio
four factors
Fig. 10. Impact of services and civic life
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
0
400
800
1600
2000
Scale of damage
Area of resilience triangle
1200
lifeline
service
daily life
Fig. 11. Sensitivity of resilience to robustness
4 Conclusion
The resilience of critical infrastructure is a key issue
for maintaining our safe and secure society, because
it is the basis of our modern life. For resilience
enhancement of critical infrastructure,
predicting and understanding its response of
critical infrastructure to a crisis are required,
and how to model interdependencies among
different sectors of infrastructure is a problem
to be solved. This paper discussed how to model
these interdependencies and how to assess the
resilience of multiple lifelines of critical
infrastructure. Our models consist of the integrated
and separate models for multiple sectors of
infrastructure. The integrated model includes not
Fig. 9 Schematic view of the virtual inftrastracture network for test simulation
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMPUTERS
DOI: 10.37394/23205.2022.21.8
Kazuo Furuta, Ryoichi Komiyama,
Taro Kanno, Hideki Fujii, Shinobu Yoshimura,
Tomonori Yamada
E-ISSN: 2224-2872
64
Volume 21, 2022
only lifeline systems but also service and civic life
systems as subsystems. We can thereby simulate the
response of critical infrastructure more realistically
under a socio-technical context. Test simulation
using a virtual structure of the lifeline networks
demonstrated that considering service and civic life
is necessary to evaluate the resilience of critical
infrastructure from a human-centered viewpoint.
Models were presented for the power grid, road
network, water supply network, and
telecommunication network of the metropolitan area
of Tokyo. We are now trying to expand the
integrated model also for applying it to the
metropolitan area of Tokyo. It is expected this
approach can provide technical insights useful for
decision makers in the emergence response policy.
Acknowledgement:
This research was supported by R&D Program:
Science of Science, Technology and Innovation
Policy, RISTEX, JST.
References:
[1] http://www.oecd.org/governance/3rdoecdhighle
velriskforum.htm
[2] http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/kokudo_kyouji
nka/pdf/khou1-2.pdf
[3] http://www.ristex.jp/stipolicy/en/project/project
16.html
[4] T. Kanno, K. Furuta, Modeling and Simulation
of Service System Resilience, Proc.
Probabilistic Safety Assessment and
Management (PSAM) 2012, CD-ROM, 2012.
[5] K. Gopalakrishnan, S. Peeta, Sustainable and
Resilient Critical Infrastructure Systems:
Simulation, Modeling, and Intelligent
Engineering, Springer, 2010.
[6] A. V. Gheorghe, M. Schläpfer, Critical Infra-
structures, Swiss National Institute of
Technology, 2004.
[7] D. Krackhardt, K. M. Carley, A PCANS Model
of Structure in Organizations, Proc. 1998 Int.
Symp. on Command and Control Research and
Technol. Conf., pp. 113-119 (1998)
[8] D. D. Dudenhoeffer, M. R. Permann, M. Manic,
A Framework for Infrastructure
Interdependency Modeling and Analysis, Proc.
Winter Simulation Conference, 2006.
[9] H. Matsuzawa, R. Komiyama, Y. Fujii,
Evaluation of Optimal Power Storage Strategy
and Optimal Power Generation Mix
considering Disaster Risk by Approximate
Dynamic Programming, Proc. 34th Japan
Society of Energy and Resources, in Japanese,
pp. 9-14, 2015.
[10] S. Yoshimura, H. Fujii, Y. Nakama, Multi-
Agent based Traffic and Environment
Simulator MATES with Its Application to
Virtual Traffic Experiment, Proc. Int.
Workshop on Develop- ment and Advancement
of Computational Mechanics, pp. 200-210 2005.
[11] M. Bruneau, et al., A Framework to
Quantitatively Assess and Enhance the Seismic
Resilience of Communities, Earthquake
Spectra, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 733-752, 2003.
Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0
(Attribution 4.0 International, CC BY 4.0)
This article is published under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License 4.0
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en_US
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMPUTERS
DOI: 10.37394/23205.2022.21.8
Kazuo Furuta, Ryoichi Komiyama,
Taro Kanno, Hideki Fujii, Shinobu Yoshimura,
Tomonori Yamada
E-ISSN: 2224-2872
65
Volume 21, 2022