2013, and Japanese government is now promoting
the National Resilience Policy for enhancing
national resilience of Japan [1][2].
For resilience enhancement of critical
infrastructure, we have to understand the response
of critical infrastructure to a crisis. Computer
simulation is a promising approach for this purpose,
but how to model interdependencies that exist
among different sectors of infrastructure is a
problem to be solved in resilience analysis of critical
infrastructure using simulation. We are now
developing a method to identify which part is
vulnerable and what risk exists by simulating
complex behaviors of critical infrastructures under
various threat scenarios considering their
interdependencies [3]. We expect the project will
contribute to the crisis management policy of Japan,
presenting options for the risk governance strategy
referring to the outcomes of technological analysis.
This paper, however, will focus on technological
aspects of the project and present the modeling
architecture of simulation as well as preliminary
results.
2 Simulation Model
Our research group is developing a model of the
critical infrastructure including the power grid, gas
supply network, water supply network, road
transportation network, and telecommunication
network in the metropolitan area of Tokyo,
considering interdependencies and developing a
system for simulating its complex behaviors under
various threat scenarios. The system consists of
detailed models for separate sectors, and the
integrated model including all of them.
2.1 Integrated Model
In the conventional approach of interdependency
analysis of critical infrastructure, only the facilities
of infrastructure, lifelines, are modeled. From a
viewpoint of socio-technical context, however, this
approach is insufficient and services that are
provided relying on the critical infrastructure should
be considered. It is because what are worthwhile for
the people are services like commodity supply,
medical service, administration, finance service, and
so on, which are provided relying on these facilities.
Operations of lifelines are also services. Since the
value of these services depends on civic life, the
resilience of service systems is further
interdependent with civic life.
From the above consideration, we have proposed
a socio-technical model shown in Fig. 1 as the
integrated model of critical infrastructure [4]. This
model consists of three subsystems of lifelines,
services, and daily life. Each lifeline system is
represented as a network. Each node represents
some facility and each link represents a conduit or
supply line of resource. The whole model of
lifelines is a multi-layered combination of multiple
networks.
Fig. 1. Integrated model of critical infrastructure
Provision of services, daily life, and recovery of
lifeline systems are modeled by the agent based
modeling architecture. A service agent is the
provider of a service and it is defined by the
company, organization, task, supplier, service type,
and so on. A citizen agent carries out various
activities in civic life like reception of services,
watching and listening of mass media, taking a bath,
dining, shopping, and so on. It is defined by the
attributes representing residence, family, and
member. Different lifestyles are distinguished
between different types of a citizen agent. A
recovery agent repairs damaged lifeline systems. A
recovery team is organized by recovery agents and it
is attributed with the ratio of assembly, the ratio of
resource sufficiency, the capability of field
communication, and so on.
When analyzing the resilience of multiple sectors
of critical infrastructure, it is essential to consider
their interdependencies. If power supply has been
lost, for instance, water supply does not work either
due to pump shutdown, and road transportation will
be confused due to blackout of traffic signals. If
road transportation is confused, repair of the
damaged power grid facility will delay. The
influence of local damage in a single sector will
propagate not only over the same sector but also
over other sectors. It may cause a cascading failure
of the whole critical infrastructure. From this
concern, studies on interdependency analysis of
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMPUTERS
DOI: 10.37394/23205.2022.21.8
Kazuo Furuta, Ryoichi Komiyama,
Taro Kanno, Hideki Fujii, Shinobu Yoshimura,
Tomonori Yamada