mainly deals with the problem that VMs appear
and disappear very rapidly in the network
which makes security management, e.g., patch
management and vulnerability scanning, very
difficult [10]. The authors describe this as the
missing of a steady state in the network, where
the steady state means that all machines are
patched and properly managed. The Mobility of
a VM, i.e., the VM can easily be copied or
migrated, imposes multiple security problems:
all the hosts, the VM will be executed on, have
to be part of the trusted computing base (TCB)
[10]; sensitive information can leave a security
perimeter or malware is introduced, and the
theft of VMs can easily be done by simply
copying a file. The traditional Software
Lifecycle, i.e., a monotonic forward progress of
the software state, is broken by virtual
machine’s snapshot and rollback mechanisms,
because the execution of the virtual machine
can be forked and be rolled back [10]. In
particular the rollback mechanism induces a lot
of problems regarding freshness of randomness
sources used for cryptographic protocols or
critical patches are removed by a rollback.
Limited Data Lifetime, e.g., for sensitive or
cryptographic information, can be
compromised due to the rollback mechanism
and that the content of the virtual machine’s
memory might be stored on the disk of the host
due to paging, snapshots, or migration [10]. In
traditional computing environments, the
Identity of a machine is often deduced from
properties like the MAC address, the location,
or Ethernet port. Virtual machines however
typically use dynamically created MAC
addresses and they might migrate from one
physical host to another, therefore properties
like the location or Ethernet port will change,
and make it difficult to assign an identity [10].
Now, author of this paper present some
solutions and highlights some benefits about
these technology [10]. The role of the VMM is
to isolate the VMs from each other and the
correctness of enforcing this property is crucial,
therefore a high assurance VMM is required
[10]. Introducing an extended virtualization
layer that overtakes functionality originally
performed in the guest operating systems has a
certain number of benefits. Users do not have
to worry about security management, e.g.,
firewalling or anti-virus detection, if these
mechanisms are provided by the virtualization
layer and are operated by a central
administration staff. Furthermore, these
security services are now independent of the
guest operating systems, which results in a
higher flexibility because a high diversity of
VMs can be securely managed. Regarding the
security issue associated with software lifecycle
and the rollback feature, the virtualization layer
could pro- vide mechanisms to store such
sensitive information and to provide strong
randomness [10].
The security of the Virtual Machine Monitor
(VMM) is crucial, because it provides the
necessary isolation between the hosted VMs
and typically runs with the highest privileges
on the system [10].
Introducing a new software layer, such as the
one providing virtualization, inherently
increases the complexity of the system, which
also increases the possibility of software
security vulnerabilities [10]. Such
vulnerabilities in the VMM can lead to the
break of isolation, i.e., a VM can access other
VMs resources. Different solutions exist to
mitigate security problems in the virtualization
layer which are based on principles of building
secure software [10]: formal verification,
security by isolation and disaggregation, and
reducing the trusted code size [10].
An interesting example for formal verification
of software, which is also relevant for our topic
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMMUNICATIONS
DOI: 10.37394/23204.2022.21.4