Application of Game Theory in the Nigerian Electoral System
Abstract: - In this paper, we carry out a study on the application of game theory in the Nigerian electoral
system. The data for the study was collected from the official publication of INEC results for six major
political parties in the February 25th, 2023 presidential election in Nigeria. In the competitive game,
each political party and INEC used mixed strategies in the game. The political parties compete for the
electorates’ vote while INEC regulates the game. INEC has six strategies and political parties also have
six strategies which they apply in various proportions to outweigh the other. Therefore, for any of the
political parties to be successful in the election, she must apply: party structure up to 19.54%; manifesto
up to 20.18%; campaign up to 19.05%; people’s perception of the political party up to 20.26%; vote
from electorate up to 19.54% and acceptable candidate up to 1.43% of the time respectively. For INEC
to effectively perform her statutory responsibility, she must apply: electoral law up to 18.71%; electoral
guidelines up to 19.99%; prosecuting electoral offenders up to 16.87%; cancelling elections up to
23.14%; inconclusive elections up to 19.19%; declaration of results up to 2.10% of the time respectively
and the value of the game was 1.5337
Key-Words: - Game theory, Electoral system, Strategies, Game value, Linear programming
Received: June 26, 2023. Revised: March 8, 2024. Accepted: April 9, 2024. Published: May 21, 2024.
International Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics & Computer Science
DOI: 10.37394/232028.2024.4.2
Harrison Obiora Amuji,
Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
E-ISSN: 2769-2477
13
Volume 4, 2024
HARRISON OBIORA AMUJI*
Department of Statistics
Federal University of Technology, Owerri
PMB 1526, Owerri Imo State
NIGERIA
DONATUS EBERECHUKWU ONWUEGBUCHUNAM
Department of Maritime Technology and Logistics
Federal University of Technology, Owerri
PMB 1526, Owerri Imo State
NIGERIA
BRIDGET NWANYIBUIFE OKECHUKWU
Department of Statistics
Federal University of Technology, Owerri
PMB 1526, Owerri Imo State
NIGERIA
KENNETH OKECHUKWU OKEKE
Department of Maritime Technology and Logistics
Federal University of Technology, Owerri
PMB 1526, Owerri Imo State
NIGERIA
KENNEDY KELENNA OKERE
Department of Statistics
Federal University of Technology, Owerri
PMB 1526, Owerri Imo State
NIGERIA
1 Introduction
A game is an interaction of two decision-makers
with defined rules and regulations that each
player must observe and at the end of the game
each player either gains or suffers a loss, see [1].
The reward could either be gains or losses.
Mixed strategies are the probability of applying
each of the strategies over a given number of
times. Game theory is an independent body of
knowledge that has applications across
disciplines such as mathematics, Biology,
Economics, and anything that involves
competition and rationality, see [2]. Most of
these games have only one winner after playing
and hence a two-person zero-sum game where a
loss to one is a gain to the other. Our interest is
in competitive games and this description is an
example of a competitive game. Other situations
can be formulated as games; therefore, we see a
game as an abstraction that defines the
description of a strategic situation. The major
interest of players in a game is to maximize their
payoffs or minimize their losses as the case may
be. The owner of the game always plays to
maximize payoff while the defender plays to
minimize losses. The defender would
concentrate on her smallest possible payoff
instead of being careless and making a loss. In
this case, the players are said to be playing their
pure strategies, and the game is expected to have
a saddle point which incidentally corresponds to
the value of the game. But if this idea of playing
pure strategy fails, then each player should look
for dominating and dominated strategies. It is
advisable to adopt a dominance rule. For
instance, the dominance rule states that a
defender of the game should choose the
minimum row as a dominating row and discard
the maximum row as a dominated row because
he/she wants to minimize losses. On the
contrary, the dominance rule for the owner of the
game states that the player will choose the
maximum column as a dominating column and
discard the minimum column as a dominated
column as he/she wants to maximize profit [3].
Life is an expression of Game theory in all
respects because it involves competition. In this
paper, we are interested in the Nigerian electoral
system as a game and the players are the
Independent Electoral Commission and the
political parties; in this case, we have two
intelligent players. The Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC) owns the game.
He plays along the columns of the game matrix
and plays the minimax criterion to maximize her
profit. At the same time, the political parties are
the defenders who also compete among
themselves and INEC. They play along the rows
of the matrix and play maximin criterion to
minimize her losses. Among the political parties,
each of these players competes for the electorates
and their votes. INEC regulates the activities of
the political parties. These set of standards are
called the strategies. The INEC strategies that
she applies against political parties are: 1.
Electoral laws, 2. Electoral guidelines, 3.
Cancelation of the result of some erring pooling
boots, 4. Declaring an election Inconclusive, 5.
Disqualification of candidates in the case of
irregularities or falsification and 6. Declaration
of election result. That is, INEC has six strategies
to apply to maintain law and order. Again,
political parties have six strategies such as 1.
Party structures, 2. Manifestoes, 3. Campaign, 4.
Good perception of their political parties, 5. Vote
from electorates, 6. Presentation of an acceptable
candidate for general election; therefore,
political parties have six strategies also.
INEC applies the electoral law to regulate the
activities of the political parties and the party
candidates. It is expected that the political parties
and their candidate should comply with the
electoral law, any deviation could lead to
disqualification of the candidate or nullification
of an election. The electoral guideline is a set of
rules of engagement. The electoral umpire sets
out these rules to guide the conduct of the
election and make it known to both the political
parties and the electorates. The electoral body
has the power to cancel any electoral process that
does not follow the electoral law or guidelines,
but the umpire has limited power over this. If the
election result was announced in compliance
with the electoral law and there was
disagreement between political parties, the
electoral body or the political party or the
International Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics & Computer Science
DOI: 10.37394/232028.2024.4.2
Harrison Obiora Amuji,
Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
E-ISSN: 2769-2477
14
Volume 4, 2024
candidate can refer the matter to court for
adjudication. Again, the electoral body can
declare an election inconclusive depending on
the set-out rules from the electoral law. The
electoral body has the power to disqualify a
candidate based on non-compliance with the
electoral laws and guidelines. Finally, the
electoral body is saddled with the responsibility
to declare the result of the election and return
whoever satisfies the requirement of the law
elected. These set-out parameters are called the
strategies which the electoral body uses to play
the game and it is within the discretion of INEC
to determine the proportion of time to use each
of the strategies. The votes from the electorates
form the cost matrix upon which the competition
is based. The manifestoes of each political party
sell them to the electorates. Electorates will
always look for a political party that has their
interest at heart and who captures most of their
expectations in the manifestoes. In other words,
manifestoes are a marketing strategy that sells
the political parties to the electorates. In recent
times, we have seen that political structure plays
a pivotal role, not only in monitoring the election
but grassroots mobilization. A structure-less
political party may win an election but will be
rigged out because there would be few or no ones
in some areas to protect the interest of the
political party. Campaigns are the most effective
marketing strategies of political parties. During
the campaign, the political parties make their
intentions known to the electorates, make some
promises, etc, that will make the electorates vote
for them in the general election. The perception
or public image of the political parties to the
electorates is another important factor to the
political parties. Every political party wants to
have a good image before the electorate. The
image makers of political parties, mostly their
spokesperson, try to create this good image about
their political parties. The ultimate goal is the
vote of the electorates and to gain legitimacy
from the people. Though these things do not
move as smoothly as they should in Nigeria, yet,
we are assuming that electoral umpires are just
and should do their work without fear or favour.
The proper combination of these factors in a
given proportion will give a political party a lead
in an election.
In this study, we apply game theory in the
Nigerian electoral system to determine the
various strategies INEC would apply in
determining electoral success in Nigeria and also
the various strategies political parties would
apply to win the election; the (probability)
proportion of the time each of the strategies
would be applied by each player and the value of
the game. This paper aims to apply game theory
in the Nigerian electoral system and the
objectives are:
To model the electoral process as a competitive
game problem, where INEC and Political parties
are the players.
1. To obtain the value of the game
2. To determine the strategies adopted by the
electoral body (INEC).
3. To determine the strategies adopted by the
political parties.
2 Literature Review
The mathematical foundation of the Theory of
Competitive Games was laid by von Neumann
[4] and it was through the collaboration of von
Neumann and Morgenstern that economists
learned of this tool for analysing economic
problems. The history of the adaptation and
development of game theory was traced to [5, 6]
even though the mathematical and general
foundation of the body of knowledge was
attributed to [1]. In reality, some people always
expect the worst but this is not in isolation from
rationality. Because he is conscious of not losing
to his opponent, he always anticipates the
opponent’s move, see [7]. But Nash Equilibrium
is a point where each player maintains a balance
in the game, it is a point where each of the
players is playing his pure strategy and this point
is the value of the game, see [8]. Game theory is
the application of real-life scenarios to solve
practical problems. It has diverse applications
across disciplines, see [9]. In dynamic games
with mixed strategies, dominance plays a
negligible impact. Hence, each player plays his
mixed strategies at a given proportion of time to
International Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics & Computer Science
DOI: 10.37394/232028.2024.4.2
Harrison Obiora Amuji,
Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
E-ISSN: 2769-2477
15
Volume 4, 2024
win over his opponent [10]. Game is a subset of
applied mathematics with an application aspect
of statistics known as decision theory. It involves
two players which could be described as
intelligent and rational players, see [11].
Previously, Game theory was seen as a concept
that cannot be quantified in solving a real-life
problem, see [12]. Game theory is as real as life
itself and it is quantifiable. Its application cuts
across almost every activity in life. According to
some researchers, the academic performance of
students involves two major players; the
lecturers trying to defend the integrity of the
process and the students whose interests are to
graduate with good classes at all costs. This is a
two-person zero-sum game where each is trying
to bring the best strategies to outweigh the other
and a loss for one is a gain to the other. Students
and lecturers are in constant competition on who
gets what in their academic performance. The
lecturers try to protect the integrity of their
institutions by maintaining a high level of
standard and reputation for their institutions
while the students try at all costs to make good
grade points. Both the lecturers and the students
employ different strategies to achieve this [1].
Other researchers applied Game theory to model
a cyber-security problem. Their work was
concerned with a two-person zero-sum game
with multiple strategies for a cyber-security
attack line in a DoS/DDoS scenario. In this case,
the network provider (defender) competes with
the attacker (illegal users). The defender of the
game tries as much as possible to protect the
bandwidth from the attacker, whose interest is to
attack the bandwidth, thereby causing a denial of
service (DoS). If the attack originated from more
than one node, it implies that the attack is
distributed DoS [13]. Game theory provides the
tools for modelling the interaction between two
rational competitors, see [14]. Some researchers
demonstrated the application of Game theory in
the Werewolf game, see [15]. Still on the
practical application of Game theory,[16] used
Game theory to model construction work, also,
there are so many other applications of Game
theory.
Game theory [`7] has been used to show how
Bitcoin transactions and blockchains work in
real scenarios. It was observed that the Bitcoin
miners are in rational competition with one
another to outweigh the other for a reward. The
application of game theory cuts across many
activities in life, provided there is a competition
or collaboration, an aspect of game theory must
be involved. Since a gain to one is a loss to the
other, the game theory involved is a zero-sum
game. The application of games finds space in
solving various economic problems [18] that
require decision-making at various stages. The
ability to cope with business and various
economic challenges is dependent on rationality,
knowing that the competitors (opponents) are
also intelligent. A decision-maker must bear in
mind that it is either he wins or loses value to the
opponents who are competing with him.
The authors [19] buttressed the application and
theoretical aspects of game theory as a complex
mathematical theory that aids in decision-
making. They noted that game theory is
associated with competition and rational
decision-making. The conflict situation where
players adopt all known strategies to win is a
game problem where a loss to one is a gain to the
other. The authors observed that the conflicts cut
across social, political, and economic spheres of
life; and players in a game include political
parties, governments, firms or businesses, prison
inmates and professional sports franchises, etc.
However, our interest in this paper is to apply
game theory in politics. Game theory was
applied between doctors and patients [20] where
each is competing with the other for a common
interest. The doctors have different strategies
such as maintaining ethical standards,
commitment to duty in other to save lives,
malpractices to make money, and other unethical
standards to cut corners, etc., the patients on the
other hand have their counter strategies to defy
the doctors’ ingenuity and in all there has to be
an equilibrium which is the value of the game.
Depending on the side one is looking at it, game
International Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics & Computer Science
DOI: 10.37394/232028.2024.4.2
Harrison Obiora Amuji,
Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
E-ISSN: 2769-2477
16
Volume 4, 2024
theory provides solutions to rational decision
problems.
In a related development, a wonderful review
work was done by [21], where details on game
theory were given and a comparison of the
popularity of game theory and entrepreneurship
was made using different journal indexing
databases such as EBSCO, Google Scholar, etc.,
and the review showed that game theory was
more popular than the entrepreneurship. This
indicates the popularity and application of game
theory in different fields of life. The author
observed that government decisions and policies
could be modelled using game theory for optimal
performance. The reviewed work shows that the
application and popularity of game theory are on
the increase. Again, similar work was done by
[22], where a bibliometric analysis of game
theory was carried out to compare the popularity
of game theory concerning energy and natural
resources. The research was based on published
works on these areas with a special interest in
WOS (Web of Science) indexing. The result
showed that game theory ranks highest in
popularity, followed by environment and green
innovation technology. Therefore, game theory
is gaining very much ground in recent years as
more people discover its application in solving
decision-related problems. In this paper, our
interest is to apply game theory in the Nigeria
electoral system where the players are the
political parties and the Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC).
3 Materials and Methods
3.1 Nature of Data for the Study
The nature of data for this study is secondary
data published by INEC on the performance of
the six most popular political parties in the
Nigerian presidential election of February 25,
2023.
3.2 Population of the Study
The population of the study cut across the entire
population of adult Nigerians who took part in
the February 25, 2023 presidential election in
Nigeria. The concern of this study is on the eight
registered political parties that took part in the
presidential election.
3.3 Sample Size
We are concerned with the presidential election
results of February 25, 2023, and our specific
focus is on the six most popular political parties
in the election namely: All Progressive Congress
(APC), Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Labour
Party (LP), New Nigerian Peoples Party
(NNPP), All Progressive Grand Alliance
(APGA) and Action Alliance (AA). Their actual
respective votes according to the official
publication of INEC will be used for the study.
3.3 Method of Data Analysis
In finding solutions to game theory problems,
there are about four methods that can be used.
The first is to look for saddle points if the players
are playing a pure strategy, basically when the
game is static, but in this case, it will be
impossible for political parties to apply a pure
strategy in a dynamic game like this. Hence,
since the game is dynamic, both INEC and
political parties will use a mixed strategy to play
the game. In this case, we observed that pure
strategy and arithmetic methods naturally fail.
Secondly, we considered a solution by
dominance. In this case, each political party is
trying to minimize losses by playing the
minimum rows and considering the maximum
row as a dominated row while the minimum row
is a dominating row. But this game is large and
not only that no row entirely dominates the other,
we observed that no available strategy should be
ignored, otherwise, the political party will inflict
self-injuries on itself. On the other hand, INEC
is the owner of the game and stands to lose
nothing provided it plays its statutory role. INEC
is funded by the government of Nigeria and
therefore not in any way losing financial value
but as a player in the game, she plays along the
column of the cost matrix and the dominant role
International Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics & Computer Science
DOI: 10.37394/232028.2024.4.2
Harrison Obiora Amuji,
Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
E-ISSN: 2769-2477
17
Volume 4, 2024
for her is to play the maximum column as a
dominating column and eliminate the minimum
column as a dominated column and finally play
to maximize her profit, and also play minimax
criterion to achieve maximum benefit from the
game. The political parties play maximin
criterion to minimize their losses. To INEC, all
the strategies are important, apart from the fact
that none of the columns entirely dominate the
other, all the strategies need to be upheld. In this
case, the dominance rule fails, hence, the
arithmetic method has naturally failed. The third
method of solution is the matrix method and we
found that the column and row oddments of the
cost matrix are not the same and hence the
arithmetic method fails also. At this juncture, we
apply the linear programming method which is
the general solution to the game problem. Every
two-person zero-sum game is equivalent to a
linear programming problem [1]. This finding
allowed for the easy calculation of the optimal
strategies for any mxn matrix game using the
Simplex / Dual Simplex method.
3.4 Assumptions of the Model
The following are the assumptions that guided us
in the development of the Game model:
1. The cost matrix does not have a saddle point
2. No row or column dominates the other.
3. Column oddment is not equal to row oddment.
4. Each player has a mixed strategy to adopt.
Table 1. Layout of the Cost Matrix
Political
Parties
INEC
A
C
D
E
F
K
Xka
Xkc
Xkd
Xke
Xkf
L
Xla
Xlc
Xld
Xle
Xlf
M
Xma
Xmc
Xmd
Xme
Xmf
N
Xna
Xnc
Xnd
Xne
Xnf
O
Xoa
Xoc
Xod
Xoe
Xof
P
Xpa
Xpb
Xpc
Xpd
Xpe
Xpf
INEC has six (6) strategies a, . . . , f and Political
Parties has six (6) strategies k, . . . , p. Table 1 is
explained as follows:
INEC
The six INEC strategies are:
a = Electoral law
b = Electoral guideline
c = Prosecuting electoral offenders
d = Cancelling election
e = Inconclusive election
f = Declaration of electoral result
Political Parties
The six Political parties’ strategies are:
k = Party structure
l = Manifestoes
m = Campaign
n = People’s perception of the political party
o = Vote from the electorate
p = Acceptable candidate in the general election
Cost Matrix
The values of the cost matrix Xka, Xkb, . . ., Xpe,
Xpf , Xpf represent the proportion of votes as a
result of the combination of the strategies.
Column allocation of Cost Matrix:
APC = column a
PDP = column b
LP = column c
ANPP = column d
International Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics & Computer Science
DOI: 10.37394/232028.2024.4.2
Harrison Obiora Amuji,
Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
E-ISSN: 2769-2477
18
Volume 4, 2024
APGA = column e
AA = column f
Table 2. Weights of Party Strategies
Characteristics
Weight
k = Party structure
0.21
l = Manifestoes
0.13
m = Campaign
0.2
n = People’s perception of party
0.12
o = Vote from the electorate
0.23
p = Acceptable candidate
0.11
Total
1
Source: Researchers, 2023
3.5 The Game model
From the political party’s point of view, the
interest is to minimize losses which are
associated with the strategies to be adopted.
However, minimization of the losses (1/V) is the
same as maximization of the inverse of the losses
due to strategies, subject to the respective cost
constraints. Hence, we have;
󰇧
󰇨
 (1)
 

 (2)
Where
 (sum of probability) (3)
v = value of the game, ie. the constraint (4)
Formulating the problem, we have;


(5)
 (6)

 (7)
Subject to
 (8)

Where Sj is the augmented slack variables that
form the starting solution
The value of the game V is
󰇡
󰇢
(9)
Where Z is the optimal objective function.
From equation (7), the strategies for political
parties are:
 (10)
From the duality theory, the strategies for INEC
are:
 (11)
Where  
4 Data Presentation and Analysis
4.1 Data Presentation
In Table 3, we present the number of votes
obtained by each political party, and in Table 4,
we present the breakdown of the votes from each
political party based on the six strategies, see
Appendix 1. In Appendix 2, we present the
tabular solution to the game problem.
4.2 Data Analysis
Let the value of the game to political parties (A)
be V
International Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics & Computer Science
DOI: 10.37394/232028.2024.4.2
Harrison Obiora Amuji,
Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
E-ISSN: 2769-2477
19
Volume 4, 2024
From INEC’s (B) point of view, she will play to
minimize V.
Applying equation (2), we have
A1: 


A2: 

A3:


A4: 

A5: 

A6: 

From equation (3), we have





































From equation (5), we have
From equation (7),
Let
; then we have,












Augmenting the slack variables, from equation
(6), we have
International Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics & Computer Science
DOI: 10.37394/232028.2024.4.2
Harrison Obiora Amuji,
Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
E-ISSN: 2769-2477
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Volume 4, 2024
Maximize Z 

From equation (8), we have,
Subject to













󰇡
󰇢 
From equation (10), the strategies for political
parties are;

󰇛󰇜󰇛
󰇜
From equation (11), the strategies for INEC are;

󰇛󰇜󰇛
󰇜
5. Discussion and Recommendation
5.1. Discussion
From the last tableau, see Appendix 2, we
observed that the optimal objective function,
which was to maximize the inverse of the value
of the game, was 0.652. We know that player A’s
interest was to minimize losses (1/V), which was
the same as maximizing the inverse of (1/V).
Therefore, the value of the game is 1.5337.
Again, the strategies for the political parties are
the primal decision variables which were
represented by yi’s, and the strategies for INEC
which were the dual decision variables were
represented by xi’s. These decision variables are
the strategies, see the summary of parties’ and
INEC’s strategies in Appendix 3. Both players
applied their mixed strategies in various
proportions. We should note that the mixed
strategies are the probabilities of applying each
strategy over a given proportion of time. The
application of mixed strategies keeps the
opponent guessing on which strategy should be
used. Mixed strategy has an advantage over pure
strategy because each player has multiple
choices of which strategy to choose, while pure
strategy uses only one strategy. A complex
system such as Nigeria's electoral system and
politicking requires mixed strategies which were
exactly applied by each player to win the
election. We also noticed from Appendix 3 that
the sum of the strategies for both political parties
and INEC is unity (that is, one) respectively.
This corresponds to the law of probability which
states that the sum of probabilities of an event is
one.
From the parties’ and INEC’s strategy summary
table in Appendix 3, we interpret as follows: The
value of each probability determines the
magnitude of application of each strategy by
INEC and political parties. Therefore, for any of
the political parties to be successful in the
election, she must apply: party structure up to
19.54% of the time; manifesto up to 20.18% of
the time; campaign up to 19.05% of the time;
people’s perception of the political party up to
20.26% of the time; vote from electorate up to
19.54% of the time and acceptable candidate up
International Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics & Computer Science
DOI: 10.37394/232028.2024.4.2
Harrison Obiora Amuji,
Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
E-ISSN: 2769-2477
21
Volume 4, 2024
to 1.43% of the time. On the other hand, for
INEC to effectively perform her statutory
responsibility, she must apply electoral law up to
18.71% of the time; electoral guidelines up to
19.99% of the time; prosecute electoral
offenders up to 16.87% of the time; cancel
election up to 23.14% of the time, inconclusive
election up to 19.19% of the time and declaration
of results up to 2.10% of the time. The above is
also interpreted as the amount of time and effort
needed to be devoted to each of these strategies.
The political parties and INEC combine these
strategies in different proportions to beat their
opponents.
5.2. Conclusion
In this paper, we carry out a study on the
application of game theory in the Nigerian
electoral system. In the competitive game, each
player, political parties, and INEC play more
than one strategy and hence, they adopt mixed
strategies. The advantage of playing a mixed
strategy is that the players keep guessing what
the next move of the opponent would be. The
political parties compete for the electorate's vote
while INEC regulates the game. INEC has six
strategies and political parties also have six
strategies that they apply in various proportions.
The data for the study was collected from the
official publication of INEC results from six
major political parties in the February 25th
presidential election in Nigeria. The total vote
for each political party was used to generate the
cost matrix alongside the weighted strategies.
Each political party was assigned a column in the
cost matrix and the weights on each strategy
were applied to generate the game (cost) matrix.
From this study, we conclude that there is a need
to adopt the scientific method (Game theory) in
our electoral system for optimal performance
against the current haphazard, rigging, and
imposition of candidates who cannot naturally
win elections. There should be further study in
this area of application of game theory in the
electoral system but in a slightly different
direction. Since there is cooperation among
members of each political party, more work
should be done on cooperative game theory in
conjunction with the zero-sum game which we
considered in this paper because cooperative
game or a combination of both could provide a
better model for the electoral system.
5.3. Recommendations
From this research, we recommend that:
(1). Game theory should be adopted and applied
by political parties for optimal benefits.
(2). The electoral body should adopt and apply
game theory to maintain its integrity and give
legitimacy to whoever wins the election.
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Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
E-ISSN: 2769-2477
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Volume 4, 2024
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International Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics & Computer Science
DOI: 10.37394/232028.2024.4.2
Harrison Obiora Amuji,
Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
E-ISSN: 2769-2477
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Contribution of Individual Authors to the
Creation of a Scientific Article (Ghostwriting
Policy)
The authors equally contributed in the present
research, at all stages from the formulation of the
problem to the final findings and solution.
Sources of Funding for Research Presented in a
Scientific Article or Scientific Article Itself
No funding was received for conducting this study.
Conflict of Interest
The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare
that are relevant to the content of this article.
Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0
(Attribution 4.0 International, CC BY 4.0)
This article is published under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en
_US
Appendix 1
Table3. Total votes obtained by each political party in the presidential election, 2023
POLITICAL PARTIES
APC
PDP
LP
ANPP
APGA
AA
VOTES OBTAINED
8,794,726
6,984,520
6,101,533
1,496,671
1,236,215
1,106,102
Source: em.m.wikipedia.org; 2023 Nigerian presidential election.
Table 4. The proportion of votes obtained by each political party based on Table 2&3
INEC (B)
PARTIES (A)
a(1)
b(2)
c(3)
d(4)
e(5)
f(6)
k(1)
1846893
1466749
1281322
314301
259605
232281
l(2)
1143314
907988
793199
194567
160708
143793
m(3)
1758945
1396904
1220307
299334
247243
221220
n(4)
1055367
838142
732184
179601
148346
132732
0(5)
2022787
1606440
1403352
344234
284330
254404
p(6)
967420
768297
671169
164634
135983
121672
TOTAL
8794726
6984520
6101533
1496671
1236215
1106102
Source: Researchers, 2023
International Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics & Computer Science
DOI: 10.37394/232028.2024.4.2
Harrison Obiora Amuji,
Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
E-ISSN: 2769-2477
24
Volume 4, 2024
Appendix 2
Solving the resulting Linear programming problem using the simplex method, we have,
BASIC
Z
Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Y5
Y6
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
RHS
Z
1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
S1
0
1846893
1466749
1281322
314301
259605
232281
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
S2
0
1143314
907988
793199
194567
160708
143793
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
S3
0
1758945
1396904
1220307
299334
247243
221220
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
S4
0
1055367
838142
732184
179601
148346
132732
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
S5
0
2022787
1606440
1403352
344234
284330
254404
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
S6
0
967420
768297
671169
164634
135983
121672
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
There are six iterations involved to arrive at the optimal tableau; hence, the final tableau is
Basic
Z
Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Y5
Y6
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
RHS
Z
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0.1220
-0.1304
-0.1100
0.1509
0.1251
0.0136
0.652
Y5
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
-0.5836
-1.1276
0.6263
0.5281
0.690
-0.710
-0.1274
Y4
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
-0.251
1.1171
-1.1209
1.5842
-0.431
0.371
0.1321
Y3
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
-0.6673
-0.7553
1.2527
0.0561
-0.121
0.0805
-0.1242
Y2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
-0.3346
1.4895
-0.4945
0.1123
-0.242
0.1609
0.1316
Y1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0.9163
-0.6276
-0.3736
-0.472
0.190
-0.210
-0.1274
Y6
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
-0.5001
-0.5001
-4.4E-06
7.5E-06
0.5001
0.5001
0.0093
International Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics & Computer Science
DOI: 10.37394/232028.2024.4.2
Harrison Obiora Amuji,
Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
E-ISSN: 2769-2477
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Volume 4, 2024
Appendix 3.
Summary of Parties’ and INEC’s strategies
Party’s Strategies
yi
INEC’s Strategies
xi
k = Party structure (y1)
0.1954
a = Electoral law (x1)
0.1871
l = Manifestoes (y2)
0.2018
b = Electoral guideline (x2)
0.1999
m = Campaign (y3)
0.1905
c = Prosecuting electoral offenders (x3)
0.1687
n = People’s perception (y4)
0.2026
d = Cancelling election (x4)
0.2314
o = Vote from the electorate (y5)
0.1954
e = Inconclusive election (x5)
0.1919
p = Acceptable candidate (y6)
0.0143
f = Declaration of electoral result (x6)
0.021
Total
1
Total
1
International Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics & Computer Science
DOI: 10.37394/232028.2024.4.2
Harrison Obiora Amuji,
Donatus Eberechukwu Onwuegbuchunam,
Bridget Nwanyibuife Okechukwu,
Kenneth Okechukwu Okeke, Kennedy Kelenna Okere
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