Reacting to a Large-Scale UNK-UNK during Its Initial Onset:

Fast Response and Retrospective Sensemaking in South Korea

THOMAS Y. CHOI1, DAESOO KIM2, SEUNG HO YOO3*

1W. P. Carey School of Business,

Arizona State University,

Tempe, AZ 85287-4706,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

2Department of Logistics, Service & Operations Management,

Korea University Business School,

Anam-dong, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, 02841,

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

3School of Interdisciplinary Industrial Studies,

Hanyang University,

222 Wangsimni-ro, Seongdong-gu, Seoul, 04763,

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

*Corresponding Author

Abstract: - This study addresses how a nation may cope with a large unknow-unknown event with looming

uncertainty. We focus on Korea’s response to the onslaught of COVID-19. Although Korea’s response was fast

and immediate, it was also incremental and disjointed. This study aims to provide a structured understanding of

the confusing state of early responses. We adopt the theory-building approach based on case studies and use

newspaper articles and government press releases as the primary sources of data. We develop a grounded

theoretical model as evidence and use the enactment theory to explain the underlying empirical and theoretical

dynamics.

Key-Words: - fast response, incremental changes, sensemaking, grounded theoretical model, enactment theory,

COVID-19.

Received: April 28, 2023. Revised: November 16, 2023. Accepted: November 29, 2023. Published: December 15, 2023.

1 Introduction

As nations slowly emerge from the effects of

COVID-19, scholars are asking what we may have

learned from this large unknow-unknown (unk-unk)

event, [1], [2]. They pose how we would respond if

another one descended on us again. To address these

important questions, we go back to the early months

of COVID-19 and study how one government with

its citizens coped with the onslaught of the virus.

As, [3], point out, this unk-unk event affected entire

societies. If so, governments should seriously devise

ways to actively solve such problems that affect the

entire society, [4]. Our goal is to offer one model for

how a nation might respond in the future if another

large unk-unk happens again.

The fundamental lesson is that we will not

be able to act coherently and that is to be

expected. Planning cannot lead to responding

because much is unknown and unproven, [5].

The responses at best can happen incrementally

albeit haphazardly. The critical element here is

that the responses need to make sense to rally

the public, and that involves what, [6], [7] has

called “retrospective sensemaking,” where

action leads to thinking. And that is how South

Korea responded. We study the process of early

responses in a grounded theory approach using

major incidents during the early months as

cases.

Among the countries affected early by

COVID-19, Korea is considered one of the

countries that responded comparatively well. In

fact, by February 22, 2021, the confirmed cases

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in Korea were only 0.17% of the total

population, compared to 1.43% worldwide and

8.66% in the U.S., [8]. The real gross domestic

product (GDP) growth of Korea in 2020 was -

1.1%, compared to -3.7% in the U.S., -7.5% in

the European areas, and -4.2% worldwide, [9].

Many media outlets at the time recognized

Korea’s response to COVID-19 as exemplary,

[10], [11], [12]. Theoretically, the early months

after the onset of such a major unk-unk event

would imply the highest level of uncertainty.

According to, [13], the COVID-19 pandemic

was, by far, different from other crises that

occurred in terms of cause, scope, and severity.

Similar to other countries, the Korean

government faced a series of COVID-19-related

crises, and preparation for a disruption of this

magnitude was simply not possible. What

appeared to have happened was reacting as best

as they could to changing conditions that they

had little control over. The responses were

incremental and reactive with various degrees

of successes and failures, [14]. In general, the

government (i.e., KCDC) responded fast to the

emerging crises. The literature discusses pali

pali, roughly translated as quickly-quickly, as a

cultural trait wherein Koreans would react fast

to impending problems no matter the cost,

including personal sacrifices, [15]. In addition,

the effective response to the nationwide crisis

involved cooperation between the government

and the industries and public. Therefore, we aim

to answer the following questions:

RQ1. What are the underlying mechanisms

for Korea’s fast response to the onslaught of

COVID-19?

RQ2: How has the government worked with

the industries and general public in its response

to emerging incidental crises?

To answer these questions, we focus on

three streams of research. First, we search for

research related to managing change, [16], [17],

to investigate how the government works with

the public to help make sense during crises, [14].

Second, research on disaster responses and

humanitarian operations management in the

operations management field has focused on

natural and human-made disasters, such as

hurricanes, earthquakes, and large-scale fires,

[18], [19]. Their main focus during disasters has

been on efficient responses by coordinating

with various stakeholders, [18], mobilization of

resources, [20], and timely sharing of

information, [21]. Third, the literature on

strategic change has investigated how decisions

and changes are made, [6], [22], [23]. This body

of literature evaluates decisions and changes

made in small steps under bounded rationality,

[24], [25], and in search of adaptation, [26].

2 Literature Review

Disasters caused by an epidemic are different

from other types of disasters. In the case of

COVID-19, the virus propagated with human

movements causing disruptions. The impact

tended to be more prolonged with ripple effects

across supply chains, [27], where many entities

are interconnected, [28], [29], [30]. Unlike

other disasters, epidemic outbreaks develop and

spread over vast geographic areas quickly, [31],

requiring timely and continual adaptation

against uncertainty and ambiguity.

2.1 Reactive and Adaptive Changes

During an epidemic crisis, changes are generally

made in a forced manner with limited scope to

provide immediate response, [17]. Time pressures

are enormous, [32], and decision behaviors must

cope with added stress under time pressure.

Protocols for policy-making and problem-solving

generally allow muddling through, [22], [23] and

incrementalism, [26], [33], [34], which promote

selective responses to be able to adapt to disruptions

with minimal predictability, [35], [36].

Thus, changes during pandemic situations

should be made immediately. Events change

quickly, and new information emerges. In particular,

responses can be formulated complementing the

routines and structures of emergency management,

[37], and selective adaptations are then made to

specialized circumstances surrounding crises. As

argued by, [18], the shifting situations in

humanitarian disasters require humanitarian

organizations to continuously adapt their operations.

Natural and human-made disasters usually occur

in certain geographic areas and time scopes.

However, pandemic outbreaks start at a certain time

point and continue for a much longer period with

changing situations. Despite this gap, the

distinguishing aspect of how responses are

constructed in the dynamic interplay between the

environment and actions has been rarely explored.

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In this regard, to suppress public anxiety and help

them make sense of how they are adapting to

emerging situations, managing general opinions

through uncertain times becomes important.

How certain groups influence the understanding

of emerging issues has been investigated in research

on the social processes of organizational

sensemaking, [38]. [16], examine the process of

strategic change and assert that the leader’s primary

role during change is sensemaking. The news media

often play a critical role in interpreting a disaster

and shaping post-crisis sensemaking, thereby

maintaining institutions, [39], [40]. Greater visibility

of situational information in the environment

impacts outcomes mainly by affecting the actions of

decision-makers and perceptions regarding

behaviors and task priority of others, [41]. Further,

transparency and communication reduce uncertainty

in the sensemaking of supply risk signals, [5], [42],

[43], and help the firms and public regain trust and

reduce unnecessary fear during pandemic crises,

[14].

2.2 Disaster Response Management

Extant literature on disaster management,

particularly humanitarian operations management,

has focused on natural and man-made disasters,

[44], [45]. Such disasters result in changing

situations, volatile information, and interplay among

diverse stakeholders. Consequently, humanitarian

organizations are under pressure to continuously

adapt their operations, [18].

2.2.1 Responding to Oncoming Disaster

An understanding of existing conditions is crucial

for an effective response during a disaster by

collecting timely information, [21]. Therefore,

information management in terms of infrastructure,

supply of resources, and needs is also crucial, [46].

In particular, information plays a central role as a

driver of adaptive decisions, [18].

Well-coordinated interactions and collaboration

support among various entities (e.g., governments,

industrial companies, and individuals) can lead to

synergies and can improve humanitarian outcomes,

[47]. These are possible through mobile networks

and wireless communications, [48]. To enhance

operational performance, collaboration is

instrumental among various stakeholders, from

federal and local governments to private companies,

to professionals and the public, [19], [20]. Hence,

intergroup leadership becomes important, [49]. In

addition, humanitarian operations should adapt to

the changing demands and needs of the people

through capacity and resource allocations, [50],

[51].

The literature on pandemic disaster response

(e.g., MERS and COVID-19) has focused on

coordination and collaboration, [52], risk

communication, [53], and quick and agile responses,

[14], [31], from the public administration

perspective. [54], introduce two mechanisms,

namely, contagion frame and civic capacity, to

explain why some communities are more resilient

than others when coping with epidemic crises. They

assert that the reason why some communities can

adapt better is due to a diverse non-profit sector

leading the community with significant civic

capacity.

2.2.2 Fast Operations Response

Flexibility, agility, and responsiveness have been

advocated widely in humanitarian operations, [18].

Fast disaster response operations require rapid

collection of well-aligned data and sharing of timely

information, swift mobilization and supply of

resources, and agile deployment and implementation

of processes.

First, the timely collection of information is

crucial for understanding emerging situations, [55],

and this information can be collected using big data

analytics, [56], [57]. Timely sharing of relevant

information is critical for those directly affected to

coordinate actions, [3], [58]. Risk communication

can be conducted through network news coverage,

[59], social media networks, [58], and blockchain

technology, [57].

Second, fast operations response requires rapid

mobilization and transfer of resources to the

location of a disaster through responder networks;

these responder networks typically comprise

members of affected communities, professional first

responders, local organizations, and informal

community organizations, [20]. Specifically,

response time is critical when matching institutional

resources and resilience capabilities to disasters, and

the ability to surge in response is a primary feature

of organizations that have frontline responsibilities,

[60]. Resources include disaster relief forces, [55],

healthcare service professionals, [19], and life goods

and materials, [61], [62].

2.3 Incremental Decision-Making and

Change

Crisis management is a special type of change

management, [17], that focuses on incremental

responses. The incremental approach becomes the

primary support during a crisis of unpredictable

changes; however, during a time of stability, the

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synoptic approach may be the main foundation,

[63], anchored in the comprehensive analytical

framework, [64].

The muddling-through concept states that

decision-making is more productive when taken in

small increments, [22], [23], [65]. This decision-

making approach considers the limitations of

humans’ cognitive abilities when facing complex

and imminent problems, [22], [23], [66].

Incrementalism emanates from a search for options

in successive and limited comparisons, resulting in

mutual adjustments based on what is practical and

what is possible, [22], [67]. In muddling-through

incrementalism, [22], [23], the disjointed

incrementalism restricts analysis to a few familiar

policy alternatives and, thus, explores the potential

consequences through a series of trials and

revisions, [67], leading to “incrementalism

adaptation”, [26]. Bounded rationality, [66], [68]

advocates problem simplification, time constraints,

physical constraints, and information overload, [25].

The logic in incremental approaches involves

learning by doing, [22], [68]. In particular, the

muddling-through incrementalism requires a

cognitive process, [31], [66], a collective managerial

cognition results in enactment, selection, and

retention processes, [6]. Here, strategy is considered

a pattern in a stream of organizational activities as

an adaptation process, [69]. It relies on empirical

assumptions regarding how decision-makers act

within cognitive constraints in their work

environment and, hence, provides recommendations

when problems encountered are complex, [63].

3 Methodology

We adopted a case study approach. Following, [70],

we compiled cases that provide information on how

Korea responded to major incidental crises in the

early months of 2020 (i.e., from January to July).

Then, we inductively analyzed the cases for

common patterns across the compiled cases. We

then apply the Gioia method, [71], to conduct the

cross-case analysis. The primary outcome of the

cross-case analysis is the grounded theoretical

model that comprises all key dimensions from the

cases, [72]. This grounded theoretical model was

developed in three steps: surveying to identify cases,

data collection and compilation, and data analysis

through within-case and cross-case analyses.

3.1 Exploratory Survey to Select Cases

The initial survey aims to identify the incidental

crises that threaten the well-being of the general

public in Korea. We selected students and

professors as our respondents from two major

universities in Korea. The student respondents were

from undergraduate and full-time MBA programs

and part-time EMBA programs who have day jobs.

A web-based survey was conducted, and 71

responses were collected from May 26 to 30, 2020.

In the survey, we requested them to write about

three incidental crises that occurred in Korea due to

COVID-19 that they consider most critical. To

minimize possible ambiguity, we explicitly provided

them the definition of incidental crisis as “a serious

threat to the well-being (health, education, work,

leisure, etc.) of the general public living in Korea,

and individual, organizational, or government

responses are required to address it.”

3.2 Identification of Cases

Three incidental crises are offered in each of the 71

respondents, with a total of 213 results. Five crises

are distinguished immediately in terms of

frequency. We decided to add two more crises, one

involving the situation in Korea immediately

preceding the onset of COVID-19 and another

involving the first, known infected patient. We

intended to investigate more comprehensively the

responses toward incidental crises from the

beginning.

We compiled seven cases that reflect the most

important crises, which are prologue, patient 1,

Daegu mass infection, the great mask ordeal,

adapting K-12 education, managing the new

arrivals, and a perfect storm in Itaewon. Table 1

shows the duration of each case, data amount, and

short descriptions, which is similar to the table

presented by, [73].

Table 1. Selected cases

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3.3 Data Collection

Our research aims to investigate the responses to

these incidental crises. We collected data from

newspaper articles, [73], to gather information with

details of what happened. The newspaper articles

offer the sequence of events and responses in

chronological order. To triangulate the data, we

compiled multiple newspaper articles associated

with each case. To further increase rigor in our

research as highlighted in, [71], we collected data

from government press releases, [74]. The press

releases were also used to gauge how the

government exercised its leadership by keeping the

industries and public informed and helping them

cope with the emerging crisis.

We used NAVER, the largest Internet portal site

in Korea, to retrieve newspaper articles for each

case (see https://news.naver.com/). We searched

news articles by combining appropriate keywords

for each case. For example, for the third case that

involves the city of Daegu, we used “Daegu” and

“COVID-19” (or “corona”). Thereafter, we

compiled the news articles in chronological order,

from the start of an incidental crisis to the date when

the three authors agreed the crisis was deemed

resolved. The duration of each case, as presented in

Table 1, generally overlaps with the dates of news

articles for each case. The government press

releases for each case were collected from the

websites of various Korean government agencies.

We compiled the government press releases along

with newspaper articles in chronological order, and

this approach was repeated for each case.

3.4 Data Analysis

3.4.1 Within-case Descriptions and Analysis

We first organized the content in bullet points in

Korean, and then the case was written in English.

Each case description consists of two parts: the

response action (i.e., what actions and behaviors

took place) and the government’s strategies to

manage the general opinion (i.e., how the

government used press releases and press

conferences to ensure that the general public is

informed). Table 1 lists the number of articles used

for each case.

After writing the descriptions of the seven

cases, in accordance with the procedure in, [70],

and, [75], we conducted the within-case analysis to

identify key event observations that capture the

response actions to address the crisis and

government strategies to manage the public opinion.

Subsequently, we highlighted key observations from

the seven cases and annotated them. We identified

72 key observations for the response action and 29

for the government strategy.

3.4.2 Cross-case Analysis

To build the overarching theoretical framework, we

adopted the approach recommended by, [71]. We

identified key observations that appear in multiple

cases (i.e., two or more cases). These become the

first-order categories as per the Gioia method. Then,

we grouped these first-order categories into second-

order practices (themes) following the practice of,

[71], and, [72]. We compiled a total of 13 second-

order practices for the response action and 4 for the

government strategy. Finally, six overarching

dimensions for the common response action and two

for the common government strategy were distilled

from the second-order practices.

The grounded theoretical model was built on the

overarching dimensions as stipulated in the Gioia

method, [71]. The three authors met virtually via

teleconferencing at least once a week for 1–2 hours

from April 1, 2020, to March 9, 2021. In total, we

met 49 times for 60.5 hours by mid-March of 2021.

We reached a consensus iteratively through a series

of discussions to ensure the credibility of our

findings, [70]. Overall, the systematic approach

based on, [70], and, [71], allowed us to generate a

theory of managing a nationwide crisis in Korea at

the very onset of the COVID-19 pandemic when

uncertainty would be the highest.

4 Within-Case Descriptions

The seven cases reflect the incidental crises that

Korea encountered during the first 6 months of the

COVID-19 pandemic. In each case, a figure (Figure

1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6,

Figure 7) is presented to capture the basic

progression of activities in the case. After the figure,

the case description focuses on how the government

helped the general public make sense of what was

going on. (Cases have been reduced to shorten the

paper length. The full annotated cases are available

upon request.)

4.1 CASE 1 Prologue: Devising New

Processes for Imminent Invasion of the

Virus

On December 31, 2019, China reported a novel

pneumonia-like viral disease in Wuhan to the World

Health Organization (WHO). The next day, the

Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

(KCDC) instituted the process of testing a patient

with similar symptoms and subsequent information

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dissemination. The KCDC formed a task force, two

days later, on the “Pneumonia of Unknown Cause”

to provide 24/7 response.

On January 7, 2020, the first suspected case was

identified. This person was examined using new

processes that had, by then, been established by the

KCDC. At that time, testing took about 1 week, and

the results for that person returned negative. Thus,

this first suspected case was considered a rehearsal

for the new testing processes. On January 8, the

KCDC issued a press release about this suspected

patient and its testing process. On January 13, the

KCDC received viral genetic sequencing

information released by the Chinese government

through a publication. Using this information,

Korean medical researchers developed a testing

approach that would yield results much faster, in

only 6 hours, using real-time gene amplification

testing (RT-PCR). This new testing approach was

subsequently released throughout the country

starting on January 31.

Fig. 1: Devising New Processes

The KCDC became the focal point in

disseminating information to the general public.

Without disclosing the identity of the first suspected

patient, the agency informed the public regarding

the details of the patient’s travel routes, what test

was performed, how long the test would take, and

the results. Further, the KCDC informed the general

public how they were requesting information from

the Chinese government for the genetic codes of the

virus. Certainly, they made sure to let the public

know when the results of the testing came out a few

days earlier than the communicated expectation of 1

week. The KCDC also informed the general public

that they expected to further reduce the testing time

to a few hours.

4.2 CASE 2 Patient 1: The Inevitable

On January 3, an enhanced screening process was

implemented for all airplane passengers arriving in

Korea. All these passengers were subject to thermal

scanning, but additional medical screening was

required for those from Wuhan, China. On January

19, a woman arriving at Incheon International

Airport from Wuhan was identified, by thermal

scanning, too. Thus, in-depth testing and contact

tracing were then conducted. A medical team

worked overnight to test this patient fever’s samples

using the new RT-PCR viral testing system, and the

result was positive.

The next morning, the patient was announced as

Patient 1. The Korean government raised its alert

level from Blue to Yellow—from the first to the

second level out of a four-level national crisis-

management system. On that same day, viral testing

was conducted on all passengers who were on the

same flight with Patient 1 and the flight crew. They

were then placed under surveillance for 14 days.

In the afternoon of that day, the KCDC held an

urgent press conference and confirmed the presence

of Patient 1. By the evening, the city of Incheon,

where the airport is located, had kickstarted its own

24/7 task force to respond to the possible existence

of any potential cases. One staff would be assigned

to each new suspected patient.

On January 21, a separate entry point was

created by the management of Incheon International

Airport for all passengers from Wuhan. Further, the

management doubled the frequency of disinfection

at ports of entry and expanded the target areas of

disinfection on moving walkways, escalators,

drinking fountains, etc. After 18 days of medical

treatment, Patient 1 was discharged and sent home

to Wuhan.

Fig. 2: Responses to Patient 1

After Patient 1 was identified, the KCDC held a

press conference within hours and provided a

detailed explanation of the process and how other

passengers were being tested and quarantined. The

Prime Minister was involved in communicating that

same day to the general public, and various regional

governments responded. Through their

announcements, the KCDC was also attempting to

educate the public about the virus. They also

disclosed how they were doing the epidemiological

tracking and tracing of the potentially asymptomatic

travelers.

4.3 CASE 3 Daegu Mass Infection: Speed

and Reach

Over the following month since the existence of

Patient 1, cases of COVID-19 were isolated.

However, with the emergence of Patient 31, the

situation became intense as this patient was a

member of a religious sect called Shincheonji, based

in the southern city of Daegu. Up until then, new

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cases were identified one or two at a time. With the

31st case, conditions tumbled into a mass infection.

When Patient 31 was first diagnosed as a

COVID-19 case, this initially seemed like an

ordinary, isolated case. However, during a routine

epidemiological tracing process, the medical

investigators found that she was a member of

Shincheonji and had been in close proximity to

other members. Sensing a potential mass infection,

the KCDC acted on this case quickly.

Patient 31 checked herself into a public health

clinic at about 4 pm on February 17. Then, at 11 pm,

she was diagnosed with potential COVID-19 and

was admitted to Daegu Medical Center. In the

following morning at 5 am, she was confirmed to

have COVID-19. The epidemiological tracing

revealed she had participated in 2-hour Shincheonji

worship services multiple times during the past

week. Officials noted that the manner of their

worship involved sitting shoulder-to-shoulder with

other members. At 10 am that morning, the KCDC

issued a press release, disclosing the potential

implications for mass infection. Reactions by

Shincheonji and the Daegu government were swift.

On that same day around 2 pm, the Shincheonji

leadership issued an official communication that all

meetings would halt immediately. At 3 pm, the

Daegu government announced that all major event

locations that this patient had visited recently would

be shut down, and everyone who had attended the

same events should be placed in quarantine.

However, tensions intensified between the

government and the Shincheonji leadership, as the

government demanded that Shincheonji submit its

complete member list but the leadership refused.

Eventually, they gave in and released the member

list, and the KCDC used that list to reach out to all

members and conduct massive tracing

investigations. To handle a large number of tests,

the government called for volunteers. Many citizens

not only from the Daegu area but also from other

distant parts of the country have volunteered.

Negotiations between the Korean government

and Shincheonji leadership occurred at many levels.

On the side of the government, wide-ranging

officials were involved: from the local public health

clinic and Daegu City government to the Ministry of

the Interior and Safety, Central Disaster and Safety

Countermeasures Headquarters, the Prime Minister,

and eventually the President. On the side of

Shincheonji, the senior clergy subsequently issued a

personal apology to the public and performed a

traditional symbolic bow of submission on

television.

Fig. 3: Massive Infection and Massive Tracing

As the country moved to an uncharted territory

of mass infection, the KCDC kept the citizens

informed of the progress. The government seemed

to take advantage of the negative public sentiment

of Shincheonji. In particular, it released information

on how they were forcing this religious sect to

disclose its membership list. Prime Minister Chung

issued a call for volunteers to help with the severe

shortages of workers at testing sites. The

government continued informing the general public

on how they were tracing individual sect members

when new information was found. The government

highlighted that the city of Daegu would not be

locked down as it was confident of its tracing

capability. Further, the central government

emphasized that it was increasing its financial

subsidy to Daegu and sending additional medical

staff to the city.

4.4 CASE 4 The Great Mask Ordeal:

Reacting but not Giving Up to React

In general, Koreans have long used masks as a first

line of defense against infection and pollution.

Manufacturers in the country had already been

developing high-quality masks to guard against the

microscopic dust blowing into Korea from China

every spring. With COVID-19, the demand for such

high-quality masks became particularly critical.

Toward the end of January 2020, the mask demand

increased by almost 1,000%, and pricing jumped

eight times on some online markets. Another major

concern was the hoarding of masks by some

merchants who intended to export them to China at

premium prices. Many Koreans refer to the mask

supply shortage at this time as the Great Mask

Ordeal.

Despite the severity of this problem, it seems

that no coherent strategy was developed to address

it. The government, instead, provided a series of

knee-jerk responses, and none of these seemed to

mitigate the problem. There were announcements of

imprisonment and fines for unfair mask trade

practices, extensions of labor hours at mask

manufacturers, first limitations and then prohibitions

of mask exports, imposition of a new reporting

system on mask manufacturers, and a mask-

rationing system.

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Although the responses were reactive and

incremental, they did not stop coming. In a sense,

the government was quite tenacious, continually

trying one thing after another. From the upstream

side of the supply chain, the government

procurement office expanded the quantity of its

mask procurement from 50% to 80% of the total

national production. On the downstream side, the

government imposed a more sophisticated rationing

system. It first limited purchases per citizen to two

masks per week. Then, it allocated different days in

the week for each citizen. However, weekend

purchases were allowed for those who could not

purchase masks during the week.

Two other types of organizations showed their

efforts to alleviate the mask shortage in addition to

the government. The first type involved large

Korean conglomerates. For example, Samsung

engaged several mask manufacturers in supplier

development to help them gain over 50% efficiency

in their production. The second type was the

professional associations of pharmacists. In Korea,

most of the masks in the rationing system were sold

through local pharmacies, and the pharmacists

collaborated closely with the government to provide

information for mobile applications that would track

mask inventory levels and communicate their

availability to citizens.

Mask distribution became more stable by April

2020. Hence, the government started to dispose of

or adjust its initiatives. Unlike how haphazardly it

reacted previously to the mask shortage, the phasing

out seemed to take place in a much more orderly

way. By May 2020, the government had released the

ban on exporting masks. Further, it disbanded the

rationing system in the first week of June 2020. The

public procurement office reduced the mandatory

supply level imposed on mask manufacturers from

80% to 60%. The number of allowed weekly mask

purchases per citizen was increased from 2 to 10. By

mid-July, the government had completely

discontinued the government-controlled mask

distribution, yielding control to market-driven

distribution.

Fig. 4: Responding Haphazardly but Phasing Out

Orderly

The government never really had a coherent

strategy for the mask distribution, which eventually

led to President Moon’s public apology to the

nation. In early January, the KCDC recommended

the use of masks, and they even distributed free

masks in Seoul, which has a large population

concentration. However, toward the end of January,

the government started to control the distribution of

masks. It urged manufacturers to produce more

masks and issued policies against raising prices and

hoarding. In particular, it punished online market

sites for related violations. Toward the end of

February, the government stopped all exports of

masks, and it began operating under the rationing

policies and even issued apologies when their

responses were not effective. Then, the government

adjusted its policies for more consistent operations

of the rationing system. In March, more detailed

plans for rationing were published to the general

public, and the mismatch between demand and

supply of masks began to decline in April.

4.5 CASE 5 Adapting the K-12 Education:

Toward a New Normal

The academic year in Korea begins with the spring

semester. After the outbreak of COVID-19, all K-12

schools needed to prepare for a switch to online

education. In March 2020, the Ministry of

Education (MOE) postponed the opening of the

spring semester by 1 week. As COVID-19 cases

continued to spread, the MOE kept rescheduling the

opening day, eventually into April. The MOE

launched an online information platform called

“School On” to help teachers get ready for online

teaching. The MOE also instituted online teaching

policies and opened a forum for teachers, students,

and parents. Regional governments also provided

hardware and software support to schools that

required additional help. Further, several

corporations participated in supporting less

privileged schools and students, by donating tablets

and providing free Internet access.

Finally, the first-ever fully online school

opening for all students, except kindergarteners, was

set for a phased launching from April 9 to April

20—with the initial opening for the senior high

classes, followed by lower classes. The intent was to

give younger students more time to familiarize the

new learning environment. Although it was

supposed to be a historic opening, things did not

work out quite as planned. On the opening day,

online school servers became unstable, and students

experienced difficulty logging in. The Education

Broadcasting System (EBS) and Korea Education

Research Information Service had been working

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hard to provide enough bandwidth, but this problem

became apparent. The EBS then worked with IT

corporations to test the system and expand its

communications infrastructure. Additional IT

companies, such as SK Telecom, KT, and LG U+,

along with the Ministry of Science and Technology

(MST), joined the effort to improve the stability and

security of the online education system. By the time

the last group of students joined on April 20, the

system had become stable.

In May 2020, the MOE announced that it

promoted both in-person and online education,

setting limits on the student count per classroom.

However, social distancing, sanitization of common

areas and surfaces, face coverings, classroom air

circulation, staggered break times, and temperature

monitoring were still closely implemented. The

MOE also provided parents the right to switch to

homeschooling. After waiting for another week,

students began coming back to school on May 20.

Despite these precautions, there was a surge of

new COVID-19 cases in different areas throughout

the country by the end of May. The opening of

school campuses, which were still in progress when

this surge occurred, was halted in many schools.

However, the MOE’s position remained in favor of

opening the schools to provide both on-campus and

online education. In June and July, many schools

seemed to be fumbling along whether they continue

or halt campus reopening. In late July, as schools

moved toward summer recess, the rate of new

COVID-19 cases decreased. Thus, the schools had

settled down and adjusted to the new normal: using

both in-classes and online classes.

Fig. 5: Ex-ante Programs and Ex-post Responses

As K-12 students were getting ready for the

school opening, the government issued a series of

press releases on how to deal with COVID-19. It

eventually postponed the opening dates and used the

remaining days to prepare the teachers for the online

programs and ensure that the necessary tools and

supplies were ready. Much planning went into

preparing, and the general public was kept informed

as school opening dates were repeatedly pushed out.

Moreover, new policies about online teaching were

instituted as the preparations were ongoing. These

preparations ranged from cyber security issues to

lessons for disabled students. After the opening-day

system fiasco, the schools were beginning to operate

with their online classes. Soon, many schools began

bringing students on campus, but then they closed

down again as the infection rate increased. Opening

up and closing down of schools were repeated, and

the hybrid approach that involves both online and

in-person teachings was emerging as the new

normal.

4.6 CASE 6 Managing the New Arrivals:

Isolate and Conquer

The battle in Korea against COVID-19 was being

waged on two fronts—containing the pandemic

internally and managing new arrivals to the country.

People were arriving constantly through airports and

seaports of the country. Korea never locked down

its international borders through the early months of

the pandemic. In the government’s “isolate-and-

conquer” strategy, targets are stratified, isolated, and

controlled. Some aspects of this approach worked,

but others did not.

Arrivals were stratified by their points of origin.

Initially, arrivals from Wuhan were isolated and

examined separately upon arrival, and this was then

expanded to all flights from China. Eventually,

isolation included several other countries, such as

Japan, Iran, and Italy. For these arrivals, a

mandatory self-diagnosis smartphone app was

supplied, and they were required to report their

health condition, twice a day, for 14 days. To

accommodate different types of passengers, entry

points were also stratified into two groups—airports

and seaports. For example, the Incheon International

Airport handles passengers from many different

international points of departure, while the Incheon

Seaport and Busan Seaport mostly handle cargo

ships and crews arriving on those ships.

Being able to trace potentially infected

individuals was an integral part of this isolate-and-

conquer strategy. Therefore, the Korean government

decided not to apply a quid-pro-quo policy to

countries that had blocked arrivals from Korea.

They reasoned that, even if they blocked passengers

from those countries, the passengers could use

improper channels to enter the country. Then, the

government would lose the ability to track and

control those individuals. Upon entry, passengers

with symptoms and those without were stratified.

Those passengers with symptoms were considered

more controllable because they were definite

entities. However, those without symptoms were

trickier to handle because some of them could still

be potential carriers. Therefore, all passengers

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without symptoms were subjected to testing that

required a waiting period of 10 hours to 1 day. If

testing returned positive, then separate

transportation to a quarantine location was offered

for further isolation. Looking ahead, the Incheon

Airport launched a post-COVID-19 task force that

began using big data and artificial intelligence (AI)

to position itself as an airport with a reputation for

“smart prevention.”

Fig. 6: Stratifying Arrivals and Processing

Strategies

The government issued press releases on how

they were dealing with arrivals from different

countries. In particular, all passengers arriving from

China were required to provide a mobile phone

number to track them. The government also

developed a mobile phone application for self-

monitoring and reporting for all suspected arrivals.

As the cases in Japan increased, the government

issued a similar policy for the arrivals from there

and then expanded this policy to European

countries. The government was steadfast in its stand

that it would not refuse arrivals even with the

increasing number of infected individuals. All

arrivals from overseas were then required to

quarantine for 14 days. The government also

reported how they were operating the dedicated

transportation services for arrivals from foreign

countries. It informed the general public that any

foreign visitors who violated the arrival policies

would be sent back home.

4.7 CASE 7 A Perfect Storm in Itaewon: Gay

Clubs, Privacy and Epidemiological

Tracing

The Itaewon district in Seoul enjoyed a lazy long

weekend celebrating Children’s Day on May 5.

However, a sinister infection case brewed that

became known only afterward. When people were

getting back to work on May 6, Patient 66 was

discovered. He was a Korean national who worked

at a software firm and was confirmed as a COVID-

19 virus carrier. Over the weekend, when he was

likely most infectious, he had been club-hopping in

Itaewon. These clubs happened to be gay clubs, and

many of their patrons resisted disclosing their

identities. Three days later on May 9, multiple cases

popped up all over the country in various places,

from military services to healthcare workers. Within

three days, the government ordered the shutdown of

all entertainment service shops (e.g., PC cafes,

karaoke bars, and dance clubs) throughout the

country.

The Seoul government and its adjacent

provinces offered free medical examinations for the

people who visited bars, restaurants, and other

service shops in Itaewon. The KCDC attempted to

conduct contact tracing using the visitor logs, but

they discovered that over 3,000 people had used

false identification. They collaborated with local

law-enforcement agencies to trace people using

phone records, credit card transactions, and closed-

circuit television monitoring. Further, they activated

the newly developed “COVID-19 Epidemiological

Support System”: a big data system that used 3

telecommunications centers and 22 credit card

companies to locate an individual’s movement

within 10 minutes.

Meanwhile, the general sentiment of Korean

public opinion, especially among the “netizens,”

began to turn against the Korean gay community.

Naturally, the gay community resisted disclosing

individual identities and being forced to “come out.”

In response, the government offered “anonymous

testing,” requiring only a phone number to those

people who had visited Itaewon and were reluctant

to be tested. Even when testing returned positive,

any personal information that could be tracked to a

specific individual would be deleted, and only

information necessary to trace secondary potential

infections would be kept. A total of about 56,000

people exposed to the Itaewon case were tested. On

May 16, the news became more encouraging as the

rate of infection decreased significantly down to

about 10 new cases per day.

However, the optimism was proven premature.

By May 19, the infection had accelerated in

Incheon, a city about 30 miles west of Seoul. These

cases were eventually traced to a teacher in a for-

profit teaching academy, who had been in Itaewon

during the long weekend and who had lied about his

identity to a government staff. By then, he had

become Patient 102. Given that his occupation is a

teacher, he eventually infected students, parents, and

even the customers of karaoke bars that the students

frequented. One of those infected by Patient 102

was an employee working for the distribution center

of Coupang, the largest online retailer in Korea. She

would become another super-spreader.

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On May 24, the Central Disaster Safety

Response Headquarters implemented a QR-code-

based system to increase contact tracing accuracy.

All entertainment service shops were required to use

this system starting in mid-June. Eventually, in early

August, the rate of infection decreased to about 10

new cases per day. Hence, the government relaxed

the lockdown on entertainment service shops on

August 4.

Fig. 7: Super-Spreader Leading to Another Super-

Spreader

The government issued one press briefing after

another as the super-spreader became known, and

the general public was becoming more concerned.

Press briefings included how the tracing was being

conducted and clubs, bars, and other entertainment

businesses were locked down. The government

issued open notices for all visitors to the affected

entertainment area in Itaewon to get tested, and they

also noted potential punishment if otherwise. Those

who get tested voluntarily were assured anonymity.

The government also reminded the general public

not to direct their criticisms against the gay

community. It continued to inform the public about

the ongoing tracking-and-tracing effort. For

instance, the government staff had been calling

those people suspected of being in the affected area,

and they reported how many of them had been

contacted and were yet to be contacted. Ultimately,

they used the police force for the last few people

that they were not able to contact via phone. Given

the inaccurate records of the visitors to the

entertainment businesses, the government has issued

a new policy regarding the visitor log using the QR

code.

5 Cross-Case Analyses

The key actions are extracted from the within cases

by annotating each case and flagging them. These

actions then lead to the first-order categories in the

Gioia data structures (Figure 8 and Figure 9 in

Appendix). These categories are organized into two

groups—what actions and behaviors occurred in

seven cases from the case description above the

summarizing figures (Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3,

Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7) and how

government managed the general public through

press releases from the paragraph following the

summarizing figure in each within case.

5.1 Emerging Key Constructs

In each group, we compile common observations

that occurred across multiple cases (i.e., two or

more cases). Then, these common observations were

used to build the overall grounded theoretic model

as stipulated in the Gioia method, [71].

5.1.1 Observations Related to Action Responses

Responses in general occurred incrementally. Often,

they seemed more like muddling and fumbling

along. However, responses were made diligently

and tenaciously, and improvements were achieved

incrementally. For instance, during the early days,

the KCDC was in a reactive mode in responding

incrementally to new information from WTO and

China. Their first responders immediately offered

24/7 services. Enhancements were made

incrementally to regulate new arrivals from China,

especially those arriving from Wuhan.

Technology had an enormous role in helping

manage the pandemic. Smartphone applications

were developed to help measure increased demand

patterns for masks. Samsung’s smart factory

technology was disseminated to mask manufacturers

to help them increase productivity. Additional

smartphone applications and QR code-based

systems were developed for tracking purposes and

to gather the health information of the citizens. Big

data and AI were applied to phone records, credit

card transactions, and closed-circuit monitoring to

control the mass infection.

The highest priority was being able to trace

epidemiologically the movement of people and the

potential spread of infection. For instance, when

other countries were locking down their borders, the

Korean government was firm not to close the

borders because they were concerned about people

arriving through illegitimate means, and this would

cause a break in their tracing system. Further, after

detecting the infection, the tracing system would

kick in to identify the source and estimate the state

of the spreading of the virus.

Various levels of government and professional

organizations learned to launch new processes as

they learned from incremental responses. The

schools were ready to open their online teaching

system. However, they ran into an unanticipated

snag—the servers became unstable. They

immediately involved various IT companies (i.e.,

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SK Telecom, LG U+) and MST to ensure server

stability and security of the online teaching system.

Ultimately, the outcome was not perfect, but the

school system had settled into a hybrid model of

online and in-person teaching.

5.1.2 Government Strategies for Managing

General Public

In general, the government opted to err on the side

of full disclosure and giving away the details. When

the tension was high about the first suspected case

of infection, the KCDC informed the public of the

details of this patient’s travel routes, what testing

was being performed, how long it would take, and

the results.

The government offered information in real-

time and repeated this process continuously.

Specifically, following the outbreak of the mass

infection in Daegu, one press release was given after

another, and the news unfolded as if watching a live

documentary. For instance, the KCDC issued a

press release within 5 hours after the case involving

a member of the religious section was confirmed,

explaining the details of the case. Then, a few hours

later, the local government of Daegu issued another

press release about how they were locking down all

major event locations that this patient had visited.

When the outcome was better than what had

been announced, the government broadcasted the

news in a celebratory tone. For example, this

happened when the results of the first suspected case

came out earlier than what had been announced.

Further, it promised better performance in the future

by referring to this success they just celebrated.

5.2 Cross-case Analysis using the Gioia

Method

The Gioia method, [71], was adopted as a means to

conduct the cross-case analysis. The first-order

categories were compiled by looking across all

seven within-case descriptions. Then, the second-

order practices were extracted as emerging themes.

Finally, second-order practices were grouped to

articulate the overarching dimensions, as shown in

Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10 and Figure 11 in

Appendix.

Owing to the nature of the COVID-19 pandemic

and the uncertainty it posed on the entire country

and various government organizations, professional

associations, and citizens, much of the responses

occurred incrementally and by muddling through.

As shown in the top row of Figure 8 (Appendix),

both these two second-order practices capture

adapting incrementally. Responding pali pali, which

appears on the fourth row, is also conceptually close

to this dimension. It reflects a culturally unique

characteristic of Koreans wherein they respond

quickly under a sense of urgency. That is, they

spring into action immediately and would keep at it

tenaciously.

The dimension of investigating scientifically

encompasses tracing epidemiologically and

systematically probing for the triggering points of

mass infections. This dimension is perhaps

conceptually linked to another dimension referred to

as implementing technologies. Problems were

solved through different technologies, and the

government cooperated with leading technology

companies in the country to address the problems.

Ultimately, new processes and plans were made,

leading to the dimension of instituting new

processes. Simultaneously, health information was

collected, and communications were made with the

public, which we refer to as the dimension of

sharing information.

By evaluating the government’s press releases,

we observe how they attempted to help the public

make sense of what was happening. As shown in

Figure 9 (Appendix), their actions were captured in

the first-order categories. A variety of strategies

were utilized for constant communication with the

public. Further, the government attempted to

educate the public on various issues, such as

preventive measures and protecting minority

interests. These two second-order practices lead to

the dimension of forming public opinion by

explaining actions. The government also used

previous successes and self-congratulatory

broadcasts. By continuously informing the public

about what happened, they attempted to build the

public’s confidence in them.

6 Results

Our grounded theoretic model explains how Korea

has responded quickly to the outbreak of the

COVID-19 pandemic and how the government

attempted to help the general public make sense of

what was going on. Incrementalism is at the center

of all these efforts. After collecting and analyzing

the data, it is clear that, unless responses were made

incrementally, even as unprepared as they were, fast

responses would not have been possible.

The model has two parts (Figure 10, Appendix).

Divided by a broken line, the model above the

broken line reflects the action responses captured by

the overarching dimensions from Figure 8

(Appendix) and their relationships. Meanwhile, the

model below the broken line reflects how the

government has driven the sensemaking for the

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general public through their press releases. The

dimensions there were obtained from Figure 9

(Appendix).

6.1 Action Responses

The model begins with the deeply ingrained sense of

pali pali among Koreans. This sense is embedded in

their culture and drives how they can respond

quickly to emerging circumstances. This explains

why a health worker would not hesitate to stay up

all night to complete the testing of a potential case.

Such a sense is reflected in investigating

scientifically. For instance, when the day of the

online school opening drew near, everyone worked

hard to respond. However, when they ran into a

snag, they began investigating scientifically by

coordinating with the leading technology companies

in the country to address the problem. When the

potential case of mass infection was suspected in

Itaewon, the KCDC reached out to all citizens for

their cooperation. Immediately, they activated their

epistemological tracking technologies.

Interestingly, the scientific investigations almost

always did not offer a definitive solution as they led

to tinkering and adapting incrementally. For all new

arrivals, the government used a stratified approach

in terms of the types of arrivals and used tracking

technologies. However, as the spreading behavior of

the virus was elusive, the best they could do was to

adapt incrementally. This did not imply that the

government did not attempt to systemize processes.

For the new arrivals, depending on whether they had

symptoms, their process was different on how they

were transported and how they were tracked.

Therefore, there is a feedback relationship between

adapting incrementally and instituting new

processes with arrows pointing in both directions.

This feedback relationship was apparent throughout

the cases we have compiled. In particular, during the

great mask ordeal, the government tried one thing

after another instituting new processes, from

blocking profit-motivated exporters to increasing

manufacturing capacity and rationing system. Each

time, adaptation was incremental and led to new

processes.

6.2 Government Strategies for Sensemaking

The government used many different strategies to

manage public sentiment. These approaches ranged

from disseminating detailed information (i.e., testing

procedures and handling of new arrivals) to

educating and instructing them (i.e., how the

problem associated with school opening is

addressed and why the public anger should not be

directed at the gay community).

The government also explained their

corresponding actions openly with details and

highlighted actual occurrences to gain the public’s

confidence. The two dimensions, as shown in Figure

10 (Appendix), are supporting each other. Helping

the public make sense of what was happening (e.g.,

first suspected patient, potential mass infection, and

mask shortage) was an incremental effort. The

government attempted to form public opinion by

explaining actions and gaining its confidence by

highlighting specifics.

The grounded theoretical model for action

responses is built around the two, reciprocally

affecting dimensions of adapting incrementally and

instituting new processes. As shown in Figure 10

(Appendix), these two action responses are focused

on how Korea responded quickly to the COVID-19

outbreak. However, these responses were facilitated

by the use of technologies, and all the dimensions

ultimately feed into the dimension of sharing

information. This is a critical observation because,

ultimately, all the responses must be translated into

a communicable form and sensibly provided to the

public. Therefore, the dimension of sharing

information crosses over to how the government

manages public opinion and builds public

confidence to keep them informed and make sense

of unpredictable and ever-changing circumstances.

7 Discussion

As operations and supply chain management

professionals, we tend to espouse that thinking leads

to action. For example, the Shewhart cycle of plan,

do, check, and act promotes that we think and

contemplate first and then engage in doing and

acting, [76]. The enactment theory, [6], [7], [77],

[78], argues otherwise. It argues that we tend to

engage in action first and then we think and make

sense of what happened retrospectively by

observing the actions committed, [41], [43]. This

concept is particularly applicable in the context of

the initial stage of disaster response where we need

to respond and act before we can think and

contemplate.

7.1 Enactment Theory and Sensemaking

Enactment theory was proposed by, [79], [80], [81].

It explains that individuals and organizations engage

in sensemaking subsequent to their actions.

Enactment is a social process by which a “material

and symbolic record of action”, [82], is established,

and it involves both a process of actions and an

enacted environment, [7]. It has also been identified

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as one of the underutilized theories in supply chain

management.

The virus struck Korea and gave the country its

first case (i.e., Case 2). The KCDC took action in

response and acted on the reality that impacted

them. To ensure that the public remain informed, it

then issued press releases and held press

conferences to explain what happened in a

sensemaking effort. Specifically, sensemaking is

retrospective and circular, and subsequent

sensemaking further shapes beliefs, [83].

Meanwhile, enactment produces the uncertain

occurrence that is then made sensible. As the

general public braced for another critical incident,

the government gained trust, perhaps in a guarded

way, to press forward.

The crises as captured in our seven cases require

strong sensemaking demands. When actions are

taken, people strive to sort out a crisis for both

sensemaking and subsequent actions that would

affect the unfolding of the crisis itself, [38]. A

collective mind emerges as an ongoing activity

stream when activities are considered as

contributions to overcoming the crisis, [84]. In our

study, the Korean government strove to provide a

collective understanding for the general public by

helping them make sense of the emerging situations

through press releases.

7.2 Theoretical Implications: The

“reactment” Theory

When facing an enormous unknown event that

threatens the safety and well-being of everyone,

reacting well may become the best option. Based on

our study, reacting does not occur in a large,

concerted effort, but it occurs in many incremental

responses. Reactment theory, as proposed in Figure

11 (Appendix), may apply to the unk–unk

disruptions wherein ex-ante strategies lose their

effectiveness, but ex-post responses become the

mainstay, [85]. Reactment combines two terms,

reaction and enactment. What happened during the

crisis was not a typical enactment but something

that combines reacting and enacting.

7.3 Incremental Reactions

Our study focuses on early responses to the

pandemic. The literature promotes resilience

buildup and a shared culture of preparedness at the

societal level before the disruptive event, [20], [86].

After a commotion occurs, responses should be

quick, and responses require rapid mobilization and

transfer of resources to where the disaster has

occurred. Overall, the literature seems to promote

preparedness and coordination when facing a

disaster. However, major disasters cannot be

prepared for, and no overarching coordination is

possible, which was the case with the COVID-19

pandemic.

Responses happen in a reactive mode, and there

is little wide-ranging coordination. Instead,

incremental responses and muddling occur.

Organizations and the affected people do the best

they can to stay afloat to minimize the spread of the

virus. In these situations, decision-making is more

effective when taken in small increments, as

opposed to an overarching way, [22], [23]. In our

study, although they happened reactively and

incrementally, the sensemaking efforts by the

government through their press releases were

attempts to offer rationality and logic, [87], [88], for

the responses. We observed how various

organizations such as KCDC responded

incrementally in a pali pali manner and the patterns

of response actions converging on sharing

information used by the government to lead public

opinion.

7.4 Incremental Adaptation

We consider that, for a major crisis like the COVID-

19 pandemic, recovering back to the previous state

of normalcy cannot be the primary goal. Instead,

adapting incrementally to seek new normalcy may

become the primary end state of existence. As

researchers, we need to find a way to be able to

adapt and be viable with minimal damage to society,

[18].

Adaption, rather than recovery, becomes the

primary desired outcome. When a large gap exists

between the potential preparedness measures and

the steps that must be taken for them to stay afloat,

people may realize that adjusting and adapting

toward the possible new normal becomes more

important than recovering from the disruption and

returning to the way it used to be. As presented in

our grounded theoretical model, incremental

reactions through pali pali led to scientific

investigation and technology implementation as

adaptation strategies. Certainly, new processes were

instituted as a sign of incremental adaptation.

7.5 Sensemaking and Sense-giving

In general, a lead group facilitates sensemaking for

other groups, [38]. In our case, the government

assumed this role. [16], explain how changes, in our

case those caused by the spread of the virus, involve

the “current modes of … action to enable the

organization … to cope with consequential

environmental threats” (p. 433). The leader’s

primary role during significant change is not only

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sensemaking but also sense-giving. Sensegiving is a

companion concept to sensemaking and is defined

as “the process of attempting to influence the

sensemaking and meaning construction of others

toward a preferred redefinition of organizational

reality” (p. 442).

In our study, the government helped the public

make sense of what was going on in their

sensemaking efforts. The government was engaged

in sense-giving, and through sensegiving the public

attained sensemaking to elaborate on the concept of

sensegiving. They highlighted what happened and

explained the actions taken. Once the public attains

sensemaking, that understanding and grasp of reality

feedback to adaptation through the public’s

confidence in the state’s leadership, as retention

feedback to selection in the enactment model, [6].

7.6 Summary

Do actions lead thinking or does thinking lead

actions? We think both. Planning and strategizing in

a stable environment can lead to actions and

behaviors. However, under a severe and widespread

threat of an unk-unk event, the crises would appear

in unexpected places. In this situation, reacting well

becomes the best course of action for the

government, industries, and the public. Korea

reacted immediately and incrementally. Even when

the reactions were made poorly, the negative impact

was minimal as they were incremental, and Korea

was able to rebound quickly. The government then

helped the general public with sensemaking to

understand the current situation. Therefore, the

enactment theory has proven useful in

understanding the reality that Korea lived through,

we lived through, where quickly reacting in small

increments emerges as a legitimate and viable

approach to adaptation.

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APPENDIX

First-order categories Second-order practices

Overarching dimensions

. Incrementally improving process

. Devising new process incrementally

. Expanding processes incrementally

Enhancing incrementally

. Muddling in reactive responses

. Muddling and fumbling along Muddling through

. Adopting new technology (smartphone app)

. Deploying big data and AI

. Using big data

. Using new technology (QR code-based system)

Solving problems through

technologies

. Supporting mask production enhancement with Samsung's

smart factory technology

. Cooperating with smart phone app companies for mask

inventory status

. Supporting education system and network

. Donating tablets

Government cooperating with

technology companies

. Exploring with tracing technology (before infection)

. Investigating with tracing technology (after infection)

Tracing epidemiologically

. Identifying domestic triggering points (Shincheonji, Itaewon)

. Raising red flag (mass in close proximity)

. Detecting convergence of unexpected events

. Facing unexpected turn of events

. Coping with unexpected but connected events

Probing triggering points for mass

infection

. Triggering fast response

. A regional government responding immediately

. A regional government responding decisively

Creating a sense of urgency

. Showing fast response

. Erring on the side of taking action as opposed to no action

. Taking action based on big data analysis

Taking action immediately--within

hours and days

. Preparing intensely

. Responding tenaciously

. Responding beyond affected category

Responding tenaciously and

intensely

. Launching a new process

. Making new policies and platform

. Developing a quick testing approach

. Stratifying arrivals for processing and tracking

Making new processes

. Launching school opening in a phased approach

. Openly allowing foreign arrivals so as not to lose ability to track

Planning logically

. Collecting health information

. Controlling health information via smart phone app

Compiling health information

. Communicating immediately

. Keeping things in the open

Communicating openly about

public health implications

Sharing information

Adapting incrementally

Implementing

technologies

Investigating

scientifically

Responding "pali pali"

(quickly quickly the

Korean style)

Instituting

new processes

Fig. 8: Common response action data structure

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First-order categories Second-order practices

Overarching dimensions

. Erring on the side of full disclosure

. Erring on the side of giving too much information

. Keeping up the public’s alertness/awareness

. Disclosing information real time

. Adjusting and explaining why

. Communicating openly

. Offering reasoned response

. Developing new technology

. Providing incremental and continuous briefings

. Providing detailed information

Staying close to the public

. Providing instructions on preventive measures

. Putting in effort to ensure minority protection

Educating the public

. Promising better performance based on past good performance

. Building on past success

. Building on small wins

Buidling on success

. Broadcasting/celebrating when outcome is better than what

had been announced.

. Government touting its ex-ante strategies

Using self-congratulatory

broadcast

Forming public opinions

by explaining actions

Building confidence in

government by pointing

to what happened

Fig. 9: Common government strategy structure

Fig. 10: Grounded theoretical model of fast responses and sensemaking

Fig. 11: Proposed reactment theory framework

Instituting new pr

ocesses

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Contribution of Individual Authors to the

Creation of a Scientific Article (Ghostwriting

Policy)

- Thomas Choi: Conceptualization, Data curation,

Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology,

Project administration, Supervision, Validation,

Writing - original draft, Writing - review &

editing

- DaeSoo Kim: Data curation, Formal analysis,

Investigation, Validation, Writing - original draft,

Writing - review & editing

- Seung Ho Yoo: Data curation, Formal analysis,

Investigation, Validation, Writing - original draft,

Writing - review & editing

Sources of Funding for Research Presented in a

Scientific Article or Scientific Article Itself

No funding was received for conducting this study.

Conflict of Interest

The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.

Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0

(Attribution 4.0 International, CC BY 4.0)

This article is published under the terms of the

Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en

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