The Relevance of Audit Quality, Debt Financing and Earnings
Management
HUI JING
Lyceum of the Philippines University Manila Campus,
Manila 1002,
PHILIPPINES
Abstract: - The relevance of audit quality, DF, and EM is a topic of common concern at home and abroad. The
research first analyzes the DF mode, EM motivation, and financial audit mechanism. Then the modified Jones
model is applied to EM. Two regression models are constructed by introducing control variables and adjustment
variables. According to the empirical results of 11835 observed sample values, there are differences in the degree
of earnings management among A-share companies. The average accrued profit is 0.063, the maximum value is
3.960, the minimum value is 0, and the standard deviation is 0.091. The situation of different listed companies
getting debt financing increments varies greatly, with an average value of 0.095 and a standard deviation of
0.214. The average asset-liability ratio is 0.429, and the average enterprise size is 22.215. Correlation analysis
shows that there is a positive correlation between bank loan increment, total debt increment, commercial credit
increment, and earnings management behavior, while there is a negative correlation between audit quality and
earnings management. The regression analysis results show that there is a positive relationship between the total
increase in corporate debt, the increase in commercial credit, the increase in bank loans, and the degree of
earnings management, while there is a negative correlation between audit quality and the degree of earnings
management.
Key-Words: - Debt financing; Earnings management; Financial audit; Modified Jones model; Regression model
Received: March 29, 2023. Revised: September 18, 2023. Accepted: September 24, 2023. Published: October 6, 2023.
1 Introduction
The audit work is mainly to review the financial
report of the enterprise and give relevant suggestions.
The audit quality (AQ) is closely related to the
accountants' workability, professional quality, the
size of the accounting firm, and the risk of
undertaking audit work, [1]. Because the earnings
management (EM) behavior of enterprise
management has always existed, it is a "legal" tax
reduction behavior. If the accountant cannot reveal
the financial problems in the audit work, the
high-quality audit work cannot be guaranteed, [2].
There is rich research on EM at home and abroad,
mainly focusing on two aspects. EM mainly
represents the management of businesses. The
financial report and EM behavior of the enterprise are
the active management behavior of businesses.
Businesses often use two management techniques for
EM: accrual items and real operating earnings, [3]. At
this stage, most scholars focus on the impact of DF on
EM, but there is no clear classification of debt
increment and increment methods, [4]. To investigate
the effects of DF on EM, this study introduces
financial audits. Based on the analysis of the
correlation among the three, the regression analysis
model of debt financing, EM, and financial audit is
established to improve the EM of enterprises.
2 Related Works and Research
Hypothesis
2.1 Related Work
EM is usually used to operate the profit balance point
by enterprise management, which has a two-way
promoting and inhibiting effect. In, [5], the authors
collected listed companies in Vietnam from 2007 to
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2205
Volume 20, 2023
2016 as data samples to discuss the impact of CEO
rights on EM. The results of regression analysis
showed that CEO rights had a positive impact on EM.
In enterprises with high foreign shareholding, this
effect was more significant. In other words, the
potential dual role of foreign investors should be
considered by policymakers with oversight
responsibilities. Taking the directors of Indonesian
manufacturing companies as a sample, [6], discussed
the impact of bonus motivation, political motivation,
debt contract motivation, and tax motivation on EM.
The results of multiple regression analysis showed
that these four motivations had an impact on EM
practice. The highest motivation of directors for EM
was political cost motivation. The second was bonus
incentive, tax incentive, and debt contract incentive,
which provided evidence for the potential motivation
of directors to encourage EM practice. In, [7], the
authors studied the relationship between EM and the
culture of time-honored enterprises. The results
showed that the accrued EM and actual EM of
time-honored enterprises were much lower than
those of other enterprises. The transition between
corporate EM and culture came from cultural
infiltration with senior management. The association
between trusted brands and EM was significantly
moderated by property rights and incentive
compatibility. In, [8], the authors analyzed the impact
of accrual earnings management (AEM), the
adoption of international financial reporting
standards (IFRS), and the stock market integration of
Latin American Integrated Market (MILA)
companies. A multi-level mixed model was used for
robustness analysis. The findings demonstrated that
businesses adopted AEM as a premeditated tactic to
erode corporate governance. Agency costs were
reduced through the introduction of MILA and the
adoption of IFRS. In, [9], the authors used EM to
measure the mentality of enterprise managers. The
discretionary accruals represented the EM of
enterprises. The results showed that EM had a
negative correlation with the probability and
frequency of stock repurchase. The scale of EM
could be used as a reliable indicator of company
valuation. In, [10], the authors used the panel data set
of 250 companies in the Baltic Sea from 2012 to
2016 to analyze the relationship between EM and
reporting complexity. The findings revealed that EM
was completed about 6-11% of the company year.
EM and reporting complexity were positively
correlated, although this association was only seen in
enterprises with higher liquidity.
It is noteworthy that AQ is also closely related to
EM. Generally, AQ can effectively promote the real
EM of enterprises. In, [11], the authors studied
whether audit companies would hire former Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
employees based on negative PCAOB inspection
reports and whether such employment would reduce
future inspection defects and improve audit quality.
The findings revealed a strong correlation between
the amounts of deficiencies listed in prior inspection
reports and the number of PCAOB staff working for
large audit firms. However, there was a bad
correlation between the number of former PCAOB
personnel employed and the number of problems in
the company's subsequent inspection reports. It
indicated that the former PCAOB personnel had
higher audit professional quality, which improved the
AQ. In, [12], the authors used reputation theory to
predict the potential personal costs of auditors when
performing their professional obligations. The
experiment found that auditors with negative
reputations faced more stringent choices when
predicting budget overruns. The auditor's perceived
reputation directly affected AQ. In, [13], the authors
discussed the impact of external auditors' regular
interaction with some parties in their work, such as
accounting firms, audit team members, and
customers on audit quality. The AQ was translated
into improved financial reports, which depended on
the stakeholders of audited financial statements to
make wise business decisions. The results verified
the essential function of auditors' view on the fair
treatment of partners in AQ. In, [14], the authors
studied the impact of geographic distance between
audit partners and customers on audit quality. The
research uses modeling distance to match partners
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2206
Volume 20, 2023
and customers. The result showed that the
geographical distance between partners and potential
customers was an important matching criterion. If
other qualities of a partner are more significant, they
will also be weighed again. In addition, when the
partner is farther away from the customer, the AQ
will be reduced.
To sum up, there are a large number of research
data on debt financing (DF) and earning management
at home and abroad, mainly including EM
motivation, DF scale, and DF sources. However, the
analysis of DF and EM on the quality of financial
audits is relatively small. The study takes the quality
of financial audit as an adjusting variable to explore
the impact of DF and EM, aiming to provide
effective ideas for EM of enterprises.
The advantage of this study is that it takes the
quality of financial audit as a moderating variable to
explore the impact between debt Financing and
earnings management. In the existing literature, there
is relatively little research on the relationship
between debt Financing and earnings management in
terms of financial audit quality. This study fills this
research gap and provides a new perspective for
further revealing the relationship between debt
Financing and earnings management. At the same
time, the use of the modified Jones model to measure
the degree of earnings management provides more
realistic and accurate results, providing a more
reliable data source for research. In summary, this
study is innovative and practical.
2.2 Research Hypothesis
As for the relationship between DF and EM, through
the analysis of principal-agent theory and contract
theory, the relationship between the increment and
source of debt and EM is obtained. In contract theory,
restrictive treaties and debt contracts influence each
other. In contract theory, restrictive treaties and debt
contracts influence each other. With the increase of
corporate debt, in order not to violate the contract,
managers must make the enterprise realize well
before creditors through EM. When creditors
increase their investment, they will also add the
treaty in the contract to restrict the operators. Once a
breach of contract is discovered by creditors, it may
bring great pressure on the operation of the enterprise,
[15]. It will also promote the business operators to
achieve non-default through the adjustment of
earnings information. In the principal-agent theory,
from the perspective of financing, the relationship
between the two parties is the relationship between
the creditor and the debtor. The entrusting party
hopes to obtain a stable income after lending their
funds. The operator hopes to use the funds in
high-risk and high-return projects. There will also be
many problems between the two parties, [16].
Therefore, hypothesis 1 is put forward, that is, the
EM behavior of enterprises is positively correlated
with the increase of DF.
In view of the relationship between DF and EM,
domestic enterprises often obtain financing through
bank loans. Before the bank loans, they will know
the actual financial information, debt repayment
ability, and profitability of the enterprise through the
audit of the bank's financial experts and regulatory
authorities in advance, [17]. The ability of enterprises
to obtain bank loans increases with the addition of
earnings information. To obtain lower-cost loans,
enterprises are more active in EM. Therefore,
hypothesis 2 is proposed, that is, the degree of EM of
enterprises with more bank loans will also increase.
From the perspective of signal transmission theory,
enterprise investors often audit through a
high-quality third-party institution to strengthen the
transparency of the financial information of the
enterprise, deliver relatively reliable investment
information to the majority of investors, and improve
the trust between investors and enterprises. The
supplier determines whether to continue to cooperate
with the enterprise and provide the source of goods
through the financial information and operating
ability of the enterprise. Therefore, enterprises pay
great attention to the credit of enterprises in the
operation. This also urges operators to establish good
financial information through EM to ensure
cooperation between upstream and downstream
enterprises. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is put forward,
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2207
Volume 20, 2023
that is, business credit loans of enterprises increase
with the deepening of EM, [18]. Although China's
bond market is still at the initial stage, there are still a
small number of enterprises with strong operating
ability and good performance that use bond
financing.
The higher the audit quality, the lower the impact on
debt financing and earnings management
The higher the
audit quality, the
lower the impact
on bank loans,
commercial use
and earnings
management
Audit quality has
little impact on
corporate bond
financing and
earnings
management
H1
H2 H3
Three hypotheses
Audit quality Debt financing
Earnings
management
Fig. 1: Three hypotheses
After financing through the bond market, these
enterprises will disclose their financing information
to make it more transparent. Investors and financial
analysts can better supervise, and also connect with
the interests of enterprises. To establish a good
corporate image and win the trust of investors in the
capital market, such enterprises do not need the
operation of EM. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is put
forward, that is, the increase in corporate bond
financing has little impact on EM.
In view of the relationship among debt financing,
EM, and audit quality, listed bond financing
enterprises are subject to strict supervision by
relevant departments, and the company's financial
management is more rigorous. Enterprises have good
operating ability, and EM operations are also few.
Therefore, bond financing enterprises have little
impact on EM, [19]. Therefore, three hypotheses are
proposed. Firstly, the higher the AQ is, the lower the
impact on DF and EM. Secondly, the stronger the
AQ is, the lower the impact on bank loans,
commercial use, and EM. Thirdly, the AQ has no
effect on corporate bond financing and EM. In Figure
1, hypotheses are displayed.
3 Multiple Regression Model of Debt
Financing, EM, and Audit Quality
3.1 Definition and Calculation of Variables
At present, the models commonly used in
quantitative EM are the time series model and the
Jones model. Due to the systematic limitation of the
time series model on time and EM, the development
status of China's capital market cannot be analyzed
using this model. Jones model and modified Jones
model, which are developing faster at home and
abroad, are more in line with domestic EM. These
two models are relatively more realistic and accurate
in representing the EM of enterprises and are more
suitable for verifying empirical assumptions. Both of
these models represent the degree of EM of the
enterprise with controllable accrued profits. Firstly,
the non-controllable accruals model is obtained by
model fitting. Then the controllable accruals are
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2208
Volume 20, 2023
obtained through the difference between the total
accruals and the non-controllable accruals. In view of
the fact that the Jones model sets revenue as
non-controllable accrued profit, this study selects the
improved Jones model to replace the degree of EM
to prevent the calculation error of EM, [20].
Combined with the research purpose,
absEM
refers
to the absolute value of the controllable accrued
profits. The calculation formula of the model is
shown in Formula (1).
, , ,
,..
1 2 3 .
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
,. . .
1 2 3
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
, 1 ,
,
, 1 , 1
1
* * *
1
* * *
i t i t i t
it i t i t it
i t i t i t i t
it i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i t i t
it
i t i t
TAC NE OCF
TAC REV PPE
A A A A
NAC REV REC PPE
A A A A
TAC NAC
DAC AA



(1)
Formula (1),
and
,it
TAC
refer to the net
profit and accrued profit of the enterprise
i
at the
end of the accounting year
t
.
,it
NAC
,
,it
DAC
and
,it
OCF
represent the non-controllable accrued profit,
controllable accrued profit, and net cash flow of
operating activities of the enterprise
t
at the end of
the accounting year
t
. The total assets of the
enterprise
i
in time
1t
are expressed in
,1it
A
.
.it
REV
refers to the growth of the current operating
income, which is the difference between the current
period and the previous period in the main operating
income.
.it
PPE
refers to the original value of fixed
assets in the current period. The increase in accounts
receivable in the current period compared with the
previous period is indicated by
.it
REC
.
,it
DAC
is
the controllable accrued profits in the
t
period of
the enterprise
i
after the total assets correction.
absEM
can also refer to the degree of EM. The
enterprise's EM level increases with the addition of
the absolute value of controllable accruals.
The multiple regression model is a widely used
statistical analysis method in fields such as finance
and economics. Its basic idea is to use multiple
independent variables (or predictive factors) to
predict the dependent variable (or outcome variable).
In the research, a multiple regression model is used
to study the impact of debt Financing, EM, and audit
quality on corporate earnings. In the study, we
construct a multiple regression model with earnings
as a dependent variable and debt Financing, EM, and
audit quality as independent variables. By fitting the
sample data, the impact coefficients of each variable
on corporate earnings can be obtained, and it is also
possible to observe whether there is a significant
correlation between them. By analyzing the results of
the regression equation, conclusions and experiences
can be drawn, which can provide decision-making
suggestions for enterprise decision-makers.
It should be noted that multiple regression models
can only predict the correlation between the
dependent variable and the independent variable, and
cannot explain causal relationships. Therefore, in
practical applications, it is necessary to carefully
analyze the regression results and pay attention to
controlling for other possible influencing factors. For
the "multiple regression model of debt Financing,
EM and audit quality", the definition and calculation
of variables are also very critical. In this model, debt
Financing, EM, and audit quality are all regarded as
independent variables, while corporate earnings are
regarded as dependent variables. Among them, debt
Financing refers to enterprises obtaining funds by
issuing bonds to creditors or loans to banks and other
financial institutions. The debt financing ratio refers
to the proportion of total liabilities of an enterprise in
total assets. The calculation method is debt Financing
ratio=total liabilities/total assets; The size of an
enterprise's business scale is generally measured by
total assets. There is a certain relationship between
EM and corporate earnings, and generally speaking,
larger enterprises have relatively higher levels of
earnings. The calculation method for EM is total
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2209
Volume 20, 2023
assets; Audit quality refers to the quality of an
auditor's audit of a company's financial statements.
Generally, factors such as the size of the auditing
firm, audit fees, auditor qualifications, and
experience are used to reflect audit quality. Among
them, audit fees are considered an important
indicator reflecting audit quality. The calculation
methods of audit quality variables can be selected
and compared based on actual situations; Corporate
surplus refers to the sum of a company's net profit
and accrued profit. In a multiple regression model,
corporate earnings are used as the dependent variable,
and the relationship between other independent
variables and corporate earnings needs to be obtained
through regression analysis. After determining the
definitions and calculation methods of each variable,
multiple regression models can be used to study their
interactions. Through multiple regression analysis,
the degree to which each independent variable affects
corporate earnings can be determined.
The explanatory variables of the study are DF
methods, including corporate bond increment,
commercial credit increment, and bank loan
increment of listed companies. Enterprise DF
accounts are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Corporate DF subjects
Non-current liabilities
Belong to DF
account
Does not belong to debt
financing
Long-term loan
1
\
Bonds payable
1
\
Including:
preferred stock
1
\
\
Perpetual bond
1
\
Long-term payables
1
\
Long-term payroll payable
\
1
Estimated liabilities
\
1
Deferred income
\
1
Deferred Tax Liability
\
1
Other non-current liabilities
\
1
Current liabilities
Belong to DF
account
Does not belong to DF
account
Short-term borrowings
1
\
Trading financial assets
\
1
Financial liabilities measured at fair value with changes included in
current profit and loss
\
1
Derivative financial liabilities
\
1
Notes payable
1
\
Advance receipts
\
1
Employee compensation payable
\
1
Taxes payable
\
1
Other payables
\
1
Including:
Interest payable
\
1
\
Dividends payable
\
1
Liabilities held for sale
\
1
Non-current liabilities due within one year
\
1
Other current liabilities
\
1
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2210
Volume 20, 2023
DF is mainly concentrated on long-term loans,
bonds payable, long-term accounts payable, and
short-term loans and notes payable. According to
previous studies, the calculation method of total debt
increment
DI
is the ratio of the difference between
the total debt at the end of the period and the
beginning of the period and the total assets at the end
of the period. The calculation formula of corporate
debt increment
CBI
is the ratio of the difference
between the ending value and the beginning value of
bonds payable and the total value of assets at the end
of the period. When calculating the commercial
credit increment
CI
, the first step is to get the
difference between the sum and difference of the
closing value of the advance receipts, notes payable,
and accounts payable, and then calculate the ratio of
the difference to the total value of the closing assets,
which is the commercial increment. When
calculating the increment
BLI
of bank loans, the
first step is to calculate the difference between the
sum of the ending value of short-term and short-term
loans and the sum of the initial value of long-term
and short-term loans, and then divide the difference
by the total amount of assets at the end of the period
to obtain the increment of bank loans (Table 2).
Table 2. Definition and calculation method of variables
Variable
classification
Variable
Symbolic
representation
Corresponding calculation formula
Control variable
Industry virtualization
ndI
Industry dummy variable
Annual virtual
earY
Annual dummy variable
Situation of the Board of
Supervisors
pvboS ard
Number of members of the Board of Supervisors
Independence of the Board of
Directors
ndI
Percentage of independent directors on the Board
of Directors
Tobin Q value
obQT
Ratio of stock market value to total assets at the
end of the period
Proportion of fixed assets
AS
Ratio of fixed assets to total assets at the end of
the period
Net cash flow from operating
activities
OCF
Ratio of net cash flow from operating activities to
total assets at the end of the period
Return on total assets
Proportion of net profit to total assets at the end
of the period
Company size
Size
Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the
period
Asset-liability ratio
evL
Ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end of
the period
Adjusting
variables
Audit quality
AQ
The value of audit passed by the top ten
accounting firms is 1, and the value of failed audit
is 0
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2211
Volume 20, 2023
Unqualified comments with emphasis
Unable to express opinions
Reserved opinions
Negative opinion
Standard
audit
opinion
Fig. 2: Audit opinion type
The definitions and related explanations of the
control variables and adjustment variables selected in
the study are shown in Table 1. The asset-liability
ratio is used to evaluate the state of the financial
leverage of an enterprise, which can reflect the
financial risk to a certain extent. In the stage of debt
financing, if the creditors have a significant increase
in liabilities or a gradual decline in operating
conditions, the company will encounter financial risk
problems, which will lead to EM motivation. The AQ
is determined based on the audit opinions. For the
adjustment variable, the value audited by the top ten
accounting firms is 1, otherwise, it is set to 0. The
types of audit opinions are shown in Figure 2.
From Figure 2, the main classification nodes of
AQ are different types of audit reports. The two basic
categories are non-standard audit opinions and
standard audit opinions. The standard audit opinion
refers to the unqualified audit opinion. Non-standard
audit opinions include unqualified audit opinions
with emphasis on matters, qualified opinions,
negative opinions, and opinions that cannot be
expressed. In addition, in terms of company size, the
company size can influence the EM through both
income and cost. When the scale of the company is
small, the degree of EM is relatively high, because
the regulations and management of the enterprise
need to be further improved. On the contrary, the EM
is relatively low. The return on total assets can not
only reflect the profitability of the enterprise but also
display the relevant performance of the enterprise
management. The net cash flow from operating
activities reflects whether the enterprise has
financing needs. When the enterprise has more cash
flow, the financing demand will be reduced, and the
probability of normal operation of the company is
high. On the contrary, enterprises will have a strong
demand for financing, which will urge managers to
conduct EM. In the case of imperfect new accounting
standards and related systems, the proportion of fixed
assets may urge the enterprise managers to conduct
EM. When the Tobin Q value is greater than 1, the
enterprise will not make additional investments. On
the contrary, enterprises will increase corresponding
investments. In this state, it may urge the enterprise
managers to conduct EM. The higher the
independence of the board of directors is, the
stronger the corresponding role of supervision and
governance. It can reduce the EM behavior of
enterprises. The board of supervisors has the
responsibility of restriction and supervision within
the enterprise, which can ensure the maximization of
shareholders' rights and interests and standardize the
operation of the company. The larger the size of the
board of supervisors is, the stronger the
corresponding supervision ability of the enterprise,
thus reducing the degree of EM of the enterprise. For
the annual dummy variable, the years from 2014 to
2018 are set as 1, and the remaining years are 0.
According to the industry classification standard of
the China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2013,
the manufacturing industry and non-manufacturing
industry are set as Level 2 and Level 1 respectively.
The meaning of the explanatory variable and
explained variable is displayed in Table 3.
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2212
Volume 20, 2023
Table 3. Definition and calculation method of
variables
Variable
type
Variable
name
Variable
code
Variable calculation
method
Interpreted
variable
Accrued
profit
(operable
part)
absEM
Calculation according
to Jones model
Explanatory
variable
Increase in
debt
DI
Quotient value
between the amount of
debt increase and the
total amount of assets
at the end of the
accounting year
Increase in
corporate
bonds
CBI
Quotient value
between the increased
amount of corporate
bonds and the total
amount of assets at the
end of the accounting
year
Increase in
business
credit
CI
Quotient value
between the increased
amount of commercial
credit and the total
amount of assets at the
end of the accounting
year
Increase in
bank loans
BLI
The quotient between
the increased amount
of bank loans and the
total amount of assets
at the end of the
accounting year
From Table 3, the research mainly uses four
variables, namely, the increase in debt, the increase
in corporate bonds, the increase in commercial credit,
and the increase in bank loans, to explain the accrued
profits (the operational part).
3.2 Sample Selection and Regression Model
The research selects an A-share company as the
research object. The selected time period is from
2014 to 2018. The sample of companies with a lack
of data and an asset-liability ratio greater than 1 are
eliminated. At the same time, the sample is processed
by Winsorize. Finally, 2839 listed companies with
11834 observation samples in five years are selected.
The annual distribution of sample data is shown in
Figure 1. From Figure 1, in five years, some
enterprise data fail to meet the requirements and are
excluded from the sample. The most excluded data is
in 2015, up to 653. The least excluded year is 2018,
with 128. On the whole, the annual distribution of
samples is reasonable and uniform. The financial
data is from the Guotai'an database (Figure 3).
2199 2186 2270 2468 2711
18.58 18.47 19.18
20.86
22.91
0
5
10
15
20
25
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Number of samples
Number of
samples Percentage /%
Percentage /%
Fig. 3: Distribution of selected samples
To verify the impact of DF methods and DF on EM,
regression model 1 is created to test. The calculation
method is Formula (2).
, 1 0 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 . 6 , 7 , 8 ,
9 , , , ,
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
absEM Debt Size ROA
OCF Lev AS TobQ Ind
SpvBoard IND Year


(2)
Formula (2),
,it
refers to the random error term.
0
is a constant term.
19
aa
refers to the
parameters of corresponding variables.
19
aa
refers to four explanatory variables. A regression
model 2 is established to verify the impact of AQ on
the correlation between DF and EM. The calculation
formula is shown in Formula (3).
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2213
Volume 20, 2023
, 1 0 1 , 2 ,
3 , 4 , 5 . 6 ,
7 , 8 , 9 ,
10 , , 11 , , , ,
'
*
i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
absEM Debt Size
ROA OCF Lev AS
TobQ Ind SpvBoard
Debt AQ AQ IND Year

(3)
4 Analysis of Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2 displays descriptive statistical analysis
results, with a total of 11835 observed sample values.
The average value of controllable accrued profit is
0.063. The maximum value is 3.960, and the
minimum value is 0, which indicates that there is a
large gap in the EM of a few enterprises. The
standard deviation of this indicator is relatively small,
with a value of 0.091, which indicates that the gap of
EM degree of most A-share enterprises is relatively
small. In terms of explanatory variables, the
minimum, maximum, average, and standard
deviation of total debt increment is -0.28, 1.317,
0.095, and 0.214 respectively. It means that there are
certain differences between different listed
companies in obtaining DF increments, and a few
companies have debt increments. This data reflects
the correlation between EM and debt increment to
some extent. For the three ways of debt financing,
the difference between the minimum and maximum
value of commercial credit increment and bank loan
increment is the most obvious, and the average is
smaller of the three. The minimum gap and average
corporate debt increment are small, which indicates
that corporate bond financing is rare and the amount
of financing is small. In terms of control variables,
the average, median, maximum, and minimum
asset-liability ratios are 0.429, 0.419, 0.898, and
0.053 respectively. This shows that the asset-liability
ratio of most enterprises is at a relatively low level,
and the enterprises have very serious insolvency, or
the funds are not fully utilized. The average, median,
maximum, and minimum company sizes are 22.215,
0.419, 0.898, and 0.053 respectively, which shows
that there is a large gap between the size of different
listed companies, and the size of listed companies is
relatively large. The average, median, maximum, and
minimum return on total assets is 0.042, 0.037, 0.205,
and -0.144 respectively. The average, median,
maximum, and minimum of net cash flow from
operating activities are 0.041, 0.041, 0.234, and
-0.169 respectively, which indicates that the overall
cash level of listed companies is poor and has urgent
financing needs. For the adjustment variable, the
average value of AQ is 0.631, which shows that
63.1% of the sample listed companies have been
audited by the top ten domestic accounting firms
(Figure 4).
4.2 Correlation Analysis
The correlation between numerous variables is
investigated in this study. Table 4 (Appendix)
displays the particular outcomes.
From Table 4 (Appendix), the correlation
coefficient between control variables and explanatory
factors is less than 0.40, which indicates that there is
only a weak correlation between them.
Therefore, the analysis of model regression does
not have a multicollinearity issue. The relationship
between the three variables of bank loan increment,
enterprise total debt increment, and business credit
increment and EM behavior is a positive correlation.
The correlation coefficient between AQ and EM is
below 0, which demonstrates that the relationship
between them is negative.
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2214
Volume 20, 2023
0.091 0.103 0.082 0.032 0.214
0.483
0.209
1.276
0.052 0.069 0.167
2.161
0.053
1.035
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0
5
10
15
20
25
absEM BLI CI CBI DI AQ lev Size ROA OCF AS TobQ Ind Spvboard
Standard deviation
Average
Average
Standard deviation
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
absEM BLI CI CBI DI AQ lev Size ROA OCF AS TobQ Ind Spvboard
Minimum value
Median
Maximum
(a) Average and standard deviation results
(b) Median and maximum results
Minimum value / Median
Maximum
Fig. 4: Descriptive statistical analysis results
4.3 Regression Analysis
The model variables have a positive relationship with
the total increment of corporate debt, EM behavior,
commercial credit increment, and bank loan
increment. The EM has a negative correlation with
AQ. The absolute value between the control variable
and the explanatory variable of the regression model
is less than 0.4, so the model does not have a very
obvious linear problem. The required variables are
reasonable. *, **, and *** represent significant levels
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, and the data in ()
represent t values. The relationship between DF, DF
methods, and EM is shown in Table 5. From model 1,
the EM and the increase in corporate debt have a
significant positive relationship, with a regression
coefficient of 0.073. The degree and motivation of
EM increase with the growth of debt financing. The
1% significance level confirms the validity of initial
hypothesis 1. The degree of EM has a positive
relationship with bank loans, which is consistent with
hypothesis 2. The EM and the regression coefficient
of corporate debt increment are not significant,
which verifies hypothesis 4. The regression
coefficient between EM and corporate business
credit is 0.146, which verifies hypothesis 3. The
degree of EM increases with the improvement of
business credit. Enterprises with better business
credit have more customer control advantages. If the
repayment ability of the enterprise is weakened, the
normal operation of the enterprise will be seriously
affected, because there is no necessary raw material
supply. There is a significant positive correlation
between the asset-liability ratio and EM at 1%. An
increase in the debt ratio of enterprises will add to
the financial risk of enterprises. The regression
coefficients of the enterprise size and the return on
total assets are negative and positive respectively,
and show obvious correlation at the level of 1%.
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2215
Volume 20, 2023
Therefore, enterprises can provide corporate profits
by processing financial information related to the
return on total assets, thus increasing the degree of
EM.
Table 5. The relationship between DF, DF methods, and EM in model
-
absEM1
absEM2
absEM3
absEM4
BLI
0.106***
(12.66)
-
-
-
CI
-
0.146***
(14.25)
-
-
CBI
-
-
0.019
(0.65)
-
DI
-
-
-
0.073***
(18.26)
evL
0.058***
(11.36)
0.056***
(10.88)
0.069***
(13.45)
0.048***
(9.28)
Size
-0.004***
(-4.04)
-0.003***
(-3.63)
-0.003***
(-3.70)
-0.004***
(-4.32)
0.139***
(7.20)
0.146***
(7.6)
0.174***
(9.06)
0.115***
(5.97)
OCF
-0.195***
(-13.83)
-0.248***
(-18.16)
-0.239***
(-17.38)
-0.205***
(-14.96)
AS
-0.024***
(-4.50)
-0.013***
(-2.37)
-0.023***
(-4.25)
-0.015***
(-2.79)
obQT
0.005***
(10.95)
0.005***
(11.32)
0.005***
(11.08)
0.005***
(10.73)
ndI
0.015
(1.00)
0.020
(1.32)
0.016
(1.03)
0.018
(1.21)
pvboS ard
-0.001
(-1.09)
-0.001
(-1.10)
-0.002**
(-1.97)
-0.000
(-0.40)
-cons
0.107***
(5.46)
0.095***
(4.87)
0.101***
(5.13)
0.109***
(5.60)
N
11834
11834
11834
11834
ndustryFEI
YES
YES
YES
YES
earY FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
F
110.28
115.38
91.65
130.84
2
R
0.0767
0.0800
0.0645
0.0899
The relationship between EM, AQ, and DF
method increment and DF increment in model 2 are
shown in Table 6. Under the influence of audit
quality, the impact of DF increment on EM changes.
The regression coefficient between the interaction of
AQ and total DF increment and the degree of EM is
-0.051, which shows a significant negative
correlation at the level of 1%, that is, the higher the
audit quality, the less the impact on DF and EM.
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2216
Volume 20, 2023
Table 6. The relationship between EM, AQ, and DF method increment and DF increment in model 2
-
absEM1
absEM2
absEM3
absEM4
BLI
0.166***
(12.82)
-
-
-
CI
-
0.205***
(12.98)
-
-
CBI
-
-
0.010
(1.04)
-
DI
-
-
-
0.104***
(16.93)
AQ
-0.006***
(-3.54)
-0.005***
(-3.01)
-0.008***
(-4.79)
-0.004***
(-2.06)
*BLI AQ
-0.098***
(-6.05)
-
-
-
*CI AQ
-
-0.099***
(-6.90)
-
-
*CBI AQ
-
-
-0.091
(-0.70)
-
*DI AQ
-
-
-
-0.051***
(-6.60)
evL
0.059***
(11.41)
0.056***
(10.96)
0.068***
(13.38)
0.049***
(9.41)
Size
-0.003***
(-3.52)
-0.003***
(-3.21)
-0.003***
(-3.19)
-0.003***
(-3.87)
0.140***
(7.26)
0.149***
(7.80)
0.175***
(9.14)
0.117***
(6.11)
OCF
-0.193***
(-13.69)
-0.247***
(-18.14)
-0.237***
(-17.27)
-0.203***
(-14.89)
AS
-0.024***
(-4.45)
-0.012***
(-2.30)
-0.023***
(-4.19)
-0.014***
(-2.71)
obQT
0.005***
(11.18)
0.006***
(11.52)
0.005***
(11.23)
0.005***
(11.02)
ndI
0.014
(0.92)
0.020
(1.31)
0.016
(1.04)
0.017
(1.13)
pvboS ard
-0.001
(-1.15)
-0.001
(-1.15)
-0.002**
(-2.04)
-0.000
(-0.42)
-cons
0.100***
(5.15)
0.090***
(4.61)
0.096***
(4.89)
0.102***
(5.27)
N
11834
11834
11834
11834
ndustryFEI
YES
YES
YES
YES
earY FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
F
96.53
99.33
77.71
113.99
2
R
0.0816
0.0838
0.0666
0.0950
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2217
Volume 20, 2023
The regression coefficient between AQ and bank
loan increment and EM is -0.098. The regression
coefficient between the interaction of AQ and
business credit and EM degree is -0.099, and both of
them show a significant negative correlation at the
level of 1%. The higher the audit quality, the lower
the impact on bank loans, commercial increment, and
EM. The regression coefficient of AQ and corporate
bonds to EM is -0.091, but it is not significant. In
regard to corporate bond financing and EM, AQ has
no impact, which is consistent with the three
presumptions mentioned above. Therefore, AQ can
greatly reduce the positive effect of bank loans and
commercial credit increment on EM, but it cannot
affect the regulatory effect of corporate debt
increment on EM.
This study uses a large number of data and
analytical methods to explore the relationship
between earnings management behavior and debt
Financing. The empirical results indicate that there is
a certain correlation between these two factors. At
the same time, the empirical results also indicate the
impact of the interaction between control variables
on this relationship. From the results of descriptive
statistical analysis, it can be seen that the degree of
earnings management of most enterprises is
relatively stable, and different listed enterprises have
certain differences in the amount of debt financing
increment. On this basis, through correlation analysis
and regression analysis, the following results are
obtained: First, the degree of earnings management is
positively related to debt Financing and the
increment of debt financing, while the degree of
earnings management is negatively related to audit
quality. This can be understood as that when facing
financing needs, enterprises will affect the increase
of debt Financing by adjusting earnings management
behavior in order to maintain profitability; Secondly,
from the results of regression analysis, it can be seen
that when interaction terms appear in the control
variables, audit quality has a moderating effect on the
relationship between bank loans, commercial credit
increment, and earnings management. This indicates
that in reality, more consideration needs to be given
to the impact of the interactions between different
variables on the results. In practical applications,
these results may have significant implications for
businesses and policymakers. For example, in the
case of high audit quality, to reduce the impact of
debt financing, enterprises can actively adjust
earnings management behavior to reduce financing
costs. At the government level, relevant policies can
be formulated to guide enterprises to achieve more
stable financial operations. In conclusion, this study
provides a method to explore the relationship
between earnings management and debt financing
behavior and suggests further exploring other
possible factors in future research to better
understand the interaction of these two factors.
Through empirical research on the data of A-share
listed companies, this study systematically analyzes
the relationship between debt financing increment
and earnings management and considers the impact
of multiple regulatory factors on the relationship,
including audit quality, debt Financing methods, etc.
The research results have high credibility and
explanatory power and have important reference
value for an in-depth understanding of corporate
financial management and its influencing factors. In
addition, in terms of research methods, the study
adopted a multiple regression analysis method to
consider multiple factors, effectively avoiding the
impact of a single factor, and more comprehensively
and objectively presenting the relationship between
debt Financing and earnings management. Therefore,
the advantage of this study is that it comprehensively
considers the impact of multiple factors on the
relationship between debt financing increment and
earnings management, and the results are highly
reliable and explanatory, which has enlightenment
and reference value for the practice and theoretical
research of enterprise financial management.
4.4 Robustness Test
In the robustness test, two kinds of test methods are
used to test the robustness of model parameters and
the regression function. Table 7 displays the results
of the model parameters' robustness test.
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2218
Volume 20, 2023
Table 7. Robustness test
Sample
size
Change of
parameters
Variation range of variable parameters
Confidence
interval
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
50
Standard
deviation
0.055
0.056
0.055
0.044
0.049
0.055
0.054
0.053
0.052
0.051
[0.047,0.055]
80
0.048
0.055
0.053
0.054
0.051
0.045
0.051
0.056
0.055
0.052
110
0.049
0.055
0.051
0.051
0.053
0.055
0.047
0.052
0.055
0.056
Table 8. Results of the robustness test of EM, DF, and DF methods
-
absEM1
absEM2
absEM3
absEM4
BLI
0.122***
(14.48)
-
-
-
CI
-
0.194***
(18.81)
-
-
CBI
-
-
0.002
(1.02)
-
DI
-
-
-
0.092***
(22.82)
evL
0.051***
(9.90)
0.046***
(8.96)
0.063***
(12.26)
0.037***
(7.17)
Size
-0.003***
(-3.28)
-0.003***
(-2.82)
-0.003***
(-2.88)
-0.003***
(-3.67)
0.132***
(6.81)
0.135***
(7.02)
0.173***
(8.92)
0.098***
(5.11)
OCF
-0.199***
(-14.00)
-0.261***
(-19.08)
-0.250***
(-17.98)
-0.207***
(-15.08)
AS
-0.030***
(-5.65)
-0.016***
(-2.87)
-0.029***
(-5.35)
-0.019***
(-3.54)
obQT
0.006***
(12.00)
0.006***
(12.50)
0.006***
(12.13)
0.006***
(11.76)
ndI
0.005
(0.31)
0.011
(0.72)
0.005
(0.34)
0.008
(0.55)
pvboS ard
-0.001
(-0.81)
-0.001
(-0.66)
-0.002**
(-1.81)
-0.000
(-0.15)
-cons
0.099***
(5.02)
0.084***
(4.32)
0.92***
(4.65)
0.102***
(5.25)
N
11834
11834
11834
11834
ndustryFEI
YES
YES
YES
YES
earY FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
F
122.70
139.89
98.15
159.83
dj.R-SquareA
0.0847
0.0955
0.0688
0.1078
The sample size changes along the scale of 50, 80,
and 110 in the test. The parameters vary from 0.0 to
0.9. With the change of parameters and sample size,
the confidence interval of the model is always within
the range of 0.047 to 0.055. The model itself has the
advantages of parameter operation robustness and
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2219
Volume 20, 2023
performance. It can be inferred that even when
encountering small range parameter changes or
sample size changes in practical applications, the
model is likely to still maintain reliable performance.
Therefore, when using this model, it is more
reassuring to adjust parameters or change the scale of
data collection without worrying about the potential
impact on the performance of the model. This also
provides greater flexibility and security guarantees
for the practical application of the model. At the
same time, the application value of this model has
also been effectively validated in areas involving
high reliability or stability.
To ensure the stability of the proposed model, the
extended Jones model is used to verify the
practicability of the modified Jones model. The
robustness test results of EM, DF, and DF methods
are shown in Table 8. The commercial credit
increment, bank loan, total asset financing, and EM
still show a significant positive correlation, below
1%. There is no obvious correlation between the
increase in corporate debt and the degree of EM. The
robustness tests of EM, audit quality, DF, and DF
methods show that AQ is a good regulatory variable,
and significantly weakens the positive effect of the
increment of industrial credit, bank loan, and total
DF on EM. The AQ cannot well adjust the
relationship between the increase of corporate debt
and the degree of EM. This is consistent with the
hypothesis proposed in the study and the regression
results mentioned above. Therefore, the proposed
model is stable.
It can be considered that the modified Jones
model is reliable, and has certain practicability in
studying the relationship between earnings
management, debt financing, and debt financing. In
addition, audit quality also plays a certain role in
regulating this relationship. When enterprises
conduct earnings management, business credit
increment, bank loan increment, or total debt
financing increment, audit quality can play a role in
limiting and controlling, thus improving the
robustness and sustainability of enterprises.
Therefore, when conducting earnings management
and debt Financing, enterprises should improve audit
quality as much as possible, adopt reasonable and
stable financing methods, and avoid negative impacts
on the financial stability of enterprises. In conclusion,
the modified Jones model is reliable and practical in
studying the relationship between earnings
management, debt Financing, and debt Financing.
Audit quality can be used as a regulating variable to
control the earnings management behavior and debt
financing of enterprises. When conducting earnings
management and debt financing, enterprises should
pay attention to avoiding excessive borrowing and
earnings management, and adopt reasonable and
stable financing methods to ensure financial stability
and sustainable development.
5 Conclusion and Inspiration
Through theoretical analysis of the relationship
between AQ, DF, and EM, this paper puts forward
the interaction between different DF methods and
EM of enterprises, and the role of AQ in their impact.
The empirical analysis results show that more DF
enterprises, whether through bank loans or
commercial credit financing enterprises use the most,
trigger corporate managers to manage corporate
earnings, increase their advantages, and then make
corporate DF higher. Bond financing has little impact
on EM. AQ can reduce the impact of bank loans and
commercial credit DF on EM, but it has little impact
on bond financing. For the company, when faced
with operational and financial difficulties, the
company's operators should properly adopt EM
measures to avoid financial risks and default. At the
same time, they can also obtain more financing to
improve the production efficiency of enterprises.
However, earnings information should be used
reasonably. The long-term operation of the enterprise
should pay more attention. To support the enterprise's
successful development, the management capability
of the business is enhanced, making investors more
confident. For creditors, before and after investment,
creditors should reduce their dependence on the
evaluation of enterprise earnings information,
objectively and comprehensively understand the
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2220
Volume 20, 2023
enterprise's operating ability and loan repayment
ability, and carefully examine the specific financial
information and profitability of the enterprise. In the
operation, it is also necessary to supervise, and
improve the debt contract, reduce the operation of
enterprises through surplus information, maintain the
operation of enterprises, understand the direction of
financing funds, ensure the safety of funds, and
reduce risks. For the market supervision department,
many listed companies in China have EM. It is
mainly caused by the information asymmetry
between the debtor and the debtor. Most financing
entities, including bank loans, only pay attention to
the financial information of the enterprise and rarely
know the specific scale and operating capacity of the
enterprise, which also increases the risk of financing.
Relevant departments should effectively monitor the
financial information of enterprises and the capital
trend of debt financing, and disclose major events of
the company.
References:
[1] Begenau J, Salomao J, Firm Financing over the
Business Cycle, The Review of Financial
Studies, Vol.32, No.4, 2019, pp. 1235-1274.
[2] Zalata A M, Tauringana V, Tingbani I, Audit
Committee Financial Expertise, Gender, and
Earnings Management: Does Gender of the
Financial Expert Matter?, International Review
of Financial Analysis, Vol.55, 2018, pp.
170-183.
[3] Brennan M J, Kraft H, Leaning Against the
Wind: Debt Financing in the Face of Adversity,
Financial Management, Vol.47, No.3, 2018, pp.
485-518.
[4] Jung Y, Kim S, Information Risk and
Debtholders' Mispricing by Considering Audit
Quality, Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial
Studies, Vol.49, No.3, 2020, pp. 463-508.
[5] Le H, Qian L K, Ting I, Taylor M P,
Cuthbertson K, Dooley M P, CEO Power and
Earnings Management: Dual Roles of Foreign
Shareholders in Vietnamese Listed Companies,
International Journal of Finance and
Economics, Vol.27, No.1, 2022, pp.
1240-1256.
[6] Marantika A, Djatmiko B, Jatiningrum C,
Purwohando K, The Motivation of Earnings
Management Practices in Indonesia Companies:
Board of Director Perspective, Social
Psychology of Education, Vol.58, No.2021,
2021, pp. 5075-5087.
[7] Saci F, Jasimuddin S M, Hoque A, Does
Corporate Culture Matter to Earnings
Management? Evidence from Chinese
Time-onoured Brand Firms, Australian
Economic Papers, Vol.60, No.3, 2021, pp.
435-465.
[8] Mendoza J, Ramos C, Sepúlveda S, Fuentealba
C, Solis R F, Impact of Earnings Management
on Agency Costs: Evidence from MILA
Markets, Baltic Journal of Management,
Vol.16, No.2, 2021, pp. 247-275.
[9] Chen N Y, Liu C C, Share Repurchases and
Market Signaling: Evidence from Earnings
Management, International Review of Finance,
Vol.21, No.4, 2021, pp. 1203-1224.
[10] Pajuste A, Poriete E, Novickis R, Management
Reporting Complexity and Earnings
Management: Evidence from the Baltic
Markets, Baltic Journal of Management,
Vol.16, No.1, 2020, pp. 47-69.
[11] Hendricks B E, Landsman W R, Pena-Romera
F D, The Revolving Door between Large Audit
Firms and the PCAOB: Implications for Future
Inspection Reports and Audit Quality,
Accounting Review, Vol.97, No.1, 2022, pp.
261-292.
[12] Blum E S, Hatfield R C, Houston R W, The
Effect of Staff Auditor Reputation on Audit
Quality Enhancing Actions, Accounting
Review, Vol.97, No.1, 2022, pp. 75-97.
[13] `Herda D N, Lavelle J J, How and Why
Auditors' Social Exchange Relationships
Influence Their Attitudes and Behaviors:
Implications for Audit Quality, Business
Horizons, Vol.65, No.3, 2022, pp. 245-249.
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2221
Volume 20, 2023
[14] Francis J R, Hallman N J, Golshan N, Does
Distance Matter? An Investigation of Partners
Who Audit Distant Clients and the Effects on
Audit Quality?, Contemporary Accounting
Research, Vol.39, No.2, 2022, pp. 947-981.
[15] Ewert R, Wagenhofer A, Effects of Increasing
Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality
and Audit Quality, Journal of Accounting
Research, Vol.57, No.1, 2019, pp. 121-168.
[16] Xu X L, Chen H H, Exploring the
Relationships between Environmental
Management and Financial Sustainability in
the Energy Industry: Linear and Nonlinear
Effects, Energy & Environment, Vol.31, No.7,
2020, pp. 1281-1300.
[17] Meng Y, Yin C, Trust and the Cost of Debt
Financing, Journal of International Financial
Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol.59, No.3,
2019, pp. 58-73.
[18] Cai J, Shi G, Do Religious Norms Influence
Corporate Debt Financing?, Journal of
Business Ethics, Vol.157, No.1, 2019, pp.
159-182.
[19] Zhang N, Liang Q, Li H, Wang X, The
Organizational Relationship-based Political
Connection and Debt Financing: Evidence
from Chinese Private Firms, Bulletin of
Economic Research, Vol.74, No.1, 2022, pp.
69-105.
[20] Bronson S N, Masli A, Schroeder J H.
Releasing Earnings when the Audit Is Less
Complete: Implications for Audit Quality and
the Auditor/Client Relationship, Accounting
Horizons, Vol.35, No.2, 2021, pp. 27-55.
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2222
Volume 20, 2023
APPENDIX
Table 4. Variable Correlation Analysis
\
absE
M
BLI
CI
CBI
DI
AQ
Lev
Size
ROA
OCF
AS
TobQ
Ind
Spvb
oard
absE
M
1.000
0.074
***
0.096*
**
0.008
0.13
4***
-0.04
2***
0.07
8***
-0.04
2**
0.032
***
-0.12
7***
-0.15
6***
0.054
7***
0.024
**
-0.04
4***
BLI
0.173
***
1.000
0.196*
**
-0.01
7*
0.62
3***
0.012
0.18
2***
0.101
***
-0.00
5***
-0.25
6***
-0.09
7***
-0.08
7***
0.008
-0.02
8***
CI
0.151
***
0.323
***
1.000
0.024
***
0.63
8***
0.021
***
0.13
8***
0.097
***
0.126
**
0.027
***
-0.16
8***
-0.03
2***
-0.00
9
-0.05
7***
CBI
0.015
0.006
0.042*
**
1.000
0.13
8***
0.006
0.14
2***
0.168
***
-0.02
1***
-0.02
5***
-0.03
5***
-0.13
4***
-0.00
6
0.036
***
DI
0.217
***
0.716
***
0.719*
**
0.176
***
1.00
0
0.018
***
0.24
4***
0.147
***
0.098
***
-0.16
9**
-0.20
3***
-0.07
8***
0.008
-0.06
7***
AQ
-0.05
6***
0.011
*
0.007*
**
-0.01
2
0.00
7
1.000
0.02
1**
-0.08
3***
0.035
***
0.052
***
0.013
-0.03
4***
0.001
0.015
Lev
0.065
***
0.487
***
0.156*
*****
0.083
***
0.21
7***
0.023
**
1.00
0
0.534
***
-0.41
5**
-0.16
8***
0.024
**
-0.62
7***
-0.01
5*
0.232
***
Size
-0.05
4***
0.101
***
0.094*
**
0.087
***
0.13
4***
0.108
***
0.52
4***
1.000
-0.06
8***
0.043
***
0.009
-0.70
6***
-0.02
5***
0.297
***
ROA
0.013
-0.00
5
0.086
0.025
***
0.06
7***
0.042
***
-0.3
84**
-0.03
2**
1.000
0.387
***
-0.13
4***
0.364
***
-0.02
7***
-0.12
5***
OCF
-0.17
5***
-0.24
8***
0.013*
**
-0.05
6***
-0.1
51**
0.048
***
-0.1
75**
0.045
***
1.001
1.000
0.026
8
0.098
***
-0.02
5***
0.024
***
AS
-0.12
6***
-0.08
8***
-0.154
***
-0.07
6***
-0.1
61**
0.017
**
0.07
6*
0.086
***
0.386
***
0.263
***
1.000
-0.12
8***
-0.05
8***
0.157
***
Tob
Q
0.103
***
-0.06
4***
-0.048
***
-0.05
2***
-0.0
54**
-0.02
7**
-0.4
61**
-0.58
8**
0.256
***
0.078
***
-0.16
7**
1.000
0.049
***
-0.29
4***
Ind
0.023
**
0.011
-0.014
-0.00
3
0.00
1
0.005
-0.0
17*
0.001
-0.01
7***
-0.02
4**
-0.05
6**
0.072
***
1.000
-0.08
5***
Spvb
oard
-0.05
1***
-0.04
2***
-0.053
***
-0.01
2
-0.0
62
0.017
*
0.22
6***
0.331
***
-0.09
4***
0.026
***
0.195
***
-0.21
4***
-0.09
7***
1.000
Contribution of Individual Authors to the
Creation of a Scientific Article (Ghostwriting
Policy)
The author contributed to the present research at all
stages from the formulation of the problem to the final
findings and solution.
Sources of Funding for Research Presented in a
Scientific Article or Scientific Article Itself
No funding was received for conducting this study.
Conflict of Interest
The author has no conflict of interest to declare.
Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0
(Attribution 4.0 International, CC BY 4.0)
This article is published under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en
_US
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2023.20.191
Hui Jing
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
2223
Volume 20, 2023