A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Fiscal Policy under Economic Growth
from the Perspective of MMT: Toward a Neoclassical Basis of MMT
YASUHITO TANAKA
Faculty of Economics
Doshisha University
Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto, 602-8580
JAPAN
Abstract: - We present a game-theoretic analysis of fiscal policy under economic growth from the perspective
of MMT using a simple two-periods overlapping generations (OLG) model. We show the following results. 1)
Sustained budget deficits are necessary to maintain full-employment under economic growth driven by popula-
tion growth. 2) An excessive budget deficit triggers inflation, and after one period inflation full-employment is
maintained by sustained budget deficits with constant price. 3) Insufficient government deficit causes involuntary
unemployment, and we need extra budget deficit over its steady state value to recover full-employment. These
budget deficits need not be, and must not be redeemed. Therefore, if it is institutionally and legally possible, they
should be financed by seigniorage not by public debt.
Key-Words: - Overlapping generations model, Full-employment, Budget deficit, Growth, MMT
Received: June 15, 2021. Revised: January 26, 2022. Accepted: February 17, 2022. Published: March 3, 2022.
1 Introduction
This paper will present a game theoretic analysis of
a simple two-periods overlapping generations (OLG)
model with pay-as-you-go pensions in which goods
are produced solely by labor, and mainly show the
following three results.
1. Sustained budget deficits are necessary to main-
tain full-employment under economic growth
driven by population growth. Budget deficit is
necessary under growth because of deficiency
of the consumptions by the older generation
consumers. Since the budget deficits to main-
tain full-employment must be sustained, if it is
institutionally and legally possible, the budget
deficits should be financed by seigniorage not by
public debt. This budget deficit need not to be,
and must not be redeemed.
2. An excessive budget deficit triggers inflation.
About this excessive budget deficit that has
caused inflation, only the excess portion should
be reduced. There is no need to make up for
past excesses by creating surpluses or reducing
deficits.
3. Insufficient government deficit causes involun-
tary unemployment, and we need extra budget
deficit over its steady state value to recover full-
employment. After recovery of full-employment
we can maintain it with sustained budget deficits.
Thus, the extra budget deficit should not be re-
deemed.
In the next section we present a model of this pa-
per. In Section 3 we consider budget deficit for eco-
nomic growth. In Section 4 we analyze inflation by
excessive budget deficit, and in Section 5 we consider
involuntary unemployment due to insufficient gov-
ernment deficit, and necessity of extra budget deficit
to recover full-employment. In Section 6 we will
consider a case of economic growth by technological
progress instead of population growth.
This paper is one of the attempts to give a theo-
retical basis to the so-called functional finance theory
by [3] and [4]. It also present a theoretical foundation
to MMT (Modern Monetary Theory, [5]). In partic-
ular, we provide a rationale for the following claims
([2]). We refer to the summary of Kelton’s book by
[1]. In fact, Hogan argues that Kelton is wrong, but
he summarizes Kelton’s argument to the point.
1. The treasury creates new money.
The money supply equals the net savings (the
savings minus the pay-as-you-go pensions). An
increase in the money supply equals the increase
in the net savings. As expressed in the equation
(4) in Section 3.1, an increase in the net savings
from a period to the next period equals the bud-
get deficit in the latter period. The rate of an in-
crease in the net savings, which equals the rate
of in increase in the money supply, equals the
rate of economic growth, and therefore the bud-
get deficit and an increase in the money supply
does not cause inflation in this case.
2. Inflation is caused by federal government deficit
spending, not by Fed policy.
As we will show in Section 4.1, if the actual
budget deficit is larger than the budget deficit
that is necessary and sufficient to maintain full-
employment under economic growth with con-
stant price, the price of the good will rise.
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3. Federal government spending is not related to
taxes or borrowing.
As summarized above, sustained budget deficits
are necessary to maintain full-employment under
economic growth, and these budget deficits make
it possible to maintain full-employment. It is im-
possible to maintain full-employment in a grow-
ing economy with a balanced budget. There-
fore, even if the budget deficit to maintain full-
employment is financed by the national debt, it
does not need to be repaid or redeemed, and must
not be repaid or redeemed. Future budget sur-
pluses need not and must not make up the deficits
for growth.
Recently, we have published some studies about
theoretical or mathematical bases of MMT using a
model with or without microeconomic foundations
of behaviors of consumers and firms under perfect
or monopolistic completion (for example, [10], [11],
[12]). This paper is an attempt to interprete these re-
sults in the framework of Game Theory.
2 The model
We consider the following model. It is a two gener-
ations overlapping generations (OLG) model, and a
simplified version of the model used by [6], [7], [8]
and [9] with pay-as-you-go pensions.
1. There are one good and one firm. The firm pro-
duces one unit of the good by one unit of labor
at present (Period t). Although there is only one
firm, it behaves competitively. Let wbe the nom-
inal wage rate and pbe the price of the good.
Then, p=w, and the real wage rate is one.
2. Consumers live over two periods, Period 1 and
Period 2. In Period 1 (younger period, working
period) they can work and earn the wages. They
buy and consume the good by wages. In Period
2 (older period, retired period) they buy and con-
sume the good by their savings and the pay-as-
you-go pensions. The good can be consumed by
any unit, that is, a consumer can consume, for ex-
ample, 0.1 units of the good. The population of
consumers grows from a period to the next period
at the rate γ1>0.
3. There are four younger generation consumers in
Period t. If a consumer is employed, he sup-
plies one unit of labor (labor supply is indivisi-
ble), receives the wage, consumes the good, pays
tax for pay-as-you-go pensions for consumers
of the older generation, lends money to unem-
ployed younger generation consumers (if invol-
untary unemployment exists) and leaves the re-
maining income.
If a consumer is not employed, his income is
zero. However, he can receive a pay-as-you-
go pension after retirement, so he consumes the
good in his Period 1 by borrowing money from
employed younger generation consumers using
his pension as collateral. We assume that utility
of an employed consumer is larger than utility of
an unemployed consumer.
Each consumer determines his consumption and
labor supply at the beginning of Period 1 depend-
ing on the situation that he is employed or not
employed. He spends half of his income, respec-
tively, on consumption in Period 1 and that in Pe-
riod 2.
4. There are 4
γolder consumers in Period t(four
older generation consumers in Period t+ 1). If a
consumer was employed in his Period 1, he con-
sumes the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension. If he is not employed, he con-
sumes the good only by the pay-as-you-go pen-
sion, and repays his debt due to consumption in
Period 1.
We assume zero interest rate. Repayment by a con-
sumer who was unemployed in the younger period
is assured. An employed consumer is indifferent be-
tween lending money to unemployed consumers and
leaving money.
We assume that the tax other than that for the pay-
as-you-go pension system is zero.
3 Sustained full-employment under
growth with constant price
3.1 Period t
Let us consider the following pair of strategies of
the firm and the younger generation consumers at a
steady state with full-employment and constant price
under economic growth due to population growth at
the rate γ1. The strategies of the consumers are
derived from their utility maximization over two pe-
riods. Denote the pay-as-you go pension received by
each older generation consumer in each period is γτ.
On the other hand, the tax for the pay-as-you-go pen-
sion paid by each younger generation consumer is τ
because of the population growth. The nominal wage
rate and the price are 1.
1. Firm: employs four younger generation con-
sumers and produces four units of the good.
2. Each employed younger generation consumer:
supplies one unit of labor, receives wage 1, con-
sumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units of the good, pays τ
units of tax for the pay-as-you-go pension system
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for the older generation consumers, and leaves
the rest of the income;
1
2[1 (1 + γ)τ].
In the next period he consumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension γτ .
Each older generation consumer consumes 1
2[1+(γ
1)τ]units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension (γτ ). Let Gtbe the government ex-
penditure other than the pay-as-you-go pension. The
total demand for the good is
21 + 1
γ[1 + (γ1)τ] + Gt.
Note that there are four younger and 4
γolder genera-
tion consumers. This must be equal to the total sup-
ply, 4. Thus,
Gt=2(γ1)
γ[1 (1 + γ)τ]>0.(1)
The total net savings of the older generation con-
sumers, which is the difference between their con-
sumptions and the pensions, is
2
γ[1 + (γ1)τ]
4
γγτ =2
γ[1 (1 + γ)τ].(2)
On the other hand, the total net savings of the older
generation consumers in the next period, who are the
younger generation consumers in Period t, is
2[1 + (γ1)τ]4γτ = 2[1 (1 + γ)τ].(3)
The difference between (3)and (2) is
2
γ(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ] = Gt.(4)
Therefore, the government expenditure Gtin (1)
equals the increase in the net savings of the consumers
from Period t1to Period t.
Is the pair of strategies above in a Nash equilib-
rium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of the
younger generation consumers and the older gen-
eration consumers, and the government expendi-
ture, employment of four consumers and produc-
tion of four units of the good are optimal.
2. Each younger generation consumer: given the
behavior of the firm, consumptions of the other
consumers and the government expenditure, sup-
ply of one unit of labor and 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units
of consumption are optimal under the assumption
that each consumer spends half of his income, re-
spectively, on consumption in Period 1 and that
in Period 2.
Since we assume zero tax other than the tax for the
pay-as-you-go pension system, the government ex-
penditure equals the budget deficit, and the existence
of the positive government expenditure means the ex-
istence of the budget deficit. Since the budget deficits
to maintain full-employment must be sustained, if it is
institutionally and legally possible, the budget deficits
should be financed by seigniorage not by public debt.
Budget deficit is necessary under growth because of
deficiency of the savings of the older generation. This
budget deficit is not debt and does not need to be, and
must not be redeemed.
Since consumers leave the savings by money, the
money supply equals the net savings (the savings mi-
nus the pay-as-you-go pensions). An increase in the
money supply equals the increase in the net savings.
As expressed in the equation (4), an increase in the net
savings from Period t1to Period tequals the bud-
get deficit in Period t. The rate of an increase in the
net savings, which equals the rate of in increase in the
money supply, equals the rate of economic growth,
and therefore the budget deficit and an increase in the
money supply does not cause inflation in this case.
3.2 Period t+ 1
Next we consider Period t+1. Let us consider the fol-
lowing pair of strategies of the firm and the younger
generation consumers in Period t+ 1.
1. Firm: employs 4γyounger generation con-
sumers and produces 4γunits of the good.
2. Each employed younger generation consumer:
supplies one unit of labor, receives wage 1, con-
sumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units of the good, pays τ
units of tax for the pay-as-you-go pension system
for the older generation consumers, who are the
younger generation consumers in Period t, and
leaves the rest of the income;
1
2[1 (1 + γ)τ].
In the next period he consumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension γτ .
Each older generation consumer consumes 1
2[1+(γ
1)τ]units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension (γτ ). Let Gt+1 be the government ex-
penditure other than the pay-as-you-go pension. The
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total demand for the good is
2(1 + γ)[1 + (γ1)τ] + Gt+1.
This must be equal to the total supply, 4γ. Thus,
Gt+1 = 2(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ] = γGt.(5)
The government expenditure Gt+1 in (5) equals the
increase in the net savings of the consumers from Pe-
riod tto Period t+1. This relationship holds true even
after Period t+ 1.
Is the pair of strategies above in a Nash equilib-
rium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of the
younger generation consumers and the older gen-
eration consumers, and the government expendi-
ture, employment of four consumers and produc-
tion of 4γunits of the good are optimal.
2. Each younger generation consumer: given the
behavior of the firm, consumptions of the other
consumers and the government expenditure, sup-
ply of one unit of labor and 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units
of consumption are optimal under the assumption
that each consumer spends half of his income, re-
spectively, on consumption in Period 1 and that
in Period 2.
From these results we get the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 1. In order to maintain economic growth
we need sustained budget deficits. The budget deficit
in each period equals the increase in the total net sav-
ings of the older generation consumers (the difference
between their consumptions and the pensions) from
the previous period to this period.
4 Inflation by excessive budget deficit
4.1 Period t
In this section we suppose that the government expen-
diture in Period tis larger than Gtin the previous case.
Denote it by ˆ
Gt. The actual price of the good in Period
tis ρ > 1, and the actual nominal wage rate is also
ρ. We assume that the inflation is not anticipated by
the older generation consumers in the previous period
(when they are young in their Period 1). We consider
the value of ˆ
Gtwhich triggers inflation at the rate ρ
under full-employment. Let us consider the following
pair of strategies of the firm and the younger genera-
tion consumers.
1. Firm: employs four younger generation con-
sumers and produces four units of the good.
2. Each employed younger generation consumer:
supplies one unit of labor, receives wage ρ, con-
sumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units of the good at the
price ρ, pays ρτ units of tax for the pay-as-you-
go pensions for the older generation consumers,
and leaves the rest of the income;
ρρτ
ρ
2[1 + (γ1)τ] = ρ
2[1 (1 + γ)τ].
In the next period he consumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension ργτ at the price ρif the price of
the good is ρin Period t+ 1.
Each older generation consumer consumes 1
2ρ[1 +
(ργ 1)τ]units of the good by his savings and the
pay-as-you-go pension (ργτ ). The nominal total de-
mand for the good is
2ρ[1 + (γ1)τ] + 2
γ[1 + (ργ 1)τ] + ˆ
Gt
=2
γ1 + ργ + (ργ2
1)τ+ˆ
Gt.
If this is equal to the nominal total supply, 4ρ, we have
ˆ
Gt=2
γργ 1(ργ2
1)τ.
Comparing this with Gtin (1),
ˆ
GtGt(6)
=2
γργ 1(ργ2
1)τ(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ]
=2(ρ1)(1 γτ )>0.
This means that an excessive budget deficit expressed
in (6) causes inflation under full-employment.
Is the pair of strategies above in a Nash equilib-
rium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of the
younger generation consumers and the older gen-
eration consumers, and the government expendi-
ture, employment of four consumers and produc-
tion of four units of the good are optimal.
2. Each younger generation consumer: given the
behavior of the firm and consumptions of the
other consumers, supply of one unit of labor and
1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units of consumption are optimal
under the assumption that each consumer spends
half of his income, respectively, on consumption
in Period 1 and that in Period 2.
From these results we get the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 2. The excessive budget deficit ex-
pressed in (6) causes inflation under full-employment.
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4.2 Period t+ 1
Next we consider Period t+1. Let us consider the fol-
lowing pair of strategies of the firm and the younger
generation consumers in Period t+ 1. The pay-as-
you-go pension for each older generation consumer is
ργτ . Assume that the price of the good in this period
is ρ.
1. Firm: employs 4γyounger generation con-
sumers and produces 4γunits of the good.
2. Each employed younger generation consumer:
supplies one unit of labor, receives wage ρ, con-
sumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units of the good at the
price ρ, pays ργτ units of tax for pay-as-you-go
pension to the older generation consumers, who
are the younger generation consumers in Period
t, and leaves the rest of the income;
ρρτ
ρ
2[1 + (γ1)τ] = ρ
2[1 (1 + γ)τ].
In the next period he consumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension ργτ at the price ρ.
Each older generation consumer consumes 1
2[1+(γ
1)τ]units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension (ργτ ) at the price ρ. Let ˆ
Gt+1 be the
government expenditure other than the pay-as-you-go
pension. The nominal total demand for the good is
2ρ(1 + γ)[1 + (γ1)τ] + ˆ
Gt+1.
Note that there are 4γyounger generation consumers.
This must be equal to the nominal total supply, 4ργ.
Thus,
ˆ
Gt+1 = 2ρ(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ].
From (5) we find
ˆ
Gt+1 =ρGt+1.
This relationship holds true even after Period t+ 1.
Therefore, after one period inflation full-employment
under constant price is maintained by sustained bud-
get deficits. Only the excess portion should be re-
duced. There is no need to make up for past excesses
by creating surpluses or reducing deficits.
Is the pair of strategies above in a Nash equilib-
rium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of the
younger generation consumers and the older gen-
eration consumers, and the government expendi-
ture, employment of four consumers and produc-
tion of 4γunits of the good are optimal.
2. Each younger generation consumer: given the
behavior of the firm, consumptions of the other
consumers and the government expenditure, sup-
ply of one unit of labor and 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units
of consumption are optimal under the assumption
that each consumer spends half of his income, re-
spectively, on consumption in Period 1 and that
in Period 2.
From these results we obtain the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 3. After one period inflation full-
employment under constant price is maintained by
sustained budget deficits. Only the excess portion
should be reduced. There is no need to make up
for past excesses by creating surpluses or reducing
deficits.
5 Insufficient budget deficit and
recovery from recession
5.1 Period t
Now we assume that the government expenditure in
Period tis insufficient. Let the actual value of the
government expenditure be
˜
Gt=2
γ(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ]
1
2.
It is smaller than Gtin (1). We assume that it is non-
negative. The price of the good and the nominal wage
rate in Period tis 1. We also assume that upto the
previous period, Period t1, full-employment has
been realized. Let us consider the following pair of
strategies of the firm and the younger generation con-
sumers.
1. Firm: employs three younger generation con-
sumers and produces three units of the good.
2. Each employed younger generation consumer:
supplies one unit of labor, receives wage 1, con-
sumes 1
2[1+(γ
4
3)τ]units of the good, pays 4
3τ
units of tax for pay-as-you-go pensions for the
older generation consumers, and leaves the rest
of the income:
1
4
3τ
1
21 + γ
4
3τ=1
21γ+4
3τ.
In the next period he consumes 1
2[1 + γ
4
3τ]
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension γτ .
3. One unemployed consumer: consumes 1
2γτ units
of the good by borrowing money from employed
younger generation consumers using his pension
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as collateral. In the next period he consumes 1
2γτ
units of the good by the pay-as-you-go pension
γτ , and repays his debt due to consumption in
Period 1
Each older generation consumer consumes 1
2[1 +
(γ1)τ]units of the good by his savings and the
pay-as-you-go pension (γτ ). The total demand for the
good is
3
21 + γ
4
3τ+1
2γτ (7)
+2
γ[1 + (γ1)τ] + ˜
Gt
=3
21 + γ
4
3τ+1
2γτ +2
γ[1 + (γ1)τ]
+2
γ(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ]
1
2= 3.
Note that there are 4
γolder generation consumers,
three employed and one unemployed younger con-
sumers. (7) means that the total demand equals the
total supply, and there exists one involuntary unem-
ployment.
Are the strategies of the firm and the younger gen-
eration consumers above in a Nash equilibrium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of the
younger generation consumers and the older gen-
eration consumers, and the government expen-
diture, employment of three consumers and pro-
duction of three units of the good are optimal.
2. Each younger employed consumer: given the be-
havior of the firm, consumptions of the other con-
sumers and the government expenditure, supply
of one unit of labor and 1
2[1 + (γ
4
3)τ]units
of consumption are optimal under the assumption
that each consumer spends half of his income, re-
spectively, on consumption in Period 1 and that
in Period 2.
3. One younger unemployed consumer: given the
behavior of the firm, consumptions of the other
consumers and the government expenditure, 1
2γτ
units of consumption is optimal given the situa-
tion that he is unemployed, and spends half of his
income, respectively, on consumption in Period
1 and that in Period 2.
From these results we get the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 4. The insufficient government expendi-
ture (or budget deficit) causes involuntary unemploy-
ment.
5.2 Period t+ 1
Next we consider Period t+ 1. Suppose that we re-
cover full-employment in Period t+ 1 by increasing
the government expenditure (or the budget deficit).
Let ˜
Gt+1 be the government expenditure other than
the pay-as-you-go pension which is sufficient to re-
cover full-employment.
Let us consider the following pair of strategies of
the firm and the younger generation consumers in Pe-
riod t+ 1. The pay-as-you-go pension for each older
generation consumer is γτ . Assume that the price of
the good in this period is 1.
1. Firm: employs 4γyounger generation con-
sumers and produces 4γunits of the good.
2. Each employed younger generation consumer:
supplies one unit of labor, receives wage 1, con-
sumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units of the good, pays
τunits of tax for pay-as-you-go pension for the
older generation consumers, who are the younger
generation consumers in Period t, and leaves the
rest of the income;
1τ
γ
2[1 + (γ1)τ] = 1
2[1 (1 + γ)τ].
In the next period he consumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension γτ .
Each older generation consumer, who was employed
in the previous period, consumes 1
21 + γ
4
3τ
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-you-
go pension (γτ ), and one older generation consumer,
who was unemployed in the previous period, con-
sumes 1
2γτ units of the good by the pay-as-you-go
pension. He also repay the debt for consumption in
the previous period.
The total demand for the good is
2γ[1+(γ1)τ]+ 3
21 + γ
4
3τ+1
2γτ +˜
Gt+1.
Note that there are three older generation consumers
who was employed, and one of them was unem-
ployed. Suppose that this is equal to the total supply,
4γ. Then,
˜
Gt+1 = 2(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ] + 1
2.
Comparing this with (5)
˜
Gt+1
Gt+1 =1
2>0.
Therefore, to recover full-employment from a state
with involuntary unemployment we need extra bud-
get deficit. After recovery of full-employment we can
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maintain it with sustained budget deficit. Thus, the
extra budget deficit should not be redeemed.
Is the pair of strategies above in a Nash equilib-
rium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of the
younger generation consumers and the older gen-
eration consumers, and the government expendi-
ture, employment of four consumers and produc-
tion of 4γunits of the good are optimal.
2. Each younger generation consumer: given the
behavior of the firm, consumptions of the other
consumers and the government expenditure, sup-
ply of one unit of labor and 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units
of consumption are optimal under the assumption
that each consumer spends half of his income, re-
spectively, on consumption in Period 1 and that
in Period 2.
From these results we obtain the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 5. In order to recover full-employment
from a state with involuntary unemployment we
need extra budget deficit. After recovery of full-
employment we can maintain it with sustained budget
deficit. Thus, the extra budget deficit should not be
redeemed.
6 Growth by technological progress
6.1 Sustained full-employment under
growth with constant price
6.1.1 Period t
Let us consider the following pair of strategies of
the firm and the younger generation consumers at a
steady state with full-employment and constant price
under economic growth at the rate γ1. The strate-
gies of the consumers are derived from their utility
maximization over two periods. We suppose that the
labor productivity is 1 in Period t, and it increases at
the rate γ1. Also we assume that the nominal wage
rate is 1 in Period t. Denote the pay-as-you go pension
in this period by τ. We assume
(1 + γ)τ < 1.
1. Firm: employs four younger generation con-
sumers and produces four units of the good.
2. Each employed younger generation consumer:
supplies one unit of labor, receives wage 1, con-
sumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units of the good, pays τ
units of tax for the pay-as-you-go pension system
for the older generation consumers, and leaves
the rest of the income;
1
2[1 (1 + γ)τ].
In the next period he consumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension γτ .
Since we consider a steady state under growth at the
rate γ1, each older generation consumer consumes
1
2γ[1 + (γ1)τ]units of the good by his savings and
the pay-as-you-go pension (τ). Let Gtbe the govern-
ment expenditure other than the pay-as-you-go pen-
sion. The total demand for the good is
21 + 1
γ[1 + (γ1)τ] + Gt.
Note that there are four younger and four older gen-
eration consumers. This must be equal to the total
supply, 4. Thus,
Gt=2(γ1)
γ[1 (1 + γ)τ]>0.(8)
The total net savings of the older generation con-
sumers, which is the difference between their con-
sumptions and the pensions, is
2
γ[1 + (γ1)τ]4τ=2
γ[1 (1 + γ)τ].(9)
On the other hand, the total net savings of the older
generation consumers in the next period, who are the
younger generation consumers in Period t, is
2[1 + (γ1)τ]4γτ = 2[1 (1 + γ)τ].(10)
The difference between (10)and (9) is
2
γ(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ] = Gt.(11)
Therefore, the government expenditure Gtin (8)
equals the increase in the net savings of the consumers
from Period t1to Period t.
Is the pair of strategies above in a Nash equilib-
rium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of the
younger generation consumers and the older gen-
eration consumers, and the government expendi-
ture, employment of four consumers and produc-
tion of four units of the good are optimal.
2. Each younger generation consumer: given the
behavior of the firm, consumptions of the other
consumers and the government expenditure, sup-
ply of one unit of labor and 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units
of consumption are optimal under the assumption
that each consumer spends half of his income, re-
spectively, on consumption in Period 1 and that
in Period 2.
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6.1.2 Period t+ 1
Next we consider Period t+1. Suppose that the labor
productivity in Period t+ 1 is γ1, and the nominal
wage rate is also γ1. Let us consider the following
pair of strategies of the firm and the younger gener-
ation consumers in Period t+ 1. The pay-as-you-go
pension for each older generation consumer is γτ.
1. Firm: employs four younger generation con-
sumers and produces 4γunits of the good.
2. Each employed younger generation consumer:
supplies one unit of labor, receives wage γ, con-
sumes γ
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units of the good, pays γτ
units of tax for the pay-as-you-go pension system
for the older generation consumers, who are the
younger generation consumers in Period t, and
leaves the rest of the income;
γ
2[1 (1 + γ)τ].
In the next period he consumes γ
2[1 + (γ1)τ]
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension γ2τ.
Each older generation consumer consumes 1
2[1+(γ
1)τ]units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension (γτ ). Let Gt+1 be the government ex-
penditure other than the pay-as-you-go pension. The
total demand for the good is
2(1 + γ)[1 + (γ1)τ] + Gt+1.
This must be equal to the total supply, 4γ. Thus,
Gt+1 = 2(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ] = γGt.(12)
The government expenditure Gt+1 in (12) equals the
increase in the net savings of the consumers from Pe-
riod tto Period t+1. This relationship holds true even
after Period t+ 1.
Is the pair of strategies above in a Nash equilib-
rium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of the
younger generation consumers and the older gen-
eration consumers, and the government expendi-
ture, employment of four consumers and produc-
tion of 4γunits of the good are optimal.
2. Each younger generation consumer: given the
behavior of the firm, consumptions of the other
consumers and the government expenditure, sup-
ply of one unit of labor and γ
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units
of consumption are optimal under the assumption
that each consumer spends half of his income, re-
spectively, on consumption in Period 1 and that
in Period 2.
From these results we get the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 6. In order to maintain economic growth
we need sustained budget deficits. The budget deficit
in each period equals the increase in the total net sav-
ings of the older generation consumers (the difference
between their consumptions and the pensions) from
the previous period to this period.
6.2 Inflation by excessive budget deficit
6.2.1 Period t
In this subsection we suppose that the government ex-
penditure in Period tis larger than Gtin the previous
case. Denote it by ˆ
Gt. The actual price of the good in
Period tis ρ > 1, and the actual nominal wage rate is
also ρ. We assume that the inflation is not anticipated
by the older generation consumers in the previous pe-
riod (when they are young in their Period 1). We con-
sider the value of ˆ
Gtwhich triggers inflation at the
rate ρunder full-employment. Let us consider the fol-
lowing pair of strategies of the firm and the younger
generation consumers.
1. Firm: employs four younger generation con-
sumers and produces four units of the good.
2. Each employed younger generation consumer:
supplies one unit of labor, receives wage ρ, con-
sumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units of the good at the
price ρ, pays ρτ units of tax for the pay-as-you-
go pensions for the older generation consumers,
and leaves the rest of the income;
ρρτ
ρ
2[1 + (γ1)τ] = ρ
2[1 (1 + γ)τ].
In the next period he consumes 1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension ργτ at the price ρif the price of
the good is ρin Period t+ 1.
Each older generation consumer consumes 1
2ργ [1 +
(ργ 1)τ]units of the good by his savings and the
pay-as-you-go pension (ρτ). The nominal total de-
mand for the good is
2ρ[1 + (γ1)τ] + 2
γ[1 + (ργ 1)τ] + ˆ
Gt
=2
γ1 + ργ + (ργ2
1)τ+ˆ
Gt.
If this is equal to the nominal total supply, 4ρ, we have
ˆ
Gt=2
γργ 1(ργ2
1)τ.
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Comparing this with Gtin (8),
ˆ
GtGt(13)
=2
γργ 1(ργ2
1)τ(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ]
= 2(ρ1)(1 γτ )>0.
This means that an excessive budget deficit expressed
in (13) causes inflation under full-employment.
Is the pair of strategies above in a Nash equilib-
rium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of the
younger generation consumers and the older gen-
eration consumers, and the government expendi-
ture, employment of four consumers and produc-
tion of four units of the good are optimal.
2. Each younger generation consumer: given the
behavior of the firm and consumptions of the
other consumers, supply of one unit of labor and
1
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units of consumption are optimal
under the assumption that each consumer spends
half of his income, respectively, on consumption
in Period 1 and that in Period 2.
From these results we get the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 7. The excessive budget deficit
expressed in (13) causes inflation under full-
employment.
6.2.2 Period t+ 1
Next we consider Period t+ 1. Suppose that the la-
bor productivity in Period t+ 1 is γ, and the nominal
wage rate is ργ. Let us consider the following pair of
strategies of the firm and the younger generation con-
sumers in Period t+ 1. The pay-as-you-go pension
for each older generation consumer is ργτ . Assume
that the price of the good in this period is ρ.
1. Firm: employs four younger generation con-
sumers and produces 4γunits of the good.
2. Each employed younger generation consumer:
supplies one unit of labor, receives wage ργ, con-
sumes γ
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units of the good at the
price ρ, pays ργτ units of tax for pay-as-you-go
pension to the older generation consumers, who
are the younger generation consumers in Period
t, and leaves the rest of the income;
ργ ργτ
ργ
2[1+(γ1)τ] = ργ
2[1(1+γ)τ].
In the next period he consumes γ
2[1 + (γ1)τ]
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension ργ2τat the price ρ.
Each older generation consumer consumes 1
2[1+(γ
1)τ]units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension (ργτ ) at the price ρ. Let ˆ
Gt+1 be the
government expenditure other than the pay-as-you-go
pension. The nominal total demand for the good is
2ρ(1 + γ)[1 + (γ1)τ] + ˆ
Gt+1.
This must be equal to the nominal total supply, 4ργ.
Thus,
ˆ
Gt+1 = 2ρ(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ].
From (12) we find
ˆ
Gt+1 =ρGt+1.
This relationship holds true even after Period t+ 1.
Therefore, after one period inflation full-employment
under constant price is maintained by sustained bud-
get deficits. Only the excess portion should be re-
duced. There is no need to make up for past excesses
by creating surpluses or reducing deficits.
Is the pair of strategies above in a Nash equilib-
rium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of the
younger generation consumers and the older gen-
eration consumers, and the government expendi-
ture, employment of four consumers and produc-
tion of 4γunits of the good are optimal.
2. Each younger generation consumer: given the
behavior of the firm, consumptions of the other
consumers and the government expenditure, sup-
ply of one unit of labor and γ
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units
of consumption are optimal under the assumption
that each consumer spends half of his income, re-
spectively, on consumption in Period 1 and that
in Period 2.
From these results we obtain the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 8. After one period inflation full-
employment under constant price is maintained by
sustained budget deficits. Only the excess portion
should be reduced. There is no need to make up
for past excesses by creating surpluses or reducing
deficits.
6.3 Insufficient budget deficit and recovery
from recession
6.3.1 Period t
Now we assume that the government expenditure in
Period tis insufficient. Let the actual value of the
government expenditure be
˜
Gt=2
γ(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ]
1
2.
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It is smaller than Gtin (8). We assume that it is non-
negative. The price of the good and the nominal wage
rate in Period tis 1. We also assume that upto the
previous period, Period t1, full-employment has
been realized. Let us consider the following pair of
strategies of the firm and the younger generation con-
sumers.
1. Firm: employs three younger generation con-
sumers and produces three units of the good.
2. Each employed younger generation consumer:
supplies one unit of labor, receives wage 1, con-
sumes 1
2[1+(γ
4
3)τ]units of the good, pays 4
3τ
units of tax for pay-as-you-go pensions for the
older generation consumers, and leaves the rest
of the income:
1
4
3τ
1
21 + γ
4
3τ=1
21γ+4
3τ.
In the next period he consumes 1
2[1 + γ
4
3τ]
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension γτ .
3. One unemployed consumer: consumes 1
2γτ units
of the good by borrowing money from employed
younger generation consumers using his pension
as collateral. In the next period he consumes 1
2γτ
units of the good by the pay-as-you-go pension
γτ , and repays his debt due to consumption in
Period 1
Each older generation consumer consumes 1
2γ[1 +
(γ1)τ]units of the good by his savings and the pay-
as-you-go pension (τ). The total demand for the good
is
3
21 + γ
4
3τ+1
2γτ (14)
+2
γ[1 + (γ1)τ] + ˜
Gt
=3
21 + γ
4
3τ+1
2γτ +2
γ[1 + (γ1)τ]
+2
γ(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ]
1
2= 3.
Note that there are four older generation consumers,
three employed and one unemployed younger con-
sumers. (14) means that the total demand equals the
total supply, and there exists one involuntary unem-
ployment.
Are the strategies of the firm and the younger gen-
eration consumers above in a Nash equilibrium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of the
younger generation consumers and the older gen-
eration consumers, and the government expen-
diture, employment of three consumers and pro-
duction of three units of the good are optimal.
2. Each younger employed consumer: given the be-
havior of the firm, consumptions of the other con-
sumers and the government expenditure, supply
of one unit of labor and 1
2[1 + (γ
4
3)τ]units
of consumption are optimal under the assumption
that each consumer spends half of his income, re-
spectively, on consumption in Period 1 and that
in Period 2.
3. One younger unemployed consumer: given the
behavior of the firm, consumptions of the other
consumers and the government expenditure, 1
2γτ
units of consumption is optimal given the situa-
tion that he is unemployed, and spends half of his
income, respectively, on consumption in Period
1 and that in Period 2.
From these results we get the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 9. The insufficient government expendi-
ture (or budget deficit) causes involuntary unemploy-
ment.
6.3.2 Period t+ 1
Next we consider Period t+ 1. Suppose that we re-
cover full-employment in Period t+ 1 by increasing
the government expenditure (or the budget deficit).
Let ˜
Gt+1 be the government expenditure other than
the pay-as-you-go pension which is sufficient to re-
cover full-employment.
Suppose that the labor productivity in Period t+ 1
is γ, and the nominal wage rate is γ. Let us consider
the following pair of strategies of the firm and the
younger generation consumers in Period t+ 1. The
pay-as-you-go pension for each older generation con-
sumer is γτ . Assume that the price of the good in this
period is 1.
1. Firm: employs four younger generation con-
sumers and produces 4γunits of the good.
2. Each employed younger generation consumer:
supplies one unit of labor, receives wage γ, con-
sumes γ
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units of the good, pays
γτ units of tax for pay-as-you-go pension for the
older generation consumers, who are the younger
generation consumers in Period t, and leaves the
rest of the income;
γγτ
γ
2[1 + (γ1)τ] = γ
2[1 (1 + γ)τ].
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In the next period he consumes γ
2[1 + (γ1)τ]
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-
you-go pension γ2τ.
Each older generation consumer, who was employed
in the previous period, consumes 1
21 + γ
4
3τ
units of the good by his savings and the pay-as-you-
go pension (γτ ), and one older generation consumer,
who was unemployed in the previous period, con-
sumes 1
2γτ units of the good by the pay-as-you-go
pension. He also repay the debt for consumption in
the previous period.
The total demand for the good is
2γ[1+(γ1)τ]+ 3
21 + γ
4
3τ+1
2γτ +˜
Gt+1.
Note that there are three older generation consumers
who was employed, and one of them was unem-
ployed. Suppose that this is equal to the total supply,
4γ. Then,
˜
Gt+1 = 2(γ1)[1 (1 + γ)τ] + 1
2.
Comparing this with (12)
˜
Gt+1
Gt+1 =1
2>0.
Therefore, to recover full-employment from a state
with involuntary unemployment we need extra bud-
get deficit. After recovery of full-employment we can
maintain it with sustained budget deficit. Thus, the
extra budget deficit should not be redeemed.
Is the pair of strategies above in a Nash equilib-
rium?
1. Firm: given the consumption behavior of the
younger generation consumers and the older gen-
eration consumers, and the government expendi-
ture, employment of four consumers and produc-
tion of 4γunits of the good are optimal.
2. Each younger generation consumer: given the
behavior of the firm, consumptions of the other
consumers and the government expenditure, sup-
ply of one unit of labor and γ
2[1 + (γ1)τ]units
of consumption are optimal under the assumption
that each consumer spends half of his income, re-
spectively, on consumption in Period 1 and that
in Period 2.
From these results we obtain the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 10. In order to recover full-employment
from a state with involuntary unemployment we
need extra budget deficit. After recovery of full-
employment we can maintain it with sustained budget
deficit. Thus, the extra budget deficit should not be
redeemed.
7 Conclusion
This paper attempts to provide a game-theoretic ba-
sis to functional finance theory and MMT (Modern
Monetary Theory). We have shown that to achieve
and maintain full-employment in a growing economy
we need sustained budget deficits even without infla-
tion, and this budget deficit must not be redeemed.
The model of this paper is very simple. For exam-
ple there is no capital and investment. In the future
research we would like to consider a model in which
firms make investments.
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Volume 19, 2022
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Sources of funding for research
presented in a scientific article or
scientific article itself
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant
Number 18K01594 in Japan.
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