Analysis of Fraud Pentagon Theory to Detecting Fraudulent Financial
Reporting using F-Score Model in State-Owned Companies Indonesia
TARMIZI ACHMAD
Faculty of Economics and Business, Diponegoro University, Semarang, INDONESIA
DIAN INDRIANA HAPSARI
IMANG DAPIT PAMUNGKAS
Faculty of Economics and Business, Dian Nuswantoro University, Semarang, INDONESIA
Abstract: - This study aims to analyze the effect of the fraud pentagon theory consisting of external pressure,
effective monitoring, rationalization, capability, and arrogance on fraudulent financial reporting. This study
uses the F-score model to see the potential for fraudulent financial reporting. The data used in this study are
secondary data from the company's annual reports. The population of this research is state-owned companies
listed on the IDX (Indonesia Stock Exchange) during 2015-2019. The sampling technique used purposive
sampling so that the sample obtained is 180 samples. The analysis technique used is logistic regression analysis
with S.P.S.S. versions 20.0. The findings show that external pressure and rationalization have a significant
effect on fraudulent financial reporting. Meanwhile, effective monitoring, capability, and arrogance have no
considerable impact on fraudulent financial reporting. The results of this study indicate the occurrence of
fraudulent financial reporting in state-owned companies listed on the IDX if the related state-owned companies
experience external pressure and have rationalizations to commit fraud.
Key-Words: - Fraudulent Financial Reporting, Fraud Pentagon Theory, F-scores Model.
Received: June 5, 2021. Revised: November 21, 2021. Accepted: January 8, 2022. Published: January 10, 2022.
1 Introduction
Financial reports are essential tools for companies in
communicating financial information to investors or
creditors [1]. [2] classify fraud into three categories,
namely, asset misappropriation, corruption, and
fraudulent financial reporting. A survey conducted
in 2020 found that of the three types of fraud,
fraudulent financial reporting was one of the lowest,
the Percentage was 10%, but suffered the most loss
of the two other fraud cases valued at $ 954,000 [2].
Then this fact can prove that this annual account is
the most destructive type of fraud. In addition,
Indonesia was also elected for the first time with 16
countries with fraud cases in the Asia Pacific
Region. Fraud cases usually occur more internally
than in external companies, the corporate
environment [3].
Management deliberately carries out fraudulent
financial reporting with a specific purpose [4];[5].
The Fraud Pentagon Theory is an evolution of the
Fraud Triangle Theory by adding two new elements.
The elements that are added to this theory are
competence and arrogance [6]. [7] found that
fraudulent financial reporting poses a significant
risk to companies and can affect long-term success.
[8] stated that fraud is common in Indonesia, from
the government to banking to corporations. The
recent case in Indonesia involved a sizeable state-
owned company is Garuda Indonesia. The results of
an audit by the Financial Services Authority
(O.J.K.) showed there were debt fund violations.
However, reported in the financial reports of Garuda
Indonesia in 2018 were recorded as income.
Therefore deviated from Article 69 of Law No. 8 of
1995 on the Capital Market and the Ordinance of
Bapepam and L.K. No. VIII.G.7 on the presentation
and disclosure of ex issuers and public companies
[9].
Developed various analyses to detect indications
of fraudulent financial reporting, the study used the
F-Score model, a model developed by [10]. The F-
Score model is the sum of two variables: provision
quality and financial performance [11]. One of the
factors influencing fraudulent financial reporting is
external pressure. According to [12], the most
common example of pressure is borrowing
additional debt or external funding sources to keep
the company competitive. [8], [13]–[15] found that
external pressure significantly affects fraudulent
financial reporting. However, [16] found that
external pressure did not substantially impact
fraudulent financial reporting.
Fraud occurs due to inadequate supervision,
which creates an opportunity to commit fraud [17].
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[18] found that effective monitoring had a
significant positive effect on fraudulent financial
reporting. [19] found that effective monitoring had a
significant negative impact on fraudulent financial
reporting. [13], [17] found that effective monitoring
did not significantly affect fraudulent financial
reporting. [12] found rationalization has a
significant positive effect on fraudulent financial
reporting. [20][21] found that rationalization did not
significantly impact fraudulent financial reporting.
Capability is a person's ability or power to
commit fraud within a company [22]. The position
of executives in a company can be a determining
factor in fraud. [23] found that the capability had a
significant negative impact on fraudulent financial
reporting, while [13] found that the capability did
not substantially affect fraudulent financial
reporting. [24] note that arrogance is a characteristic
of a lack of conscience as an attitude of superiority
or arrogance in someone who believes that they
cannot personally have internal control. [8] found
that arrogance has a significant positive effect on
fraudulent financial reporting, while [25] [20]
found that arrogance did not substantially impact
fraudulent financial reporting.
2 Literature Review
2.1. Fraud Pentagon Theory
The Fraud Pentagon Theory is known as the
Crowe's Fraud Pentagon. The elements added to this
theory are competence and arrogance. [8] Arrogance
is the greed and attitude of superiority of people
who believe that company procedures or policies do
not affect them. Such a person completely ignored
the consequences imposed on the victim. Arrogance
and competence play a central role in determining
whether employees currently have something they
need to carry out fraud. [6] argues that the fraud
triangle theory needs to be adapted to the current era
when technology is rapidly advancing. They then
propose two additional elements, capability, and
arrogance, referred to as Crowe's Fraud Pentagon.
The Fraud Pentagon Theory evolves the Fraud
Triangle Theory by adding two new elements:
capability and arrogance.
2.2. Hypotheses Development
External Pressure on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting
Under external pressure, a company may find a
higher risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
[18] also state that any element or combination of
several factors can encourage someone to commit
fraud. Fraud has two keywords; the first is willful
fraud, meaning the act is being carried out
consciously, and the perpetrator is aware of the
fraud. The second keyword is a fraud, which affects
the manipulated object. Research results from [1],
[26]–[28] found that external pressure affects
fraudulent financial reporting. This suggests that
fraudulent financial reporting is due, among other
things, to an excessive outside force, as explained
by [13]. These studies have strengthened the truth of
the Fraud Pentagon Theory.
H1: External pressure affects fraudulent financial
reporting.
2.3 Effective Monitoring on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting
Fraud stems from inadequate supervision that
enables a person to commit fraud [29]. Due to the
ineffectiveness of oversight, management believes
that its performance is out of control, which leads
management to seek to optimize its profits.
Effective oversight is the condition of a company
when it does not have an adequate oversight unit to
monitor company performance [30]. Fraud is the
result of inadequate monitoring that a manager or
agent may have the capability to engage in deviant
behavior. Good surveillance can reduce fraudulent
practices. It is believed that the independent Board
of Commissioners can promote the effectiveness of
corporate oversight, whose job it is to ensure the
implementation of corporate strategy. [5], [20]
found effective monitoring affects fraudulent
financial reporting.
H2: Effective monitoring affects fraudulent
financial reporting.
2.4 Rationalization of Fraudulent Financial
Reporting
[18] say that rationalization is the third pillar of the
fraud triangle and is challenging to measure. [29]
state that fraud is begun based on an attitude,
character, or set of ethical values that enable the act
to be carried out. People in an urgent environment
force them to rationalize the fraud they have
committed. Rationalization arises as a person seeks
to justify activities that contain copy [31]. [5], [32],
[33] found that rationalization affects fraudulent
financial reporting. This means that cheating begins
based on an attitude, character, or set of ethical
values that allows it to be made possible. Described
action [34]. These studies have strengthened the
truth of the Pentagon fraud theory. This theory
explains that rationalization, replaced by overall
boundaries, can affect fraudulent financial reporting.
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H3: Rationalization affects fraudulent financial
reporting.
2.5 Capability of Fraudulent Financial
Reporting
According to [35], capability is the ability or power
that a person has to commit fraud within a company.
On the contrary, the change in the board of directors
could eliminate the old board of directors who
already knew about the company's fraud [36]. The
various traits described by [37] relate to the skill
element in the actions of the cheating agent, namely
the skill, such as position/function, brain, self-
confidence/ego, obsessive-compulsive skills,
effective lying, and immunity to stress. [22], [38]
found that capability affects fraudulent financial
reporting. This shows that fraud occurs due to abuse
of leadership positions in the company, as stated by
[26]. These studies have strengthened the truth of
the fraud pentagon theory.
H4: Capability affects fraudulent financial
reporting.
2.6 Arrogance of Fraudulent Financial
Reporting
According to [6], due to the level of organization,
C.E.O. will do everything to maintain his position
and position in a company. [13] stated that
arrogance caused by the frequency of C.E.O. image
appearances influences fraudulent financial
reporting. Changes in the board of directors/board of
directors can also lead to periods of stress,
impacting the development of fraud opportunities.
This is because the new board of directors or
directors does not have full knowledge of the
company, which leads to ineffective performance
and thus opens up opportunities for fraud. [12], [23],
[24], [30] found that arrogance has an impact on
fraudulent financial reporting.
H5: Arrogance affects fraudulent financial
reporting.
3 Method
The population in this study are state-owned
companies in Indonesia that are listed on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from
www.IDX.co.id. The research sample was
determined by purposive sampling. The sample used
has two criteria, namely state-owned companies,
which are listed consecutively in the IDX in the
period 2015-2019, and state-owned companies in
the IDX with complete data on all required variables
in the period 2015-2019. So, with the research
period, obtained 36 state-owned companies five
years, namely 2015-2019, or in other words, there
were 180 samples in this study. This study uses
secondary data from financial reports, annual
reports, and summaries of the financial performance
of state-owned companies listed on the IDX from
2015 to 2019. The quantitative data analysis in this
study used logistic regression analysis using
S.P.S.S. version 20.0. The following is a logistic
regression equation used in this study.
Ln Fraud =
1-Fraud
β0 + β1LEV, β2IND, β3TACC, β4DCHANGE,
β5CEOPIC
Information:
Fraud = Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Ln = Natural Logarithm
β0 = Constant regression coefficient
β1, β2, β3, β4, β5 = Regression coefficient for each
variable
LEV = Comparison of Total Debt to Total
Assets
IND = Percentage of number of
Independent Audit Committees
T.A.C.C. = Total accruals
D.C.H.A.N.G.E. = occurrence of changes in the
composition of the board of directors
C.E.O.P.I.C. = Total C.E.O. photos plastered in the
annual report
Table 1. Operational Definition of Variables
Variables
Measurement
Source
Pressure
(X1)
External Pressure (LEV)
=
Total Liability/ Total
Asset
[39]
Opportunity
(X2)
Effective monitoring =
Number of independent
members of the
examination board /
total number of the
examination board
[17]
Rationalizat
ion (X3)
Total Accrual Ratio =
Total Accrual (Net
Income-Cashflow
Operation/Total Assets
[40]
Capability
(X4)
Capability is measured
by a dummy variable
where if there is a
change in the company's
directors during the
2015-2019 period, it is
coded 1. If there is no
[13]
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change in the company's
directors during the
2015-2019 period, it is
coded 0.
The indicator of this
arrogance factor is
denoted by C.O.P.I.C.,
which is the number of
photos of the C.E.O.
displayed in a company
annual report.
[41]
The calculation uses F-
scores.
[10]
Source: Extracted from various journals, 2021
Table 2. F-Scores Formula
F-Scores = Accrual Quality + Financial
Performances
Accrual Quality is calculated using RSST Accrual.
RSST Accrual = (∆WC + ∆NCO + ∆FIN) /
Averages Total Assets
Information:
WC = Current Assets - Current Liability
NCO = (Total Assets - Current Assets -
Investment and Advances) - (Total Liabilities-
Current Liabilities - Long Term Debt)
FIN = Total Investment - Total Liabilities
ATS = (Beginning Total Assets + End Total
Assets) / 2
Information:
WC = Working Capital
NCO = Non-Current Operating Accrual
FIN = Financial Accrual
ATS = Average Total Assets
Financial Performances =
Change in Receivables + Change in Inventories +
Change in Cash Sales + Change in Earnings.
Information:
Change in Receivables = ∆Receivables / Average
Total Assets
Change in Inventories = ∆Inventories / Average
Total Assets
Change in Earnings = (Earnings (t) / Average
Total Assets (t)) - (Earnings (t-1) / Average Total
Assets (t-1))
4 Results And Discussion
4.1 Research Data
This study was conducted period 2015-2019 on
state-owned companies that went public in
Indonesia and reported their financial reports on the
Indonesian Stock Exchange. There are 38 State-
Owned Enterprises listed or listed on the IDX in the
2015-2019 period. There are two state-owned
companies on the IDX with incomplete data for the
2015-2019 period. The sample consisted of 36 state-
owned companies on the IDX and with complete
data from 2015-2019. So, that with the time series
data method (2015-2019), the number of
observations (n) = 180.
Table 3. Determination of Research Samples
No
Information
Amount
Company
1
State-Owned Companies that are
listed or listed on the IDX in
succession in the 2015-2019
period.
38
2
State-Owned Companies
companies on the IDX with
incomplete data for the 2015-
2019 period.
(2)
Research Samples
36
Amount of Research Data
(36 x 5 years)
180
Source: Processed secondary data, 2021
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
This study analyzed descriptive statistical data from
the research variables. The minimum value
accompanies the explanation of the data, maximum
value, mean, variance, and standard deviation.
Descriptive statistics of research data can be seen in
Table 4.
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Research Data for
the Period of 2015-2019
Variable
N
Min
Max
Mean
SD
External
Pressure
180
.10
1.69
.4554
.22
245
Effective
Monitoring
180
.25
.88
.4443
.10
812
Rationalizat
ion
180
-.60
1.63
.0006
0.4
769
Capability
180
.00
1.00
.2438
.42
289
Arrogance
180
1.00
8.00
3.3783
2.8
330
Fraudulent
Financial
Reporting
180
.00
1.00
.0461
.20
06
Valid N
(listwise)
180
Source: Processed secondary data, 2021
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Based on Table 4. the average value for external
pressure (leverage) is 0.45. The lowest external
pressure value was 0.10, and the highest external
pressure value was 1.69. The mean value of the
monitoring effectiveness was 0.44. The lowest
monitoring effectiveness value was 0.25, and the
highest practical monitoring value was 0.88. The
average for rationalization is 0.0006. The lowest
rationalization value is -0.60, and the highest
rationalization value is 1.63. The average skill score
was 0.0006. The lowest capability value of 0
indicates that the company's directors have not
changed, and the highest skill value of 1 indicates
that the company's directors have changed. The
mean value of the Arrogance variables using the
size of the number of C.E.O. photos displayed in the
State-Owned Companies annual reports on the IDX
from 2015 to 2019 is 3.33. The lowest arrogance
variable number is one, and the arrogance variable
number is 8. The average value of fraudulent
financial reporting using the F-score measurement is
measured by the dummy variable of 0.04. The
lowest number of fraudulent deals 0 indicates that
the company is not engaged in close fraud with a
value of f <1.00, and the highest number of
fraudulent sales is 1, which suggests an f-score>
1.00. These results are in the classification Table 5.
as follows to see.
From classification table 5. it can be analyzed
that the 2x2 contingency table that should occur or
is also known as the frequency of expectations is
based on empirical data of the dependent variable.
Companies determine the number of samples with
the category of the dependent variable is fraudulent
financial reporting (code 1) consists of 5 dates.
Meanwhile, 175 companies were the companies that
did not commit fraudulent financial reporting (code
0).
Table 5. Classification Test Result
Predicted
Observed
Fraudulent
Financial
Reporting
Percentage
Correct
.00
1.00
100.0
Step 0
Fraudulent
Financial
Reporting
.00
1.00
0
0
.0
Overall
Percentage
97.15
a. Constant is included in model
b. The cut value is 0.500
4.3 Determination Coefficient
The coefficient of determination essentially
measures the extent to which the model's capability
to deal with the independent variables, namely
external pressure, monitoring effectiveness,
rationalization, capability, and arrogance, along with
the explanation of the variation of the dependent
variable (Fraudulent Financial Reporting) with the
output indicator as follows.
Table 6. Result of the Coefficient of Determination
Step
-2 Log
like hood
Cox &
Snell R
Square
Nagelkerke
R Square
1
29.179
0.980
.335
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 8
because parameter estimates changed by less
than .001
The test results show that the coefficient of
determination for the Cox and Snell R-squared tests
is 0.098 and for the Negelkerke R-squared, 0.335,
which means that the variability of the dependent
variable can explain the variability of the
independent variable is 33.5%.
4.4 Result
In the Hosmer and Lemeshow test, a significance
level of 0.057> significance level was obtained (5%
= 0.05). The research data model for explaining the
research variables was classified as suitable or
sound and feasible. In addition, the model feasibility
test can be seen from the results of the omnibus test.
Chi-square value of 12.391> chi-square table on
D.F. (number of independent variables 5) which is
11.07 or with a significance of 0.030 (<0.05).
Discards H0, indicating that adding independent
variables can have a natural effect on the model, or
in other words, declaring the model fit. The
coefficient of determination for the Cox and Snell
R-squared test is 0.098, and the Negelkerke R-
squared test is 0.335, which means that the
dependent variable's variability can be explained by
the variability of the independent variable, 33, 5%.
The logistics model in this study can be described as
follows.
Ln Fraud
1−Fraud = 3.646 - 6,396 X1 - 7,191 X2 + 5,591
X3 - 0,312 X4 - 0,255 X5
The regression equation explains the following:
- A constant value of 3.646 means that the
company's fraudulent financial reporting
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increases by 3.646 when all independent
variables are considered steady or consistent.
- The external pressure regression coefficient (X1)
is -6.396. This means that when external
pressures increase by 1%, fraudulent financial
reporting decreases by 6,396 while the other
independent variables are considered constant.
- The regression coefficient of effective
Monitoring (X2) of -7,191. This means that
when the effective Monitoring increases by 1%,
fraudulent financial reporting decreases by
7,191, while the other independent variables are
considered constant.
- Rationalization regression coefficient (X3) of
5,591. Suppose rationalization has increased by
1% while the other independent variables are
considered constant, fraudulent financial
reporting increases by 5,591.
- Skill regression coefficient (X4) of -0.312. If the
capability has increased by 1% while the other
independent variables are considered constant,
the fraudulent financial reporting will decrease
by 0.312.
- The regression coefficient of Arrogance (X5) is -
0.255. If arrogance has increased by 1% while
the other independent variables are considered
constant, fraudulent financial reporting decreases
by 0.255.
4.5 Hypothesis Test
Hypothesis testing uses a logistic regression test
performed simultaneously on all variables: external
pressure, monitoring effectiveness, rationalization,
capability, and arrogance in fraudulent financial
reporting. The test results are as follows.
Table 7 Multivariate Test Results
Hy
po
Th
esis
Variable
Coeffi
cient
Value
P-
Value
Result
H1
X1 Y
-6.396
0.029
Accepted
H2
X2
Y
-7.191
0.474
Rejected
H3
X3
Y
5.591
0.032
Accepted
H4
X4
Y
-0.312
0.805
Rejected
H5
X5
Y
-0.255
0.287
Rejected
4.5.1 External Pressure on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting
The results showed that external pressure (X1) had a
significant and negative effect on fraudulent
financial reporting (Y). The value of the regression
coefficient is -6,396, and the probability value (P)
for the external pressure variable (X1) for fraudulent
financial reporting (Y) is 0.029 <level of
significance (5% = 0.05).
[42] explain that this is likely because external
parties, namely creditors, can monitor the progress
of the company's debt cycle to reduce the possibility
of fraudulent financial reporting. In addition, the
creditors will consider various factors that will
influence whether to apply for a loan. Of course,
creditors will approve loan applications to
companies that already have a credible and good
image and are not authorized by the O.J.K. Hence,
these various factors prevent companies from
tampering with financial statements despite having
financial risks with high leverage ratios.
The results of this study are in agreement with
research by [1], [12], [26], [28]. They found that
external pressure had an impact on fraudulent
financial reporting. This suggests that fraudulent
financial reporting is due, among other things, to an
excessive outside force, as explained by [13]. These
studies have strengthened the truth of the fraud
pentagon theory.
4.5.2 Effective Monitoring on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting
The results showed no significant impact between
the supervision effectiveness (X2) variable on
fraudulent financial reporting (Y). The regression
coefficient value is -7.191, and the probability value
(P) for the variable Supervision Effectiveness (X2)
for fraudulent financial reporting (Y) is 0.474.> The
significance level (5% = 0.05) [17] stated that this
could be due to the hiring of the Board of
Commissioners in the company just to meet the
regulatory requirements, namely O.J.K. No.
33/PJOK.04/2014. Therefore, the appointment of
the independent committee of commissioners is only
for the fulfillment of good corporate governance, so
the role and function of the independent committee
of commissioners in overseeing the company are not
maximal. The results of this study are the results of
the survey [16]. [5], [32], [33] found that effective
monitoring does not affect fraudulent financial
reporting.
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4.5.3 Rationalization of Fraudulent Financial
Reporting
The results showed a significant and positive
influence between the rationalization variable (X3)
on fraudulent financial reporting (Y). The regression
coefficient value is 5,591. The probability (P) for
the rationalization (X3) for fraudulent financial
reporting (Y) is 0.032. According to [43], this is due
to the delimitation concept. This means that
management can manipulate income by capturing
when the transaction occurs even though the money
has not been paid out or received. The results of this
study are in agreement with the research carried out
by [15], [18], [44], who found that rationalization
affects fraudulent financial reporting. This means
that fraud is committed based on an attitude,
character, or set of ethical values that make it
possible to carry out the actions described by [34].
These studies have strengthened the truth of the
fraud pentagon theory. This theory explains that
rationalization, replaced by overall boundaries, can
affect fraudulent financial reporting.
4.5.4 Capability on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting
The results showed no significant influence between
the capability variable (X4) on fraudulent financial
reporting (Y). The regression coefficient value is -
0.312, and the probability (P) for the capability
variable (X4) for fraudulent financial reporting (Y)
is 0.805.> The significance level (5% = 0.05. [5]
stated that this could happen because made a change
of directors. After all, the previous director failed to
perform his duties and responsibilities. According to
[37], it can improve corporate performance by
hiring more competent directors than previous
directors, which impacts better business
performance. The tendency towards fraudulent
financial reporting is very low. This study's results
agree with research by [22], [26], who found the
capability did not affect fraudulent financial
reporting.
4.5.5 Arrogance of Fraudulent Financial
Reporting
The results showed no significant influence between
the arrogance variable (X5) on fraudulent financial
reporting (Y). The regression coefficient value is -
0.255, and the probability (P) for the arrogance
variable (X5) of fraudulent financial reporting (Y) is
0.287.> The significance level (5%=0.05) indicates
that between none, the arrogance variable (X5)
versus fraudulent financial reporting (Y) has a
significant impact. [32] note that this happens
because the photo of the C.E.O. shown in the
company's annual report can be a form of
transparency about who is responsible for the
company's activities and a form of leadership
involvement and responsibility for each action of
the company. The results of this study are in
agreement with research by [26], [45], [46] found
that arrogance did not affect fraudulent financial
reporting.
5 Conclusions
This investigation explains that if there is external
pressure and rationalization, it will affect fraudulent
financial reporting. However, effective oversight,
skill, and arrogance do not materially affect
fraudulent financial reporting. The higher the
external pressure on the company, the lower the
fraudulent financial reporting of the company. This
is because external parties, namely creditors, can
monitor the course of the company's debt cycle,
thereby minimizing the possibility of fraudulent
financial reporting. Furthermore, creditors will
consider various factors that influence the decision
to apply for a loan. Of course, creditors will approve
loan applications to companies that already have
credibility, a good image, and are not sanctioned by
the Financial Services Authority. Thus, these
various factors cause companies not to manipulate
financial statements even though they have financial
risks in high leverage ratios.
Rationalization arises because individuals seek
justification for their activities that contain fraud.
Fraud perpetrators have the assumption that their
behavior is ethical and reasonable because, so far,
they have provided many services for the company.
The accrual principle relates to the decision-making
process by management and includes knowledge
regarding rationalization in financial statements.
Acknowledgment:
This research funded the Basic Research Grants for
Higher Education, DRPM DIKTI. Number: 225-
82/UN7.6.1/PP/2021
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Contribution of Individual Authors to the
Creation of a Scientific Article (Ghostwriting
Policy)
Ahmad, Tarmizi
Formulation idea; objectives and benefits of
research. Design of theoretical framework and
sampling technique.
Hapsari, Dian Indriana
Methodology development or design; data
tabulation, data processing, and result
Pamungkas, Imang Dapit
Analyze and conclude as well as create tables,
figures, adjust journal templates, revision and as a
correspondent Author
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This article is published under the terms of the
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WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2022.19.13
Tarmizi Achmad,
Dian Indriana Hapsari,
Imang Dapit Pamungkas
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
133
Volume 19, 2022