The Impact of Contracting on the Portuguese National Health System
GUALTER COUTO
School of Business and Economics and CEEAplA
University of Azores
9500-321 Ponta Delgada, Portugal
PORTUGAL
MARIA ROCHA
School of Business and Economics
University of Azores
9500-321 Ponta Delgada, Portugal
PORTUGAL
PEDRO PIMENTEL
School of Business and Economics and CEEAplA
University of Azores
9500-321 Ponta Delgada, Portugal
PORTUGAL
JACINTO GARRIDO VELARDE
Department of Social Sciences, Languages and Literatures, University of Extremadura, 06071
Badajoz, SPAIN
University Research Institute for Sustainable Territorial Development (INTERRA),
University of Extremadura, SPAIN
*Correspondent author: jgarridoif@gmail.com // jgvelarde@unex.es
RUI ALEXANDRE CASTANHO
Faculty of Applied Sciences, WSB University
41-300 Dabrowa Górnicza
POLAND
and
College of Business and Economics, University of Johannesburg
PO Box 524, Auckland Park
SOUTH AFRICA
Abstract: All treatments, materials, instruments, exams, vaccines, tests, hospitalizations, surgeries, human
resources, investigations, medicines, autopsies, among many other services provided by the National Health
System (SNS). Therefore, funding is required, and the external services and supplies to which the SNS must
constantly update its technologies and the necessary and continuous training and essential maintenance and
cleaning expenses. Moreover, health financing has been a matter of great concern, both nationally and
internationally, as health expenditures are growing faster than economic growth. Over the years, efficiency in
resource allocation has always been a desirable objective, but one that is not easy to achieve. The truth is that
there is much waste in allocating resources. Thereby, this study analyzes the impact of the contractualization
process to which Portugal has adhered, which is most similar to a privatization model; that is, we sought to
understand whether the contractualization of the SNS has a favorable effect on the economic level. However,
after the entire process and development of the work, it is concluded that the contracting had a negligible impact.
The repercussion that it had on the economic performance of Portuguese Hospitals was in a negative sense. In
the statistical analyses it was used tests of differences between averages, to check the behavior of the economic
performance of hospitals towards the contracting process. It was taken data of reports and accounts from a sample
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Gualter Couto, Maria Rocha,
Pedro Pimentel, Jacinto Garrido Velarde,
Rui Alexandre Castanho
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of fifteen Portuguese Hospitals S.A. that went through this contracting process from 2003 to 2017, in order to
calculate the four indicators, such as: Return On Assets (ROA); Return On Equity (ROE); Economic Value
Added (EVA) and the Market Value Added (MVA). For each of these indicators, were analyzed and compared
the resulted effects between the period of two years before and two years after the contracting process. From the
obtained results, we can conclude that contracting process had little impact on the economic performance of
Portuguese Hospitals and the resulting impact was not favorable.
Key-Words: Contracting, Economic performance, Health System.
Received: May 7, 2021. Revised: December 8, 2021. Accepted: December 30, 2021. Published: January 3, 2022.
1 Introduction
Health is a vital sector in the economy and society. It
has a significant impact not only on a personal level
but also on a social level, in the development of
companies, in the State itself, and its economic,
financial, political, scientific, and technological
growth. Efficiency in allocating resources has always
been a desirable goal over the years, but it is not easy
to achieve. The truth is that there is a lot of loss in the
allocation of resources.
All health systems currently in existence were based
on their development and evolution on two primary
models: the Bismarckian Model and the Beveridgean
Model. These models are based on the principle
that access to health care does not depend on
citizens' ability to pay, but only on their needs,
so the contribution depends on income
(Carrondo, 2014) [1].
The Bismarckian Model was first adopted in
Germany in 1883, with Chancellor Otto Bismarck,
who inaugurated and developed this system, which
today still influences central Europe's health systems.
This social security model, imposed by the State, is
based on the following characteristics: insurance is
mandatory; intends to guarantee the risk coverage of
workers for others; its funding comes from social
contributions based on wages, in charge of employers
and workers, and the management of each benefit is
organized in boxes, which are managed by the State,
with the participation of taxpayers.
Although it is based on social insurance, where
access to citizens is universal, this insurance is
conditioned by the employment situation - once it is
supported by the contributory effort of wages and
employers. In this way, the model benefits the most
disadvantaged workers, not leaving aside those
workers who have more fair wages through this
health insurance scheme [2] (Simões, 2004). This
model was adopted and adapted by other countries,
like Austria, Holland, or Switzerland [3].
The Beveridgeano Model originated in England and
has as main characteristics universal rights, intended
for all citizens, limited by the financial, human, and
technical resources available, but ensuring social
minimums for all, in conditions of need. It is a public
system based on four basic principles: universal
access, the inclusion of all treatments, free of charge,
and financing from the general state budget. Its
financing derives from tax taxes, in which the right to
health is independent of work and employment,
which corresponds to the well-known national health
services [3].
Some countries, such as France, Belgium, and Japan,
represent a mixed model, which, although inspired by
the Bismarckian system, associates the compulsory
insurance principle with social protection, opening
up numerous non-contributory benefits to the most
disadvantaged [3]. These two models forced
employers and employees to discount health
insurance in a combination of public and private
providers to ensure citizens' health.
Due to several economic, political, and social factors,
there was a need to resort to mixed models that result
from the combination of the Bismarck and Beveridge
Models, bringing typical market mechanisms to the
traditional health system. In this context, the Market
Model emerges, which is structured according to the
purchasing power of health insurance by individuals
and companies; that is, adherence depends on
citizens' consumption capacity [4] (Dinis, 2013).
The United States of America (USA) does not have a
public health system similar to the European one, as
it is not based on the Beveridge Model or the
Bismarck Model. Its health system has a mixed social
and private insurance system, in which systems are
opposed [3]. This model is organized based on the
ability of individuals and companies to purchase
health insurance.
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According to Simões and Barros [5] (2007), the
Portuguese Health System is characterized by the
simultaneous existence of three systems: the National
Health Service (SNS), public and private insurance
schemes for certain professions, and mandatory for
their beneficiaries (health subsystems) as well as
voluntary private health insurance.
The financing of the Portuguese health system, as in
most European health systems, results from a
combination of public and private financing, in which
private insurance tends to be complementary to
public insurance. This health system is coordinated
by the Ministry of Health, which provides and
finances public health care.
Contextually, this study analyzes the impact of the
contracting process to which Portugal has adhered
and most closely resembles a privatization model. It
sought to understand whether the National Health
System contracting has a favorable effect on an
economic level. However, after all the process and
development of the work, it is concluded that the
contracting revealed a minor impact. The
repercussion it had on the level of the economic
performance of Portuguese Hospitals was negative.
Health financing has been a significant concern in the
national and international context, as health spending
is growing faster than economic growth.
In brief, the article is organized into four points:
Introduction, Methodology, Discussion of Results,
and Final Considerations.
Regarding point 2 - Methodology, this will be
responsible for presenting the model used to assess
the impact of the contracting process and respective
assumptions. The base model that will support the
work refers to the work developed and analyzed by
Anuatti-Neto et al. [6] and Cardoso et al. [7], which
consists of an analysis of the impact of privatization
on companies. This model was subject to some
modifications in terms of assumptions due to the need
to adapt to the theme and was applied to analyze the
impact of contractualization on the National Health
System.
Section 3 - Discussion of the results is dedicated to
the presentation and analysis of the main empirical
results obtained through applying the model adopted
to analyze the impact of contracting.
Finally, point 4, referring to the Final Conclusions,
presents the most important results achieved
throughout the work.
2 Methodology
This study's main objective is to analyze the impact
of contracting the national health system in Portugal.
Initially, the intention was to analyze the impact of
privatization on the national health system. However,
as previously mentioned, in Portugal, at least until
today, there is no privatization situation in the health
sector, the contracting process being the closest to the
privatization system to which Portugal has adhered
to. Then, calculations were carried out to verify the
impact of this process on the performance of
Portuguese Hospitals.
In a current universe of 41 Public-Private Entities in
this area, where 11 are EPE hospitals, 8 are local EPE
health units, and 22 are EPE Hospital Centers. All
EPE Hospitals that suffered aggregations in the same
period of analysis and all EPE Hospitals that do not
present published data and are necessary to complete
the study, relating to the period between 2002 and
2007, were excluded. Thus, 15 public sector hospitals
were considered to have transformed Hospitals
Corporations into Public Business Entities.
#
Designation of the Health Unit
1
Hospital Center of Alto Minho
2
Hospital Center of Médio Tejo
3
Hospital Center of Cova da Beira
4
Hospital Center of Vila Real / Peso da
Régua
5
Disctrict Hospital of Figueira da Foz
6
Garcia de Orta Hospital
7
Infante Dom Pedro Hospital
8
Pulido Valente Hospital
9
Santo André Hospital
10
São Gonçalo Hospital
11
São Sebastião Hospital
12
Coimbra Regional Oncology Center
13
Lisboa Regional Oncology Center
14
Padre Américo Vale Sousa Hospital
15
IPO Porto
Table 1: Sample of Public Hospitals used in the
study.
The study considers a two-year lag period for the
assessment of economic performance, as in the
studies by [6] Anuatti-Neto et al. (2005) and Cardoso
et al. [7].
2.1 Data analysis
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In order to measure the impact of contracting the
National Health System in Portugal, four economic
performance indicators were analyzed: Economic
Value Added (EVA), Market Value Added (MVA),
Return On Assets (ROA), and Return On Equity
(ROE). Table 2 adapted from [7] presents all these
indicators and respective calculation formulas. Also,
to calculate these indicators, data from the Hospitals'
reports and accounts were used.
Indicators
ROA - Return on Assets
ROE - Return on Equity
EVA - Economic Value
Added
MVA - Market Value
Added
Table 2: Profitability and Economic
Performance Indicators.
Thereby, to be able to check the calculation of the
EVA indicator, it is necessary to estimate the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Cost of Equity
Capital (Kcp), the Cost of Equity Capital (Kca), and
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (CMPC).
To determine the Cost of Equity (Kcp), CAPM was
used, according to Equation 1 [8].
E(r)=rf+βL (rm-rf) (1)
For the calculation, it was necessary to obtain the
following values: Risk-free return rate (rf), Beta of
the Indebted Hospital (β_L), and the expected market
return (rm).
In order to obtain market profitability, daily
quotations for the PSI-20, from 2003 to 2017, were
removed from the website: investing.com. Then, a
rate of return was calculated for each day and, finally,
the average return for each year was calculated. From
the average of all the years under analysis, we
obtained an estimator for the average profitability of
the market.
To measure the β_U, first, a synthetic β was
determined, through the Degree of operational
leverage, by Equation 2 [8]:
β_U Operating Leverage Degree = (Variation in Operating
Result) / (Variation in Sales) (2)
After obtaining the synthetic β_U, the leveraged Beta
was calculated using Equation 3 [8]:
β_L= β_U (1+ (1-Tax rate) ((Foreign Capital) / (Equity)) (3)
Equation 4 [8] was used to calculate the Cost of
Foreign Capital (Kca) for each year n:
Kca=Financial Results _ (year n) / ((Foreign Capital
_ (beginning of year n) + Foreign Capital _ (end of
year n)) / 2) (4)
After gathering the necessary values, the Weighted
Average Cost of Capital was calculated by Equation 5
[8]:
CMPC = (Foreign Capital) / (Total Assets) × Kca (1-Tax Rate) +
(Equity) / (Total Assets) × Kcp (5)
Finally, in order to calculate the Invested Capital, the
following Equation 6 was used:
Capital Invested = Total Equity + Total Liabilities-Suppliers (6)
The equation presented above was the same used to
measure Invested Capital and approximation Equation
7 [9]. Considering that, in hospitals' total capital, the
most essential non-renumbered component
corresponded to the suppliers' section, it was decided to
estimate the capital invested by the difference between
total capital and suppliers.
Capital Invested = Fixed Assets + Working Capital Needs + Active
Treasury (7)
After gathering all the necessary values, it finally
became possible to calculate the EVA indicator. Two
different forms of calculation determined the MVA
indicator: one of the forms used was direct, updating
the previously determined EVA indicator; the other
method of calculation used was through Multiple
Methods, where two different multiples were used.
Equation 8 [10] illustrated below was used to calculate
the MVA indicator's value by updating the EVA.
MVA = ∑_ (i = 1) ^ n (Operating Income _i × (1-tax
rate) -CMPC × Invested Capital _ (i-1)) / (1 + CMPC)
^ i (8)
Considering that the sample of the present study is
not quoted on a stock exchange, to determine the
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market value of each of the Hospitals, the Multiple
Method was used, using two separate multiples: the
multiple Price to Earnings Ratio (PER) and the
multiple Enterprise Value Multiple (EVM).
Subsequently, to verify the Hospitals' performances
comparatively, before and after the contracting
process, a difference test between means was also
carried out, using a database between 2003 and 2004
referring to the period before contracting and 2005 to
2017, corresponding to the period after contracting.
It should be noted that there were many aggregations
of hospitals, starting in 2008, and not all the
necessary reports and accounts were available, so the
sample is not the best.
3 Results and Discussion
This section presents the values of the indicators
obtained, that is, where the analysis of the impact of
contracting on economic performance in Portuguese
hospitals is presented.
Tables 3 and 4 show all values obtained for
profitability indicators, namely ROE and ROA.
The values of the ROA indicator, shown in Table 3,
are expressed as a percentage. It appears that, in
almost all Hospitals, the profitability of the asset is
negative, and this means that the operating results
were negative, that is, that the Hospitals have
operating costs and losses higher than operating
income and gains.
Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 show the EVA and MVA
indicators' values. In order to simplify, the following
numbering was assigned to the acronym MVA;
MVA1- is the MVA, calculated by updating the
EVA; MVA2- refers to the MVA estimated using the
multiple PER to reach the market value of the
Hospitals and MVA3- is based on the MVA obtained,
using the multiple EVM to reach the market value of
the Hospitals.
Table 6 presents the results obtained for the MVA1
indicator, that is, the MVA calculated by the EVA
update method.
ROA
N
Hospital
Designation
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
1
Hospital
Center of
Alto Minho
-0,0258
-0,03094
-0,04164
-0,1268
-0,0595
2
Hospital
Center of
Médio Tejo
-0,1651
-0,0986
-0,0882
-0,1653
-0,1748
3
Hospital
Center of
Cova da
Beira
-0,0783
-0,1344
-0,2700
-0,1488
-0,0740
4
Hospital
Center of
Vila Real /
Peso da
Régua
-0,0124
-0,1591
-0,0182
-0,1157
-0,0361
5
District
Hospital of
Figueira da
Foz
-0,0954
-0,0927
-0,0203
-0,2631
-0,1406
6
Garcia de
Orta
Hospital
-0,0886
-0,0461
-0,0051
-0,1221
-0,01646
7
Infante Dom
Pedro
Hospital
-0,0181
-0,0596
-0,1704
-0,3278
-0,5426
8
Pulido
Valente
Hospital
-0,1976
-0,0834
-0,2103
-0,2431
0,0292
9
Santo André
Hospital
-0,0069
-0,0401
-0,1673
-0,1251
-0,0019
10
São Gonçalo
Hospital
-0,0459
-0,0661
-0,2531
-0,4887
-0,6307
11
São
Sebastião
Hospital
0,0161
0,0230
0,0003
0,0096
0,0168
12
Coimbra
Regional
Oncology
Center
-0,0287
-0,0418
0,0726
-0,0336
-0,0255
13
Lisboa
Regional
Oncology
Center
-0,0162
-0,0116
-0,0079
-0,0358
-0,0282
14
Padre
Américo
Vale Sousa
Hospital
-0,1306
-0,1343
-0,1535
-0,1805
0,0402
15
IPO Porto
-0,1226
-0,0824
-0,0234
-0,0147
0,1142
Table 3: Values obtained for the ROA indicator by
Hospital before and after contracting.
The values presented in Table 6, referring to the MVA1
indicator, are expressed in millions of euros. Table 7 shows
the results obtained for the MVA2 indicator, that is, the
MVA obtained, using the Multiple PER as an intermediate
calculation to determine the market value of the Hospitals.
Finally, in Table 8, the values obtained for the MVA2
indicator are presented, and the MVA was measured, using
the Multiple EVM as an intermediate calculation, to
determine the market value of the Hospitals.
ROE
N
Hospital
Designation
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
1
Hospital
Center of Alto
Minho
0,0020
-0,3877
-3,9365
-0,1227
-0,0353
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2
Hospital
Center of
Médio Tejo
-0,1997
-0,1013
-0,0401
-0,2221
-0,3083
3
Hospital
Center of
Cova da Beira
-0,1077
-0,2347
-0,5043
-0,3574
-0,2361
4
Hospital
Center of Vila
Real / Peso da
Régua
0,0027
-0,1905
-0,3213
-0,4204
-0,1862
5
District
Hospital of
Figueira da
Foz
-0,1593
-0,0951
0,1521
-0,7397
-0,3051
6
Garcia de Orta
Hospital
-0,1374
0,0455
-0,1338
-0,5424
-5,2694
7
Infante Dom
Pedro
Hospital
0,0026
0,0203
-0,2078
-0,3515
-1,0943
8
Pulido
Valente
Hospital
-0,4982
-0,2230
-2,8156
1,8762
-0,0918
9
Santo André
Hospital
0,0071
0,0171
0,0320
-0,0384
0,0195
10
São Gonçalo
Hospital
0,0275
-0,0236
-0,3640
-2,3114
1,7811
11
São Sebastião
Hospital
0,0219
0,0345
0,0367
0,0328
0,0332
12
Coimbra
Regional
Oncology
Center
0,0059
0,0033
0,0115
0,0035
0,0154
13
Lisboa
Regional
Oncology
Center
0,0019
0,0270
0,0153
0,0047
0,0047
14
Padre
Américo Vale
Sousa
Hospital
-0,1728
-0,2102
-0,1248
-0,2313
0,0860
15
IPO Porto
-0,1014
-0,0253
0,0213
-0,0242
0,1824
Table 4: Values obtained for the ROE indicator
per Hospital before and after contracting.
EVA
N
Hospital
Designation
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
1
Hospital
Center of
Alto Minho
-65,23
-49,47
11,32
91,80
-83,88
2
Hospital
Center of
Médio Tejo
98,30
-188,14
-133,60
141,33
-36,17
3
Hospital
Center of
Cova da
Beira
-90,82
-58,18
55,62
65,89
-10,74
4
Hospital
Center of
Vila Real /
Peso da
Régua
-154,04
-19,36
28,09
491,17
53,44
5
District
Hospital of
Figueira da
Foz
-21,74
-35,05
-33,63
70,16
-2,90
6
Garcia de
Orta
Hospital
-46,91
-121,96
-92,52
37,35
47,46
7
Infante
Dom Pedro
Hospital
-135,67
-118,51
-26,04
192,44
119,75
8
Pulido
Valente
Hospital
15,93
-27,42
7,65
-7,78
-77,03
9
Santo
André
Hospital
-138,13
-115,09
422,76
-65,32
-142,26
10
São
Gonçalo
Hospital
-22,31
-15,65
-5,03
20,59
36,43
11
São
Sebastião
Hospital
-281,20
-283,34
-230,29
-297,73
-339,29
12
Coimbra
Regional
-103,55
-91,43
-161,97
-32,04
-117,59
Oncology
Center
13
Lisboa
Regional
Oncology
Center
-246,61
-304,22
-254,04
-163,46
-277,88
14
Padre
Américo
Vale Sousa
Hospital
-60,33
-73,95
-64,40
1,96
-123,39
15
IPO Porto
-113,95
-226,41
-216,16
-238,35
-580,53
Table 5: Values obtained for the EVA indicator
by Hospital before and after contracting.
MVA1
N
Hospital
Designation
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
1
Hospital
Center of
Alto Minho
-26,29
-35,28
-20,31
171,76
-156,94
2
Hospital
Center of
Médio Tejo
-914,49
5172,18
4813,85
5607,16
-1434,88
3
Hospital
Center of
Cova da
Beira
-35,61
-51,81
-102,09
241,29
-39,35
4
Hospital
Center of
Vila Real /
Peso da
Régua
-30,47
-8,73
-18,95
62,19
6,77
5
District
Hospital of
Figueira da
Foz
-11,85
-49,59
-73,11
-795,81
32,85
6
Garcia de
Orta
Hospital
-32,12
-212,18
-208,42
-82,80
-105,23
7
Infante
Dom Pedro
Hospital
-36,29
-106,09
-9,35
-425,73
-264,93
8
Pulido
Valente
Hospital
74,20
-253,08
-67,25
-229,62
-2273,12
9
Santo
André
Hospital
-37,82
-102,75
-3110,19
534,24
1163,50
10
São
Gonçalo
Hospital
-7,45
-12,54
-0,82
-15,52
-27,45
11
São
Sebastião
Hospital
-59,72
-280,74
-671,47
-4105,11
-4678,18
12
Coimbra
Regional
Oncology
Center
-38,84
-93,46
-485,40
-139,05
-510,38
13
Lisboa
Regional
Oncology
Center
-80,87
-337,96
-574,01
-856,44
-1455,91
14
Padre
Américo
Vale Sousa
Hospital
-27,77
-91,70
-99,10
2,23
-140,22
15
IPO Porto
-52,70
-354,67
-756,96
-2904,36
-6982,56
Table 6: Values obtained for the MVA1
indicator by Hospital before and after
contracting.
MVA2
N
Hospital
Designation
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
1
Hospital
Center of Alto
Minho
-4,80
-581,25
-1170,69
-376,51
-110,45
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DOI: 10.37394/23207.2022.19.2
Gualter Couto, Maria Rocha,
Pedro Pimentel, Jacinto Garrido Velarde,
Rui Alexandre Castanho
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
18
Volume 19, 2022
2
Hospital
Center of
Médio Tejo
-1346,93
-655,26
-292,23
-1078,58
-1128,43
3
Hospital
Center of
Cova da Beira
-406,92
-625,60
-929,79
-475,09
-212,99
4
Hospital
Center of Vila
Real / Peso da
Régua
-28,49
-269,31
34,07
-700,61
-110,20
5
District
Hospital of
Figueira da
Foz
-194,41
-106,96
188,31
-536,99
-173,04
6
Garcia de Orta
Hospital
-516,32
164,25
-443,00
-1608,82
-1702,97
7
Infante Dom
Pedro
Hospital
-26,84
25,41
-499,11
-480,36
-718,20
8
Pulido
Valente
Hospital
-705,90
-240,92
-832,68
-597,92
-98,98
9
Santo André
Hospital
-14,62
18,68
524,94
-609,76
19,02
10
São Gonçalo
Hospital
7,40
-11,60
-128,05
-222,46
-217,60
11
São Sebastião
Hospital
41,46
103,28
118,82
101,58
108,75
12
Coimbra
Regional
Oncology
Center
-16,84
-13,00
6,08
-19,50
9,97
13
Lisboa
Regional
Oncology
Center
-50,28
79,03
11,90
-46,82
-44,91
14
Padre
Américo Vale
Sousa
Hospital
-483,72
-514,41
-298,30
-413,80
137,18
15
IPO Porto
-649,25
-210,19
53,39
-202,71
1202,97
Table 7: Values obtained for the MVA2
indicator by Hospital before and after
contracting
MVA3
N
Hospital
Designation
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
1
Hospital
Center of Alto
Minho
-20,01
-201,57
-193,27
-141,66
-65,56
2
Hospital
Center of
Médio Tejo
-266,13
-145,69
-118,63
1188,51
-193,38
3
Hospital
Center of
Cova da Beira
-65,09
-97,59
-161,53
-74,63
-39,70
4
Hospital
Center of Vila
Real / Peso da
Régua
-5,65
-75,24
-98,38
-453,37
-49,07
5
District
Hospital of
Figueira da
Foz
51,30
-46,25
-13,90
-95,86
-37,93
6
Garcia de Orta
Hospital
-142,87
-60,18
-14,04
-424,88
-177,23
7
Infante Dom
Pedro
Hospital
-32,07
-45,89
-115,75
-163,15
-240,79
8
Pulido
Valente
Hospital
-132,02
-43,47
-85,15
-109,52
12,82
9
Santo André
Hospital
-32,93
-59,07
-1139,72
-582,38
-25,54
10
São Gonçalo
Hospital
-14,23
-18,18
-35,07
-46,48
-47,06
11
São Sebastião
Hospital
-3,20
2,67
-17,20
-19,74
-18,80
12
Coimbra
Regional
Oncology
Center
-59,51
-57,43
29,76
-65,52
-53,33
13
Lisboa
Regional
Oncology
Center
-77,83
-79,22
-43,97
-104,19
-99,59
14
Padre
Américo Vale
Sousa
Hospital
-37,10
-51,41
-44,63
-34,83
22,97
15
IPO Porto
-200,98
-131,70
-61,22
-56,22
139,47
Table 8: Values obtained for the MVA3
indicator by Hospital before and after
contracting
Looking at Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, analyzing the
values obtained for each economic performance
indicator, two years before and two years after
contracting, it can be seen that hiring did not
significantly impact the performance of these
indicators. However, it can be seen that in more than
half of the Hospitals, there was a downward
evolution in most of the indicators, in line with the
study by Dinis [4].
It can be seen that, except for the Garcia da Orta,
Infante Dom Pedro, and São Gonçalo Hospitals, the
difference in profitability before and after contracting
was very insignificant. Pulido Valente, Santo André,
São Sebastião, Padre Américo Vale Sousa Hospitals,
Portuguese Institute of Oncology Porto Francisco
Gentil, Regional Oncology Center of Lisbon and
Coimbra had a very similar behavior regarding
contracting, which means that in all of them there was
an improvement in the return on Equity after
contracting. The Hospital de São Gonçalo stands out,
as this was the one that most benefited from the
contracting; however, both its net result and the value
of Equity went from positive in 2003 to negative in
2007. As for the other Hospitals, Centro Hospitalar
do Alto Minho, Médio Tejo, Cova da Beira, Vila
Real, and Figueira da Foz also had very similar
behaviors, but in a reverse behavior to those
previously mentioned, as their return on Equity
Capital worsened with the contracting. It should be
noted that the Hospital that most worsened its
recovery after contracting was Hospital Garcia da
Orta. According to the 2007 report and accounts of
this same Hospital, due to reasons of national health
policy, some of the prices or tariffs charged are lower
than those necessary to ensure income that allows the
coverage of the total operating costs and adequate
levels of remuneration for invested capital, as well as
self-financing.
Furthermore, of the fifteen hospitals, there is only an
increase in economic performance in six of them:
Hospital de São Gonçalo, Infante Dom Pedro, Garcia
da Orta, Figueira da Foz District, Centro Hospitalar
Cova da Beira, and Centro Hospitalar Peso da Régua
Vila Real. In this way, these six hospitals started to
create more value after going through a contracting
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BUSINESS and ECONOMICS
DOI: 10.37394/23207.2022.19.2
Gualter Couto, Maria Rocha,
Pedro Pimentel, Jacinto Garrido Velarde,
Rui Alexandre Castanho
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
19
Volume 19, 2022
process. In this sense, the Hospital where there was
greater value creation, after contracting, was the
Hospital de São Gonçalo. The other Hospitals, given
the contracting, did not obtain better results about
value creation since they lost value after the
contracting process. It should be noted that the
Hospital that most deteriorated in value, that is,
devalued, was the Portuguese Institute of Oncology
of Porto São Francisco Gentil.
In order to further develop this analysis, a hypothesis
test was applied to test the normality of the data,
where the Hypothesis null (H0) means that the data
distribution is normal and Hypothesis 1 (H1) implies
that the data distribution is not normal. The test used
to test the data's normality was the Shapiro Wilk test
since the sample is small and less than 30. The level
of significance considered in the study was 5%. Thus,
table 9, appendix A and B, shows that only the data
from the MVA3 indicator follow a normal
distribution; the remaining data from the other
indicators do not follow a normal distribution.
Indicators
SIG
Decision
ROA
0,001
Reject H0
ROE
0,006
Reject H0
EVA
0,048
Reject H0
MVA 1
0,000
Reject H0
MVA 2
0,004
Reject H0
MVA 3
0,609
Accept H0
Table 9: Normality test.
Subsequently, on the ROA, ROE, EVA, and MVA
indicators, where the null hypothesis was rejected in
the previous normality test, a non-parametric test of
the difference between means was applied, whose
name is Mann Whitney test for two different samples.
For the MVA3 indicator, where the null hypothesis
was accepted in the previous normality test, a
parametric T-student test was applied for two
different samples.
Concerning the Mann Whitney test that was applied,
the Hypothesis null (H0) means that there is a
similarity between the indicators' means, and
Hypothesis 1 (H1) indicates no similarity between
the means of the indicators. The level of significance
considered was 5% (Table 10). When observing the
results obtained in Table 10, it can be concluded that
the null hypothesis is accepted in all variables, so
there is a statistical similarity between the means of
the indicators, as all parameters are higher than the
5% significance level. Thus, it appears that the
economic indicators are statistically equal when
compared before and after contracting.
Indicators
SIG
Decision
ROA
0,933
Accept H0
ROE
0,686
Accept H0
EVA
0,800
Accept H0
MVA 1
0,476
Accept H0
MVA 2
0,305
Accept H0
Table 10: Mann Whitney test.
Finally, the last test performed in the SPSS was the
T-student parametric hypothesis test for two
independent samples, in which the null hypothesis
(H0) means that there is a similarity between the
means of the indicators and the hypothesis 1 (H1)
means that there is no there is a similarity between
the averages of the indicators. The level of
significance, again considered, was 5%. Table 11
shows the results obtained.
Indicators
SIG
Decision
MVA3
0,209
Aceitar H0
Table 11: T-Student test.
Thereby, through the analysis of Table 11, it can be
verified that the significance of the coefficient is
0.209, that is, much higher than 5%, so the null
hypothesis is not rejected, which means that there is
a similarity between the averages of the indicators.
Thus, it is concluded that the economic indicators are
not statistically different when compared before and
after the contracting process.
4 Final Remarks
The study explored the impact on the National Health
System in the perspective of the contracting process
by analyzing the behavior of the economic
performance of a sample of fifteen Hospitals in the
period between 2003 and 2017.
The main results found in this study, which
qualitatively analyzes the Hospitals' economic data,
allow us to conclude that, in Portugal, the behavior of
the Portuguese Hospitals' financial performance vis-
à-vis the contracting process was not very significant
and unfavorable. This conclusion is in line with the
study by Dinis [4].
Furthermore, we found that only eight Hospitals
created value in relation to the contracting, more
specifically, Hospital Pulido Valente, Hospital de
Santo André, District Hospital Figueira da Foz,
Hospital Padre Américo Vale de Sousa, Centro
Hospitalar Médio Tejo, Centro Hospitalar Cova da
Beira and the Regional Oncology Centers of Lisbon
and Coimbra.
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DOI: 10.37394/23207.2022.19.2
Gualter Couto, Maria Rocha,
Pedro Pimentel, Jacinto Garrido Velarde,
Rui Alexandre Castanho
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
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Volume 19, 2022
The Hospital that, with the contracting process,
created more value in a relevant way continues to be
the Portuguese Oncology Institute of Porto São
Francisco Gentil. In turn, the Hospital that started to
create less value compared to contractualization, in a
more significant way, is no longer Garcia da Orta,
becoming Infante Dom Pedro.
Contextually, there is still no other study that
analyzes the impact of contracting the national health
system on hospital profitability and economic
performance indicators. So, this is an innovative
study.
5 Study Limitations and Prospective
Research Lines
There are already other studies that analyze this
impact. However, they do not use the same
methodology to perform the fundamental analysis. In
fact, all the policies adopted affect the State budget
and the health of all taxpayers and compromise future
generations. This is a very appreciated and essential
topic these days, so it needs to be analyzed and
studied.
In fact, there were no hospital reports and accounts
before 2003. In the sample of hospitals analyzed, we
were only able to access data from 2003 and 2004.
As study limitations, it is possible to emphasize the
absence of accounting data in the period before
contracting, since only data related to the years 2003
and 2004 were found. Besides, there was a scarcity
of studies developed with the same object of
research, the inexistence (or lack of knowledge) of a
similar study, and the sample size (despite being a
sample for convenience).
This work may be a starting point for other studies
about the impact of contracting and the National
Health System's sustainability. In this sense, it is
considered that it would be interesting to analyze the
effect of the policies and reforms adopted in Portugal
within the scope of contracting the National Health
System.
This study may also be a useful contribution to the
future realization of economic-financial research, to
verify the solvency and financial balance of each
hospital, before and after contracting, as well as a
study of issues related to sustainability and
problematic in the efficiency of the distribution and
allocation of resources, in an equitable way for the
whole country.
Regardless of the results obtained and the limitations
identified since there are not many studies on this
topic, it is still expected that this study will arouse
interest on the part of readers and alert them to the
question of the importance of efficiently managing
available resources to claim a more just, pragmatic,
efficient and equal National Health System for all.
Appendix A
Appendix B
Indicators
SIG
Decision
ROA
0,001
Reject H0
ROE
0,006
Reject H0
EVA
0,048
Reject H0
MVA 1
0
Reject H0
MVA 2
0,004
Reject H0
MVA 3
0,609
Accept H0
Contribution of individual authors to
the creation of a scientific article
(ghostwriting policy)
Author Contributions: All the authors contributed
equally to the development of the present paper. All
phases of the paper development have been proper
discussed and worked on by the authors. All authors
have read and agreed to the published version of the
manuscript.
Sources of funding for research
presented in a scientific article or
scientific article itself
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DOI: 10.37394/23207.2022.19.2
Gualter Couto, Maria Rocha,
Pedro Pimentel, Jacinto Garrido Velarde,
Rui Alexandre Castanho
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
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Volume 19, 2022
This paper is financed by Portuguese national funds
through FCT Fundação para a Ciência e a
Tecnologia, I.P., project number UIDB/00685/2020.
Also, the authors wish to acknowledge funding for
this research work from the VI Regional Research
Plan and the Regional Government of Extremadura
and the European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF), associated with financing the research
group Sustainable Development and Territorial
Planning (GR18052)
Creative Commons Attribution
License 4.0 (Attribution 4.0
International, CC BY 4.0)
This article is published under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en
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DOI: 10.37394/23207.2022.19.2
Gualter Couto, Maria Rocha,
Pedro Pimentel, Jacinto Garrido Velarde,
Rui Alexandre Castanho
E-ISSN: 2224-2899
22
Volume 19, 2022