Ethical Resilience Management Framework for Critical Healthcare
Information Infrastructure
JYRI RAJAMÄKI, AARNE HUMMELHOLM
Leppävaara Campus
Laurea University of Applied Sciences
Vanha maantie 9, 02650 Espoo
FINLAND
Abstract: - The growing complexity of the digital ecosystem in combination with increasing global risks
involves various ethical issues associated with cybersecurity and resilience. This paper offers a conceptual
resilience governance framework and design aspects for ethical and resilient cyber-physical e-health and e-
wellbeing systems. Our safety and security thinking has been based on a supposition that inside defensive walls
we are safe. The focus of our actions has been controlling our own systems, improvement of protection, and
staying inside the protection. However, nobody can control complex large integrated cyber-physical systems,
but on the other hand, coordination and cooperation is a salient point. In e-health and e-wellbeing, this means
that the focus is shifting from the control and securing of health and welfare data in a silo to using that data to
promote health and wellbeing worldwide in our connected world. On the other hand, we have an ethical need to
complement the existing security and risk management knowledge base by developing frameworks and models
where we are using, for example, artificial intelligence systems that enable network-wide flexibility and
resilience management that strive to maintain and improve critical operations.
Key-Words: - cloud services, cross-border healthcare, eHealth, healthy aging, SHAPES project, well-
being
Received: April 18, 2021. Revised: January 27, 2022. Accepted: February 28, 2022. Published: April 4, 2022.
1 Introduction
Digitalization changes societies; especially the
use of information and communication technology
(ICT) in the health and wellbeing (H&W) sector
effects on aging persons. Digital transformation and
ecosystem thinking steer the Smart and Healthy
Ageing through People Engaging in Supportive
Systems (SHAPES) project that supports the
wellbeing of the elderly at home. Ethical questions
have always been crucial in H&W. The rapid
dissemination of ICT makes some of those
questions even more pressing making cybersecurity
an important ethical dimension of the features of
future H&W solutions ethical principles [1], [2].
This design science research (DSR) continues the
work presented at the DIGILIENCE 2020
conference [3] going deeper into the ethical problem
of how to design the level of trust that promotes to
exchange of health data for promoting H&W of
citizens. The Relevance Cycle of DSR bridges the
contextual environment of the research project with
the design science activities [4]. This DSR’s
environment is the e-health and e-wellbeing domain
and ambient assisted living of elderly persons. The
main problem concerning this DSR: The mental
picture of cybersecurity should turn from “threat,
crime, attack” to “trust” and willingness to share
H&W information. The Rigor Cycle connects the
design science activities with the knowledge base of
scientific foundations, experience, and expertise that
informs the research project [4]. The knowledge
base of this study consists of (i) ethics of
cybersecurity science [5], (ii) science and practice of
resilience [6], [7] (iii) cybersecurity science [8], (iv)
trust-building in the digital world [9], and (v)
situational awareness in cyber systems [10]. The
central Design Cycle iterates between the core
activities of building and evaluating the design
artifacts and processes of the research [4].
2 Ambient Assisted Living of Elderly
Persons
Applications of intelligent sensor systems, analytical
devices, telecommunication systems, and various
information systems are very rapidly evolving and
adaptable to people's daily activities and needs,
including more efficient and intelligent home-
related services. This development means that in the
digital world, also elderly persons can be provided
with more effective treatment methods that allow
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them to live longer in their homes and live there
better. Elderly persons can be provided with better
home care and preventive healthcare. Elderly
persons can easily carry portable sensors and
intelligent devices on their bodies and wrists that
relay their vital information to hospital systems in
real-time, from which healthcare staff can track
human vitality even in real-time.
At the same time, we must develop artificial
intelligence (AI) which is gathering information
through several types of communications systems
(e.g. wireless sensor networks, wireless ad hoc
networks, wireless mesh networks, and so on) over
using different types of communication technologies
(e.g. device-to-device, machine-to-machine, sensor-
to actuators communications systems). All this kind
of development together with artificial intelligence
gives elderly persons better life and healthcare
possibilities, now and in the future when they are
living in their homes.
2.1 People in the Environment
The latest sustainable development systems and
healthcare systems, which can also be used at home,
improve the quality of life of special groups,
including elderly persons. Such systems allow older
people to stay alone at home for longer, to be more
independent, and reduce hospital stays and time
spent with doctors and healthcare. Internet of things
(IoT) devices, actuators, and sensors can be used to
improve the safety of the elderly lifestyle and home
environment. Such developments are very important
for the elderly and society as a whole, as the number
of elderly persons is growing rapidly, as lifestyle
changes in developed countries and improvements
in the medical field increase the amount of the aging
population. These innovations are used together
with information and communication technologies
to develop applications and services for elderly
persons to help them in their needs of daily affairs.
As people, as well as the elderly, live in homes
for much longer and healthier lives and their well-
being is much better than before because of these
new healthcare services, the development also
requires health professionals to adapt and train in a
new environment, so that they can use and manage
they get from new technologies - and healthcare
information and wellbeing information obtained
from them so that they would make their treatment
decisions as quickly and efficiently as possible. As
applications for intelligent sensor systems,
analytical equipment, telecommunications systems,
and various information systems evolve rapidly and
adapt to people's daily activities and needs,
including more efficient and intelligent home
services, we also need new types of service
companies and companies to maintain home
systems, who assist, maintain equipment and
systems in this type of home environment. In all
these activities, they must take into account the
privacy and cyber and information security
requirements of the newer EU directives (GPDR,
MDR, and NIS). In these new sustainable
development systems and healthcare systems, we
must also take care of ethical and moral issues
concerning developing and using these new
services.
These new sustainable development systems and
healthcare systems will also give relatives a better
way to monitor the health status and wellbeing of
their elderly. This opportunity also poses challenges
for healthcare systems in the sharing of healthcare
patient data, as these must take into account privacy,
information, and cybersecurity issues, even if the
patient’s healthcare information is provided to the
patient's relatives. In this situation, we must also
take care of ethical and moral issues concerning the
patient’s healthcare information and which way we
give this information to the patient’s relatives.
2.2 Organizational Systems
The social and health authorities’ organizations in
Finland are 1) national healthcare systems, 2) The
Social Insurance Institution, and 3) National Health
Care Research Institute. Patient healthcare
information is also shared with social and healthcare
authorities’ information systems and information
banks. Nowadays we must take care of the
difference between healthcare information and
wellbeing information because they are classified at
different security levels. Patients’ healthcare
information is classified, and they must be separated
in data centers and communications systems from
wellbeing information so that hackers and cyber
attackers cannot use possible vulnerabilities in these
systems and attack our healthcare systems.
Social and healthcare information systems are
coming more and more complex systems and they
are forming a lot of connections and federations
between different ICT systems and applications in
our societies. These service providers use many
subcontractors, supply and service chains are
complex, many different application developers
work together developing different software
components, and therefore maintenance chains are
also branched out to many parties, and so on. In
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such information and communication environments,
it is difficult to ensure that security and
cybersecurity are implemented by the requirements
for all aspects of the entire production, service, and
maintenance chains in healthcare services. In that
kind of situation, we must also take care of ethical
and moral issues concerning the patient’s healthcare
systems and which way they are developed with EU
recommendations, and which way and where these
service providers use and store these patients’
information.
Integrating healthcare requirements in line with
the new EU directives into the health and wellbeing
environments and their systems also require action
by the government and parliament, as well as line
ministries, to bring legislation and standards into
line with the directives. At the same time, these new
laws can guide the actions of service providers to
meet the measures related to the healthcare
environment and day-to-day operations
recommended by the new EU requirements.
Legislation and regulations also impose
requirements on organizations that develop
healthcare systems and devices when developing
new products and applications in this field.
2.3 Technical Systems
Today, patients and elderly persons can be in the
hospital, in their homes, and anywhere they need to
go to do issues needed, as Fig. 1 shows. When we
are using new types of healthcare devices and
services, we need also to verify that
telecommunications operator networks and service
providers in data centers are done according to
needed requirements so, that we can trust e-health
and m-health systems working the right way and
trusted way, and our privacy and security issues are
safely done.
Fig. 1: E-health and mobile-health top-level
architecture [11], [12].
Fig.2 shows an access network environment
where elderly persons’ and patients’ devices are
used every day. We don’t know exactly the security
and cybersecurity solution in that access network,
and it is meaning challenge to use classified
information in this kind of environment.
Fig. 2: Access network architecture [11].
The access network systems will utilize artificial
intelligence (AI) in the future to help us to find
vulnerabilities, malware, or if attackers try to attack
our systems. AI can be used also to optimize
network functionalities and energy consumption and
also optimized used capacity.
Fig.2 shows the building and home
environment’s sensors and devices, which are using
the same frequencies as e-health and m-health
patients’ and elderly persons’ devices. This means
possible interferences between different devices so
that those healthcare systems maybe do not work at
all. These devices use information that has different
levels of security, such as public, restricted, or
confidential information. Today, there are many
vulnerabilities in these IoTs, sensors, and actuators,
so cyber attackers and hackers can attack our system
in such environments. Such attacks are carried out
already in the world today. Building LANs is one
important part of service chains from elderly
persons and patients’ smart devices to the service
provider’s server center as we design and develop
security and cybersecurity solutions. There must be
separate data of the different security levels so that
the data can be transmitted securely from end to end
of the service chains.
When elderly persons move around daily,
shopping, or even walking, tracking systems would
make it possible to know where elderly persons are
going or where they are. Location information is
very important because if an elderly person has
health-related incident problems, we know exactly
his or her situation, and healthcare organizations can
send the right help to the right place. It has
happened that people do not get help at the right
time and in the right place and a person has died
when he has not received help in time. This situation
also includes issues of privacy and ethics that need
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to be taken into account and addressed when using
this monitoring system, even if we use this
monitoring system to save lives in critical situations.
Location data has also been used against a person
when someone knows the person’s smart device and
its movements and knows exactly where the person
is. An example is that when a person goes into
his/her car, the car can be hacked and its systems are
modified so that the car can be steered to drive a
crash where a person can lose his/her life.
Fig.3 shows a network architecture where elderly
persons’ and patients’ smart devices are sending
bio-signals and welfare signals end-to-end. In the
communications environment, we must separate
bio-signals data from other information so that the
data can be safely transmitted from end to end of the
service chains and there are not any other
information going to the same address. Fig.4 shows
one service chain from IoT devices and sensors to
elderly persons’ smart devices and from that to a
data center and storage systems there. Table 1
shows the vulnerabilities of the IoT devices and
sensors shown in Fig.4, as well as the user interface
vulnerabilities and also the probabilities of attack.
Fig. 3: Network architecture [11].
Fig. 4: Access Network architecture and sensors
used by the elderly.
Today, almost all medical devices and wellness
devices use wireless interfaces when connected
to smart devices for the elderly. Those wireless
access network connections are vulnerable
because maybe there is not any kind of security
mechanism there and that gives hackers and
cyber attackers an easy way to attack our
healthcare systems. The same kind of situation
is also inside IoT devices and sensors. We may
not notice if someone is connected to our
system because IoT devices and sensors use
wireless networks. After all, those devices’
radio technical coverage areas extend up to 100
meters from the device with certain solutions.
Even though we use encryption systems on our
smart devices, it doesn’t help us because
hackers and cyber attackers are already inside
because they can take advantage of the wireless
connections of these IoT devices and sensors
and install malware on our smart devices. The
smart device may then be part of the BOT
network or a device containing malware may
contaminate our information systems and
applications which are in the data center.
Table 1. Vulnerabilities of access network sensors.
Figures 1-4 show how complex and fragmented the
critical healthcare information infrastructure is, with
many different types of sensors, IoT devices, and
smart devices, before older people’s bio-signals are
sent to the network and data centers servers. Then
healthcare professionals receive and analyze this
bio-signal data and provide feedback and
recommendations to elderly care. It is very difficult
to make real security solutions and protections in
this kind of environment. IoT devices and sensors
are maybe using different types of data models, they
use different protocols and there are not many
possibilities to install any kind of security concepts
inside the systems, and so on. On our IoT devices
and sensors are many different suppliers which
mean also challenges these devices’ management
and do real security solutions and protections to
these devices. Because these systems are so
complex and fragmented and have many different
types of IoT devices and sensors in use, it is also
very difficult to take care of ethical resilience things
in such operating environments. Same time we must
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also take care of security things so that hackers and
cyber attackers could not attack our systems and use
malware there. Because our IoT devices and sensors
are many different suppliers that mean also
challenges these devices’ resilience management.
3 Designing Path of Resilience
Management Framework
3.1 Ethics of Cybersecurity in Healthcare
The growing complexity of the digital ecosystem in
combination with increasing global risks involves
various ethical issues associated with cybersecurity.
Christen, Gordijn and Loi express the dilemma [2,
p. 1]: “Overemphasising cybersecurity may violate
fundamental values such as equality, fairness,
freedom or privacy. However, neglecting
cybersecurity could undermine citizens’ trust and
confidence in the digital infrastructure, in policy
makers and in state authorities.” They continue
“cybersecurity is still an under-developed topic in
technology ethics. Although there are numerous
papers discussing issues such as ‘big data’ and
privacy, cybersecurity is—if at all—only discussed
as a tool to protect (or undermine) privacy.” For
example, if a medical implant producer protects the
data transfer between the implant and receiver
server utilizing suitable cryptology, this
significantly increases the energy consumption of
the implant and frequently requires more surgeries
for battery exchange [2, pp. 1-2].
Weber and Kleine [1] have investigated the
ethical issues of cybersecurity in H&W applying the
approach of principlism based on Beauchamp and
Childress’s [13] four principles of biomedical ethics
(respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence,
beneficence, and justice). The important aims of the
employment of ICT in H&W are efficiency and
quality of services, the privacy of information, and
confidentiality of communication, usability of
services, and safety [1]. Fig.5 maps the ethical
principles to technical aims.
Fig. 5: Technical aims mapping to ethical principles
(Adopted from [1])
3.2 Fundamental Concepts of Cyber
Resilience
The human body is inherently resilient in its ability
to persevere through infections or trauma, but our
society’s critical infrastructure lacks the same
degree of resilience, typically losing essential
functionality following adverse events [14]. Without
proper protection and development with
cybersecurity in mind, modern society relying on
critical infrastructures would be extremely
vulnerable to accidental and malicious cyber threats
[6], [7]. Resilient systems can minimize the negative
impacts of adverse events on societies and sustain or
even improve their functionality by adapting to and
learning from fundamental changes caused by those
events [14].
The Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) doctrine
[15] identifies four domains that create shared
situational awareness and inform decentralized
decision-making:
Physical: Physical resources and the capabilities and
the design of those resources;
Information: Information and information
development about the physical domain;
Cognitive: Use of the information and physical
domains to make decisions; and
Social nexus: Organization structure and
communication for making cognitive decisions.
The National Academy of Sciences identifies four
event management cycles that a system needs to
maintain to be resilient [16]:
1. Plan/Prepare: Lay the foundation to keep services
available and assets functioning during a
disruptive event (malfunction or attack).
2. Absorb: Maintain the most critical asset function
and service availability while repelling or
isolating the disruption.
3. Recover: Restore all asset functions and service
availability to their pre-event functionality.
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4. Adapt: Using knowledge from the event, alter
protocol, a configuration of the system, personnel
training, or other aspects to become more
resilient.
Linkov et al. [17] combined the event
management cycles and NCW domains to create
resilience metrics for cyber systems. The process of
building resilience is a collective action of public
and private stakeholders responding to infrastructure
disruptions [18].
3.3 Situational Awareness and the Concept of
Cyber-Trust
The purpose concerning security is to know what is
going on and what will happen in the network(s),
and to be aware of the current level of security in
the network(s), how to design or build-in security
and resilience to a networked environment, and to
define trade-offs for security and privacy levels
versus system’s usability [9]. The overall aim is to
mitigate cybersecurity risks, which in turn supports
the business continuity and operations of the whole
society [9].
Investing in systems that improve confidence and
trust can significantly reduce costs and improve the
speed of interaction. From this perspective,
cybersecurity should be seen as a key enabler for the
development and maintenance of trust in the digital
world. Cybersecurity has the following four themes
[9]: (1) security technology, (2) situational
awareness, (3) security management, and (4)
resilience of operational systems, as shown in Fig.6
Situational awareness is needed for having a correct
understanding of security incidents, network traffic,
and other important aspects that affect security; and
6 technologies are needed for protection [9]. Human
aspects have to rule in via security management.
Consequently, resilient systems and infrastructures
can prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and
more successfully adapt to adverse events.
Fig. 6: Themes of Trust-building (adopted from [9])
Situational awareness (SA) is the main
prerequisite of cybersecurity and resilience. Without
SA, it is impossible to systematically prevent,
identify, and protect the system from cyber incidents
and if a cyber-attack happens, to recover from the
attack [9]. SA involves being aware of what is
happening around your system to understand how
information, events, and how actions affect the
goals and objectives, both now and soon. It also
enables the selection of effective and efficient
countermeasures, and thus, protects the system from
varying threats and attacks.
Situational awareness is needed for creating a
sound basis for the development and utilization of
countermeasures (controls), where resilience
focuses. The most important enablers of SA are
observations, analysis, visualization, governmental
cyber-policy, and national and international
cooperation. For the related decision-making,
relevant information collected from different
sources of the cyber environment or cyberspace,
e.g., networks, risk trends, and operational
parameters, is needed. This requires information
exchange between different stakeholders. And
always, when dealing with information exchange,
the main question is “trust”.
Cyber situational awareness high-level
architecture includes the data fusion engine,
information interfaces, and the HMI providing an
effective visualization layer [10]. These
functionalities should be as automatic as possible
without human interaction. However, there should
be an operator for controlling the sensors and data
fusion algorithms and inputting information into the
system.
The cognitive SA system for supporting
decision-making needs several input and output
interfaces [10]:
Sensor information interfaces. The system
implements interfaces for the input of
cybersecurity sensor information.
Interfaces for status information. The system
implements interfaces for inputting the status
information of all the known cyber entities.
Information on systems, devices, and sensors
with their status and configuration information,
but also the spare parts of physical devices are
relevant information for a cybersecurity SA
system. Also, information about the status of
saved data and the status of information flows
should be reported. Some of that information can
be automatically generated using data interfaces
and some should be user-generated by using
HMI.
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Interfaces for analysis information. The system
implements interfaces for information based on
the analysis. That kind of information includes
analyzed impact assessment information,
Indicator of Compromise (IOC) information, and
early-warning information from open-source
intelligence using, e.g., social media or CERT
bulletins. Further, required policies and
objectives should be input into the system.
Interfaces for information exchange. The system
implements interfaces for cybersecurity
information exchange with trusted companions.
HMI. The system implements HMI for effective
visualization of the current status of the cyber
domain under control and for the input of
information that cannot be entered automatically.
HMI is also used for controlling the data fusion
process. HMI should implement different
visualizations for different levels of users: e.g.
technical user who requires detailed technical
information, whereas a decision-maker needs
different visualization. HMI also implements
filters for data allowed for different users.
3.4 Cyber Security Science
Cybersecurity aims to make cyberspace safe from
damage or threat. Fig.7 shows three perspectives of
cyberspace: (1) a data or information perspective
that comes from the information theory space; (2) a
technology perspective that includes the hardware,
silicon, and wires, as well as software, operating
systems, and network protocols; and (3) a human
perspective that acknowledges that the human is as
responsible for the dynamics of the system as the
data and the technology are [8].
Fig. 7: Cyberspace at the overlap of data,
technology, and human [8]
The overall goal of cybersecurity is that all systems
and infrastructures are resilient. An e-health
platform is a cyber-system that has human,
technology, and data domains. One can think of a
cyber-system as consisting of two sub-systems: the
proper resilient operating system and the (cognitive)
situational awareness system that both have human
(social), technological (physical), and data-based
(information) domains. Fig.8 shows this concept.
Security management, security technologies, and
security information connect these sub-systems.
However, security information is mostly created or
transferred from the operational system to the SA
system via security technologies.
Security
management
Security
information
Security
technologies
Technology
for cyber
security
Situational
Awareness
Human
Organisation
structure and
communication for
making cognitive
decisions
Data
Artificial
Intelligence for
cyber security
Technology
Physical resources
and the capabilities
and the design of
those resources
Human
Organisation
structure and
communication for
making operational
decisions
Data
Information and
information
development about
the technology
domain
Operational
system
Cognitive
Situational
Awareness
system
Fig. 8: Resilient Cyber-system as a combination of
Operational system and Cognitive SA system
3.5 Security Management and Governance
Security policy is currently the main element used to
communicate secure work practices to employees
and ICT stakeholders. It is a declaration of the
significance of security in the business of the
organization in question. Additionally, the security
policy defines the organization’s policies and
practices for personnel collaboration. However,
people still often fail to comply with security
policies, exposing the organization to various risks.
One challenge is to promote methods and
techniques that can support the development of
comprehensible security policies in the emerging
ICT paradigms, e.g., cloud computing and multiple
devices [9]. Developing policies that can defeat the
main reasons driving non-compliance, such as a
habit, is challenging.
An information security management system
(ISMS) focuses on the continuous management and
operation of a system by the documented and
systematic establishment of the procedures and
processes to achieve confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the organization’s information assets
that do the preservation. ISMS provides controls to
protect organizations’ most fundamental asset,
information. Many organizations apply audits and
certification for their ISMS to convince their
stakeholders that the security of the organization is
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properly managed and meets regulatory security
requirements. An information security audit is an
audit of the level of information security in an
organization. Security aware customers may require
ISMS certification before a business relationship is
established. Unfortunately, ISMS standards are not
perfect and they possess potential problems.
Usually, guidelines are developed using generic or
universal models that may not apply to all
organizations. Guidelines based on common,
traditional practices take into consideration
differences between the organizations and
organization-specific security requirements.
In Fig.8, security management covers the human
and organizational aspects of cybersecurity. Its
focus areas include security policy development and
implementation, risk management and information
security investment, incentives, and trade-offs.
Security management also integrates the social
layer’s operational and cognitive aspects; all
technical and organizational components should
learn from prior events and incidents.
3.6 Security Technologies and Security
Information
Security technologies include all technical means
towards cybersecurity, such as secure system
architectures, protocols, and implementation, as well
as tools and platforms for secure system
development and deployment. Security technologies
are needed for fulfilling the recognized security
requirements, and for building resilient
infrastructures and systems with dependable
hardware and software that can also meet future
security challenges [9].
Security technologies enable the technical
protection of infrastructures, platforms, devices,
services, and data. Technical protection starts with
secure user identification and authorization which
are necessary features in the most secure
infrastructures, platforms, devices, and services.
Fortunately, well-known technologies exist for their
implementation. Typically, processes and data
objects are associated with an owner, represented in
the computer system by a user account, who sets the
access rights for others. A global trend is to increase
the use of cloud service technology when providing
critical services. Data go into a cloud and will not
come back to end-user’s devices. Also, government
data has already gone to a cloud, and in the future
more and more government data will migrate to
cloud servers and services. Partnerships between
cloud service providers and security solution
providers are becoming more common. We will see
the emergence of cloud service-specific solution
providers as well. Identity management and
encryption will be the most important cloud security
services to be offered. These services will be
eventually offered for small to medium-sized
businesses as well. We will also see the emergence
of cloud security standards. Challenges are that
quite often cloud service providers believe that
security is just an end-user issue and firewall means
security. Therefore, currently, we do not have
proper cloud security standards and we lack
awareness of a true understanding of comprehensive
cloud security [9].
Security technologies are needed also then if
something has happened. For example, forensics can
lead to the sources of the attack/mistake and provide
information for legal and other ramifications of the
issue. Forensics also facilitates the analysis of the
causes of the incident, which in turn, makes it
possible to learn and avoid similar attacks in the
future.
In Fig.8, security technologies include all
technical means towards cybersecurity, such as
secure system architectures, protocols, and
implementation, as well as tools and platforms for
secure system development and deployment.
Technologies that create or transfer security
information from the operational system to the SA
system include sensors that collect the first level of
data. Commonly, host- and network-based tools
generate logs that are used for SA. Firewalls, system
event logs, antivirus software, packet captures, net
flow collectors, and intrusion detection systems are
examples of common cyberspace sensors [8]. Level-
two technologies generate information from the data
to determine a current situation. Generally, level-
two technologies require the bringing together of
data and performing some level of analytics. The
simplest form is signature-based tools such as
antivirus and intrusion detection systems. These
systems have encapsulated previous knowledge of
detected attacks into signatures that detect and alert
when attacks are detected in operational systems.
More advanced systems such as security
information and event managers (SIEMs) provide
infrastructure to bring together datasets from
multiple sensors for performing correlations.
Vulnerability analysis to determine how many
unpatched vulnerabilities exist in a system is also a
form of level-two technology [8]. The third and
final level is hard to achieve and only a few
examples of effective tools exist. Cyber-threat
intelligence provides information on active threat
actor methods, techniques, and targets providing
some level of predictive information to enable
taking pre-emptive security measures [8]. Artificial
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BIOLOGY and BIOMEDICINE
DOI: 10.37394/23208.2022.19.9
Jyri Rajamäki, Aarne Hummelholm
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intelligence for cybersecurity develops with high
speed and offers new possibilities for better SA.
3.7 Cognitive Situational Awareness and
Resilience Management
Increasingly interconnected social, technical, and
economic networks create large complex systems,
and risk assessment of many individual components
becomes cost and time prohibitive, or even
impossible [14]. No one can control the whole
system of infrastructures, and our outlook should
move to coordination and cooperation. The
uncertainties associated with the vulnerabilities of
these systems challenge our ability to understand
and manage them. Risk assessment and risk
management are no longer sufficient in the modern
cyber-physical world, which has unforeseeable and
non-calculable stress situations. To address these
challenges, a risk assessment should be used
whenever possible to help prepare for and prevent
the consequences of foreseeable events, but
resilience must be built into systems to help them
quickly recover and adapt when adverse events do
occur [14].
The cognitive situational awareness system in
Fig.8 utilizes the information from the operating
system to make decisions that aim toward better
resilience.
3.8 Governance Framework and
Requirements
Fig.9 presents the conceptual resilience governance
framework for a resilient e-health cyber-system.
4 Discussion
This paper offers a conceptual resilience governance
framework and design aspects for ethical and
resilient cyber-physical e-health and e-wellbeing
systems. Our safety and security thinking has been
based on these days a supposition that inside
defensive walls we are safe.
Nowadays our societies provide a wide range of
services available to citizens in real-time, regardless
of location or time together with e-health and e-
wellbeing services. This also means that almost all
systems are interconnected through different
integration platforms. There are also many
federations between information systems. Before we
can design ethical and flexible cyber-physical e-
health and e-wellbeing systems, we need to look at
different scenarios, use cases, and requirements.
Also, large cross-system integrations and
federations in ICT systems mean that there is a lot
of interdependence between different ICT systems
and between organizations and stakeholders. We
need to identify dependencies on all internal and
external systems and data flows, and only then can
we design and implement flexible cyber-physical e-
health and wellbeing systems.
Human
perspective
Human
perspective
Human
perspective Security
management
Security
information
Security
technologies
Technology
Human
Data
Technology
Human
Data
Operational
system
Resilient cyber-physical eHealth system
Trusted social networks
(CERTs etc.)
Shared
information
from other
organisation
Information
for sharing
Energy system
Telecommunication system
Early warning systems
Analysation
and
intelligence
information
from open
sources
Resilient XX system
Cognitive
Situational
Awareness
system
Fig. 9: Conceptual resilience governance framework for e-health CPSs
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Ethical and resilient cyber-physical e-health and
e-wellbeing systems includes also analyses of attack
vectors, threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to specify
a comprehensive cybersecurity architecture for
electronic health and wellbeing systems. For this
ethical and resilient development and design of
cyber-physical e-health and e-wellbeing systems, we
need to use, for example, the Enterprise
Architecture Framework (EA) to describe all
systems and environments [11] and then get the
systems to work together in a controlled way with
cybersecurity and information security in mind.
When we are taking ethical and resilient cyber-
physical e-health and e-wellbeing systems in use we
must be also test systems in real environments to
verify their functionalities and security aspects.
Acknowledgments:
This work was supported by the SHAPES project,
which has received funding from the European
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme under the grant agreement no. 857159.
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WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on BIOLOGY and BIOMEDICINE
DOI: 10.37394/23208.2022.19.9
Jyri Rajamäki, Aarne Hummelholm
E-ISSN: 2224-2902
76
Volume 19, 2022