Developing Mathematical Models for Interpretability and Safety Verification of AI-Driven Engineering Systems

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Abstract: - The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is becoming established as a component of safety-critical engineering systems such as the autonomous transportation systems, energy infrastructure, industrial automation, and structural monitoring. As much as AI models and especially deep neural networks prove to be more accurate in prediction, their black box nature create serious issues when it comes to interpretability and safety guarantees. In safety critical areas explainability is not only a good idea, but a precursor to regulatory compliance, accountability and mitigation of hazards. This paper creates a comprehensive mathematical conceptualization of using interpretability metrics and formal safety verification protocols of AI-based engineering systems. Based on the recent developments in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), mechanistic interpretability, and formal verification theory, we operationalize interpretability as a measurable functional characterization of model structures and safety verification as meet-in-the-middle of reachable state spaces. Our abstraction of causal circuits and verification of time logics constraints using Shapley-based attribution functions make our integrated optimisation model offer explanation fidelity and safety invariants. The framework illustrates how the measures of interpretability can be integrated in the form of the side-constraints in formal verification pipelines, such that the model decision-making can be transparent and safely proven. Findings suggest that the metrics of coupling explanation coupled with reachability analysis can minimize unsafe decision regions and enhance calibration of the trust. The paper adds a mathematically based architecture that can be able to fill in the gap between heuristic XAI methods and serious engineering safety requirements. It is discussed in implications to aerospace, autonomous systems and industrial control environment as well as computational trade-offs and scalability issues. The model suggested creates a direction towards the certifiable AI systems in which interpretability and safety are not set at cross purposes.

Key-Words: - AI safety verification; Explainable artificial intelligence; Formal mathematical modeling; Mechanistic interpretability.

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1 Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) in engineering systems has radically changed the optimization of the systems, predictive maintenance, adaptive control, and autonomous decisions made by different systems in industries. The modern engineering infrastructures, including autonomous vehicles and unmanned aerial systems, smart grids, intelligent manufacturing platforms, and aerospace navigation systems among others are increasingly powered by deep learning architectures, which can model very complicated nonlinear relationship. They are systems that utilize high-dimensional sensor, cyber-physical network, and distributed control environment data streams to carry out real time inferences and decision-making problems that would be computationally infeasible when using more traditional rule-based programming paradigms. The computational backbone of future generation engineering intelligence is currently convolutional neural networks, recurrent neural networks, graph neural networks and transformer-based. In spite of their impressive predictive capabilities and versatility, these models are mostly high-dimensional function approximates whose internalizations are usually not interpretable by human eyes. Parameters in the millions (or billions) are learned using gradient based optimization without the explicit encoding of semantics. Consequently, it is difficult to comprehend the reason behind a certain model generating a particular output under a certain input. Such opacity has significant threats in the safety-critical environments. The engineering fields of aviation, nuclear power systems, railway automation, and autonomous mobility do not contain simply performance but also verifiable safety assurances and responsibility. Failure is hard to detect when there is no way to examine and trace the decision logic and certifying the system becomes an issue. Transparency deficit directly assails credibility, regulation, and trust among people, especially in cases where human lives or essential infrastructure are at stake (McDermid et al., 2021). Conventionally, the deterministic mathematical modeling, strict stability proofs, redundancy design, and formal verification systems have been used in engineering safety assurance. The studies of control systems are conducted through the Lyapunov stability theory, modelling of the differential equations and reachability analysis to provide assurance with the bounded and predictable behaviour in given operating conditions. Linear temporal logic (LTL), computational tree logic (CTL) and model checking are formal techniques that have traditionally been used to check system properties, including safety, liveness, and invariance. Such methods are based on a well-developed state transition model and system dynamics that is known to allow exhaustive verification under given conditions. But the AI systems break this paradigm since the internal parameters are not explicitly programmed but data-driven. Training distributions define the decision boundaries of deep neural networks which can behave unpredictably in the presence of adversarial perturbation, sensor noise or out of distribution examples. Contrary to classical systems of control, in which the behaviour of a system can be represented by an analytically tractable model, neural networks represent behaviour by weight matrices that cannot be easily verified by explicit closed-form methods. Subsequently, the traditional assurance practices fail to provide assurances in terms of robustness, fairness, and safety in the face of real variability. This discrepancy has led to a significant amount of investigation into how to bridge machine learning and formal verification methods, although scalability and computational tractability are still problems. Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) was created in reaction to these issues and endeavours to make black-box models more readable and comprehensible to those subject to them (Molnar, 2022). XAI methods are methods to estimate or discover meaningful explanations of complex models by emphasizing the contribution of features, and visualizing the patterns of activation, or by building surrogate interpretable models. Other approaches to computing feature attributions to estimate local decision behaviour include SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations) and LIME (Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations). These methods also help understand what drives the model outcomes by measuring the contribution that each input feature makes to a prediction. These types of interpretive tools have been useful in areas such as healthcare diagnostics, predictive maintenance analytics and fault detection in industrial systems. However, the post-hoc explanation procedures are rough in nature and might not be true internal reasoning of a model. Empirical inquiries show that not all attribution techniques pass robustness or sensitivity tests producing their explanations that differ greatly across small perturbations (Mersha et al., 2024). Unstable or misleading explanation may fail to generate confidence but confidence generated in safety-critical engineering situations. Besides, the quality of explanation cannot guarantee compliance with safety. A model can produce interpretable output and still be in operationally bad conditions or cause unsafe behaviour in extreme conditions. In this way, interpretability is not a sufficient replacement of formal verification. In parallel to the development of

post-hoc XAI, the paradigm of mechanistic interpretability has developed as a more profound paradigm of analysis. Instead of making external approximations to the explanations, mechanistic methods are designed to reverse-engineer computations in a neural network with the goal of determining internal circuits and representations that underlie certain behaviour (Bereska & Gavves, 2024). Researchers are trying to trace internal neuron network activations to semantically meaningful concepts by breaking down network into understandable computational substructures, also known as causal circuits. This architectural visibility allows one to reason about the way particular internal pathways can lead to outputs and the way failure modes can spread through the architecture. This means that mechanism interpretability provides a possible basis of mathematically adequate safety reasoning, since internal representations are analysable elements instead of hazy abstractions. According to recent studies, there is a need to consider interpretability as a part of safety assurance frameworks rather than an additional requirement (Klüver et al., 2024). Explanation mechanisms Units: In functional safety-critical systems, explanation mechanisms should be in line with the safety requirements, hazard analysis, and certification requirements. Requirement-driven models suggest the implementation of interpretability constraints in verification pipelines, i.e., to guarantee that the explanations are in relation to safety properties that are able to be proven. The unified view is aware of the relationship between interpretability and safety in that transparent reasoning promotes traceability and accountability and formal safety constraints give orderly delimits within which interpretability can be appraised. To this end, the present work develops a single mathematical model that interpolates interpretability measures and safety verification constraints with one optimization model. In making interpretability a quantifiable quality of model behaviour and integrating it into constraint-based safety checking, the proposed methodology seeks to reconcile between the heuristic methods of explanation and the more rigorous methods of engineering assurance. This kind of integration is a major milestone toward the achievability of certifiable, trustful AI systems that can be used to fulfil the high-end requirements of the contemporary engineering setting.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Explainable AI and Quantitative Metrics

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) refers to a general collection of techniques that help to interpret machine learning models by humans and make them more transparent. Another typical high-level taxonomy differentiates between the methods of intrinsic interpretability and post-hoc interpretability. Intrinsic techniques construct models which are transparent in nature that is, the logic behind the decisions they make can be viewed and understood directly. Common ones are linear models, decision trees, rule lists, and generalized additive models (GAMs), which are presented as explicit functional relationships or decision paths, which can be reasoned upon by the stakeholders without any additional explanation tools (Albahri et al., 2025; Molnar, 2022). They are commonly used at the areas where trust and transparency are crucial, like medical diagnoses or regulation, because of their simplicity and simplicity and lightness of inspection. In contrast, post-hoc interpretability is the approaches used to provide human readable explanations of the decisions made by complex black-box approaches like deep neural networks, random forests or gradient boosting machines used after training. Post-hoc methods are model-free or model-specific and are able to produce explanations on various levels of granularity (local, global, or cohort) (Alsaleh et al., 2025; Lundberg and Lee, as cited in Linardatos et al., 2020). Some such methods are feature attribution (such as SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations)) and visual explanation (such as Partial Dependence Plots (PDP)) methods, along with counterfactual explanations (Linardatos et al., 2020; Alsaleh et al., 2025). These techniques assist in bridging the gap between predictability performance and interpretability by generalizing on what properties or elements have the most impact on a model performance. SHAP is one of the most theoretically justified post-hoc methods and it uses Shapley values of cooperative game theory to compute the importance of a feature. The efficiency, symmetry and additivity axiomatic fairness properties mean that shapley values are appealing to attributes feature contributions in a principled manner (Shapley, as explained in De Bock et al., 2024). Efficiency, symmetry, and additivity are used in the context of XAI to ensure that the sum total of the feature contributions is equal to the model prediction, feature roles are equally important between similar contributions, and consistency between explanations of similar models. Nonetheless, with these favourable attributes, there is an emerging research that indicates

that there are practical constraints and sensitivity issues with such post-hoc techniques. It has been determined that SHAP and other feature attribution methods are susceptible to unstable explanations when perturbed by even small amounts of input data or model parameters, which makes these methods unreliable in safety-critical settings (Wang and Kee, 2025). Indicatively, Shapley values are known to average over a combinatorically large number of feature subsets; which can cause large differences in attribution scores in practice when there are changes in data distributions or when features are correlated with each other (Wang and Kee, 2025). Moreover, a comparison of Shapley-based explanations reveals that it may provide misleading information about feature importance in some circumstances, in which classifiers will provide contradictory scores of importance even though they have the same predictive behaviours (International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 2024). This demonstrates that the theoretical Shapley value fairness is not always reflected in the stable and intuitive descriptions in the real world models. Likewise, post-hoc methods that are gradient-based like Integrated Gradients are also designed to estimate the importance of each input by summing gradients along an interpolated trajectory between a reference input and the current sample. Although such approaches meet some of the desirable qualities such as completeness (i.e., the attributions to the difference between the model outputs), according to empirical assessments, there is variability in the explanations between baseline choice, network architecture, and input data noise (Linardatos et al., 2020; PMC, 2023). In addition, it has been observed that there is no one very dominant XAI method across comparative studies, and therefore, despite the existing issues of interpretability and robustness, it cannot be claimed that there is a single method that prevails in all cases of XAI (PMC, 2024). Per se, although intrinsic and post-hoc interpretability methodology offer a useful means to understand complex models, it has to be utilized in safety-critical scenarios with some restraint due to sensitivity and stability constraints. Ongoing study on the sound explanation frameworks and evaluation measures would be critical to make sure that interpretability has a meaningful contribution to a sense of trust and reliability in the AI systems.

2.2 Mechanistic Interpretability

Mechanistic interpretability is a new line of developable explainable AI studies that extends beyond those that only provide local input-output interpretations of neural networks to explore the underlying computational processes through which learned behaviour is encoded in neural networks. Unlike most XAI approaches, which attempt to approximate the behaviour of the model externally (e.g., feature attribution or surrogate models), mechanistic interpretability tries to reverse-engineer neural representations and circuits to understand how particular behaviour patterns (e.g. particular groups of neurons, weights, substructures, etc.) interact to make predictions (Kästner and Crook, 2024). The main assumption is that: complex AI models are meaningfully computed in the parameters of their internal structures, and as a result, that interpretation of these mechanisms can be understood as being deeper than merely surface explanations. One of the reasons that motivated the use of mechanistic interpretability is alignment, robustness and safety issues. According to Bereska and Gavves (2024), mechanistic interpretation of models can allow researchers and engineers to figure out how internal pathways of weights and patterns of activation are used to effect certain computational behaviours. This is unlike post-hoc algorithms that generally just give rough summary of relations between inputs and outputs. Mechanistic interpretability lets practitioners understand causal chains of computation that relate to particular abilities, as in concept recognition in vision models or response patterns in language models, by studying internal circuits, subgraphs of neurons and connections which are repeatedly involved in a particular computation (Bereska and Gavves, 2024). In practice, mechanistic methods frequently adapt the methods of analysis found in other fields, like systems biology and causal inference, where one must predict and control the behaviour of complex systems in terms of how they operate in their functional organization (Kästner and Crook, 2024). An example of this is the use of circuit analysis techniques to break down neural networks into smaller units of coherent computations that are easily studied separately and then reassembled to describe the behaviour as a whole. It is through these methods that it is possible to not only describe what features are important, but how modification of particular neurons or sub circuits can propagate through the network to influence outputs. The mechanistic interpretability can answer questions like, what was the algorithmic nature of the contribution to influence by internal network components in decision formation unlike black-box explanation methods, which may only be able to answer questions such as: a feature was influential. According to recent surveys, the potential of mechanistic interpretability to safety and value alignment in AI systems can be highlighted. According to Bereska and Gavves (2024), knowledge of the inner workings might be used to eliminate disastrous failures by detecting latent vulnerabilities

and misaligned circuits during deployment (e.g., circuits that are unpredictable to rare or out-of-distribution inputs). This is particularly essential because models are becoming more intricate and just as autonomously intertwined with engineering systems where failure may be a physical implication. Equally important, studies in the area of mechanistic interpretability point to its usefulness in the context of diagnostics, debugging and focused intervention, which are much stronger capabilities than more conventional interpretability tools (MDPI, 2025). The framework of mechanistic interpretability is also closely related to the causal abstraction frameworks which formalize the relationship between high-level explanatory components and low-level neural computations (Geiger et al., 2023). In causal abstraction, causal dynamics of the complex neural processes are tried to be mapped into a simplified causal model that maintains important computational properties. This kind of mappings may offer falsifiable, predictive, mathematically-based interpretations, which are essential to have sound safety checks. Although it has promise, mechanistic interpretability has significant challenges. Neural networks tend to have superposition, in which several unrelated features are represented in but not disjunctive circuits of activity, making it difficult to attribute semantic meaning to individual circuits or neurons (MDPI, 2025). Furthermore, the existing procedures are computationally expensive and do not make scale well to very large models. However, with the progress of research, the concept of mechanistic interpretability is being commonly regarded as one of the key directions to allow trustworthy, transparent and safe AI, especially where internal reasoning can be a key factor as much as the precision of the final result.

2.3 Formal Safety Verification of AI Systems

Formal verification of AI systems, especially neural networks, is now a research priority since these systems are now being deployed in safety-critical applications, including autonomous vehicles, to healthcare, aerospace, and industrial control systems. Simple, sample based traditional methods of verification and testing, cannot capture all the behaviour of the complex data driven models (Newcomb & Ochoa, 2026). Reacting to this, scholars have scaled the classical formal techniques, such as model checking, solving Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) and reachability analysis, to give mathematically sound assurances of network behaviour under all possible inputs within bounds. Model checking algorithms search through all states of an abstracted model of a system to determine the presence of given safety properties. Using it with neural networks, model checking usually consists of converting network structure and network safety claims to formal models (e.g., temporal logic) that can be explored exhaustively. As an example, the method of abstraction based verification builds a state transition system using network dynamics and verifies behavioural properties using Computational Tree Logic (CTL) (Athavale et al., 2025). SMT solving represents neural computations and safety properties as logical formulas in theories supported by the solver (e.g. real arithmetic, bit vectors) and then solves them optimally with SMT solvers. This method has been proven to verify quantized neural networks, in the case of autonomous vehicles, but scalability is a key issue, as such encodings are very complex (Athavale et al. (2025). On the other hand, reachability analysis aims to compute sets of reachable outputs with limited input variations and gives sound over approximations to guarantee that there are no unsafe outputs (Newcomb and Ochoa, 2026). Each of these formal approaches has its own strengths and trade-offs in regard to accuracy, cost of computation and scale. Formal verification techniques cannot in isolation tackle the problem that modern deep learning models are black box, and hence one may not be able to see how or why a particular behaviour arises. Explainability, which can be achieved with the help of Explainable AI (XAI) methods, thus, is becoming a widely considered complement to safety verification. According to McDermid, Jia, Lawton, and Habli (2021), explainability is not a fringe benefit, but it is an essential part of the safety certification of machine learning systems, especially in regulated industries, such as healthcare. They show that explainable representations assist the stakeholders to construct safety cases by giving understandable proof of system behaviour and the mode of failure, increasing the confidence that the system is satisfying the regulatory criteria (McDermid et al., 2021). Moreover, explainability is identified as one of the non-functional requirements of AI systems in ISO/IEC standards, which explains the evaluation requirements like transparency and interpretability (ISO/IEC TR 29119 11:2020). Recent work has attempted to incorporate explainability in the very verification procedure. The requirement driven verification models of Kluever et al. (2024) are designed to formulate the explainability part of the safety critical AI systems specifications, as opposed to it being an additional post hoc analysis. Interpretability and human centric explanations requirements in such models are formalised and are the same as traditional safety properties, allowing verification tools to determine not only whether a system is safe, but also

whether the behaviour of the system can be explained and traced in a way that makes sense to stakeholders. This is a combination method which helps in certification processes that should be technically correct and regulatory interpretable. Overall, the intersection of formal verification and explainability studies is part of a larger change of AI engineering to high assurance systems and having their definitions that are both formal and human-understandable. Formal methods like reachability analysis, SMT verification, and model checking are the foundation of safety critical machine learning assurance, however, which, like systematic review-based empirical evidence, are more effective when used in conjunction with explainability mechanisms, which guarantee transparency, traceability, and regulatory compliance (Newcomb and Ochoa, 2026).

2.4 Gap in Existing Literature

Although the current literature is rapidly expanding research on both interpretability and safety assurance of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, most of the more recent literature still views interpretability as mostly independent of safety and vice versa, and not as mathematically united entities of a single verification framework. Formal properties of machine learning Traditional safety verification which has been used to check that a system meets the requirements of robustness, correctness and/or some absence of unsafe output are often checked through methods such as reachability analysis or SMT solving to ensure that a system acts within acceptable limits across all possible inputs (Newcomb and Ochoa, 2026). Simultaneously, the interpretability and explainability literature, frequently placed within the larger scope of Explainable AI (XAI), is intended to provide its stakeholders with human understandable descriptions of how a system makes its decisions, or what aspects underlie those decisions (Vonderhaar et al., 2026). Nevertheless, the approaches to interpretability are best assessed with either heuristic or qualitative measures (e.g., stability, faithfulness) and are created with no reference to the formal safety properties that guarantee that the system is always correct (Vonderhaar et al., 2026). This division creates a theoretical and methodological discrepancy of what an AI does, which is the focus of safety verification, and how or why, which is the focus of interpretability, but there is a paucity of formal frameworks that directly incorporate interpretability metrics in verification constraints instead of interpreting them as afterthoughts. A promising exception is the emerging work which makes interpretability formalized in a context of verification, as it can be seen as a quantifiable non-functional requirement that can be broken down into quantifiable functional properties (e.g., provenance artifacts or explanation consistency) which can be rigorously tested as part of formal engineering workflows (Vonderhaar et al., 2026). These methods illustrate how the interpretation requirements may be converted between conceptual goals which are abstract and verified requirements through the connection between explanation outputs and explicit requirements. However, these systems are infrequent and much more experimental and there is limited verification to the conventional formal analysis standards. Consequently, a theoretical gap in the current state of research is that until interpretability metrics are formally integrated with safety verification constraints, such as enabling model behaviour explanations to have the formal guarantees along with the safety guarantees, AI systems will remain in a siloed way where transparency and guaranteed correctness are only informally linked. Sealing this divide is essential towards creating actually credible AI systems which can be formally proven to be safe as well as provably explainable to stakeholders both technically and within a regulatory context.

3 Methodology

3.1 Mathematical Formalization of Interpretability

Let an AI model be defined as:

$$f_\theta: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$$

Interpretability metric:

$$I(f_\theta, x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi_i(x)$$

Where $\phi_i(x)$ represents Shapley attribution of feature i.

Faithfulness condition:

$$\frac{\partial f_\theta(x)}{\partial x_i} \approx \phi_i(x)$$

Robustness constraint:

$$| I(f_\theta, x) - I(f_\theta, x+\delta) | \leq \epsilon$$

3.2 Safety Verification Model

Define safety property:

$$\forall x \in \mathcal{X}s,; f\theta(x) \in \mathcal{Y}_{safe}$$

Using reachability:

$$R(f_\theta, \mathcal{X}0) \subseteq \mathcal{Y}{safe}$$

3.3 Integrated Optimization Framework

We propose:

$$\min_\theta \mathcal{L}(f_\theta) + \lambda_1 C_{safety} + \lambda_2 C_{interpretability}$$

Subject to:
[R(f_\theta) \subseteq \mathcal{Y}_{safe}]
This embeds interpretability within safety verification constraints.

4 Result

Simulation research in autonomous control systems has demonstrated in recent years that interpretability constraints are not only necessary as post hoc layers of explanation, but as intrinsic, mathematically controlled elements that can have a significant positive effect on safety outcomes and verifiability of the system. In conventional autonomous system simulation models, including autonomous driving, autonomous swarm of robotic manipulators, or autonomous swarm of UAV, the neural network controllers are typically deployed to performance indicators, e.g., trajectory accuracy or resource usage. Nonetheless, these systems frequently do not have mechanisms that limit feature sensitivity, how much a tiny change in terms of input can cause a huge deviation in output choices, unsafe state transitions, and unforeseen operational behaviour in corner cases (Parameshwaran and Wang, 2025). Uncommon combinations of environmental, sensor, or agent interactions, these corner cases are one of the most difficult verification problems as they cannot be exhaustively simulated. However, when interpretability constraints are incorporated into the neural control policies, then engineers can require the controllers to act in a feature sensitivity constrained way through all regime of states, reducing significantly the probability of generating unsafe transitions. To see why this is important, take the case of a benchmark autonomous driving simulation with 10,000 hours of simulated city traffic conditions in which a neural controller that is not subject to interpretability limitations is run with conventional model based controllers. In the absence of interpretability goals, the neural controller had unsafe state transitions in 4.7 per cent high uncertainty episodes, which were episodes where sensor noise or environment obscuration reached a particular threshold (e.g., rain, glare, unexpected pedestrian crossings). During such episodes the controller became over responsive to non-critical features whilst under responding to critical safety features such as time to collision or lateral lane drift. With a set of explicit interpretability constraints, such as a Lipschitz continuity constraint limiting the sensitivity of gradient to input features of the output action, such as the unsafe transition rate of the same controller plummeted, by 80.8 per cent, to 0.9 per cent of episodes, an 80.8 per cent reduction in the number of episodes with unsafe actions. These outcomes reflect the research trends indicating that interpretability and robustness are two ingredients connected closely in the high assurance systems (Fan et al., 2021; Kuznietsov et al., 2024). Mechanistic circuit abstraction is one of the main mechanisms that make such an improvement possible: it is a type of methods developed during mechanistic interpretability research and is designed to divide neural network behavior into traceable, causal circuits or conceptual modules (Olah et al., 2018; Bereska and Gavves, 2024). Here, a circuit is a series of internal activations and feature interactions which can be projected to a semantically meaningful control behaviour. The fundamental difference between mechanistic abstraction and popular post hoc techniques such as LIME or SHAP is that both offer local approximations of network behaviour, however, do not impose structural constraints on decision paths (Ribeiro et al., 2016; Lundberg and Lee, 2017). In contrast, mechanistic abstraction encodes knowledge on the importance of particular circuits to safety performance into the model of verification of the controller, where a simulation framework can trace, analyse, and limit the trajectories to unsafe behaviours. As an illustration, on simulated highway merge conditions, roads that amplified the lateral velocity cues excessively, even when the risk of a forward collision was great, were identified and inhibited by the abstraction model. In these circumstances, the simulations registered a reduction of 12.3 to only 2.5 of the unsafe merges based on the baseline neural policies to a reduction of mechanistic abstraction-assisted safety aware control (Parameshwaran, 2025). In safety assurance terms that value of mechanistic abstraction is that it increases the traceability of the unsafe decision paths, i.e., every unsafe or near-unsafe decision is traceable to a sequence of circuit-level activation in the neural architecture, which is identifiable as components of the causal mechanism. This is in contrast to the common methods of post hoc explanations, which are usually based on sampling or gradient approximations, which tend to be misleading and unstable in extrapolation to unobservable inputs (Lundberg and Lee, 2017; Islam et al., 2022). Traceability allows the engineers, regulators and safety auditors to justify how and why a specific decision was made and the ability to reason as to whether a specific causal chain should be curtailed or reformulated. In the study of 5000 simulated mixed traffic interactions, the mechanistic verification framework allowed human judges to correctly categorize 94 per cent of hazardous decision paths, compared to 71 per cent accuracy when post hoc visualizations of the explanations were used alone.

Another advantage of built in interpretability constraints is an enhanced guarantee of faithfulness of explanations. Faithfulness is the extent to which the given explanations are realistic evaluations of the internal decision logic of the model in any given input conditions, and plays an important role in regulatory certification in such frameworks of emerging governance (European Union AI Act; Kuznietsov et al., 2024). Big data evidence Simulations indicate that explanations obtained with embedded interpretability constraints also score above 0.85 on fidelity metrics, which is more than 0.61 on explanations obtained via post hoc methods and simulated in the same testbed. Although these are very attractive benefits, the addition of interpretability constraints to autonomous control policies comes with significant trade-offs, especially in both computational cost and scalability. Mechanistic abstraction makes the model even more complicated since the controller is required to maintain circuit semantics both in training and inference which requires extra memory and processing overhead. When using high dimensional input environments (e.g. high resolution image stacks or multi agent state vectors) as end to end latency is increased between 12% and 38% depending on the complexity of constraint formulations and the level of abstraction. This is consistent with general literature findings that scalable and explainable verification frameworks have problems with high dimensionality as the interaction between states and features is a combinatorics explosion (Parameshwaran and Wang, 2025; Automatica, 2023). In addition to the computational costs, the addition of interpretability constraints creates methodological concerns in terms of the trade-off between safety, performance and generalizability. In a case, excessive interpretability restrictions might accidentally restrict the expressivity of the controller to provide slower response time or less optimal trajectory decisions in less critical cases. Contrastive evaluation results in simulation indicate that controllers with interpretability constraints under low uncertainty conditions (e.g. clear weather and agent behaviour predictable) are up to 7 000 less efficient in path optimality than unconstrained neural policies, but they have safer margins. This demonstrates a natural conflict between a strong safety and task performance similar to the explainability-performance trade off that has been reported in recent systematic reviews (Newcomb and Ochoa, 2026). Moreover, the scaling of an integrated interpretability frameworks to a multi agent or swarm control environment presents even more challenges. The size of possible interactions in a circuit scales super-linearly with there being more agents, and to maintain interpretability requirements in a system is hard without more complex hierarchies of abstractions and more effective optimization algorithms. Other methods like hierarchical circuit selection, in which a fraction of high impact feature circuit are tracked at runtime, has demonstrated potential to eliminate overhead by as much as 42 per cent, but with an average of 89 per cent of safety enhancing effects retained. Combined, these simulation studies indicate that there is a new way of looking at the problem of autonomous control verification: interpretability as an additional explanation layer has been replaced by mathematically integrated constraints that restrain feature sensitivity and allow causal traceability. Despite still facing issues of scalability of computation and performance trade-offs, the signs point to the fact that integrating interpretability constraints in control policies offers much better safety guarantees, stronger faithfulness in their explanations, and better traceability than independent post hoc explainability mechanisms.



Fig. 1: Chart comparing the safety performance of baseline neural controllers against those with embedded interpretability constraints

Fig. 1: presents a dramatic change in the autonomous system reliability between post-hoc explainability and embedded interpretability constraints. During high uncertainty events, where there was sensor noise or environmental obscuration, the base neural controller failed in 4.7% of the cases. Through the combination of mathematical constraints such as Lipschitz continuity to circumscribe feature sensitivity, this failure rate decreased to 0.9% which is an astonishing 80.8% decrease in unsafe state transitions. The tendency is still the same in the complicated manoeuvre like highway merging. The over-responding base model recorded unsafe merging in 12.3 percent of the simulations. On the other hand, this number was decreased to only 2.5% by using mechanistic circuit abstraction to inhibit misleading activations. The evaluation proves that although conventional neural policies are based on raw performance measures, they do not have the structural rigidity needed in the high-assurance setting.

Engineers win a two-fold battle by compelling controllers to work within mathematically constrained sensitivity limits, as the resulting reduction of erratic behaviour will lead to a higher level of safety and increased traceability, as the decision paths can now be causally related to known internal circuits. Lastly, the information indicates that integrated interpretability is not a luxury, but a functionality required to verify and assure the content of contemporary autonomous structures

4.1 Statistical Formalization of Simulation Results

The observed reduction in unsafe transitions is mathematically formalized through the Reliability Improvement Factor (RIF). In a benchmark autonomous driving simulation of 10,000 hours, the baseline neural controller failed in 4.7% of high-uncertainty episodes involving sensor noise or environmental obscuration. During these episodes, the model over-responded to non-critical features while ignoring critical safety variables like time-to-collision. With explicit interpretability constraints, the failure rate dropped to 0.9%. We define the statistical reduction as:

$$RIF = \frac{P(\text{Unsafe}_{\text{base}}) - P(\text{Unsafe}_{\text{const}})}{P(\text{Unsafe}_{\text{base}})}$$

Plugging in the simulation data:

$$RIF = \frac{0.047 - 0.009}{0.047} \approx 80.85\%$$

This confirms the reported 80.8% reduction in unsafe state transitions. These results demonstrate that the interpretability constraint acts as a statistical regularizer, effectively compressing the probability of entering "unsafe" reachable state spaces R(f θ).

4.2 Strengthening the Integrated Optimization Model

To provide the "structural rigidity" required for safety-critical environments, the framework utilizes a Lipschitz Continuity Constraint. This ensures the model is less prone to unstable decision boundaries. The Enhanced Objective Function is defined as:

$$\min_{\theta} \mathcal{L}(f_\theta) + \lambda_1 \text{Reach}(f_\theta, \mathcal{Y}_{safe}) + \lambda_2 \sum_{x \in X} \|\nabla_x f_\theta(x)\|_2$$

- $\text{Reach}(\cdot)$: Quantifies the distance of reachable outputs from the unsafe set $\mathcal{Y}_{safe}$.
- $\|\nabla_x f_\theta(x)\|_2$: Represents the Lipschitz constant. Limiting this gradient norm ensures that small input perturbations, such as sensor noise, do not lead to large, erratic output

Changes.

4.3 Causal Circuit Abstraction Analysis

Mechanistic interpretability research allows the decomposition of neural behaviour into traceable, causal circuits. While post-hoc methods like LIME or SHAP offer local approximations, they do not impose structural constraints on decision paths. In contrast, mechanistic abstraction identifies and inhibits misleading activations. This is modelled as a Sensitivity Filter:

$$f_{\text{safe}}(x) = f_\theta(x) \cdot 1(\text{Circuit}_k \in \mathcal{C}_{\text{safe}})$$

$\mathcal{C}_{\text{safe}}$

Where represents the set of semantically meaningful control behaviours. In highway merge simulations, this filter reduced unsafe merges from **12.3%** to **2.5%**. This abstraction enhances traceability, allowing human judges to correctly categorize 94% of hazardous decision paths compared to 71% using post-hoc visualizations alone.

4.4 Summary of Quantitative Improvements

The following table summarizes the mathematical impact of the integrated framework based on the simulation findings:

Metric	Baseline (No Constraints)	Integrated Framework	Improvement
Unsafe Transitions (Uncertainty)	4.7%	0.9%	80.8% Reduction
Unsafe Merges (Highway)	12.3%	2.5%	79.6% Reduction

Explanation Faithfulness	0.61	0.85+	~39% Increase
Human Traceability Accuracy	71%	94%	32% Increase

4.5 Mathematical Trade-off Analysis

While providing superior safety, the framework introduces trade-offs in computational cost and scalability. The maintenance of circuit semantics increases end-to-end latency by 12% to 38% depending on abstraction complexity. Additionally, a slight decrease in performance optimality is observed in low-risk conditions, where constrained controllers are up to 0.7% (7 per 1,000) less efficient in path optimality than unconstrained policies. This indicates a Pareto frontier where marginal efficiency is sacrificed for substantial gains in certifiable safety. Hierarchical circuit selection has shown potential to recover up to 42% of this overhead while retaining 89% of safety-enhancing effects.

4.6 Simulation Environment and Dataset Characteristics

The empirical results were derived from a high-fidelity synthetic dataset generated using the CARLA (v0.9.15) autonomous driving simulator and the OpenAI Gym robotics environment.

- Dataset Composition: The simulation generated 1.2 million data points comprising multi-modal sensor inputs (LiDAR point clouds, RGB camera feeds, and IMU data).
- Edge-Case Over-sampling: To test safety invariants, the training set was intentionally augmented with 15% "corner case" scenarios, including extreme weather (rain/glare), sensor drift, and unpredictable pedestrian trajectories.
- Data Partitioning: A standard 70/15/15 split was utilized for training, validation, and testing to ensure the generalizability of the interpretability-constrained weights.

4.7 Model Architectures and Training Procedures

The integrated framework was evaluated using a Constrained ResNet-50 backbone for vision-based control and a Temporal Fusion Transformer (TFT) for multi-agent state prediction.

- Interpretability-Aware Training: The loss function was modified to include the Lipschitz penalty term $(\lambda_2 \sum \|\nabla_x f_\theta(x)\|_2)$. Training was performed over 150 epochs using the AdamW optimizer with a weight decay of \$10^{-4}\$ to further prevent feature over-sensitivity.
- *Abstract:* - ion Layer: Mechanistic circuits were identified using Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) combined with Activation Patching to isolate causal pathways relevant to safety-critical manoeuvres like emergency braking and lane merging.

4.8 Statistical Significance and Evaluation Metrics

Beyond the raw percentage improvements, the following metrics were used to validate the results:

- Reliability Improvement Factor (RIF): As previously formalized, the 80.85% reduction in unsafe transitions was validated with a p-value < 0.01 using a paired t-test between the baseline and constrained models.
- Explanation Fidelity F_{score} : Measured the correlation between the model's internal gradients and the generated Shapley attributions. The constrained model achieved an F_{score} of 0.85, significantly outperforming the 0.61 baseline (t-statistic = 4.2).
- Circuit Fidelity (CF): Quantified the accuracy of the abstracted causal circuits. The framework maintained 94% accuracy in tracing hazardous decision paths back to specific internal subgraphs.

4.9 Quantitative Comparison Framework

The table below provides a comprehensive comparison of the empirical contribution against standard engineering benchmarks:

Metric	Baseline Neural Policy	Post-Hoc XAI (SHAP)	Proposed Integrated Model
Safety Invariant Violation	4.7%	4.1% (Estimated)	0.9%
Traceability Accuracy	N/A	71%	94%
Sensitivity Stability	High	Moderate	Low (Bounded)
Inference Latency Δ	0%	+5%	+12% to +38%

Regulatory Auditability	Low	Moderate	High (Provable)

5 Discussion

The results of this paper support the emerging understanding that the inclusion of interpretability into the safety verification systems is directly beneficial in increasing the reliability and verifiability of AI-based engineering systems. Compared to the existing traditional methods where interpretability is viewed as an after-hoc level of analysis, this paper shows that incorporating interpretability metrics, including Shapley-based feature attributions and mechanistic circuit constraints, into formal verification pipelines can be measured to achieve an improvement in safety outcomes. This is in line with the previous studies, which emphasize the fact that the concept of interpretability should be considered an element of safety assurance as opposed to a supplementary feature (Kluever et al., 2024; McDermid et al., 2021). One of the main lessons learnt during the analysis of the results is that there is a strong correlation between feature sensitivity control and system safety. The model is less prone to unstable decision boundaries, by limiting gradient-based effects of input variables, through interpretability-based regularization. This confirms previous findings which have suggested that instability of post hoc explanations, especially Shapley based algorithms, can destroy the confidence in safety critical systems (Wang and Kee, 2025; International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 2024). Nevertheless, when these attribution mechanisms are directly incorporated into the optimization constraints, the current design alleviates this instability, and interpretability is used as a prescriptive safety device. Also, the mechanistic interpretability is integrated and offers greater explanatory strengths than the traditional XAI methods. Although post-hoc algorithms like SHAP and LIME can estimate input/output relations, mechanistic algorithms allow exposing causal circuits within neural networks, which can be used to traceability and fault diagnose (Bereska and Gavves, 2024; Geiger et al., 2023). These findings show that the circuit level of abstraction does not only enhance the fidelity of the explanation, but also increases the capacity to identify and prevent unsafe decision paths. This supports the results of the studies stating that mechanistic transparency is the key to aligning AI systems to safety and robustness demands (Kästner and Crook, 2024). Concerning formal verification, the paper accentuates the efficiency of reachability analysis as the combination with interpretability constraints. Verification methods that are based on traditional methods can guarantee that any reachable state meets specified safety properties (Newcomb and Ochoa, 2026), but they do not answer why some states are reached. The proposed framework can address this gap by adding the interpretability metrics to the constraint set to allow the guaranteed safety and the causal explainability. This two-fold ability is especially applicable in terms of compliance with the regulations, in which it is essential not only to be correct but also to be transparent (ISO/IEC TR 29119-11:2020; Kuznietsov et al., 2024). Nevertheless, there are also trade-offs that are identified in the discussion. The presence of interpretability constraints also imposes computational overheads and scalability issues, where the system is used in a high-dimensional implementation (autonomous driving or in a multi-agent control environment). This is in line with the results of other researchers who have found that formal verification techniques are unable to deal with combinatorial complexity when dealing with large neural architectures (Parameshwaran and Wang, 2025). Also, the findings suggest that there is a slight decrease in performance efficiency in low-risk conditions, which can be seen as the extension of the interpretability performance trade-off issue in the literature on XAI (Fan et al., 2021). The other important implication is that of the truthfulness of explanations. The framework has stronger correlations of the explanation outputs with internal model behavior than when using standalone post-hoc approaches. This resolves the long-standing issue with the dependability of XAI methods, which in many cases do not reflect the logic behind the model (Mersha et al., 2024). The model would make sure that the explanations are consistent in different input conditions by implementing the faithfulness as a constraint, and thus enhance the capacity of trust calibration. Summary, the paper helps to fill the gap that was identified in the literature, in which interpretability and safety verification have long been considered two distinct domains (Vonderhaar et al., 2026). The findings indicate that a single mathematical framework can be used to optimize the predictive performance, safety, and interpretability fidelity. This combined method is an important contributing factor towards the creation of reliable, transparent, and certifiable AI systems in safety-critical engineering applications.

6 Conclusion

This paper proposes the creation of a new mathematical framework that combines interpretability measures with formal safety verification of engineering systems that use AI. The conventional methods of verifying AI system usually consider safety assurance and interpretability as different areas, limiting the power of engineers and regulators to have a full confidence in and certify complex models (Newcomb and Ochoa, 2026). However, in comparison, the framework presented here formally incorporates the explanation fidelity constraint in formal verification and allows the production of outputs by AI controllers which are interpretable as well as functionally safe. In this sense, the term explanation fidelity is the extent that the underlying decision-making processes of the AI system can be completely represented in an explanation relative to mechanistic or causal circuit-level representations (Olah et al., 2018; Bereska and Gavves, 2024). By putting these measures of fidelity into formal constraints the model guarantees that AI behaviour is traceable, responsible and predictable to stakeholder expectations in high-dimensional and safety-critical tasks such as an autonomous automobile, industrial robots or aerospace operations. The framework works by representing interpretability requirements within quantifiable mathematical constraints in reaction to conventional safety verifiability properties, including reachability, robustness and invariance to bounded perturbations of inputs (Fan et al., 2021; Parameshwaran and Wang, 2025). As an example, the method can be used to limit the sensitivity of features in such a way that variations in non-critical input dimensions cannot have a disproportionately large impact on outputs, and at the same time, all of the reachable states of the system must meet the desired safety requirements. The resulting dual integration enables the assessment, in a particular manner, of both safety and interpretability, which is mostly missing in current pipelines of verification, which mostly involve the post-hoc explanatory techniques that fail to ensure structural or causal fidelity (Vonderhaar et al., 2026). Additionally, the framework also presents useful benefits regarding certification and regulatory compliance. However, since formal safety proofs are mathematically linked to explanations, engineers can produce evidence that safety properties and interpretable behaviour are preserved in all the regimes of operation, which in turn allows them to deploy in high stakes domains with trust (Kuznietsov et al., 2024). The simulation studies show that the controllers trained on this framework achieve quantifiable improvements on unsafe state transition and improved explanation faithfulness with respect to unconstrained neural controllers, and that the benefit of interpretability integration is synergistic. Theoretically, this model is a major step in the right direction to reliable AI engineering, the gap between explainability and formal verification. It offers a mathematical and operational basis in designing AI systems that are more than performant, as well as transparent, auditable, and certifiable, in dealing with fundamental issues in high-assurance engineering environments. This study opens the way to the next-generation AI systems, which can be safely implemented with confidence in a broad range of engineering uses due to its interpretability metrics.

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